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ABSTRACT
This study considers the role of social reform movements in the
long term devehpment of social policy. The objective is to offer a
socially-based, developmental frame of reference for analysing changes in
social policy. The analysis is drawn from a single case history which
covers the development of youth corrections policy in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts over an one hundred and fifty year period beginning in 1826
with the opening of the Boston House of Reformation and concluding in
1972 with the closing of the state training schools. The annual reports
of the state institutions and administrative bodies provides the primary
data for the study. This evidence is augmented by an assortment of
secondary references and personal interviews.
The study is divided into four sections. The first section
presents the case history. The development of the Boston House of
Reformation, the Massachusetts State Reform School for Boys, the Lyman
School for Boys, the Boston Juvenile Court, the Judge Baker Foundation,
the Roxbury Special Youth Project and the "deinstitutionalization" of
the Department of Youth Services is presented in review form.
The second section of the study provides the first level of
analysis. The case history is re-considered as a sequence of seven
ideal programs: The asylum program, the supervised placement program,
the vocational education program, the child protection program, the
child guidance program, the community prevention program and the
community-based services program. Each of the programs are compared in
terms of four categories: structural forms, practice traditions, theory
traditions and authority forms.
The third section considers the mechanics by which one program
has changed into another. The vision of change suggested here reveals
policy program changes to be the result of social reform movements that
arise to diffuse new program concepts across social service and
geographic areas. These social reform movements help to shape the way
in which social problems are defined as well as the character of the
programs that are advocated as effective responses.
Section four considers the long term dynamics of social policy
change. The periodic emergence of specific social reform movements is
seen as the result of broader general social movements on-going in the
social structure and on-going developmental processes within the specific
social policy area.
The study concludes with a summary of the frame of analysis
and an assesment of its value.
Thesis Supervisor:
Martin Rein,
Professor of Sociology
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PREFACE
This study has been conducted largely for myself and my friends.
For me it has been a test; for them, it is offered as a gift of support.
In it I have tried to use commonly accepted social science concepts and
frames of analysis to consider questions that I felt were important to the
community of professionals in Boston who are currently struggling to alter
social and economic inequities and injustices.
I have attempted to consider social reform and social policy
as the means to those ends. All the while that I have struggled to stay
true to the history of youth corrections, I have also attempted to stay
close to the issues that have arisen among us during the past three years.
The Boston community I have lived in during this period has been a
relatively quiet and reflective place. The ideals, rhetoric and action
of the 1960's have been abandoned and eroded. New progressive ideas are
rare and the sense of common purpose has been fragmented among professional
positions. The young people who appear in my classes are sensitive, but
dubious and docile. We who are older are confronted by the dilemmas of
making a living and remaining true to commitments seemingly anachronistic.
We seek in social reform and the manipulation of social policy the
principles we once sought on the campuses and in the streets. We remain
skeptical that social reform and social policy offer effective avenues
for the visions we still hold. I have not resolved that questioning here.
Rather, I have tried in this work to remind us of those earlier
Massachusetts activists who struggled with these same dilemmas, and to
review the effects of their efforts. In this reflection, I have sought
5to bridge the gap between the principles of their past and the challenge
of our future.
The study grew out of research originally conducted for the
Juvenile Justice Standards Project. For this I thank Judith Areen of
Georgetown University and the Institute for Judicial Administration.
Further funding, office space and research support were made available
through a graduate fellowship at the Joint Center for Urban Studies. I
am grateful to Peter Leavitt and Anne Aubrey Brown of the Joint Center
for their help. I particularly wish to thank Sara Jane Woodward for
final typing and editing.
Because so much of this study relied on library research, there
are innumerable staff librarians to whom I owe special thanks. In
particular I am grateful to the staff at the Massachusetts State Library,
the Boston Public Library, the Harvard Law Library, Widener and Houghton
Libraries and the Boston College Social Work Library.
In order to piece together the various stories which went into
the case history, I interviewed a wide range of people. Those most
critical to the quality of the history include Joseph Leavey, Robert
Brown, Carmen Pizzuto, Joseph Zabriski, Arnold Schucter and Yitzak Bakal,
all of whom were or are members of the Department of Youth Services;
Walter Miller and Alden Miller of Harvard's Center for Criminal Justice;
Eliot Sands, of the Probation Commission; Anne Steavor of the Judge Baker
Guidance Center; Marenda Prentis, previously of the Massachusetts Conference
on Social Welfare; and Rachel Deering of Westborough. For both his aid in
re-constructing the story and his kindly and extensive encouragement, I
owe much to Benedict Alper of Boston College. Both Barbara Brenzel and
6John Wirkkala read many drafts and offered valuable criticism and needed
encouragement. Jon Pynoos and Carl Sussman also read several drafts.
They, like others of my friends, endured my stresses and continually
offered support and affection. Several members of the faculty at M.I.T.
followed my work, reviewed it and offered me memorable guidance. In
particular I thank Martin Rein, Donald Schon, Aaron Fleisher, Lisa Peattie
and Gary Marx. Finally, I owe the greatest debt for both endurance and
warm companionship to Barbara Beelar.
REFORM SCHOOL REFORM
THE NATURE OF CHANGE IN A SOCIAL POLICY BIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION
1. On a crisp winter morning in January, 1972, the Massachusetts
Commissioner of Youth Services, Jerome Miller, closed the Lyman School for
Boys, the nation's oldest state reform school. Amid the whirling cameras
of the national news media and in defiance of the reform school staff,
Miller evacuated the boy inmates and drove off with them in a long cortege
of cars toward a future without incarceration. Symbolically the event
signalled across the states that Massachusetts had set out in earnest to
close its institutions for delinquent youth and rely, instead, on
community homes and non-residential services. In so doing, the Commonwealth
placed itself squarely at the vanguard of "deinstitutionalization," the
latest reform in youth corrections policy.
Deinstitutionalization, or the process of closing down large
custodial social service institutions and substituting other modes of
service delivery, has in the past ten years become a fashionable objective
in social policy. It derives its support from a common sense among
practitioners and theorists that institutional treatment has not and can
not satisfactorily respond to the needs of deviant and dependent people.
There is an irony in this deinstitutionalization. The institutions which
it intends closing were once advocated as the preferred response to the
problems of behavioral deviance and social dependency. They are now seen
as the treatment of last resort.
9Today the antiquated structures of the Lyman School stand mostly
vacant and deserted upon a pastoral hill near the quiet village of
Westborough. The brick cottages and white farmhouses stand like cemetery
monuments to an idea--a state policy which once caught the imagination
of social reformers, but today no longer seems relevant. Both the
establishment of the Lyman School and its closing were the results of
vigorous compaigns to reform the ways in which Massachusetts citizens
dealt with their wayward and delinquent children. There is a story in those
old buildings and it is a tale that has much to tell of the life and death
of a social policy.
This is a study of social reform. It considers social reform
because, in the eyes of this author, the capacity for reform has been a
primary factor in this nation's ability to cope with social and economic
change. Social reform has been a key mechanism in the maintenance of economic
and technological progress. State reform has stood as a governor over the
accumulation of the energy of dissent, several times forestalling the
possibility of serious political upheaval. Whether one views this
remarkable quality of reform as a virtue or an incumbrance depends on how
one views the direction of social reform.
The direction of social reform is revealed in the social policies
it generates. Social reform and social policy are intimately linked.
Current social policy is an expression of the history of social reform; it
always bears the scars of its development. The manner and character of
social policy is largely dependent upon the successes and failures of the
social reforms which have shaped its biography. This study is an analysis
into the nature of social reform as it appears in the history of social
policy in Massachusetts youth corrections.
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A reasonable understanding of social reform in youth corrections
policy or any other program, policy or organization requires an appropriate
frame of reference. The directions of social reform are the result of many
factors. Social and economic forces, changes in social values, attitudes
or knowledge, the development of new technologies or practices, changes in
inter-organizational relationships or characteristics of participants, and
the emergence of new and influential leaders all play important roles in
determining the character of social reform. The difficulty in explaining
reform lies in identifying these various factors and in developing a frame
of analysis for classifying and relating them. This task is made all the
more difficult because, at this time, there is no well-recognized theory
of social reform. Nor is there a systematic framework for developing a
taxonomy of social reform elements. Few studies address social reform
directly as a subject of study and those that do all too frequently cover
the subject in a descriptive, episodic and atheoretical fashion.
2. The social sciences offer no one discipline which claims social
reform as a category. Instead, the term appears sporadically in the
literature of sociology and public administration. Much of this appears
in discussions of the more comprehensive terms of social, political or
organizational change. These broader considerations of change offer
potential approaches to an analysis of social reform. For instance, there
are numerous studies, essays and theoretical analyses concerned with
organizational change. Much of the empirical work done by organizational
analysts has focused upon the social-psychological adaptation of groups in
order to achieve organizational effectiveness. Many of these studies focus
11
heavily upon the microsystems within organizations and do not consider
organizations as objects of study in themselves.1  The broad directions
of organizational change are thus outside their scope.
The same can be said of many of the classic sociological studies
of organizational change. The works of Barnard, Gouldner, and Blau, while
providing excellent insight into the internal structure of organizations
undergoing change, offer little explanation for the external conditions of
change, the actual procedures of change or the historical direction of
change.2 Those works which do focus upon change in organizations frequently
take a normative "how to" approach rather than a theoretical approach. 3
Much of this work has developed out of studies of private firms and its
direct relevance to public services can only be inferred. This focus on
private organizations has resulted in a lack of concern for organizational
purpose. Public administrations are characteristically established for
The classic study is F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Management
and the Worker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939). Robert
Guest's study of the effects of changes in leadership upon factory "morale"
and production is an excellent example, as is the Mann and Hoffman study
of organizational changes rendered by new technology in a public power
plant. See Robert Guest, Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful
Leadership (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin-Dorsey, 1962), and Floyd C. Mann and
L. R. Hoffman, Automation and the Worker: A Study of Social Change in
Power Plants (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).
2See Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1938); Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); and Peter M. Blau,
The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicaco: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
3Chris Argyris builds his insights upon case studies of organizations
undergoing change, but he remains primarily pragmatic. See Chris Argyris,
Organizations and Innovations (Homestead, Ill.: R. D. Irwin, 1965).
Other authors offer primarily textbooks useful for training managers. See
Robert T. Golembicwski, Renewing Organizations: A Laboratory Approach to
Planned Change (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock Press, 1972).
12
purposes defined outside the organizations. Social, rather than private,
purposes are often multiple, complex, ambiguous and readily vulnerable
to frequent changes.
The study of social change among sociologists originates with
the early founders of the discipline. The general direction of history
and its meaning were central concerns of nineteenth century theorists.
Optimists such as August Compte, the apostle of the Enlightenment, and
Herbert Spencer, the evolutionary Evangelist, saw the course of social
change and history as a linear ascent to higher orders of human existence.
In contrast, the conservative, Oswald Spengler, and the neo-Machiavellian,
Vilfredo Pareto, viewed the trends of history as a cyclical revolution of
events in which fundamental conditions either did not change or worsened.
Recognizing these tensions within sociology's grand theories,
Max Weber attempted to construct an integrated synthesis.5 Weber
described a cyclical sequence in which old social orders collapse and
charismatic leaders arise to establish new orders which become routinized
and likewise collapse in time. But this cyclical nature of social
development was countered by a secular cultural development in which
rationality and its bureaucratic forms were continually evolving.
While the empirical literature of organizational theory is too
limited in scope and theory, the grand theories of sociology are too broad
4One theorist who has tried to integrate the internal functioning of public
organizations with their external environment through the concept of goals
has been Philip Selznick. See his T.V.A. and the Grass Roots (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1949). For a concise statement of the
theory, see "Foundations of the Theory of Organizations," American
Sociological Review, 13:25-30 (1948).
5The clearest statements lay in Weber's The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).
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and speculative. What is needed is study more associated with the middle
range. The finely developed categories of organizational analysis serve
as an excellent model, but the temporal perspective must be developed in
order to capture the direction of social reform. Reforms in American
social policy take place in a highly organized society. An analysis of
social reform should take into account the empirically based knowledge of
how organizations actually function. Specific organizational referents
are needed to ground the analysis in concrete case material.
Such grounding is available in the literature of history.
Historians often address social reform as a subject of study. Typically,
such studies have focused upon the reform of something such as a policy,
institution or practice. Among these studies there appear three
different approaches to the history of reform.
First there is the reform period perspective. David Rothman's
study of the nineteenth century rise of the institution belongs to this
class, as do the various studies of the Progressive period by Richard
Hofstadter, Clarke Chambers and George Mowry.6 Such studies envision the
ideal course of history as segmented into periods of active reform
interspersed by periods of stagnation. Reform periods are identified by
the temporal clustering of many reforms of things. Such periods are often
6See David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and
Disorder in the New Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Richard
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Random
House, 1955); Clarke A. Chambers, Seedtime of Reform: Social Service
and Social Actions 1918-1933 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1963); and George E. Mowry, The California Progressives
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952).
3.
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explained by reference to underlying economic, demographic or cultural
conditions. Yet seldom are these connections specifically developed. No
attempt is made to test the assumptions developed to explain one reform
period against the conditions underlying the next.
A second orientation towards reform focuses on reformers
themselves. Levine's study of different individuals' perspectives on
reform in the Progressive period is a good example.7 Mann's study of
reform leaders in post Civil War Boston is another case. 8  In this view
reform results from the unique interaction of charismatic individuals and
social conditions each imprinting its special character on the other. The
success of reform and its particular character depend significantly upon
the competence and vision of the individuals who assume leadership roles.
The theory underlying these works is only implied. No categories are
established and causation remains vague. The relationship between men and
conditions appears serendipitous and reforms without leadership appear
impossible.
Finally, there is the spirit of reform vision. This approach
focuses upon reform spirits, tempers or climates. The best example is
Arthur Schlesinger's study of the American reform impulse.9 An impulse
toward reform is considered a part of the collective unconscious of a
people. Schlesinger views this spirit as a latent energy reserve in America
7Daniel Levine, Varieties of Reform Thought (Madison: State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1964).
8Arthur Mann, Yankee Reformers in an Urban Age (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1954).
9See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., The American as Reformer (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1950).
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most commonly tapped during periods of crisis. Yet, lyrical and lovely as
such concepts appear, they are developed no further than the metaphor. No
attempt is made to locate reform spirits in the norms or values of society
or within the psychological recesses of the individual mind. Causal
conditions are alluded to, but no testable theory is developed. Reform
spirits appear as driving forces of reform as well as their own cause.
Each of these approaches implies a different frame of analysis.
None of them clearly states its theory. Drawing theory from them is
difficult. Their analytical underpinnings are formulated too loosely,
couched in language too diverse and noncomparable and addressed to too
many different historical problems. Yet the historical approach does
provide the concrete data upon which a framework can be constructed. Any
of these studies provides a case study, or rather, a case history which
could serve as evidence. Such case histories provide an important resource
in developing a way of seeing the social reform of social policy.
4. The first section of this study covers the construction of such
a case history. The case centers on the development of youth corrections
policy in Massachusetts. The history covers a period of some one hundred
and fifty years beginning with the earliest attempts by the citizens of
Boston to establish a public policy towards delinquents and culminating in
the Commonwealth's recent community-based corrections policy. The case
covers developments in private as well as public charities, courts as well
as corrections, mental health as well as education, community organizing
as well as residential services, and other states as well as Massachusetts.
16
But these subjects are included only because they explicate the case. The
focus remains on the development of Massachusetts youth corrections policy.
The case history covers the histories of several youth correcting
institutions which have appeared and disappeared over this period. But
this history is not bound to these specific institutions. The case
centers upon the continuing evolution of a social policy: youth
corrections policy. As such it fits among a wide collection of studies
focused upon the history of social policy in mental health, physical
health, adult and youth corrections, welfare and education.
Until recently much of the history of social policy has assumed
an orthodox interpretation viewing the continuous changes in policy as a
steady march of progress and humanitarianism in the care of deviant and
dependent people. Henry Hurd's monumental study of the rise of institutions
in the treatment of the insane equates the institution with the great
medical and psychiatric improvements of the nineteenth century.10 Not
surprisingly, the American Psychiatric Association, in its centennial
history, also views the devlopment of mental health policy as a continuous
road of progress.11  Both Orlando Lewis and Blake McKelvey are critical in
their studies of the rise of the prison in adult corrections, yet both
regard the development of the prison and penitentiary and their treatment
10Henry M. Hurd, The Institutional Care of the Insane in the United States
and Canada, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1916).
11See One Hundred Years of American Psychiatry, ed. J. K. Hall et al.
(New York: American Psychiatric Association, 1944). For a somewhat more
critical appraisal, see Albert Deutsch, The Mentally Ill in America: A
History of their Care and Treatment from Colonial Times (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, Doran, 1937).
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plans as humane and progressive ventures.12 This same sense of progressive
improvement is noted in Homer Folks' classic study of the care and
treatment of neglected and delinquent youth and the two early histories
of the juvenile court. 13
Such simple interpretations of social history fit American
orthodoxy better than historical facts. Most mental asylums, prisons,
alsmhouses and reform schools deteriorated into fairly oppressive and
inhumane custodial centers within a few decades of their founding.14 The
various laws and administrative regulations which accumulated over the
nineteenth and early twentieth century increasingly came to reduce the
civil liberties and self-determination of those identified as deviant or
dependent.15 Over this same period the role of the family and community
in social melioration was continually eroded as state and professional
bureaucracies increasingly assumed dominance in these areas.
Seldom do these studies explicate the mechanics by which progress
produces change in the policies under consideration. Social policy reform
is assumed to occur because legislatures pass laws, old administrators
12See Orlando F. Lewis, The Development of American Prisons and Prison Customs:
1776-1845 (Albany: New York Prison Association, 1922), and the broader
survey in Blake McKelvey, American Prisons: A Study in American Social
History Prior to 1915 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).
13Homer Folks, The Care of Destitute, Neglected and Delinquent Children
(Albany: The Charities Review, 1900). Orthodox histories of the juvenile
court can be found in Timothy D. Hurley, The Origins of the Juvenile Court
Law (Chiacgo: Chicago Visitation and Aid Society, 1907), and Herbert H.
Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1927).
14See Rothman, chap. 10.
15See Nicholas N. Kittrie, The Right to be Different: Deviance and
Enforced Therapy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
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become more competent, new administrators are appointed or new challenges
are posed by social and economic transformations. New ideas appear to
spring into policy without historical roots. In general, these studies
fail to explain how particular policies are selected as more progressive
than their alternatives and fail to specify the historical or current
criteria of progress and humanitarianism.
A second approach to social policy history appears in the
rewriting of the orthodox interpretations. Such revisionists as David
Rothman, Clarke Chambers and Roy Lubove have attempted to retell the reform
period story without the assumption of humanitarian progress.16 Yet with
the exception of this major ideological difference, revisionist social
policy history shares many of the problems of orthodox history. The studies
are long on historical facts and speculative interpretation and short on
theory. For example, David Rothman, in considering the establishment of
the institutions, refers to the "discovery of the asylum," "the age of the
asylum," and a "cult of the asylum," but he never develops these metaphors
into a theory. Revisionist historians, like orthodox historians, assume
consensus and unity. The agents of action for Rothman are typically
"Americans" or "early nineteenth century society." He writes of "movements,"
"cults" and "reformers," but never differentiates actors by class, race or
sex.
The implementation of change is seldom developed in revisionist
writing and the causes or forces of change remain sketchy in their
16See Rothman, 1971; Chambers, 1963; Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist:
The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965), ard The Progressives and the Slums: Tenement
House Reform in New York City, 1890-1917 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1962).
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functioning. Again Rothman's study serves as example. The forces of change
which set the stage for the rise of the asylum are the "social, intellectual
and economic changes that differentiated the states of the new republic
from the several colonies." These forces prompted "Americans" to "rethink
inherited procedures and devise new methods to replace old ones." 17  The
motivation for these Americans was their sense of loss and their sense of
hope. They observed the loss of the social order and stability of colonial
society.18 They dreamed of constructing new institutions that would
re-establish community stability and order. 19
The asylum was to fulfill a dual purpose for its innovators.
It would rehabilitate inmates, and then, by virtue of its
success, set an example of right action for a larger society.
. . . The well ordered asylum would exemplify the proper
principles of social organization and thus insure the safety
of the republic and promote its glory. 20
In its simplest form, Americans, under the stress of socio-historical change,
are seen as driven by loss and hope to redesign institutional arrangements
in order to care for deviants and dependents and insure social order and
tranquility. Yet the social reformers who opened the institutions were not
the general public, but a select group of well-educated, wealthy East
Coast Protestants. Not all Americans felt the same loss of hope nor feared
the same social instability. Nor were the social and economic changes of
17 Rothman, 1971, p. 57.
18
"Under the influence of demographic, economic and intellectual developments
they [Americans] perceived that the traditional mechanisms of social control
were obsolete." Rothman, 1971, p. 58.
19"To comprehend and control abnormal behavior promised to be the first step
in establishing a new system for stabilizing the community, for binding
citizens together." Rothman, 1971, pp. 58-59.
20Rothman, 1971, p. xix.
20
the time some inevitable orginal cause. The production of the economic
surpluses upon which these private philanthropists depended resulted in
the very social instability and ethnic immigration they so feared.
The revisionist interpretation of social policy history takes
only a half step away from orthodoxy. In the past two decades, a third
histographic approach has emerged which in most every way confronts and
challenges the previous interpretations. Variously labeled, this approach
focuses upon social control as the motivator of social policy reform. The
works of Clifford Griffen, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Michael
Katz and Anthony Platt all provide examples of this approach.21 The common
vision underlying this approach sees American society as divided among
competing classes and groups. Inequality exists in the distribution of
power and economic resources among these groups. Conflict and threat, not
consensus and unity, characterize intergroup relations. The values and
actions of individuals arise from class and group interests. Meliorative
services and humanitarian benevolence are masks covering economic
self-interest. Piven and Cloward see the history of poor relief and
welfare as functionally linked to the threat of civil disorder among the
lower class. Michael Katz sees the rise of the public school as a middle
(and upper) class effort to convert a potentially threatening immigrant
population into a docile labor force.
21See Clifford Griffen, Their Brothers' Keepers: Moral Stewardship in the
United States, 1800-1865 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1960);
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The
Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Random House, 1971); Michael
Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1968); Anthony Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); and Sanford J. Fox,
"Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective," Stanford Law
Review, 22:1187-1239 (June, 1970).
21
Anthony Platt's interesting account of the origins of the juvenile
court provides an excellent example of the social control approach. Platt
sets out to debunk the orthodox interpretation of the court's origins.
Through the use of the social reaction theory of sociology he shows how
the law makers controlled the definition of deviance and delinquency. In
analysing the results of the juvenile court law, he considers the social
position of those who created the court and "invented" delinquency. He
finds three roots of the invention: a middle class concern to control the
children of the dangerous classes, the professional strivings of reform
school keepers and custodians, and the efforts of a select group of middle
class women to achieve careers and meaningful, yet feminine, identities.
There is a level of cynicism and moralism in this analysis and
the other social control interpretations that reveals its own crude
orthodoxy. Where the traditional interpretations may be too idealistic,
the social control approach reduces all ideals to simple socio-economic
conditions. While ideology may cover self-interests, it cannot be assumed
that all past social reformers were blind to what is now so evident. Nor
can it be assumed that earlier social reformers were openly conspiring in
their deception and manipulation of the lower class. Social control
historians, like orthodox historians, employ current values in evaluating
historical events. They assume that reformers knew or should have known
what real reforms were necessary and that they intentionally or
unintentionally selected the wrong ones.
The reductionism and simplicity of both the orthodox and social
control approaches make both interpretations unconvincing. Where the
orthodox vision today appears naive, the social control orientation appears
22
crass and distasteful. Yet the revisionist perspective offers too flimsy
an explanatory principle. Somewhere among these approaches and much
deeper, one suspects, lies a satisfactory balance in interpreting social
policy history.
More integrated, although not necessarily more intensive,
approaches appear in the general histories of social welfare. Harold
Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux's study is by now a classic.22 They argued
that major structural transformations in America, particularly
industrialization, urbanization and the rise of capitalism, created a
transitional period of social disorganization and family vulnerability
that mandated the emergence of state social welfare services. But the
development of social service policy has been constrained by the values
and assumptions of capitalism.
America's response to the human problems of industrialism
represents a constantly moving compromise between the values
of security and humanitarianism . . ., on the one hand, and
individual initiative and self-reliance in the competitive
order on the other. 2 3
More recent studies such as those of Samuel Mencher, Walter
Trattner and Robert Bremner have also tried to link social policy development
to the twin processes of structural and ideational transformation.24  In
studying both British and American welfare history, Mencher focuses more
2 2Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social
Welfare (New York: Free Press, 1958).
23Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1958, p. 42.
24Samuel Mencher, Poor Law to Poverty Program: Economic Security Policy
in Britain and the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1967); Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A
Social History of Social Welfare in America (New York: Free Press,
1974); and Robert H. Bremner, From the Depths: The Discovery of
Poverty in the United States (New York: New York University Press, 1967).
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specifically on the role of ideology, noting distinctions among the
liberal, romantic and laissez-faire belief systems which have emerged
during the past three centuries. Bremner focuses less on structural
conditions and more on the role of philanthropic and social activist
efforts in creating the ideological vision upon which responses to poverty
were constructed.
While these histories of social welfare offer much insight into
the relation between grand forces in the social structure and specific
changes in the social services, they offer little insight into the
mechanics of these changes. Reforms of social policy appear as
unembodied responses to socio-historical transformations. Little attention
is paid to the specifics of policy formation or its actual implementation.
It is easily assumed that the welfare policies achieved were the welfare
policies intended. Like revisionist histories of social policy, these
studies do not assume the linear ascent of progress, and like the
revisionists they assume much consensus among "Americans" or "reformers"
seldom identifying class, sex or race interests. 25
Each of these approaches to social policy history liberally
intertwines social policy with social reform. Social policies emerge
through the processes of social reform. Current social policy is the
result of a history of previous policies and a particular product of
the reforms which changed one policy into another. Any particular social
policy is shaped by a multitude of forces, only one of which is its
25For an analysis of European social welfare history that does look at
policy formation and class interests, see Asa Briggs, "The Welfare
State in Historical Perspective," European Journal of Sociology,
2:221-258 (1961).
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developmental history. This study focuses centrally upon the contributions
of this developmental history to social policy content.
A developmental approach to social policy history suggests that
policies are not merely reactions to socio-economic conditions. The
particular character of social reforms may be shaped by their socio-economic
environment, but the resultant policies are formed within the constraints
of their own biographies. No social reform, no matter how radical its
resultant policy, can ignore the heavy hand of its own continually unfolding
history. Yet development need not mean progress, consensus or unity. Nor
does it imply conflict or oppression. All that is suggested under the
rubric of development is that sequences of change reveal an underlying
logic. Between any given social policy and its predecessors lies one
or more several understandable social reforms which construct a natural
linkage between them.
The case history of Massachusetts youth corrections policy
provides the data upon which such an analysis of social reform can be
built. It is through this analysis of social reform that I hope to
present a means of seeing how social policy changes.
FRAMEWORK OF STUDY
1. Frame of Reference. This study presents a frame of analysis for
considering the process of change in social policy. My objective is to
describe a particular way of seeing changes in social policy that is
modeled upon the metaphor of development. The developmental paradigm is
not new. It has a long tradition as an organizing concept in explaining
social change in historical analysis. 1 I believe that it has much to
offer in considering processes of change in social policy.
I am not presenting a well developed theory, but, rather, a
frame of analysis. My grandest aim is to offer a means of viewing social
policy change that is rich and highly explanatory. As a frame of
analysis in policy studies, the developmental perspective is somewhat
unconventional. While I believe that it is a very simple and natural
way of viewing the subject, others have found it difficult to grasp, so I
will develop it in the following paragraphs as clearly as I can.
I will begin by defining social policy as the aggregate of
social responses to social problems. By a social problem I mean a
condition interpreted by a large number of people as stressful because it
violates some salient norms.2 The social reaction to such social problems
For a good review see Robert A. Nisbet, Social Change and History:
Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1966).
2Clearly the condition is not a problem until it is so identified. In a
seminal article Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers state: "Every
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is defined as a social response. It follows that a social response is a
form of social action directed toward reducing the stress of a social
problem. But social policy is not simply one response to one problem.
I mean social policy to include all of the social responses currently in
evidence: popular response and not so popular responses. I mean social
policy to look and feel like a climate: an atmosphere composed of social
problems and social responses. Social policies are less gadgets we can
handle than "worlds" we live inside of.
The concept of change is commonly understood, but difficult to
define. Out of the various competing definitions, I have selected Robert
Nisbet's simple but elegant statement: "change is defined as a succession
of differences over time in a persisting identity. "3  In order to make use
of this definition I will equate social policy with "a persisting identity."
Thus, social policy is seen as a persisting phenomenon across which
differences flow. It is in this sense that social policy is seen as a
continuous climate. It is a climate through which storms of change flow.
The meteorological metaphor is useful here because climates are typically
something we are only mildly aware of until they change, until storms pass
through them. I have in mind the same image of social policy. We are only
social problem thus consists of an objective condition and a subjective
definition . . . The objective condition is necessary but not in itself
sufficient to constitute a social problem. . . . Social problems are what
people think they are." See their "The Natural History of a Social Problem,"
American Sociological Review, 6:320-328 (June, 1941), p. 320. This
conception is much more relativistic than earlier definitions of social
problems which assumed that the conditions themselves were the problems.
Such definitions assumed a consensual society. See C. Wright Mills, "The
Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," American Journal of
Sociology, 49:165-180 (September, 1943).
3 Nisbet, 1966, p. 168.
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vaguely aware of the social policy climate in which we live and work, but
we are easily disturbed by changes in it.
Like the meteorological atmosphere, every period of the history
of a social policy climate has a particular character. These states of
the climate may be called social policy programs of response. A program
of response is a particular aggregate of social responses which for a time
exist as the dominant social policy. Each period during the history of
social policy may be characterized by a unique way of seeing social problems
and an equally unique way of responding to them. These unique patterns are
the programs of response. We often see these with the clarity of
historical reflection. The almshouse was a unique program for responding
to the problem of economic dependency during much of the nineteenth century.
Prohibition was a unique response to the problem of excessive alcohol
consumption during this century.
At a given moment in the history of a social policy there may
be evidence of several different, often competing programs of response.
Old patterns of response may be waning at the same time that new patterns
are arising. Except during particular periods of transition, it is normally
possible to view one of the several programs as dominant. By program
dominance, I mean that a large number of people view the particular program
as the most legitimate response to a particular problem. Often program
dominance is confirmed by public decision makers who decide that a given
program is the official policy of the state, and that decision in itself
recognizes dominance.
Dominance among programs of response changes over time. The long
history of a social policy will often demonstrate the ascent and descent of
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a sequence of programs into policy dominance. For instance, educational
historians note how the vocational education programs of the 1880's were
replaced by the progressive programs of the 1920's, which were replaced by
the post-Sputnik scientific programs of the 1960's as the dominant
educational policy of many school districts. Like storms in the
atmosphere, programs of response periodically sweep through social policy
climates causing much disturbance and leaving behind much that has changed.
Change in social policy, however, does not mean simply that new
knowledge and new techniques are added. Almost as often, change means
that old knowledge and old techniques must be discarded. The old idea may
be disproven or replaced by a new set of ideas that explain more. The old
practice may be found ineffective, or harmful, or simply may be superseded
by something that works better. Change in social policy implies improvement.
New, more relevant programs are adopted, while older, less relevant
programs are dismissed.
Social policy, thus, results from a periodic process whereby
new programs of response are propelled into dominance and replace past
programs. The process by which one program replaces another is called
social reform. For purposes here, social reform is defined as a sub-type
of change in which social action is directed toward improving social
policy by advancing new programs into policy dominance. The social action
component of social reform is the social reform movement. Put more simply,
new programs of response are propelled to policy dominance by social reform
movements. This is not an uncommon notion. We frequently speak of social
reform movements effecting policy change. For instance, the temperance
movement is said to have achieved prohibition and the civil rights movement
is noted for the desegregation of the schools.
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While not all changes of social policy can be characterized as
resulting from social reform movements, many can, and those that can are
characterized by a particular pattern of activity that is necessitated by
the mechanisms of organizing social movements. Social reform movements
both guide and constrain the development of new programs of response.
Movements are necessary to mobilize the participation required to advance
new programs. As the movement achieves success and its program achieves
dominance, both the movement and the program are transformed. The movement
is institutionalized and the program is implemented. This transformation
has profound effects on the development of the program.
Social reform movements arise on a periodic basis. Programs of
response endure a common life cycle. Born in the enthusiasm associated
with innovation and newness, programs soon reveal a wide discrepancy
between performance and expectations that eventually leads to diminished
support and a general discontent. The stage is set for a new social reform
movement. But the origins of social reform in social policy do not arise
from endogenous conditions of the programs of response alone. Often
programs of response will fall into popular disrepute long before new
programs supersede their dominance. Larger social and economic
transformations of the general social structure heavily determine both the
timing of new social reform movements and the content of new programs of
response. General social movements that arise among national and
international populations frequently provide the conducive environment
for the emergence of particular social reform movements. Thus, the
Crusade for Social Justice at the turn of the century was the medium in
which the movement to establish the juvenile court and the movement to
curtail abusive child labor practices were sprouted.
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All of this, I am suggesting, fits within a developmental
perspective. The developmental metaphor not only suggests that social
policy change exhibits certain continuous and necessary characteristics,
it also suggests that there is some long term cumulative pattern by which
social policy maintains and perhaps improves its persisting identity. We
do learn from the past. Techniques are improved and structures are made
more efficient. Yet such progress may not be fundamental. While we are
better able to respond to social problems, our understanding of these
problems and the relationship between problems and responses requires
significantly more development.
2. Scope of the Study. This study derives its foundations from one
major case history: the history of youth corrections policy in Massachusetts.
No doubt the study could be enriched by the inclusion of other policy
histories, in other locations. 4  Certainly, there is much room for
additional study, especially in testing the framework produced here.
The study is constructed upon an analysis of the content of
Massachusetts youth corrections policy. It might have been possible to
build the analysis from existing case material. Instead, I decided that
it was important to know one case intimately in order for the analysis to
be grounded as closely as possible in personal experience and personal
interpretations. Because of the need to both narrate a case and present
an analysis, this decision resulted in a study overly long in its text.
4The case history focuses almost entirely on youth corrections for boys.
A parallel study of nineteenth century Massachusetts policy toward girls
is currently in process. See Barbara M. Brenzel's forthcoming
dissertation, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University.
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The history of Massachusetts youth corrections policy is unique
largely because of the leadership the Commonwealth has demonstrated in
social policy innovations. Much concerning this uniqueness will be
explored in the analysis. Yet this uniqueness does not appear to be so
bold or exotic as to render the case unrepresentative in terms of a study
of social reform. The study has been undertaken as a means of analyzing
social policy development. Throughout the study the focus is on the
single case, but in the shadows rests a more general problem: the problem
of how the public creates social policy; how, in particular, are social
problems, social responses and social groups linked together in the
policy-making process. The findings here are most likely not generalizable
to all social policy formation. The term social policy in common use
covers a wide range of policy considerations from distributive justice
through meliorative support for the disadvantaged. This study considers
only one end of the spectrum, the end most commonly spoken of as social
service or human service. While the frame of analysis developed here may
be applicable to a range of public policy considerations, I only offer the
analysis as generalizable to social policy directed toward the care and
control of deviant and dependent people.
3. Nature of the Evidence. The history of social policy may be
written as a history of intentions or consequences. This difference in
approach is significant. In social policy, consequences are frequently
much less attractive than the ideals of policy intentions. But,
concentrating on consequences alone in order to build critical history
and assuming in retrospect that the conditions achieved were the conditions
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intended reveals a simply-minded notion of the relation between policy and
product. Social policies do express social objectives. The intended and
attempted programs of response tell much about the way in which public and
private bodies thought about the problems of the day and their position in
responding to them. This study will focus on the programs of youth
corrections policy in their intended and attempted form.
The primary resources for constructing the case history of
Massachusetts youth corrections policy are the annual records of state
and local institutions. These records are available for public review at
the Massachusetts State Library and various municipal and university
libraries.5 The records rest on library shelves as discrete collections.
Although they are bound in many volumes organized sequentially by year,
as a total collection they can be considered as a contemporaneous compendium
of data. The subject of the reports varies little over the volumes. Each
provides a yearly accounting of the institution's performance under
certain policies. This consistency of subject provides a persistent
identity which would in some terms make the collection of volumes a "set"
of records. The relation among the volumes is clearly developmental over
time. No one volume was written or placed on the shelf before its
preceding volumes. Each volume does relate to the others within the
structure of a historical sequence. But if, for the moment, the historical
5The annual reports of the state correctional institutions are available at
the state library. The annual reports of the various state boards of
oversight and administrative departments are available at the state library
and Littauer Library, Harvard University. The annual reports concerning
the Boston House of Reformation are included in the Boston Town Records
available at the Boston Public Library and Littauer Library. The annual
ledgers of the Westborough institution are available at the Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe College.
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sequence is ignored and the collection is seen only as a set of records,
then it is possible to do a simple comparison of the volumes to study the
difference between the records. This comparative analysis forms the
initial analysis of the study.
The secondary resources for studying Massachusetts youth
correction policy are many and varied. The history of Massachusetts and
Boston has long attracted historians. Countless analyses and interpretations
are available on the state, its government, its institutions and its
people. The recent development of social policy histories frequently
focuses on or cites Massachusetts examples. Many of these works are
relied upon for direct and background evidence in the analysis. A review
of them is provided in the bibliographic appendix.
Finally much of the more recent data has been made available
to me through a varied assortment of personal interviews with participants
and observers of the events of the past four decades. These oral
histories, while never so systematic or analytical as the written
histories, were critical in widening the range of perspectives and
bringing the chronicle up to date.
4. Units of Analysis. The highly relativistic nature of change
causes several problems in attempts to carry out studies. For one, the
nature of change, its intensity and, even, its possible causes appears
to vary depending upon the categories used in analyzing the events. As
noted in the Introduction, various histographic approaches to the study
of social reform have differed in their interpretations in some large part
due to the units selected for study. Studying reform periods, reformers
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or reform spirits appears to account for serious differences in results.
Changes which appear minor in terms of states or nations appear as radical
discontinuities when considered in terms of individuals or families
concerned. It therefore has been important to be particularly cognizant
of the units selected as variables.
The analysis at various points considers three different units
of analysis. It opens by considering specific policy states, or programs
of response, as the unit of study. In the following sections of the
study, both social reform movements and the entire one hundred and
fifty years of policy development are considered as analytical units.
Closely related to the units of analysis problem is a levels of
analysis problem. Change may be studied simply by exploring temporal
differences. Comparing differences over time is adequate for producing
evidence of change. Most social policy histories--orthodox, revisionist
or social control--are written at this level. Demonstrating change in
history provides one level of analysis. Some historians go further. Their
interest is also caught by changes in the way change happens. In this form
of analysis change is taken as a unit of study itself, and comparative
analysis is offered as a means of noting differences in the means or
processes of change. A third order of analysis goes beyond changes of
change to consider how changes or changes of change affect (or change)
history. It was this level of analysis which inspired the grand theorists
of nineteenth century sociology. Efforts to find patterns in history or
to make the course of historical phenomena meaningful in some comprehensive
fashion motivated those early theorists in much the same was as contemporary
futurist theorists seek models for prediction and control. 6
6These levels of analysis follow the analytical classification first posed
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5. Organization of the Study. The study is designed to consider
each of these three levels of analysis. The analysis of the study is
separated into three internally dependent sections. Each section assumes
a different level of analysis and focuses upon different units of analysis.
The first section of the analysis, Section II: The Content of Social
Reform, assumes the finest scale. It focuses on the effects that social
reform has on social policy. Specifically, what phenomena of Massachusetts
youth corrections policy are changed by efforts at social reform?
Section III: The Process of Social Reform focuses on social reform as the
mechanism that brings about the observed changes in youth corrections policy.
The unit of analysis is the social reform process and both the mechanics
of policy formation and policy implementation are drawn out in the analysis.
In Section IV: The Dynamics of Social Reform, the focus is again shifted
to consider the full case history of Massachusetts youth corrections
development as the unit of analysis. This section addresses the conditions
and changes in the process of social reform over the full one hundred and
fifty years of the study.
Before turning to these three analytical sections, the basic data
of the study needs to be separately considered. In the section that
immediately follows, Section I, the case history of Massachusetts youth
corrections policy is presented in chronicle form. The chronicle of
events, the biographies of participants, the background of social and
by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown in A Natural Science of Society (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1957). See especially pp. 71-89. Radcliffe-Brown separated the
analysis of historical phenomena without regard for time, what he called
"synchronic" analysis, from analyses of how historical phenomena change,
or what he called "diachronic" analysis.
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economic conditions all serve to create the story which forms the main
body of evidence for the more abstract explorations of the analysis. This
story, then, provides the foundation of the study.
SECTION I
A HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS YOUTH CORRECTIONS POLICY
1. The Boston House of Reformation. In March of 1826 the Boston
Common Council authorized the establishment of the "Boston House of
Reformation for the Employment and Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents."
This institution was the first public structure in Massachusetts
specifically intended to respond to wayward and delinquent youth. With
its opening a whole new era of social policy commenced life in Massachusetts.
For the next one hundred and fifty years, the Commonwealth would
struggle toward and against the reformative institution as the dominant
mode of coping with and caring for juvenile delinquents.
Prior to the opening of the House of Reformation there was no
clear or consistent public policy toward delinquency. The colonial
villagers and the townspeople of the new Republic responded to their
wayward youth much as they did to older deviants. Some were punished
and some were provided new homes, but distinctions were vague and the
responses were determined more by individual situations and the
availability of community resources than by commonly acknowledged policy.
The House of Reformation represented a new approach. Josiah
Quincy, the reform-oriented mayor of Boston, and Louis Dwight, the
secretary of the Boston Discipline Society, advocated a new institution
that would remove children from adult facilities and provide for their
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moral reformation.1 The new institution opened in a wing of the new
House of Correction in South Boston. It accepted all of the wayward,
stubborn, criminal and neglected youth of Boston referred there by the
local magistrates. 2
The early success of the House of Reformation is greatly in
debt to its first superintendent, Reverend E. M. P. Wells. 3  Believing
that children were by nature virtuous, Reverend Wells sought through
rigorous supervision, kind treatment, friendly advice and strict
discipline to encourage each youth to grow in moral virtue. Reverend
Wells proved an exceptional superintendent and during his tenure the
1At the time, adult criminals were incarcerated in either county
houses of correction or the Massachusetts State Prison which had been
opened at Charlestown in 1805. It was not uncommon for youths under
age 14 to be committed to such adult facilities including the State
Prison. See Lewis, 1922, p. 74.
2Census data on the House of Reformation is hard to find as the
institution did not keep annual records during its early period.
Some data can be found in the annual reports of the Boston Prison
Discipline Society. For instance, during the year of 1829, the
institution had an average annual population of 100 inmates. The
average age of this group was 11.8, and 10 per cent of them were
female. Between 1826 and 1829 the House of Reformation received 192
youths. Of these, 49 were received as "stubborn and disobedient";
47, for "larceny and stealing"; 29, as "vagrants and vagabonds";
11, for "living an idle life"; and 4, for "living a wanton and
lascivious life." See Boston Prison Discipline Society, 4th A.R.,
1829, pp. 15-17.
3Reverend E. M. P. Wells served as superintendent at the House of
Reformation during its first five years from 1827 to 1832. He was
an ordained Episcopal minister who, in his youth, had been expelled
from Brown College for refusing to testify against a fellow student.
Mary Carpenter quoted him as telling her, "However bad a boy may be,
he can always be reformed while he is under fifteen years of age, and
very often after that age; and he who has been reckoned and treated
as incapable of anything like honesty and honor, may be worth the
most entire confidence." See Mary Carpenter, Juvenile Delinquents:
Their Condition and Treatment (London: W. F. G. Cash, 1853),
p. 212.
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institution achieved international acclaim.4 But Wells was not without
local critics. The Boston Common Council grew seriously hostile and
twice commenced committee investigations of the institution, claiming
that Wells overemphasized academic instruction to the detriment of
mechanical and trade skills, and that his entire operation was overly
costly and overly showy.5 By 1832 Reverend Wells had as much as he
desired and, after a final defense, he resigend. The resignation of
Wells marked the beginning of deterioration for the House of Reformation.
In the years that followed, the institution grew overcrowded and
was frequently moved from site to site. Discipline problems became
more serious and by 1837 more guards were appointed as escapes were
frequent.
Dissatisfied with the provisions of the House of Reformation,
Reverend Joseph Tuckerman, Boston's Episcopal Minister to the Poor, and
an "association of gentlemen of great respectability" set out in 1832
to establish a private farm school for the "reformation of boys exposed
to extraordinary temptations and who were in danger of becoming vicious
and dangerous."6 Financial problems soon forced the Boston Farm School
4Beaumont and Tocqueville called the House of Reformation "the most
original and daring plan of reform" they had yet seen. See Gustave
de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville, On the Penitentiary System
in the United States and Its Application in France, trans. Francis
Lieber (Pahiladelphia: Carey, Lea and Blanchard, 1833), p. 115. A
visit by Charles Dickens in 1842 is reported by Dickens in American
Notes (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968), p. 66.
50rlando Lewis, in his analysis, observes, "In short, the committee
obviously felt that the boys were not earning enough, working enough
and were not docile and inconspicuous enough to conform to the standards
of training of those days." See Lewis, 1922, p. 307.
6 See Lewis, 1922, p. 317. Reverend E. M. P. Wells was among these early
planners of the Farm School. For a more personal history see
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to merge with the older Boston Asylum for Indigent Boys and, in 1835,
the Boston Asylum and Farm School opened in a new structure on
Thompson's Island in the Boston Harbor. This private institution was
more selective in its admissions and, for many years, served the Boston
magistrates as a more desirable place of commitment than the public
House of Reformation.
By 1841 it was clear that the House of Reformation was
approaching a crisis. Noting that the population of the institution
had dropped to 62, that disorder prevailed inside the institution and
that the courts and community regarded the institution as little more
than a junior prison, the City Council decided to merge the House of
Reformation and the Boylston School--the city institution for neglected
and orphaned children. Although the Directors of the House of
Reformation protested strongly, the City Council stood firm and voted
overwhelmingly to merge the two institutions.7
The immediate impact of the merger was not as major as
predicted. Captain Daniel Chandler was recruited from the Boston Asylum
and Farm School as the new superintendent and William R. Lincoln was
appointed school teacher. The new mix of delinquent and dependent
children softened the institution's jail-like image and, slowly, court
commitments once again began to rise. Yet, even so, the House of
Daniel T. McColgan, Joseph Tuckerman: Pioneer in American Social Work
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1940).
7The Directors argued, "The two classes of children are different: the
duty of the City to each is different and the whole establishment
should be different." With this final protest they resigned en masse.
See Boston, City Council, Reports, City Doc. No. 6, Boston, Mass.,
1841.
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Reformation never again came close to meeting the reformative ideals of
Josiah Quincy and Reverend Wells. Instead, the truly problematic
delinquents were sent to adult facilities and those who were committed
to the House of Reformation endured a primarily custodial residency.
2. The Massachusetts State Reform School. Much of the resistance
concerning the Boston House of Reformation came from prominent Boston
citizens who believed that the reformation of juveniles should be a
state rather than municipal responsibility.8 With the reorganization of
the Boston institution in 1841, serious delinquents were thrown back into
the State Prison and County Houses of Correction. Thereafter, the pressure
increased for the state to provide reformative services for juveniles. In
January, 1847, the General Court of the Commonwealth authorized the
establishment of the Massachusetts State Reform School for Boys at
Westborough, the first such state institution in the nation. The new
reform school resulted from the advocacy of several influential Massachusetts
men including Louis Dwight, Judge Emory Washburn of Worcester, and Francis
G. Shaw, a prominent Norfolk County prosecutor. To this was added two
anonymous donations of $10,000 each from Theodore Lyman, president of the
Directors of the Boston Asylum and Farm School. These men envisioned a
state institution that would gather up the wayward and delinquent youth of
the Commonwealth and re-form them into honest, moral and productive citizens.
8Josiah Quincy, A Municipal History of the Town and City of Boston During
Two Centuries, 1630-1830 (Boston: Little and Brown, 1852), p. 102.
Both New York and Pennsylvania provided state support to their refuges
and the Boston Prison Discipline Society had long advocated that
Massachusetts follow this lead. See Boston Prison Discipline Society,
4th A.R. , 1829, p. 15.
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In May the legislature approved the incorporation of the
Trustees and in July, the Trustees appointed as first superintendent
William R. Lincoln, the man who had previously served as teacher at
the Boston House of Reformation. On November 1, 1847, the State Reform
School received its first "pupils"--26 boys.
The exclusion of girls from the State Reform School was not
to go unchallenged. By 1850 a group of prominent Boston women began
agitating for a separate state institution for delinquent girls. While
at first the legislature was reluctant to authorize a duplicate
institution, this hesitancy was overpowered, and in February of 1855
the Commonwealth authorized a State Industrial School for Girls at
Lancaster.9
When Judge Emory Washburn delivered the dedication address
at Westborough he declared,
It is proposed, by schools like this, to remove those from
the reach of temptation, so far as may be, who have been led
astray by the undisciplined passions of youth, or the more
resistless power of corrupt associates, by educating and
training them to useful trades and employments, and thereby
giving them the means of acquiring personal independence.
. . . Here it is held out, even to the disparate, the
gladsome light of home . . . which shall elevate them to the
dignity of true manhood. 10
These hopes were more easily voiced than implemented. The State Reform
School experienced a tumultuous early history. Superintendents were
appointed and released frequently. Commitments rose and fell often
9Mass., Acts of 1855, Ch. 18. Thisstudy focuses primarily on
correctional policy toward boys. For a parallel study of reformative
services for girls in Massachusetts that reveals a somewhat
different history, see Brenzel , forthcoming.
10Emory Washburn, Address at the Dedication of the State Reform School
in Westborough, Mass., December 7, 1848 (Boston: Dutton and
Wentworth, 1849), p. 16.
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and the institution wavered from severe overcrowding to extreme underuse.
Figure 1 presents a graph of the annual commitment rates which suggests
the relative instability of the institution up to 1885.11
William Lincoln remained superintendent for five years and
during his tenure the institution quickly reached capacity and required
construction of a new building. 12 A new west wing was completed in
1853, and, while this did alleviate the crowding for a time, the
population, now well above the recommended three hundred, continued to
increase. 13 The tensions arising from the overcrowding and the
incarceration of so many volatile boys came to a head in 1859 during
the administration of Superintendent William Starr. The size, the
restlessness due to the Civil War, the budget restrictions and limited
staff, the lack of suitable employment and the conditions of sentencing
are all offered as reasons for the institution's degeneration. This
last was graphically illustrated in 1859. Daniel Creedan, a fifteen
year old inmate, who recognized that his alternative sentence to an
11This graph has been developed from the census data found at the
conclusion of each of the institution's annual reports. For a
discussion of these annual reports see "Bibliography" in this study.
12In July of 1849, Theodore Lyman died leaving some $50,000 as a
permanent fund for the institution. When the legislature finally
authorized the construction of the new west wing in 1852 its
appropriation was inadequate and a large portion of the Lyman legacy
was turned over to the construction fund.
13By 1858 the annual census had reached 639. In that year 271 boys
were committed to Westborough. Of these 271, 65 were foreign-born,
with 51 born in Ireland alone. Of the 271, 132 or 48.7 per cent were
committed for property crimes (106 for larceny), 136 or 50.2 per cent
were committed for what would be today called status offences
(stubbornness, vagrancy, idle and disorderly), and 3 or 1.1 per cent
for crimes against persons. Of those committed the average age was
13.2 years. See Mass., State Reform School, 11th A.R., 1858, tables.
Figure 1: Annual Commitments to the State Youth Corrections Institution at Westborough
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adult prison would require less time than his indeterminate sentence at
the reform school, devised a strategy of provocation in hopes that his
obnoxious behavior would gain him a remand to the shorter alternative
sentence.14 On August 13, he and five other boys ignited a fire in the
ventilation system of the new west wing which quickly spread to the
roof and by evening the resulting fire had fully destroyed the new
addition.
The fire and the deteriorated conditions of the reform school
disturbed many and the continued existence of the institution was even
questioned. Alarmed by this threat, the Trustees came to the defense of
the reform school with the first comprehensive evaluation of the
institution's performance.15 But this defense proved inadequate. In
1860, a public scandal developed with the revelation that a group of
boys had been manacled in dismal, unsanitary cells--called "the lodges"--
for long periods of solitary confinement. The fire plus this scandal
finally brought the problems of the school to the attention of the public.
Serious reforms were necessary. In 1860 William Starr resigned. After a
long search, Joseph Allen was selected as the reform superintendent who
would attempt to salvage the faltering State Reform School. 16
14Mass., State Reform School, 12th A.R., 1859, p. 7.
15In their summary, the Trustees concluded that the institution's problems
arose from five causes: "first, the commitment of boys who are too old;
second, the alternative sentence; third, the difficulty of finding out
the true character of masters who apply for apprentices; fourth, the
interference of parents; and fifth, the want of means for a proper
classification of boys in the building." See Mass., State Reform School,
12th A.R., 1859, p. 7.
16Joseph Allen served at Westborough twice: first as superintendent from
1861 to 1867 and then from 1881 to 1885. On both occasions he was
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Joseph Allen did much in his early years to bring order and
discipline back to the State Reform School. His effort was an uphill
battle against unruly pupils, a hostile staff and public sentiment which
he noted at the time had "little faith . . . that the school would ever
be a success." 17 Allen established a firm but humanitarian discipline and
slowly moved the institution toward the cottage model of organization
first pioneered at Lancaster. Two cottages had been opened at Westborough
in 1860 and Allen sought to use these as incentives for improved behavior
by comparing them to conditions at a "well managed boarding school."18 Yet
Allen's control on the institution remained tenuous at best. Increasingly
the courts were looking upon the State Reform School with disrespect and
a reluctance to commit to it any but the most obnoxious youth. In
frustration and discouragement, Joseph Allen resigned in 1867.
3. The Life and Death of the Nautical Reform School. The joint
legislative committee that investigated the fire at Westborough in 1859
noted, among the problems leading to the incendiary act, the existence
in the reform school population of many older boys who not only were
detrimental to the reformation of the younger boys, but who also required
appointed to salvage the institution from its brutal and deteriorated
conditions. Allen sought in a firm and just manner to be a model for
both his officers and his wards. In regards to confinement he wrote:
"If boys never ran away, it would prove that no freedom was allowed;
if a great many, that the officers were negligent or the building was
insecure. A shrewd officer reads the intentions of the boys in their
countenances and actions and counteracts their plans." For an
interesting account of his efforts, see his own reminiscences in
Joseph A. Allen, Westboro State Reform School: Reminiscences
(Boston: Lockwood, Brooks, 1877). The quotation is from p. 37.
17Quoted in Katz, 1968, p. 199.
18Mass., State Reform School, 15th A.R., 1861, p. 35.
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a vigorous discipline for their own improvement. For several years
the idea of establishing a nautical branch of the reform school had been
discussed. Suddenly the idea appeared very attractive as a means of
segregating the older and younger boys as well as providing the older
boys with the more rigorous discipline of nautical life.
The Governor supported legislation which easily won passage
in the General Court and a "Nautical Branch of the State Reform School"
was established in 1859 to accept boys fifteen years old or older who
previously would have been committed to Westborough. Following the
pattern of the time, the Governor appointed a commission to locate,
purchase and outfit a vessel. A sturdy 649-ton ship, the "Rockwell,"
was selected and purchased in December and by summer the vessel, now
renamed the "Massachusetts," was completed and sailed to Hull Roads in
Boston Harbor to await its first inmates. On July 26, 50 boys were
transferred from Westborough to the Nautical Branch. 20
Joseph Allen, in his efforts to restore order and discipline
at Westborough, was all too eager to transfer difficult boys to the
Nautical Branch and by 1863 the "Massachusetts" had reached capacity.
In 1865 the legislature authorized the purchase of a second larger
ship, the "Geo. M. Barnard," which was made ready and available by the
summer of 1866. The existence of two ships made it possible to use one
as a reception and classification ship while using the other as an
avenue of promotion for the better disciplined youth. But this plan
19Mass., State Reform School, 13th A.R., 1859, p. 7.
20Mass., Nautical Branch of the State Reform School, 1st A.R., 1860,
bound in Mass., State Reform School, 14th A.R., 1860.
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was not to hold for long. Beginning in 1865, the Board of State Charities
gave voice to an ever-growing criticism of the seafaring reformatories.
The criticism was based on three propositions: first, that the seaman's
training was not valuable to boys, most of whom had no intention of such a
life; second, that the costs of the vessels per capita far outran land
reformatories; and, third, that the necessary congregate living style was
abhorrent to the principles of moral reform.21 By 1870, such criticism
was having impact. In that year the legislature authorized the closing
and sale of the "Massachusetts" which was at that time stationed in New
Bedford harbor. But opposition to the sale of the "Geo. M. Barnard" in
the Boston harbor was more intense and a bill for its closing lost in the
Senate the following year. In 1872, the new governor, Emory B. Washburn,
added his voice to the demand for the closing of the Nautical School and
in that year the legislature did pass the fatal legislation. On June 30,
1872, the last boys were transferred from the "Geo M. Barnard" to
Westborough and the Nautical School experiment in juvenile corrections
was terminated.
4. The Reaction to the Reform School. When the Boston House of
Reformation came under sharp attack during the early 1840's one of its
strongest defenders had been Samuel Gridley Howe, who was then a member
of that institution's Board of Directors. Howe was an institution
210n this last point, the Board of State Charities was discreet but clear:
"The packing is more close; the depraving contact more continuous; the
evil communications are more corrupting; the lack of family influence,
of female society, of variety in occupation and of amusement, are
necessarily felt more keenly than in land reformatories." See Mass.,
Board of State Charities, 7th A.R., 1871, p. xxxvii.
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builder.22  He was a leading figure in the development of the Massachusetts
School for the Blind (later renamed the Perkins School for the Blind) and
in 1848 he organized plans and lobbied for the Massachusetts School for
Idiotic and Feeble-Minded Youth. Yet, by the 1850's, Howe had come to
question the fundamental principles of the institutional response.
Increasingly, he became a formidable critic. In 1854 he attempted
unsuccessfully to persuade the legislature to abandon the idea of opening
a girls' reform school and, instead, establish a placement system whereby
wayward girls could be placed in farm families which he considered "the
natural reform schools existing in the Commonwealth."23
In 1865 Howe was appointed chairman of the new Massachusetts
Board of State Charities. Howe and the Secretary of the Board, Frank
B. Sandborn, soon developed a critique of the reformative institutions
that was sharp and detailed.24 Writing with Sandborn in the Board's
second annual report, Howe noted, "A great public institution is like a
great machine: the more you add to it, the more mechanical and routinary
22Samuel Gridley Howe (1801-1876) was a leading figure in Massachusetts
social activism. He was an aggressive abolitionist prior to the war, a
major supporter of the Union during the war, a strong advocate in the
Free Soil movement and a long-time friend and companion of Horace Mann
and Dorothea Lynde Dix, with whom he worked to advance the development
of the common school and the assault on the deplorable conditions of the
hospitals for the insane. For a fine review of the development of
Howe's thinking, see Harold Schwartz, Samuel Gridley Howe: Social
Reformer, 1801-1876 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).
23Quoted in Mennel , 1973, p. 42.
24 Frank B. Sandborn (1831-1917) was a graduate of Harvard and a disciple of
Emerson. He was a leading abolitionist during the Civil War and an
editor and writer for several Boston journals. He served as the
secretary of the Board of State Charities from 1863 to 1868 and chairman
of the Board from 1874 to 1876. For a biography see Lindsay Smith,
"Franklin Benjamin Sandborn," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society, 50:209-214 (1917).
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do its operations become."25 He had grown particularly critical of attempts
to create a family within asylum walls.
We may as well try to imitate within a house sunshine and rain,
and clouds and dew and all the shifting senses of nature, as
imitate, in a reformatory, the ever varying influences of family
life. . . . We have at best a make believe society, a make
believe family and, too often, a make believe virtue.26
Instead of incarcerating youth in custodial institutions, Howe and
Sandborn advocated a family placement system much like Howe's earlier
proposal in lieu of the girls' state reform school. Arrangements were to
be made whereby youth would be placed in the morally upstanding farm
families of the Commonwealth, there to learn productive skills as well
as virtuous habits.
In order to guarantee the success of the placement, the State
Visiting Agent was established under the Board of State Charities in 1869.
The visiting agent and his staff were to travel around the New England
states locating potential placement families, conducting state boys to
their placements and, periodically, visiting these youth in their
placements. Gardiner Tufts, the first State Visiting Agent, was a firm
believer in preventive placements and under his forceful direction, the
office of the State Visiting Agent became a formidable professional bureau.27
25Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. 160. This
important second annual report is attributed to both Howe and Frank
Sandborn, the Board's secretary. It is not specified who wrote
which sections, although Sandborn later gave Howe the major credit.
26Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. xlvii.
27Gardiner Tufts was a prodigious administrator. He had served as an
agent of the U.S. Sanitary Commission during the Civil War. He served
as State Visiting Agent from 1869 to 1879. He was appointed superintendent
of the State Primary School at Monson from 1879 to 1885, and, thereafter,
he served as the first superintendent of the Massachusetts State
Reformatory at Concord from 1885 until his retirement in 1891.
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In 1870, the legislature further solidified and expanded the
responsibilities to include the visiting of girls by a special female
visitor. Subordinate officers were appointed for attending juvenile
hearings and the state was divided into four districts in order to
regionalize staff responsibilities. According to the stated plans,
every child "placed out" under the supervision of the visiting agent
was to be visited at least once annually.
Gardiner Tufts was as equally anti-asylum as either Howe or
Sandborn. Like them, he saw "placing out" in terms of prevention. In
theory placement would divert youths from the reform school before they
required institutional reformation. The success of the practice could
be measured by decreases in the number of youth committed to the reform
schools. 28
Beneath the anti-asylum bias of Howe, Sandborn and Tufts, lay
a desire to totally depopulate the reform schools and, eventually, to
close them. The strategy of diversion and gradual depopulation which
Gardiner Tufts carried out under the office of the State Visiting Agent
produced an unanticipated problem within the reform school. The selective
reduction in the number of commitments to the reform school meant that
those who were committed were principally those most hardened in
delinquent behavior and least amenable to reformation. Without the mix
of youthful types, the institution, already overly prison-like in
character, became even more custodial, retributive and distant from the
founder's ideals.
28At the height of popularity of the placement system the ratio of
placements to institutional commitments was three to one. See John
Wirkkala, "Juvenile Delinquency and Reform in Nineteenth Century
Massachusetts: The Formative Era in State Care, 1847-1879" (Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of History, Clark University, Worcester,
Mass., 1973), p. 211.
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By 1874, the Board of State Charities no longer singularly
supported the preventive ideal. In that year Sandborn wrote:
It would appear . . . that the extreme limit of prudence in
discharging and placing on probation the children complained
of, has been reached . . . the policy pursued for the past
four or five years, while producing many good results, has been
carried in the direction of leniency toward young offenders,
quite as far as their good or the safety of the community will
permit.29
This shift in policy direction provoked a serious conflict with the State
Visiting Agent who remained committed to the maximum placement strategy.
The fights which resulted between Tufts and the Board only added fuel to
the broader public controversy over the management and conditions of the
various social welfare institutions overseen by the Board of State
Charities. This controversy ultimately resulted in the Reorganization
Act of 1879 which terminated the Board of State Charities and the office
of the State Visiting Agent and created in their stead the more powerful
State Board of Health, Lunacy and Charity and the State Superintendent
of State Minor Wards. Frank Sandborn continued on as Inspector of
Charities under the new State Board, but Gardiner Tufts was transferred
to the superintendency of the State Primary School at Monson. The
primary school had been established in 1866 as the state institution for
dependent and neglected children.
The Reorganization Act of 1879 marks a critical point in the
development of Massachusetts youth corrections policy. By this event
the basic structural framework for institutional and non-institutional
29Frank B. Sandborn in Mass., Board of State Charities, llth A.R.,
1874, pp. lxvii-lxviii.
53
responses was in place. 30  In 1820 there had been no formal public policy
toward wayward youth. Sixty years later there were two well developed
approaches competing for dominance as state policy.
5. The Collapse of the State Reform School. After Joseph Allen's
resignation in 1867 Westborough rapidly went through five superintendents.
In 1873, Allen Shepperd was appointed superintendent and it was during his
tenure in 1877 that a full scale riot occurred that required fire hoses and
brute force to subdue. The local alarm that this event aroused was so
intense that the legislature opened a hearing to consider various charges
of mismanagement and brutal disciplinary procedures. During these hearings
a long parade of boys, officers and officials gave testimony on the severe
forms of punishment frequently employed. The investigating committee
condemned the brutal procedures, recommended the discontinuance of some,
but not all, forms of corporal punishment and advised a tightening of
supervisory control of subordinates. Yet, in general, no fault was found
in the basic structure or practice of the institution.31
The year 1881 brought the State Reform School's continuing
crisis to a climax. The man who, perhaps unfairly, carries the burden
30John Wirkkala concludes that the 1879 Act "froze" the state structural
organization into a compromised tension between "walled" and "unwalled"
reform school and visiting agent approaches. See Wirkkala, 1873, p. 249.
31In conclusion the comittee noted: "Finally, we believe the institution
is in most respects in excellent condition and the superintendent
continuously endeavoring, under very trying circumstances, to promote
the welfare of those under his charge." See Mass., General Court,
Investigation into the Management and Discipline of the State Reform
School at Westborough Before the Committee on Public Charitable
Institutions, House Doc. No. 285, Boston, Mass., 1877, p. 5.
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for this trying year is Edward T. Dooley, who assumed the superintendency
in December of 1880 and resigned under pressure nine months later. Dooley
was young and assertive and he wasted no time with the staff. He
reorganized the officers, discharging some, with little regard for the
informal staff structure. These jilted officers and their Westborough
relatives stirred the townspeople into angry reaction charging Dooley
with brutality and maladministration. For his part, Dooley retorted that
the staff was exceedingly brutal, administering up to a dozen illegal
punishments per day.32 In June, and again in July, the Trustees carried
out intensive investigations which were reported to the Governor's
Council. These investigations served to excite the boys and institutional
order all but collapsed. 33 With the town, the staff and the inmates
against him, Dooley had little choice but to resign. In desperation
the Trustees turned to recall to the superintendency Joseph Allen, the
one person who yet retained the confidence of the staff and the public.
In October the reluctant Allen agreed to once again attempt to salvage
the State Reform School.
Joseph Allen accepted the task of restoring the State Reform
School only on the basis that the institution be totally reconsidered.
The institution he returned to after fourteen years absence was in his
eyes a disgrace. He found dozens of boys in disciplinary confinement,
common practices of staff brutality, several cases of venereal disease
among the boys and instances of "crimes against nature" for which he
32Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 3rd A.R., 1881, p. 97.
33In December, when Dooley assumed office, there were two boys in
disciplinary confinement. In August there were thirty-five. See
Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 3rd A.R., 1881, p. 102.
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professed great shock. 34 Yet the days were numbered for the State Reform
School. Joseph Allen completed the discharging of several more staff
officers and the disposing, rather arbitrarily, of most of the more
hardened boys. 35 The reorganization plan lowered the age of commitment
for the new Lyman School to fifteen. Older boys, those who had
previously been such a source of problems, were to be committed to the
new Massachusetts State Reformatory at Concord which was established
by the legislation in 1884.36
In 1884 the legislature authorized the reestablishment of the
reform school as the Lyman School for Boys.37 The Trustees located and
purchased the 93-acre Bella J. Stone farm located on a hill no more than
a mile from the existing institution. In the spring of 1885 some
of the most trusted boys were moved over to the reconverted farm
buildings and construction began on two new cottages. The move and
reorganization blew a fresh wind into the old institution and many now
looked at the new cottages of the Lyman School as opening up a bright
34No sooner had Allen officially received the keys in his hands than
some twenty boys escaped from the correctional wing using duplicate
keys. See Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 5th A.R., 1883,
p. 80.
35Twenty-six were contracted to shipping vessels "at some risk upon their
return" and another five were sent out "to seek employment." See
Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 6th A.R., 1884, p. 8.
36See Mass., Acts of 1884, Ch. 225. The Massachusetts State
Reformatory was to be an intermediate facility for young men and
adult minor offenders. It opened in rather overbuilt quarters at
Concord in 1885 and after only one year housed a population of
663 inmates. See Mass., Commissioners of Prisons, 40th A.R., 1884.
Gardiner Tufts served as the first superintendent at Concord from
1885 until 1891.
37Mass., Acts of 1884, Ch. 225.
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new future. The Trustees were the most optimistic of all:
For the first time since this Board has had the care of
this school, we feel that it gives promise of accomplishing,
in large measure, the work for which it was founded.38
6. The Lyman School for Boys. Following the reorganization of the
reform school at Westborough, the Trustees appointed Henry Swan, Joseph
Allen's assistant, as superintendent. Swan supervised the transition from
the confused congregate organization of the State Reform School to the more
refined cottage system that was intended for the new Lyman School. During
his tenure, five cottages were developed in three new buildings and two
remodeled ones, and a central chapel seating 250 was completed. Swan
retired in 1888 and the Trustees appointed a secondary school teacher,
Theodore F. Chapin, as superintendent.39 Chapin was to remain as
superintendent at the Lyman School for eighteen years, significantly
longer than any previous administrator. The length of his tenure gives
evidence of the long period of quiet stability which finally was achieved
after the first chaotic forty years of the institution's history. Chapin
ran a well ordered and widely respected institution and the rate of
commitments maintained a steady even incline over the eighteen years
(see Figure 1).
Chapin came to Westborough with a strong conviction that
education was the key weapon in the battle against delinquency.
38Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 7th A.R., 1885, p. 14.
39Theodore F. Chapin was trained as a teacher. As a follower of the
educational philosopher, Johann Herbart, Chapin saw in education the
key to the institution's success: "The one and whole work of
education may be summed up in the concept morality." Quoted in Mass.,
Lyman and Industrial Schools, 4th A.R., 1898, p. 38.
57
Beginning in 1894 he began questioning the efficiency of each cottage
maintaining its own schoolrooms. Instead, Chapin advocated that there
would be much to gain in economics and quality if a central schoolhouse
were constructed which centralized classrooms and provided a basement
large enough for military drill during the winter. For the next four
years, Chapin badgered at a reluctant legislature and, finally, in 1889
received a $25,000 appropriation. With this, plus a great deal of boy
labor, Chapin had his new four-story schoolhouse open by 1900.
The period of quiet stability that prevailed in the institutional
system at the turn of the century was paralleled by a stable period in
the non-institutional probation system. In 1893 the Trustees petitioned
the legislature for permission to employ their own visiting agent for
boys placed out from the Lyman School. They claimed that the
Superintendent of State Minor Wards was overcommitted and that they had
more intimate knowledge of the boys and their needs.40 On this basis the
Trustees achieved legislative approval in May of 1895 to hire a Superintendent
of Visitation and one assistant.41 As the first Superintendent of
Visitation, the Trustees appointed Walter Wheeler, who had previously
served as the last superintendent of the State Primary School. 42 Wheeler
40Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 15th A.R., 1893, p. 18.
41Mass., Acts of 1895, Ch. 428.
42The State Primary School closed in 1895. Walter A. Wheeler was
trained as a teacher. He spent nearly twenty of his early years as
a high school teacher and school committeeman in Worcester. In
1890 he was elected to the General Court from the Third Worcester
District. In 1892 he was named superintendent of the State Primary
School where he remained until its closing in 1895. See Mass.,
Lyman and Industrial Schools, 1st A.R., 1895, p. 22.
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set out immediately to familiarize himself with every boy and every
placement under his jurisdiction. Superintendent Wheeler held his position
for the next twenty-five years. During most of this period he worked in
close cooperation with Superintendent Chapin and, under their combined
efforts, the institutional and non-institutional system became highly
regarded nationally as the so-called "Massachusetts System."43
The stable period of time which runs from 1895 to 1905 is one
of the landmarks in the history of Massachusetts youth corrections. Wheeler
and Chapin were both devoted, competent men of great kindness and insight
and, while the period is not marked by significant innovation, it is also
without scandals and investigations.
7. The Boston Juvenile Court. Massachusetts has an early claim
to the establishment of a separate court for children. In 1872 the
legislature passed a bill creating specially appointed Trial Justices
of Juvenile Offenders.44 Opposition to this system arose in the state
431n 1898 the Trustees claimed that
"this work of carrying on the work of the school in behalf of
boys in their own homes or in places is the most important advance
in reformatory methods which has been made in recent years.
Without some such system of visiting, the break between the
restraint of the institution and the freedom of the world is too
sudden. In the institution the boys are subject to a strict
routine and to the support and stimulus of constant direction
and companionship; and many of those who do best under such
conditions are the first to fail when they must choose and act for
themselves amid the distractions and temptations of the world."
See Mass., Lyman and Industrial Schools, 4th A.R., 1898, p. 7.
44Mass., Acts of 1872, Ch. 358. Initially any local court had jurisdiction
over juveniles. With the establishment of the girls' reform school in
1856, jurisdiction over girls was restricted to probate judges and
special commissions. See Mass., Acts of 1855, Ch. 442. In 1870 this
same restriction was extended to boys under age 16. See Mass., Acts of
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judiciary over its inefficiency, in the legislature over its cost, and
from the State Visiting Agent over his extra work, and in 1877 the
legislature abolished the experiment, returning jurisdiction over juveniles
to police, municipal and district courts.45 Little further activity
occurred in developing a special court for children in the Commonwealth
until after the passage of the Illinois juvenile court law in 1899.
In 1906, the legislature authorized "a court . . . in the city
of Boston to be known as the Boston Juvenile Court. "46 This court was
vested with the jurisdiction, authority and powers of the Boston Municipal
Court in matters concerning all offenders under age 17 and all cases of
wayward or neglected children residing in or apprehended in central
Boston. The man appointed by the governor as first judge of the new
court was Harvey Humphrey Baker. 47 Judge Baker served the Boston
1870, Ch. 359. This restriction proved unpopular. Probate courts
were often overburdened and, in rural areas, were frequently at some
distance from complaining communities. In order to relieve the
probate courts and increase the number of judges hearing juvenile
cases the 1872 legislation created the Trial Judges of Juvenile
Offenders.
45John Wirkkala, in his analysis, suggests that the Trial Judges experiment
had won passage because it increased the Governor's patronage in
filling positions. It also greatly increased costs, caused considerable
confusion and work for the visiting agents and increased the number of
youths committed to reform schools. See Wirkkala, 1973, pp. 216-217.
4 6Mass., Acts of 1906, Ch. 489.
47Years later, writing in memorial, Roy Cushman, Judge Baker's chief
probation officer and close friend, noted: "He was not an obvious choice.
Apparently a prim New England Puritan, unmarried and outwardly quite
unrelated to the stratum of city life from which the material for his
work . . . was to come . . . [he] had what was called the 'child sense'
and he made a great success of his task." See Roy M. Cushman, Harvey
Humphrey Baker: Upbuilder of the Juvenile Court (Boston: Judge Baker
Foundation, 1920), p. 4. Baker (1869-1915) was born and raised in
Brookline. He attended Harvard Law School and as a volunteer visitor
with the Boston Children's Aid Society he developed an early interest in
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Juvenile Court for its first decade. During those years he tactfully but
firmly established the court at the center of child saving activities in
Boston. Over these years the court developed a competent professional
probation staff. During the length of his term Judge Baker increasingly
came to rely on probation and the private child protective agencies,
committing youths to the reform schools only as a last resort.48 As the
Boston Juvenile Court grew in importance, Judge Baker became prominent
nationally. He served as secretary of the National and State
Conferences of Charities and Corrections and president of the National
Parole Association. He died suddenly in 1915.
The following year, Frederick Pickering Cabot, a personal
friend of Judge Baker, was appointed to succeed him.49 Judge Cabot,
like his predecessor, dedicated his life to the Boston Juvenile Court,
serving as judge for sixteen years. Together, Baker and Cabot developed
the legal and administrative practices which served to focus the Boston
preventive orientation during the first quarter of the century.
children. Having served as secretary of a conference of Boston child
saving agencies he edited a "Manual for the use in Cases of Juvenile
Offenders." His was, therefore, a popular appointment with the
preventive services.
48According to Judge Baker's own figures, of the 1,031 children he saw in
1907 he committed only 155 or 15.0 per cent, while he placed 418 or
40.5 per cent on probation. See Cushman, 1920, tables.
49Frederick Pickering Cabot (1868-1932) like Baker grew up in Brookline,
graduated from Harvard Law School, never married and was highly
regarded for his fairness and special sensitivity in dealing with
children. His biographer notes: "He devoted himself not only to
the development of the wisest and most throughgoing methods, but to
the understanding so far as humanly possible of each child whose
fortunes were for the time within his control." See M. A. DeWolf
Howe, The Children's Judge: Frederick Pickering Cabot (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin, 1932), p. 60.
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Boston was the center of the juvenile court work. The original
legislation of 1906 established only one separate juvenile court.
Delinquency cases brought to courts in other parts of the state were heard
in special juvenile sessions of the adult district courts. Although in
the following years several studies recommended the establishment of other
juvenile courts, the judicial situation remained largely unchanged until
1972 when special juvenile courts were authorized in Worcester and
Springfield. 50 The utilization of these courts can be seen by examining
the two graphs in Figure 2. The solid line represents the annual number
of youth brought to any Massachusetts court for a delinquency hearing.
The dashed line represents the annual number of youth brought specifically
to the Boston Juvenile Court.51
8. The Massachusetts Training Schools. In 1911 the Board of
Trustees was reorganized and renamed the Trustees of the Massachusetts
Training Schools.52 By that date there were three state institutions
for juvenile delinquents. A separate State Industrial School for Boys
had been authorized in 1908 to accept boys between ages 14 and 16.53
This new institution was established to prevent older teenage boys from
50A fourth juvenile court has recently been authorized in Bristol County.
51These graphs are developed from the juvenile court statistics found
in the annual reports of Mass., Commissioners of Prisons (1908-1919)
and Mass., Department of Corrections (1920-1972).
52Mass., Acts of 1911, Ch. 566. Although the individual institutions
retained their traditional names, as a collection they were hereafter
referred to as "state training schools."
53Mass., Acts of 1908, Ch. 639.
Figure 2: Annual Delinquency Cases Brought before the Courts
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being sent to the Concord Reformatory, which was by this date little
more than a prison, and to relieve the overcrowding in the county truant
schools where many of the older boys were committed for lack of access
to the Lyman School.53 The new industrial school opened in 1909 on a
hundred-year-old Shaker farm purchased by the state in Shirley, not far
from the Industrial School for Girls in Lancaster. Figure 3 presents a
graph of the annual commitments for the Shirley institution. Like its
predecessor, the new boys' correctional facility quickly filled to
capacity and required the construction of new cottages by 1910.54 In
1911 a permanent superintendent, George P. Campbell, was appointed at
Shirley. Under Campbell's careful direction during the following
thirty-two years the Shirley institution served as the vocational trade
school for the older and more hardened delinquent boys. 55
The 1910 legislation that reorganized the Board of Trustees
also reorganized the visitation offices. Instead of separate offices for
each institution, two parole departments were created: a Boys' Parole
Department and a Girls' Parole Department. The parole work was
subdivided into seven state districts and the staffs of both departments
were gradually increased over the following five years.
53The Suffolk County Truant School in West Roxbury (est. 1886) had been
designed for less than 100 boys. By 1905 there were 215 boys in
residence. See Mass., State Board of Charity, 27th A.R., 1905, p. 79.
54Mass., Industrial School for Boys, 2nd A.R., 1910, p. 7.
55Campbell set out a well delineated plan of treatment that varied
little over his tenure. "When first committed three ideas are placed
before the boy: he must learn to play the game according to the rules
of society . . . second, every effort is made to have him see the need
of ambition based on a definite plan; and third, the concrete means to
both these ends is offered in the opportunity to learn a trade." See
Mass., Training Schools, 1st A.R., 1911, p. 90.
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By 1914 all three institution superintendents began to note a
clear pattern of increasing commitments and increasing overcrowding
(see Figures 1 and 3). The two boys' schools attempted to cope with
this condition by decreasing the average duration of residence in the
institutions, but this only served to place greater strain on the
parole departments.56 The Trustees laid the blame for this overtaxing
condition on the preparations for war with Germany.57
The war period between 1914 and 1918 brought noticeable
changes in the institutions as patriotism and war production activities
were stressed and the staffs were diminished by the manpower needs of
the war. By the close of the war the institutions bore heavy scars.
Overcrowded and understaffed, the institutions also lost several key
administrators. Elmer Coffeen, superintendent at the Lyman School for
the eleven years following Superintendent Chapin's death, died in 1917.
Both the superintendents of Lancaster and the Girls' Parole Department
retired soon after 1920. Yet most important of all, Walter Wheeler
retired in 1919 after forty-eight years of public service. At the close
of the decade it appeared that a generation was passing. Younger, more
administratively trained professionals were to replace these elders and to
pick up and try to repair the badly overcrowded, demoralized and relatively
unattractive youth corrections services.
56Between 1910 and 1915 the school populations rose 19 per cent while the
number on parole increased by 51 per cent. See Mass., Training Schools,
6th A.R., 1916, pp. 14-15. In 1916 Walter Wheeler complained that some
of his agents were responsible for 300 boys and were working seven-day weeks.
57See Mass., Training Schools, 7th A.R., 1917, p. 13. The war also
consumed boys on parole. Twenty-four per cent of boys paroled from Shirley
in 1918 were in the service. See Mass., Training Schools, 8th A.R.,
1918, tables.
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9. The Judge Baker Foundation. Before his death, Judge Baker
traveled to Chicago and there met Dr. William A. Healy and toured the
famous Juvenile Psychopathic Institute. He was so greatly impressed
with this clinic that, upon his return, he recommended that a similar
"expert child clinic" be set up to aid the Boston Juvenile Court. 58
This recommendation was so attractive that after Judge Baker's death,
Judge Cabot, Roy Cushman, Carl Carstens and others commenced soliciting
private donations for the establishment of such a clinic as a memorial
to Boston's first juvenile court judge. In 1916 they announced a fund
raising campaign to establish the Judge Baker Foundation. 59
During their solicitation the Boston planners observed a
timely opportunity. Dr. Healy, who was in Boston lecturing at Harvard,
let it be known that he was dissatisfied with the sponsorship and level
of support at the Chicago clinic. Eagerly Judge Cabot offered Healy
the directorship of the new Judge Baker Foundation. Healy was attracted
to the Boston offer because of the large stable endowment and the
possibility that his psychological orientation might have greater
impact among the many private child protective agencies for which Boston
was famous.60  Healy accepted Judge Cabot's offer and in April of 1917,
58 In 1911 he wrote: "A clinic for the intensive study of baffling
cases which fail to respond to ordinary probationary treatment would
enhance the efficiency of the court more than any other accessory."
Harvey Baker quoted in Cushman, 1920, p. 61.
59The clinic activities were to be the sole beneficiary of the foundation.
The foundation was well endowed, having received a bequest of
$2,500,000 from the estate of George B. Tinkam, a prominent
Massachusetts Congressman. See Mennel, 1973, p. 165 fn.
60See William Healy and Augusta Bronner, "The Child Guidance Clinic:
Birth and Growth of an Idea," Orthopsychiatry, 1923-1848: Retrospect
and Prospect, ed. Lawson Lowry and Victoria Sloan (New York: American
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he and his lifelong assistant, and later wife, Dr. Augusta F. Bronner,
moved to Boston to direct the new clinic. The new clinic quickly
became a vital adjunct to the Boston Juvenile Court.
Psychological malfunctioning had long been recognized as a
problem in the reform schools. As early as 1904 Superintendent Chapin
began to routinely transfer Lyman School boys to the Massachusetts
School for the Feebleminded at Waverly. The Waverly institution and a
new school for the feebleminded that opened at Wrentham in 1906 soon
filled to capacity and the Lyman School was finally forced to set aside
a separate cottage for feebleminded boys in 1916.
In 1924 Dr. Walter Fernald, the noted superintendent of the
Massachusetts School for the Feebleminded, conducted a major survey of
the inmates of the reform schools. His findings revealed the significant
prevalence of psychological problems in the reform school populations
and laid the basis for the Trustees' petition to the legislature for
establishing a specialized clinic in the reform schools. In 1926 the
legislature authorized the opening of a special mental hygiene clinic
at the Lyman School. Dr. Manly Root was appointed first psychiatrist
at the new clinic and he, in turn, hired Dr. Grace Helen Kent as the
Orthopsychiatric Association, 1948). Healy (1869-1963) was born in
England but grew up in the United States. He attended Harvard,
received a medical degree from the University of Chicago and conducted
postgraduate work in London, Vienna and Berlin. In 1908 he returned
to Chicago where he worked at the noted Chicago Polyclinic. In
1909 he was appointed first director of the Chicago Juvenile
Psychopathic Institute which, under his direction, soon achieved
international fame. A review of Healy's career and the Chicago clinic
is provided in Murray Levine and Adeline Levine, A Social History of
Helping Services: Clinic, Court, School and Community (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 155-183.
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clinic's psychometrician. Together Doctors Root and Kent soon established
a sophisticated program of psychological testing and counseling for
Lyman School boys. Beginning in 1929 the program was offered to the
Lancaster and Shirley inmates as well.
10. The State Training Schools During the Depression. In 1919 a major
state administrative reorganization placed the administration of the youth
corrections institutions under a special Division of Juvenile Training in
the new Department of Public Welfare. This reorganization did not seriously
affect the internal management of the training schools. Nor does the wild,
speculative period following 1921 appear to have affected the institutions.
Superintendent Charles Keeler, who followed Coffeen at the Lyman School,
and Superintendent Campbell at Shirley endured the period with a stoic
fortitude. The number of commitments did increase over the years (see
Figures 1 and 3) and new cottages were constructed, but the institutions,
for the most part, remained quiet and controlled. Neither did the
judicial system change much during this period. The Boston Juvenile Court
remained the state's only juvenile court and Judge Cabot continued with the
same firm steadiness as his colleagues in corrections. Likewise, Healy
and Bronner at the Judge Baker Foundation maintained a progressive but
even and competent service. The decade of the 1920's was a stable period
in Massachusetts youth corrections.
The effects of the depression altered this placid picture. By
1931 court appearances sharply increased and commitments became more
common (see Figures 1, 2 and 3). Institutional overcrowding resulted.
Yet hardest hit were the parole departments. Not only were vocational
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placements all but impossible to find, but many families found that
they did not have the economic resources necessary to accept their own
children when paroled. 61 The strain on the institutions and parole
departments was severe.
The tide of the depression began to turn in 1933, and with it
came several changes. First, the institutional censuses began to decline.
In part this was due to the government sponsored employment projects to
which boys could be paroled. Second, PWA and CWA labor were made available
to the institutions for additional buildings, remodelings and other
physical improvements. Third, the national mandate for change and recovery
swept in with the "New Deal" brought with it important personnel changes.
Dr. Manly Root and the Superintendent of Boys' Parole, John Smith, went
on to accept new federal posts. Some, like Lyman School Superintendent
Keeler, retired, while others died. After sixteen years of devoted
service to the juvenile court, Judge Frederick P. Cabot died in 1932. Once
again the passing of the old guard opened the potential for major reforms.
11. Delinquency Prevention in the Community. Following the
depression years of the 1930's there appeared a marked interest in youth
work within the communities. Neighborhood associations and block clubs
flourished in inner city neighborhoods and the idea of preventing
delinquency through the schools, churches and recreation departments
61Superintendent of Boys' Parole, John Smith, wrote, "We can not recall
when industrial conditions, so far as our boys are concerned, were so
bad. . . . In fact it was hard to find employment even on farms where
in previous years little trouble was experienced." See Mass.,
Training Schools, A.R., 1930, p. 22.
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became widespread. The State Commissioner of Probation, Herbert C.
Parsons, was a strong advocate of neighborhood youth work, as was
Judge John Perkins, who was appointed the third judge of the Boston
Juvenile Court after Cabot's death in 1932.
Within the Boston area many of these efforts were supported
by the Neighborhood Child Welfare program which operated as a demonstration
program from 1932 to 1937. Under this program high delinquency
neighborhoods were encouraged by special field workers to set up
Neighborhood Child Councils. These councils served to bring together
local residents with representatives of various private and public
service agencies in order to rectify particular community problems
that were assumed to contribute to delinquency. One of the most active
such neighborhood councils was the West End Neighborhood League which
sponsored over thirty block clubs in the West End during the mid-1930's
and hired a large staff of neighborhood residents to organize and
run the clubs.
As popular as these delinquency-prevention efforts were, they
were soon mixed into a larger controversy about the effectiveness of
the entire prevention approach. In 1931 the Harvard Law School launched
a major "Survey of Crime and Criminal Justice in Boston." The
director of the project, Felix Frankfurter, invited Sheldon and
Eleanor Glueck to conduct a major segment of the survey on juvenile
delinquents. The Gluecks had recently published results of a
follow-up study of inmates of the Massachusetts Reformatory at Concord
that demonstrated that some 79 per cent of the Concord graduates
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continued on in a life of crime. 6 2 The idea of a follow-up study on
youths who passed through the Boston Juvenile Court and the Judge
Baker Foundation was an attractive offer and in 1931 the Gluecks
commenced a five-year follow-up study of one thousand such delinquents.
The study, which was released in 1934, revealed that 53 per cent of
the boys became delinquent during the treatment period and 88 per cent
recidivated over the five years following treatment.63
These results were devastating, for they threw doubt upon
the effectiveness of the juvenile court and its probation staff which,
at the time, formed the core of the preventive approach to delinquency
in Boston. The court which had been so laboriously built by Judges
Baker and Cabot had come to appear as ineffective as the correctional
institutions it had sought to divert youth from. The Gluecks' findings
were hotly debated, but the outcome was inevitable: the spotless
reputation of the preventive approach had been tarnished.
62See Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, 500 Criminal Careers (New York:
Knopf, 1930). Sheldon Glueck (1896- ) was a graduate student at
Harvard when Healy and Bronner had first made presentations there.
Greatly impressed by their work, he sought to follow in their
research tradition upon receiving his doctorate. Eleanor Glueck
(1989-1972) joined her husband in Boston after graduating from the
New York School of Social Work and together they spent the remainder
of their lives at Harvard Law School conducting research on crime
and delinquency. Their work is voluminous. For a good but critical
review, see Jon Snodgrass, "The American Criminological Tradition:
Portraits of the Men and Ideology in a Discipline" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
1972).
63See Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile
Delinquents: Their Treatment by Court and Clinic (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1934).
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12. The State Training Schools During World War II. The attack
on Pearl Harbor in 1941 opened another period of strain in the correctional
institutions. While the populations did not rise drastically as they did
during the first World War, the problems resulting from a decreased
labor force and the general unrest of inmates during war time severely
burdened the schools. In particular, the proximity of Shirley to the
activities at Fort Devens led to significant unrest among the older boys.
But the staff problem concerned Superintendent Campbell more.
It is becoming impossible to secure satisfactory younger
personnel because of the military needs of the country and
because we can not compete with the generally high wage
scales prevailing in the industrial world around us. Our
boys are young and active and we need a leavening of young
and active men on our staff.64
The bare bones staff required the curtailment of much of the physical
education, manual training and recreational programs at the Lyman
School as well. By 1942, the Lyman School superintendent was
reluctantly forced to hire older married women to fill teaching
vacancies. 65
The Boys' Parole Department fared better. As in earlier war
efforts, the armed services became a major placement for parole and
there was an eagerness among the boys to perform their patriotic
duty.66 At the close of the war, the institutions were able to return
64See Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1941, p. 22.
65See Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1942, p. 8.
66In 1942, 14.7 per cent of the Lyman parolees and 21.0 per cent of the
Shirley parolees were in the armed services. By the following year
the figures had more than doubled with 41.2 per cent from the Lyman
School and 51.4 per cent from Shirley placed in the military. See
tables in Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1942, and A.R., 1943.
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to a period of normalcy. With the cessation of hostilities many
predicted a major post-war increase in delinquency, but it does not
appear to have materialized (see Figure 2).67
13. The State Youth Service Board. In 1948 the legislature
passed the Youth Service Board Act of 1948 which abolished the Trustees
of Massachusetts Training Schools and established in its place the
Massachusetts Youth Service Board.68 The Youth Service Board was
charged with the central responsibility for the diagnosis, treatment
and care of all delinquent youth.69
The new Youth Service Board offered a powerful lever for
reform. The correctional institutions were clearly faltering and
generally regarded as ineffective. The embryonic community youth
programs, while under some question, had yet to be given a real
demonstration. But John Coughlin, the man who came to dominate
67Although Lyman School psychologist, Bessie Pasein, did note a rough
adjustment between war time and post-war community life: "Principally,
the difference lies in readjustment of the presence of a father in
the home, in the tightening of disciplinary measures and resentment
at such treatment." See Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1946,
pp. 15-16.
68Mass., Acts of 1948, Ch. 310.
69The concept of a central, professional board responsible for
disposition and treatment was an innovation advocated since 1940 by
the American Law Institute in its Model Youth-Corrections Authority
Act which served as a prototype for the 1948 act. See Mass., General
Court, Report of the Special Committee of the Senate to Make an
Investigation and Study of the Division of Youth Services, Senate
Doc. No. 1310, Boston, Mass., 1967, pp. 14-17. For an explanation
of the act see "The Youth Corrections Authority Act," Proceedings
of the National Probation Association, 35:227-240 (1941).
74
Massachusetts youth corrections as Chairman of the Youth Service Board
for the next two decades, remained skeptical of community prevention.
Instead Coughlin chose to expand upon the reformative institutional
system. 70 In 1952 the Division of Juvenile Training was reorganized
into the Division of Youth Services and John Coughlin was appointed
director of the new Division. As both chairman and director, Coughlin
was well positioned to implement a major program of institutional
expansion.
During the next decade, Chairman-Director Coughlin oversaw
a significant expansion of existing institutions and the opening of
several new facilities. Along with this expansion came a significant
growth in the numbers of juveniles committed to the institutions
(see Figures 1 and 3). In 1954 the Division opened a special 96-bed
medium security unit for boys at Bridgewater. Known as the Institute
for Juvenile Guidance, this prison-like facility was to act as a backup
for the training schools' more difficult problems. A special
publicity report written at the time reveals the Institute's dual
purpose:
The immediate objective of the Institute is to protect the
rights of the community and its citizens by providing
security measures to restrain selected individuals. The
long range objective is to provide an intensive therapeutic
program necessary in the treatment and rehabilitation of
deep seated, aggressive behavior problems. 71
70At the time of his appointment, John L. Coughlin was superintendent
of schools in Marblehead. Educated at Harvard and previously school
superintendent in Canton, Coughlin was considered a bright and
effective educational administrator. He served as Chairman of the
Youth Service Board from 1951 to 1969.
71Mass., Division of Youth Services, Services to Youth--"The Story of
the Youth Service Board," Boston, Mass., 1955, p. 14. A Security and
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In 1955, a special facility for younger boys, the John
Augustus Hall at Oakdale, was opened in the old Worcester County Training
School. This facility was to drain off the population of boys ages 7
to 10 who still found themselves committed to the Lyman School. At its
opening Coughlin noted the hopes of the Board:
At this facility we will attempt to provide a decent,
clean environment as closely related to normal living as
possible in the institutional setting, to the end that the
developments of anti-social attitudes may be arrested and
prevented. The younger the child the better the hope that
this end can be achieved. 72
The third facility opened during this period was the new
Reception-Detention Center for Boys at Roslindale. This new center
was to minimize the effects of detention.
The philosophy of the Detention Center is based on the
feeling that through constructive experiences during the
period of detention and through the design of living
within the Center, initial shock at arrest and removal
from home will be reduced; the child will be better
prepared for appearance in court, and will accept more
readily the court's findings and any subsequent program
for rehabilitation. 73
The Roslindale facility was also to house the Division's reception
center for boys which had been mandated by the Youth Service Board Act.
Coughlin planned the Reception-Detention Center as a national model.
When the unit opened in January of 1956 it was hailed as the "first
Treatment Unit for up to 15 boys had opened at Shirley in 1951, but in
two years the facility had grown to 33 boys, well over capacity. This
condition initiated the search for an alternative structural response.
72Mass., Youth Service Board, A.R., 1956, p. 5.
73Mass., Youth Service Board, A.R., 1955, p. 9. At the time boys were
detained in crowded quarters at the old Bouve School building on
South Huntington Avenue. Their removal permitted the centralization
of girls' detention in the South Huntington Avenue building.
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specially designed state supported detention unit in the country."74 It
was relatively luxurious. With one hundred single occupancy rooms, it
also included a gymnasium, cafeteria, classrooms, counseling rooms, a
chapel , an infirmary, a swimming pool , crafts rooms and a TV-movie room.
Yet overcrowding appeared to be its destiny as well. By 1958 the
center housed more than 170 boys. 75
These three institutions, plus a special forestry camp
opened at Brewster in 1960, offered the new Youth Service Board a
highly differentiated set of institutional alternatives in making
dispositional decisions. Still the opening of these new institutions
did not result in major reforms in correctional practice. The additional
space made available at Westborough and Shirley by the diversion of
segments of their populations to the specialized institutions did not
long remain. The rising number of juvenile commitments maintained the
training schools' overcrowded conditions. 76  Far from reducing the
congestion in the training schools so as to permit basic reforms, the
opening of the new institutions only served to increase the state's
total number of incarcerated youth. In the face of institutional
expansion, the problems of overcrowding and understaffing grew to
serious proportions. In summarizing the year 1958, Superintendent
of the Lyman School, John Borys, wrote,
January of 1958 was by far the worst experience of my seven
years with the Youth Service Board. . . . During the month
74 Mass., Youth Service Board, A.R., 1956, p. 5.
75Mass., Youth Service Board, A.R., 1958, p. 11.
76The average population at the Lyman School increased from 209 in
1952 to 349 in 1964. See Mass., Youth Service Board, A.R., 1952
and A.R., 1964, tables. See also Figure 1.
77
we were very successful in providing three certain
minimum needs for children; one, we were able to feed them;
two, we were able to clothe them; three, we have sufficient
mattresses on which children could sleep. During the month
the Superintendent was forced to grant 252 days of sick leave
to the staff without an opportunity to hire one single
individual for even one day. 77
Borys's sarcasm reveals more than the numbers do: the institutions were
in crisis.
14. Community Action to Prevent Delinquency. Although the
findings of the Gluecks' research during the 1930's and subsequent
research conducted in the 1940's 78 seriously discredited the preventive
approach to delinquency, the social activists of Boston refused to give
up on the community prevention idea. The post-war period brought a
renewed concern over the problems of juvenile delinquency and street
gangs in the city.
A sense of crisis appeared in Boston in early 1954 when a
series of violent gang incidents culminated in the death of a rabbi
during a New Year's Eve mugging. The media demanded action and the
aroused citizens of Roxbury met together to organize a community
response. Together, they established the Greater Boston Council for
Youth, and, with funding from the United Community Services, they
organized the Roxbury Special Youth Project.79 The project was divided
77Mass., Youth Service Board, A.R., 1958, p. 7.
78See also Edwin Powers and Helen Witmer, An Experiment in the Prevention
of Delinquency: The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1950).
79For a review of the history see Walter P. Miller, "The Impact of a
'Total Community' Delinquency Control Project," Social Problems,
10:168-191 (Fall, 1962).
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into a service program directed by David Austin, a leading social
worker with prior settlement house experience, and a research component
directed by Walter Miller, a Harvard-based anthropologist. 80 The
service program focused on street gang work, direct family services and
community organizing. The research focused on assessing the extent of
delinquency and evaluating the effectiveness of community youth work.
The project lasted for three rancorous years during which it
was frequently at odds with various private and public agencies. The
Greater Boston Council for Youth, which had been formed of representatives
from all relevant agencies, proved to be a highly volatile body.81
Conflicts frequently flared within the Council and between the Council
and Project Director Austin. In 1957 issues finally came to a clear
head and Austin resigned. Austin's resignation signalled the end of
the project and six months later the Roxbury Special Youth Project was
terminated. Before leaving his post Austin submitted a recommendation
that the City of Boston pick up and continue the youth work portion of
the project; this attracted the notice of the new Mayor, John Collins.
In 1960 the city established the Youth Activities Bureau to continue
preventive youth work in the city.
80David M. Austin was trained as a social worker. He had worked in New
York City in a "detached worker" program there. Prior to accepting the
position at the Roxbury Project he had served as settlement house
coordinator for Boston's Health and Welfare Council. Walter P. Miller
was trained as an anthropologist. From 1948 to 1952 he conducted a
study of the Fox Indians. Between 1953 and 1955 he was affiliated
with the Harvard School of Public Health. His work in Roxbury led him
to an interest in gang delinquency on which he has written many articles.
81For a more detailed review of the inter-organizational conflicts that
eroded the project, see Walter P. Miller, "Inter-institutional
Conflict as a Major Impediment to Delinquency Prevention," Human
Organization, 17:20-23 (Fall, 1958). Hereafter referred to as
"Mill er , 1958a. "
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The Youth Activities Bureau, although close to the Mayor,
was not provided sufficient resources to carry out effective projects.
James Travers, the bureau director, had to content himself with a small
staff of field workers for monitoring "delinquency-prone" youths and
his own initiative in evaluating delinquency problems and recommending
new projects. A better funded and more highly developed delinquency
program arose from within the United Community Services. Beginning
in 1959 U.C.S. commenced funding a whole series of local delinquency
prevention projects out of its Duncan Russell Memorial Project on
Juvenile Delinquency. By 1961 this fund was sponsoring sixteen small
scale projects in the high delinquency areas of the city with a total
annual allotment of $100,000.82
Yet the most ambitious plan to confront delinquency in the
community arose from the Boston Youth Opportunities Project of Action
for Boston Community Development. In 1961 the U.S. Congress passed the
"Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offences Control Act" making federal
funds available on a competitive basis for "demonstration" delinquency
prevention projects in major metropolitan areas. 83 In Boston, the federal
grant went to Action for Boston Community Development, a private social
planning agency established in 1960 to coordinate "the human side of
82While these resources were plentiful and the projects fairly innovative,
the project itself remained generally unplanned and unevaluated. For a
capsulized history of these events see Stephen Thernstrom, Poverty,
Planning and Politics in the New Boston: The Origins of ABCD (New York:
Basic Books, 1969), especially pp. 64-71.
83For athorough review of these projects see Peter Marris and Martin Rein,
Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United
States (New York: Atherton Press, 1967). For a specific study of
Boston see Thernstrom, 1969.
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physical renewal." 84 The Boston Youth Opportunities Project was to be a
research and action project to reduce "the volume and seriousness of
criminal type behavior on the part of male youth 12 through 16 years of
age."85 Among others, John Coughlin of the State Youth Service Board
and James Travers of the Boston Youth Activities Bureau were active in the
project planning. The project began in 1963, with Robert Perlman, an
associate at United Community Services, as Project Director. Focusing
on opening up opportunities for youth to participate in legitimate
social activities, the project initially encouraged proposals supporting
school attendance and vocational training.
After a year of careful planning the project produced a program
plan for concentrating on school and employment training opportunities in
Charlestown, Roxbury and the South End. Then, suddenly in 1964, Action
for Boston Community Development was designated as the Boston planning and
coordinating body for the federal "War on Poverty" funds. The nascent
Boston Youth Opportunities Project was swept under by the massive
funding and complex bureaucratic and political relationships involved
in implementing the "Great Society" programs. Although several
neighborhood job training centers were established with federal funds
from the federal Office of Manpower, Automation and Training, most of the
coherency and interdependency planned for the youth project were lost in
the swells of the much larger poverty programs. The Boston Youth
Opportunities Program died not from a willful termination so much as an
unintended drowning.
84 Quoted in Thernstrom, 1969, p. 17.
85Action for Boston Community Development, "The Boston Youth Opportunities
Project: A Report and a Proposal," Boston, Mass., December, 1963,
p. 57. (Mimeographed.)
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15. The Attack on the Youth Service Board. John Coughlin's
continued strategy of insitutional expansion could not indefinitely hide
the failure of the old institutions. By the mid-1960's the focus of
reform once again identified the institutions as dismal, understaffed,
overcrowded and ineffective junior prisons. Between 1964 and 1966, there
were five separate investigations of the Youth Service Board and the
management of the institutions.86 The most devastating of these was a
U.S. Children's Bureau report commissioned by Governor John Volpe.87
Chairman-Director Coughlin defended the institutions against each of
these investigations, identifying them as personal attacks on his own
administration.88 But these defenses proved futile.
86Investigations were conducted by the Governor's Management Engineering
Task Force, the Attorney General's Advisory Committee on Juvenile
Crime, the U.S. Children's Bureau, the Massachusetts Senate and the
Massachusetts Committee for Children and Youth. There are three
useful case studies of these events, all written by researchers
sympathetic to the deinstitutionalization. These include Yitzak Bakal,
"Closing Correctional Institutions: A Case Study," Closing Correctional
Institutions, ed. Yitzak Bakal (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973),
hereafter referred to as "Bakal, 1973a"; Lloyd E. Ohlin, Robert B.
Coates ard Alden D. Miller, "Radical Correctional Reform: A Case Study
of the Massachusetts Youth Correctional System," Harvard Educational
Review, 44:74-111 (February, 1974); and Andrew Rutherford, The
Dissolution of the Training Schools in Massachusetts (Columbus, Ohio:
The Academy of Contemporary Problems, 1974).
87In 451 pages the Children's Bureau report leveled severe criticism,
charging poor administrative practices, political interference in
staffing selection, overcrowded and understaffed institutions,
inappropriate placements, unnecessary detention and the existence of
a "large number" of children in adult jails. See U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Children's Bureau, A Study of the
Division of Youth Services and the Youth Service Board, Commonwealth
of Massachusetts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1966).
88Coughlin called the Children's Bureau report "grossly untrue,
defective and professionally incompetent." See Boston Globe,
December 6, 1966.
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Gradually, a major coalition of private associations began to
form around the demand for reform.89 The coalition at first was
uncoordinated. All agreed that some change was required. But what
change remained unclear. In 1967 and again in 1968 a bill to reorganize
the Youth Service Board was filed in the legislature, but each year
Coughlin's support in the legislature was able to delay consideration.
Basically, the Director was playing a stalling strategy, but the
situation was explosive and any volatile issue was a potential trigger
to a crisis. Such an issue arose late in 1968 at the Bridgewater
Institute for Juvenile Guidance. A personnel conflict there forced
Coughlin to support his new hand-picked superintendent against the staff
and a very vocal citizens group called the Committee for Youth in Trouble.
The incident greatly weakened Coughlin's position and exposed him as
a focus for the coordination of his opposition. His removal became the
first priority of the various citizens groups, the public press and the
television channels. The final blow came in early 1969 when Boston
Juvenile Court Judge Francis Poitrast joined Coughlin's opposition.
By this time the opposition was overwhelming and in March the
new Governor, Francis Sargent, requested and received Coughlin's
resignation.90 Following the resignation of Coughlin, the pressure for
89This coalition included the Massachusetts Committee on Children and
Youth, the Massachusetts League of Women Voters, the Massachusetts
Parent Teachers Association and a single-issue protest group called
the Friends of Youth Association (later renamed the Committee for
Youth in Trouble).
90At the last moment Coughlin withdrew his resignation and the Governor's
Council refused to approve an interim director. Only with significant
pressure from Sargent was Coughlin finally convinced to leave his
long-held post. See Boston Globe, May 12, 1969.
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reform was turned upon the reorganization legislation and with the
support of the Governor, the Department of Youth Service Act achieved
passage in August.91
16. The Department of Youth Services and Deinstitutionalization.
The Department of Youth Service Act greatly reorganized the structure of
the central administration.92 Specifically the Youth Service Board and the
Division of Youth Services were abolished and replaced by a Department of
Youth Services under a gubenatorially appointed commissioner. The new
department (D.Y.S.) was to have full administrative and policy-making
authority over all of the state youth corrections institutions as well as
full responsibility for the supervision of all delinquent youth committed
by the courts.
After a broad national search for an exceptional person to
direct the new department, the Governor appointed Jerome Miller, an
Associate Professor of Social Work from Ohio State University as the first
Commissioner of Youth Services. 93 Miller was unknown in Massachusetts,
91Mass., Acts of 1969, Ch. 838.
92Yitzak Bakal , in his analysis of this period, concludes that the act
had several important consequences:
"First of all, the bill's very passage increased the credibility
and visibility of the reform movement. The Act elevated the
division to the status of a department and moved it from the
Department of Education to a new super-agency consisting of
Welfare, Health, Mental Health and Corrections. . . . Third, the
Act set a new professional tone for the agency, using key words
such as therapy, prevention, community services and research.
Finally, the Act broadly empowered the new department to 'establish
necessary facilities for detention, diagnosis, treatment and
training of its charges including post release care.'"
See Bakal, 1973, p. 157.
93Jerome Miller (1932- ), who had originally studied to be a seminarian,
had a masters degree in social work from Loyola University and a
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but he was young and aggressive and he quickly assumed the leadership
of the new reform effort in Massachusetts. Miller clearly saw his
mandate as reform. He was presented with a new department, many staff
openings, the strong support of the Governor and key legislators, and
a collection of obsolete, overcrowded, politically weak and publicly
disgraced institutions.
During his first year as commissioner, Miller made a
significant effort to reform the institutions through staff development.
Focusing intensively on Shirley, Miller sponsored an experiment in
which the cottages were reorganized into self-contained groups and both
the staff and youth were provided intensive training in the principles
of milieu therapy and guided group interaction.94 This experiment soon
proved a major failure generating both staff resentment and a collapse
in discipline.95
Sensitive to the failure of the staff development experiment,
Miller came to view the institutions as beyond reform. By 1971 he had
doctorate from Catholic University in Washington, D.C. Until 1965
he had served in the United States Air Force in Texas, Kansas and
England where he had organized social services for Air Force families
and their children. See Boston Globe, November 16, 1969.
94While in England, Miller had met Maxwell Jones, the leading advocate
of milieu therapy with delinquents. Miller had been impressed with
the man and the method. During 1970, he persuaded Jones to come to
Massachusetts and provide the training himself. For a review of the
principles of milieu therapy see Maxwell Jones, The Therapeutic
Community (New York: Basic Books, 1953).
95Although Miller had recruited major figures in group therapy techniques,
the experiment seemed doomed from the start. "The older staff, who were
by and large, unskilled, found [the] new concepts a threat, and a
challenge to their authority. The new staff had difficulty integrating
[the] concepts into the daily operations of the institution." See
Bakal, 1973, p. 159.
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decided that the only viable reform strategy was to close the institutions.
While he did not have the authority to terminate the institutions, he did
have the authority to transfer the inmates. He therefore set out on a
strategy of "deinstitutionalization" by which he transferred youth from
the institutions to various alternative placements including private
group residences, other state institutions, foster care placements and
the youths' own families.
Focusing first on Shirley, Miller commenced to close the
institution in the spring of 1971 by curtailing commitments and gradually
transferring and paroling youths in residence. The guidelines were never
made clear nor held consistent, and the resulting staff unrest and sense
of inequity among the inmates produced a large number of escapes,
several fires and the well vocalized displeasure of the residents of the
town of Shirley. This last culminated in a protest meeting with the
Governor.96  From this experience Miller learned that speed was an
important factor in closing institutions.
By mid-summer of 1971, Miller and his staff decided to close
the John Augustus Hall at Oakdale, the facility for young boys. This
was to be a rapid closing. In October several of Miller's staff members
arrived at the facility to reclassify the boys. Within the month the
majority of boys were either paroled, placed in foster care or
transferred to vacant facilities at Lancaster.97
96Mass., General Court, Joint Committee on Post Audit and Oversight,
Management Audit of the Department of Youth Services, Boston, Mass.,
1974, p. 90. This study takes an unsympathetic view of Miller's
conduct of the deinstitutionalization. Hereafter referred to as
Mass., "Post Audit and Oversight Report."
97The boys transferred to Lancaster were not assigned to Lancaster or
previous Oakdale staff, but instead, were placed under a new
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In December the long slow drain of youth out of the Shirley
facility finally came to a close and on January 2, 1972, the last of
the boys were transferred to the Lyman School, and the Industrial School
for Boys was closed. During the summer of 1971, Miller told the
superintendent of the Lyman School, Frank Ordway, that plans were being
prepared to close the Lyman School as well. Ordway was at first
disbelieving, but then became intransigent. Seeing Ordway as an
impediment, Miller transferred the superintendent to the central office
and promoted the assistant superintendent to acting superintendent at
Westborough.
As the year closed, the institutions were in complete turmoil.
The staffs were suspicious and demoralized. The traditional administrators
had lost most of their authority. The population of residents was
greatly diminished and those who remained often escaped. In December,
Miller held a central staff meeting in order to firm up the final
strategy for closing the institutions. Some wished to delay the final
closing dates, but Miller was firm. In order to avoid a general
confrontation with the legislature over the proposed budget, the
institutions had to be closed during the legislative recess in January.
Plans were rushed along. The mechanism for developing a
transition between the institutions and the future community placements
of the youth was to be a month-long conference held on the Amherst
campus of the University of Massachusetts and sponsored by a campus
based volunteer group called Juvenile Opportunities Extension (J.O.E.).
contract with the Robert F. Kennedy Action Corps. See Mass., "Post
Audit and Oversight Report," 1974, p. 99.
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The J.O.E. conference was to take place in January during the university's
winter vacation.98  Plans for the J.O.E. conference were made without
consulting staff members at the institutions. Although there were many
rumors floating about, when the morning of January 17 arrived, the
evacuation of youth from the Lyman School seems to have come as a major
surprise to the Lyman staff. On that morning, Miller, his staff and
assorted members of the news media showed up at Westborough, released
the majority of the youths remaining in the institution, some 39 in
number, piled them into cars and drove off for the J.O.E. conference.
On that same morning 17 girls were transported from Lancaster to the
Amherst campus.
By the summer of 1972 Miller had removed most all the
populations from the Lyman School and the Industrial School for Boys
and seriously reduced the population at Lancaster.99 Miller and his
staff had now turned to the complex process of organizing an alternative
community-based services program for responding to delinquency. The
wide variety of Massachusetts private services proved of significant
98Under these plans university student "advocates" would be individually
assigned to D.Y.S. youth with whom they would live in the dormitories
and attend the month-long workshops. See Robert B. Coates, Alden
D. Miller and Lloyd E. Ohlin, "A Strategic Innovation in the Process
of Deinstitutionalization: The University of Massachusetts Conference,"
in Bakal, 1973a.
99Miller had overseen the closing of the Institute of Juvenile Training
at Bridgewater in 1969 during the first year of his appointment. The
John Augustus Hall for younger boys was closed during the summer of
1971. By 1973 the institutions at Bridgewater, Oakdale, Shirley
and Westborough were fully closed. The Lancaster facility continued
to house several small uncoordinated programs. The detention center
at Roslindale remained functioning as the principle facility for
those boys requiring custodial security, and the Forestry camp at
Brewster remained open as a low security treatment center.
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benefit, for as soon as state funds were made available for
"purchase-of-service" from private vendors there was a great rush of
candidates. The confusion of the first year in sorting through
applications, arranging placements, negotiating contracts and establishing
monitoring capabilities proved almost overwhelming to the limited central
office staff of the Department.
In order to reduce the work load at the central office and
decentralize the diagnosis, placement and monitoring functions, Miller
reorganized the Department into seven regional offices, and this
transition only further added to the administrative confusion of the year.
By the close of 1972 the new community-based service program was
beginning to emerge as a stable and effective response to delinquency.
The correctional institutions were, for the most part, closed. The
one hundred and fifty year experiment in the institutionalization of
wayward and delinquent youth was over. An era that had begun with
optimism and enthusiasm in 1826 had closed. In its place there
remained a renewed optimism and enthusiasm. Many saw in these events
the beginning of a new era in Massachusetts youth corrections.
SECTION II
THE CONTENT OF SOCIAL REFORM
Section II: Chapter A
PROGRAMS OF RESPONSE IN MASSACHUSETTS YOUTH CORRECTIONS
1. This history of Massachusetts youth corrections reveals a wide
variety of responses to the problem of youthful delinquency. Throughout
the century and a half that has transpired since the establishment of
the Boston House of Reformation both the diagnosis of delinquency as a
problem and the prognosis of how to effectively respond to it have
exhibited significant changes. Youthful misbehavior has long been
recognized as a social problem. Early efforts to cope with the problem
were sporadic and varied. 2 Not until the early nineteenth century did
See the early documents in Juvenile Offenders for a Thousand Years:
Selected Readings from Anglo-Saxon Times to 1900, ed. Wiley B. Sanders
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970).
2In his excellent history of European childhood through the seventeenth
century, Philippe Aries considers many examples of youthful excesses, but
does not see these as recognized as an age specific social problem. See
his Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, trans.
Robert Baldick (New York: Random House, 1962). John Gillis sees the
child criminal of Dickens' time more associated with class than with an
age cohort. See his Youth and History: Tradition and Change in
European Age Relations, 1770-Present (New York: Academic Press, 1974).,
especially pp. 170-175. The famed Hospice de San Michele which was
erected in Rome by Pope Clement VI in 1704 and which is often regarded
as the first separate institution for delinquents in Europe actually
housed only a few boys in a population made up primarily of the aged and
infirm. See William Tallack, Penological and Preventive Principles
(London: Wertheimer, Lea, 1896).
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a widespread effort arise in Europe to confront youthful misbehavior as
a form of social deviance separate from adult deviance.3 American
developments closely follow this European timing. The emergence of a
widespread self conscious effort to respond to delinquency is a product
of the early nineteenth century.4
Only with the beginning of this century was the term "juvenile
delinquency" given legal definition. During the nineteenth century
"young criminals," "street arabs," "wayward youth" and "vagabonds" were
equally popular labels applied to young social deviants. These various
labels for misbehaving youth were not the result of mere semantic fads.
Over the past two hundred years the definition of youthful deviance has
changed in many ways. The very conception of the problem has changed
radically as dependent, neglected and mentally defective youngsters have
been, at different times, lumped into the concept and, at other times,
selectively identified and removed from the concept.
As the definition of the problem of youthful deviance has
changed over the years, so has the character of the responses to it.
At various times punishment, moral reformation, education, psychotherapy
3See Gillis, 1974, pp. 37-93 ; and Harry Elmer Barnes and Negley K.
Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology: The American Crime Problem
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943), pp. 897-904.
4Both Joseph Hawes and Robert Mennel begin their histories of American
juvenile delinquents by noting the eighteenth century origins. See
Joseph M. Hawes, Children in Urban Society: Juvenile Delinquency in
Nineteenth Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971),
and Robert M. Mennel, Thorns and Thistles: Juvenile Delinquency in
the United States, 1825-1940 (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New
England, 1973). For primary sources see Children and Youth in America,
ed. Robert H. Bremner, et. al., 3 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1970-1974).
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and physical recreation have been advocated as responses to juvenile
delinquency. Some such responses have required the child's institutional
incarceration. Others have required foster placement in the country.
Still others have encouraged the child to remain with the biological
family. Each of these different responses shares in common a positive
intention to respond to the stress of youthful misbehavior. The
history of youth corrections policy, therefore, appears as a history of
changes in the social problem definition as well as changes in the
social responses generated as policy.5
These various different problem and response formulations can
be called social policy programs of response, or, more simply, programs
of response. Ideally, a program of response is the scheme in which the
norms, practices, theories and structural forms of a given social
policy are integrated and made a reasonable strategy for action. Such
programs may be very clearly drawn out in official documents or may be
only vague outlines constructed in the minds of a few practitioners or
policy makers. Where written down, these programs are easier to
reconstruct, although, in practice, programs seldom adhere closely to
their official statements. Where unrecorded it is still possible to
reconstruct historical programs from the fragments of program reports,
government reviews, reports of visitors and the public and the private
writings of program participants.
5This distinction between social problem and social response is a
standard convention of the "social problems" approach in sociology.
For classic formulations see Contemporary Social Problems, ed.
Robert K. Merton and Robert Nisbet (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1961), and Social Problems: A Modern Approach, ed. Howard
S. Becker (New York: J. Wiley, 1966).
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It is convenient to construct a descriptive model of these
programs of response. For purposes of this analysis, programs of
response will be viewed as composed of four categories of elements:
structure, practice, theory and authority. Both the social problem
formulation and the social response formulation are evident in this
model.
Formulations of the social problem can be identified by the
causal theories which are employed as explanations for youthful
misbehavior. Such theory traditions define the specific character of
deviant youth as well as the roots of deviant motivation. For instance,
during the decade of the 1920's it was popular to explain juvenile
delinquency as the result of mental conflicts derived from the experiences
of early childhood and infancy. This perspective on the etiology of
delinquency was borrowed from psychological and psychiatric theories.
As a full frame of reference this psychodynamic way of explaining
delinquency can be called a theory tradition.6
Social responses, on the other hand, may be of three
different types. First, structural forms may be considered social
responses. Physical buildings, their architectural design and their
internal functional organization, may be responses designed to cope with
deviant youth. Second, authoritative forms such as legal, legislative
and administrative codes and guidelines may be established as responses.
60ther terms could be used. The term tradition is borrowed from Don
Martindale's The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin, 1960). Nicholas C. Mullins calls them "theory
groups." See his Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American
Sociology (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
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Such codes and guidelines may serve to define and control certain kinds
of illegal behavior or may authorize, systematize and regulate structural
and practice responses to delinquency. Third, practice traditions may
develop as social responses. Practice traditions include both the
normative theories of expert practice and the actual behavioral
conventions of practition's daily practice. In the example of the
1920's program that viewed delinquency as psychodynamically motivated,
the mental hygiene clinic that opened at the Lyman School in 1926 and
the Judge Baker Foundation are good examples of structural forms. These
clinics were designed as responses to the psychological formulation of
the delinquency problem. The authority form was the administrative
department, such as the Department of Mental Disease or the Department
of Public Welfare under which the clinics operated. The practice was
called child guidance and it included clinical examinations, diagnoses,
treatment plans and clinical consultation.
These four categories--theory traditions, structural forms,
authoritative forms and practice traditions--form the building blocks of
this model of the social problem-social response nexus. Together these
four elements may be referred to as a program of response:
Social Policy
Program of Response
Structure
Practice
Theory
Authority
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Throughout its history Massachusetts youth corrections policy
has been dominated by a variety of these programs of response. It is the
objective of this first section of the analysis to examine these various
programs. Using the descriptive framework it is possible to reconstruct the
case history as if it were a sequence of programs of response. By
ignoring the time dimension and considering the programs of response
comparatively it is possible to analyse each program in terms of its
similarities and differences among the set of programs and, in so doing, to
explore the kinds of programs which have come to be the Massachusetts youth
corrections policy.
2. The descriptive model with its four categories provides the
frame of analysis through which the case history of Massachusetts youth
corrections policy can be analysed. In the analysis that follows the
case history is reconstructed into seven chapters representing the seven
programmatic approaches that have risen to dominance as accepted state
and professional policy. The asylum program, the supervised placement
program, the vocational education program, the child protection program,
the child guidance program, the community prevention program and the
community-based services program each have been identified in the case
history. The precise divisions could be debated and the labels
challenged, but the case history provides significant evidence of seven
such programs and these seven programs generally characterize the major
approaches that have appeared over the one hundred and fifty year period.
Each of the programs can be identified by specific responses
within the four categories of response: structure, practice, theory and
authority. Figure 4 identifies the seven programs and labels the
Figure 4: Programs of Response in the History of Massachusetts Youth Corrections Policy
Structure Practice Theory Authority
ASYLUM PROGRAM
Refuge/Reform School
SUPERVISED PLACEMENT PROGRAM
Supervised Placement
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAM
Vocational Training School
CHILD PROTECTION PROGRAM
Juvenile Court/Probation
CHILD GUIDANCE PROGRAM
Child Guidance Clinic
COMMUNITY PREVENTION PROGRAM
Neighborhood Organization
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES PROGRAM
Community-Based Services Y
Moral Reformation
Moral Reformation
Vocational Education
Child Protection
Child Guidance
Community Org/Street Work
Moral Degeneracy
(Heredity)
Child Vulnerbility
Psychodynamic
Structural/Functional
outh Services Social Reaction
Drd. of Trustees
Brd. of Oversight
Supervisory Brd.
Administrative Dep.
Youth Authority
Regulatory Dep.
k,
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specific features that characterized the separate program categories.
Thus, the asylum program can be seen as composed of the refuge and the
reform school in the structural category, moral reform in the practice
category, the moral degeneracy thesis in the theory category and the
Board of Trustees in the authority category. The supervised placement
program was composed of the placement as structure, moral reform as
practice, heredity as theory and the board of oversight (the Board of
State Charities) as authority. The heredity thesis is bracketed in
Figure 4 to suggest the extreme ambivalence and incongruity with which
it can be seen as the theory tradition in the supervised placement
program. The vocational education program was characterized by the
vocational training school as structure, vocational education as
practice, a general void in theory and the supervisory board (the
State Board of Health, Lunacy and Charity) as authority. Likewise, the
juvenile court and probation note the structural distinction of the
child protection program, with child protection as practice, child
vulnerability as theory and a general void in authority. The child
guidance program was characterized by the guidance clinic, child
guidance practice, the psychodynamic theory, and the state administrative
department. The community prevention program was, then, characterized
by the neighborhood organization, community organizing, structuralist
theories and the state youth authority. Most recently, the community-based
services program has been identified by the community-based services as
structure, youth services as practice, the social reaction thesis as
theory and the state regulatory department as authority.
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The labels for the seven programs have not been applied
arbitrarily. The terms have been selected from the primary literature
of the time and often represent the most commonly used expression in
discussing the dominant policy approach. They are more than "catch
words." They appear to have become "loaded" with significant
connotation. Frequently, they were used to represent the entire program
or major elements of it. In this capacity these terms acted as concepts
around which participants could rally and against which others could
rebel. As the subject of this study centers on intended and attempted
policy and intended and attempted programs, much of the following analysis
is focused upon exploring these verbalized concepts. In reviewing the
various categories of each program of response careful attention is paid
to the terms most frequently used in describing the responses to
youthful misconduct. Where several concepts appeared central to the
program, their interrelationships are reviewed and the degree to which
they were attempted in program implementation is evaluated. Comparison
among programs over time is organized around the comparison of these
concepts.
The remainder of this section is divided into nine chapters.
Seven of these chapters, Chapters C through I, are devoted to considering
each of the seven programs of response which have dominated Massachusetts
youth corrections policy. The opening chapter, Chapter B, provides some
necessary background material on the undifferentiated character of
colonial and early republican youth correction policy. The concluding
chapter, Chapter J, provides a summary of this section.
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Section II: Chapter B
UNDIFFERENTIATED RESPONSES DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD
1. The Community-Based Social Structure. The early colonial period
of Massachusetts history was devoid of structural forms particularly
designed to respond to youthful misbehavior. The colonial townspeople
coped with and cared for all of their deviant and dependent members within
the social forms of normal community life and undifferentiated from them.
A spate of recent re-examinations of colonial community structure
suggests that this early communal form, while not long lasting, was,
indeed, stable and robust. 1
The utopian vision of an "errand in the wilderness" plus the
primitive economics of survival mandated the community as the basic unit
of structure in the early Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay colonies. This
organization made each free man a partner in a joint effort where each
would benefit to the extent of their common ability and for which each
would labor individually. While housing was a private good, the land
devoted to food production, the harvest and the stores were all held in
common. The care of dependents during these first few generations was
1Three of these studies use extensive data analysis to study individual
communities: Kenneth Lockridge, A New England Town: The First Hundred
Years, Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970);
Philip J. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land and Family in
Andover, Massachusetts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970); and
John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Greven's study and the book by
Lockridge are clearest in defining two colonial periods differentiated
by type of community structure. Greven sees the earlier community
structure of Andover as a reversion to the traditional patriarchal form
of sixteenth century England with a strong emphasis on authority,
patriarchy, mutual aid and stability. See Greven, 1970, pp. 268-272.
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also a communal function. While the elderly, sick and orphaned were
serviced in local families, the family itself was largely a dependent
appendage of the community.2
2. The Family-Based Social Structure. The communal form of social
structure did not survive long. The tightly controlled patriarchal
community was replaced by a more tolerant, more fragmented social
organization during the late seventeenth century.3 The result was a rapid
proliferation of new community settlements and greater economic activity.
These new communities were more open and fluid in organization and relied
more heavily upon the family as the primary unit of social structure. As
the community lost prominence, the extended family, often spread across
several settlements, became the primary locus of socialization, social
control and care giving.4
2The family served as the community's hospital , house of correction, church,
school and social welfare institution. See Demos, 1970, pp. 184-185.
3Conventional historians see this transformation as the result of the erosion
of Puritan idealism and English traditions by the corrosive forces of the
American Wilderness. See, for instance, Perry Miller, Errand in the
Wilderness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). More recent
historical interpretations view this transition less as erosion and more
as a functional response to internal changes within the communities
themselves. Greven notes the role of population growth over the restricted
land area of Andover as encouraging geographic mobility of sons after 1700.
See Greven, 1970, pp. 125-130. Lockridge sees the role of an increased
birth rate and a decreased infant mortality rate as the cause of the
unprecedented population expansion during this period. See Lockridge,
1970, pp. 66-69.
4This transformation is more fully developed by James A. Henretta in his
review article, "The Morphology of New England Society in the Colonial
Period," in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 2:379-398 (Autumn, 1971).
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The increasing independence of the family decreased the authority
of community control and provided greater tolerance for individual
differences. It also weakened the sense of communal responsibility and
diminished the natural guarantee of care that deviants and dependents
previously enjoyed by right. While resident dependents were yet viewed
as community responsibilities, the village and town councils were
increasingly forced to admonish, petition, coerce and bribe families into
providing the necessary care.5
As reluctant as colonial families were to overburden themselves
with their own relatives they were even more resistant to the plight of
the stranger. In part this stemmed from the increasing population of
non-homogeneous immigrants arriving in New England. By the mid-seventeenth
century the Quaker population had become viewed as a serious threat. 6 Of
even more consequence were the immigrants who arrived when English
authorities began to use transportation in earnest as a means of ridding
England of undesirable vagrants. These vagrants were found no more
desirable at the ports of Massachusetts, and vessels carrying such persons
were generally made unwelcome. The residents of Massachusetts settlements
feared these itinerant strangers because of their potential claim upon the
community's welfare. It was this fear that resulted in the laws of
5The increasing importance of the family in providing social care and
control becomes evident as communities, such as Plymouth in 1670, began
passing statutes requiring that all residents live as a part of some
family. See Robert W. Kelso, The History of Public Poor Relief in
Massachusetts, 1620-1920 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1922), p. 31.
6 Kai Erickson claims that this threat was perceived as far greater than
the number of Quakers should have warranted. It was their unsilenceable
heresy that proved threatening. See Kai T. Erickson, Wayward Puritans:
A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: J. Wiley, 1966), p. 108.
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settlement and the protective practice of "warning out" whereby towns
could selectively discourage newcomers who might too easily become
dependent.7
3. The Shelter Institutions as Structural Response. The deterioration
of the communal organization gave rise to two structural responses: the
almshouse and the jail. Where the settlement laws were designed to protect
the towns and villages from itinerant deviants and dependents, the almshouse
was designed to provide shelter for resident deviants and dependents.
Figuratively, the settlement laws defined the walls of community protection
at the edge of settlement and the almshouse and jail became two of several
information institutions within this community fortress.
Long before confinement and differentiation could separately
define youth correctional institutions, early American social reformers
had to develop and master the technology of providing public shelter
without relying upon the private family. The seventeenth-century
transition to a family-based social organization threatened to leave the
community's dependents exposed and unprotected. The erection of public
shelters was required to protect those left exposed. In 1682, Boston
opened the first public almshouse in America, although almshouse care was
not common in the Commonwealth until after 1700.8
7The first settlement laws appeared in the Plymouth Colony in 1636. Any
persons who were not sponsored by existing residents were forbidden to
take up residency. When the New England colonies were consolidated in
1672 the Articles of Confederation mandated the towns fully responsible
for poor relief and three months' inhabitancy as adequate evidence of
residency. In defense the towns authorized sheriffs and selectmen to
"warn out"--sometimes quite forcefully--new arrivals who were potential
dependents before they could establish residency. See Kelso, 1922, pp. 45-48.
8Robert Kelso describes the development of the almshouse as an outgrowth of
private initiative. As the numbers of public dependents increase, some
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Architecturally the almshouse was a roof with permeable walls.
Public protection was offered to the aged, the widow, the orphan, the
idiot, the sick and the stranger. Coming and going was frequent. These
early institutions did not separate. Institutional residents and
community members moved freely through the doors. Like the inn, the
almshouse was a social response to the need for temporary shelter.
Although it was expected that few residents would stay long, as time
passed, many did.
Temporary shelter was also the central structural expression of
the village jail. This jail was not an instrument of punishment or
reformation, nor did it serve to separate the criminal from the community.
The jail provided temporary quarters for the drunkard, the vagabond, the
prostitute, the thief awaiting trial and the guilty awaiting punishment
or deportation. The punishment of crime and the reformation of the
criminal were carried out within the community, not inside the institution. 9
Whereas the temporary provision of shelter was permitted in the almshouse,
the temporary provision of shelter was required in the jail. Detention,
town councils began to use auctions for distributing the poor to their
caretakers. As time passed certain persons established themselves as
bonded contractors who negotiated for all of the town's poor in one
bidding. "The result was a privately owned and operated almshouse where
the profit to the keeper was the object sought and where the labor of
the inmates formed a definitive and well understood part of the legal
consideration." See Kelso, 1922, p. 112.
9George Haskins observes that it was not uncommon for colonial magistrates
to refer offenders to local ministers for "conviction." Because such
conviction was intended to "humble the will" of the offender and serve as
a deterrent to others, admonition, public confession, humiliation and a
wide range of corporal and capital punishments were conducted in full
sight of the community. See George L. Haskins, Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 208-210.
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a rudimentary form of confinement, was the object of jail house shelter.
But the technical competence to guarantee detention in either physical
construction or administrative organization was seldom adequate. Escapes
were easy and frequent.10
The preferred "outdoor" system of public relief whereby care was
provided dependents in their own home or with local families offered a
simple prototype for organizing the internal structure of "indoor"
institutional systems of relief. The family was the basic care-giving and
socialization unit in the daily community and it seemed the most natural
mode of internal organization within these early shelter institutions. In
both the almshouse and the jail it was common for a keeper and his family
to occupy rooms adjacent to those of the inmates and for the entire
population to eat and work together upon a family-like routine.11
This family organization may have been the uppermost intentions
of those who first established and administered the poorhouses and
lock-ups, but the prototype did not persist. The early shelter
institutions, like many future examples, ran into the dilemma of
congestion. The very existence of the almshouse seems to have attracted
10Some communities required prisoners to post bond while others attempted
to hold the jailer responsible for the debts of escaped prisoners. In
1699, the General Court passed an "Act for the Regulating of Prisons,
and to Prevent Escapes," but even colony-wide regulations proved
ineffective. See Rothman, 1971, p. 56.
11Rothman alleges that these early colonial institutions were not
significantly different from the standard "outdoor" responses to deviants
and dependents. The sheltered and filial relations of the family
household were merely extended into artificially contrived family forms
in almshouses and jails. Architecturally, he argues, both the almshouse
and the jail appeared in facade as over-built houses and had internal
layouts much like rooms in a house. The keeper and his family merely
extended their family routine to include their charges. See Rothman,
1971, p. 55.
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as many dependents as keepers were willing to accept.12 As the demand
for institutional capacity increased, the response was to more tightly
pack the residents and increase the size of the facility. This congested
institution took on a different social reputation than its earlier form.
Whereas before the institution was seen as serving unfortunates, the
new, overcrowded institution took on the stigma of serving undesirables.13
Jails, likewise, became congested with those who simply could not be
deported nor left without restraint. They, too, became disreputable
shelters packed with evil-doers and villains. 14
In both institutions children were mixed indiscriminately with
adults. As early as 1692, the General Court passed legislation which
permitted idle and ill-behaved children to be sent to the houses of
correction.15 From its opening day, the Boston Almshouse was a major
public respository for orphaned and neglected children.16
12
"Let the public but set up a receptacle and there will always be
dependents tD occupy it. This is the history of all times among all
people."--or, at least, so it appeared to Robert Kelso. See Kelso,
1922, p. 171.
13A special study of the Boston Almshouse ordered by the town council in
1790 concluded:
"The almshouse is, perhaps, the only instance known where persons
of every description and disease are lodged under the same roof
. . by which means the sick are disturbed by the noise of the
healthy, and the infirm, liable to the vices and diseases of the
diseased and profligate."
See Boston, Town Council, Town Records of 1790, Boston, Mass., 1790.
14Lewis, 1922,
15 Kelso, 1922, p. 177.
16It was not until 1800 that a separate institution, the Boston Female
Asylum, was established for homeless girls. A separate institution
for male orphans, the Boston Asylum for Indigent Boys, was not
established until 1814.
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While in rhetoric the family ideal was espoused, many of the
early shelter institutions, particularly in the larger towns, assumed
conditions best suggested by the hold of a ship. This congregate
organization was defined by a set of wardens overseeing a sizable
population through means of mass processing, rigid routines and fairly
severe forms of discipline. Together, the almshouses and the jails
became the undifferentiated closets of the community: the dumping place
for all those whom townspeople found too problematic or undesirable to
care for within their households.
4. The Practice of Guardianship. During the period that
Massachusetts remained a colony the common practice for coping with the
community's dependents was guardianship. Such persons were to be
sheltered within the community, preferably in homes, although increasingly
in institutions, but the extent of the community's responsibility
terminated with the guarantee of life's maintenance. Little hope or
attention was given to curing or reforming these unfortunates. The
colonists did not believe that institutions could or should reform the
deviant and the value of the almshouse was never based on recovery or
reform, but more on merely gathering in the homeless.17
Still , guardianship was not simly a passive practice. As
shelter was built in order to protect, guardianship was practiced in
order to control. Deviants and dependents were not permitted to roam
17Rothman argues this case specifically: "The colonists attributed no
special virtues to institutionalization. They were not preoccupied
with having the almshouse divide the worthy from the unworthy poor,
and they certainly did not believe that incarceration could or should
alter the character of the poor." See Rothman, 1971, p. 31.
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without supervision within the community (although, with the advent of the
settlement laws, they increasingly roamed free between the communities).
Their presence was both a threat and an opportunity in the maintenance
of the moral order. Religious teachings stressed the important
contribution guardianship played in protecting the unfortunates as well as
controlling the clarity of the moral experiment.18 The very existence of
the needy, the sick and the misguided was seen as offering an opportunity
for the dutiful parishioners to demonstrate the quality of their charity.
Charity, particularly among the colonial gentry, was a symbol of status.
Guardianship, therefore, was stressed in both public relief and private
philanthropy.
In practice wayward youth in colonial Massachusetts were
treated as dependents even though youthful deviance was subject to severe
and uncompromising legal sanctions. For instance, the Massachusetts
Body of Liberties, adopted in 1641, clearly stated:
If any child, or children, above sixteen years old, and of
sufficient understanding, shall curse or smite their natural
FATHER or MOTHER, he or they shall be putt to death, unless
it can be sufficiently tqtifyed that the Parents have been
unchristianly negligent.
By 1660 Massachusetts had several severe laws providing penalties to
children for lying, breaking the Sabbath, disobedience and stubbornness.
In 1662, the Boston Town Meeting appointed persons
to prevent disorders by youth on the Lord's day; particularly
in the meeting house; in time of God's solemn worship; with
18See Miller, 1960, pp. 5-7. While not directed by the same religious
mission, Quaker social activists also viewed guardianship as a moral and
religious obligation. See Sydney V. James, A People Among People:
Quaker Benevolence in Eighteenth Century America (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963).
19Quoted in Hawes, 1971, p. 13.
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authority to correct those who were disorderly with a small
wand and in the case of contempt, to take their names and
bring them before the magistrate.20
Children's punishments most commonly included lectures, fines or prolonged
labor. Generally, incarceration and corporal punishments were avoided.
Instead, the response to youthful misbehavior was to remand the youth to
the home where strict family and religious government was expected to
deter further excesses.
If children could not be adequately disciplined in their own
homes, they could be indentured into a household with better discipline.
When Thomas Lambert of Barnstable complained in 1660 against his son,
Jedediah, that he "caryed stuburnly against his said father," the court
agreed to release the boy to a "Mr. Hinckley to dispose of him to some
honest, Godly family with his and his father's consent."21 In such
cases of indenture, the practice of guardianship was transformed by the
apprenticeship idiom. Under the governance of a contracted family, a
misbehaving youth might be controlled and taught the rudiments of a
productive living.22 Still, this early form of placement was not viewed
20Quincy, 1852, p. 6.
21Quoted in Kelso, 1922, p. 167.
22This practice was also used for dependent children. John Demos notes an
early Plymouth statute that provided when "psons in the Gourment are not
able to provide Competent and convient food and raiment for theire
Children" the children could be removed from their families and placed
with families where they would be more "comfortably provided for." See
Demos, 1970, p. 104. Such "cumpulsory" indenture differed from the
"voluntary" indenture whereby fathers bought their sons an artisan's
training. Under the involuntary contracts the schooling might be more
limited, the discipline more strict and the termination would not result
in compensation. See Carl Bridenbaugh, The Colonial Craftsman (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 131.
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as a means of reformation. A successful apprentice learned skills for
future self-support, but, if previously a wayward youth, there was little
expectation that the condition could be transformed.23
Education was an early state intervention inta the family
guardianship system of child care. By 1642, the General Court required
all parents and masters of indentured youth to teach children to read
and to understand the capital laws of the colony and the moral principles
of the religion. During the early colonial period schools were an
infrequent institution. The responsibility for education and vocational
training fell clearly upon the family. As the community-family social
network began to deteriorate during the late seventeenth century,
informally organized schools and formally organized academies increasingly
came to fill the void in teaching and training.24 With this transition
the school also became a major source of education for the dependent child.
Children in the almshouses were frequently sent out to local schools and
workshops for their training.25
23In part this resulted from the undeveloped condition of the apprenticeship
system in the American colonies. The erosion of community controls had
permitted the sophisticated apprenticeship traditions of European
communities to deteriorate into more of a bonded labor relationship
between children and masters. The shortage of labor, the expanding
market for cheaply produced goods and services and the absence of strong
guilds encouraged masters to take on many apprentices and offered little
incentive for careful supervision or moral guidance. See Oscar Handlin
and Mary F. Handlin, Facing Life: Youth and Family in American History
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 28-33.
24See Bernard Bailyn, Education and the Forming of American Society
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960).
25In 1768 an experimental spinning school was established near the
Boston Almshouse for training almshouse youth, but it proved unpopular
with local industries and it was discontinued after 1773. See Kelso,
1922, p. 178.
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As hopeful as these early training efforts were, there was no
general expectation that deviant youth could be reformed. At most it
was hoped that training such youth might restrain them from becoming a
worse scourge on the community; moreover, it was only what the community
expected any of its youth to receive. Guardianship and its derivative
apprenticeship were simple forms of social control and social training
offered to guarantee economic independence. No more was expected under
this early form of practice.
5. Predestination as Causation. In theory, social deviance in
early colonial Massachusetts resulted from the devil. The earliest
colonists were so committed to their moral mission that little tolerance
was made within the social order for the misfit. The genesis of deviance
was expelled from the community into the nether regions of the supernatural. 26
The Puritans had emigrated from Europe with the professed
intentions of establishing a "Zion in the Wilderness," an ideal religious
community which would serve as a model for a new Protestant reformation
in Europe.27  Purity of devotion and lifestyle were as critical as
survival. The idealized condition of life--"everlasting life"--was the
state of grace. In the common strivings for grace, many did not succeed.
But, success was not self-determined, for grace was determined under a
26Marion L. Starkey, The Devil in Massachusetts (New York: Knopf, 1949).
27The ideals of these New England saints are well documented in several
excellent histories. In particular see William Hubbard, A General History
of New England from the Discovery to MDCLXXX, Massachusetts Historical
Society, Second Series, Boston, 1848, vol. 5; and Perry Miller, The New
England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New York: Macmillan, 1939).
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doctrine of predestination. During life, those who were the chosen would
sense grace and so rise to authority and respect. Those who remained in
doubt would strive in their honest callings waiting to learn their fate
and the remainder would slide into conditions vulnerable to the temptations
of the devil. 28 Both deviance and dependence were attributable to God's
will. Puritan doctrine located within predestination a "cause" for all
human condition, but in no way did it follow that the individual could
therefore be excused for personal behavior.
God, so the reasoning went, arranges every moment of human
history. . . . Every act of man, then, whether it be a saintly
deed or a frightful crime, has been fully preordained. Yet at
the same time God demands that every person consent to the
future that has been chosen for him, so that he is always acting
on the basis of his own volition in the very process of carrying
out God's will. 29
Causation was predetermined, but personally accepted. The predestination
thesis assigned the vulnerability to deviance to a pre-ordained order,
but left the working out of the deviant act to a spectral compact.30 The
deviant act resulted from surrendering to temptation. The commission of
the act was symptom of the individual's willful consort with the devil.
28The eminent John Winthrop saw in predestination an explanation for all
status including deviance: "God Almighty, in his most holy and wise
province, hath so disposed of the condition of mankind, as in all times
some must be rich and some poor, some high and eminent in power and
dignities, others mean and in subjection." Quoted in Erickson, 1966,
p. 191.
29 Erickson, 1966, p. 191.
30 Erickson argues that where the act stood as a symptom of a spectral
compact and as a confirmation of social condition, it served to freeze
the wayward Puritan into a deviant identity which precluded reform--"to
characterize a person as deviant was to describe his spiritual
condition, his calling, his vocation, his state of grace." See Erikson,
1966, p. 198.
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Youthful deviance and dependence fell under this same assumption
of predestination, but the presumption of innocence forestalled the
inevitable identification, at least through puberty. The shrill antics
of Abigail Williams and her companions in Salem in 1692 were never
credited to their own volition. The devil was presumed to act only
through the accused adults. 31 The deviance of children was not enough
to seal their fate.
As Massachusetts passed out of the strictly Puritan period,
the predestination thesis receded in favor, but it lingered on in formal
settings. The legislation of the eighteenth century is replete with
prohibitions against providing or succumbing to temptations. 32
6. The Undifferentiated Response. A wayward youth could be
either deviant or dependent. Colonial society made little of the
distinction between the two. A youth's misconduct was sharply admonished,
but it was taken primarily as a sign that the community should assume
responsibility for the youth's proper upbringing. While the laws
regarding youthful deviance were strict and severe, in practice, the
response to such youth differed little from the response offered those
youth who fell dependent on the community due to parental neglect or
mental defect. Guardianship and apprenticeship were not defined in terms
of punishment or retribution, nor in terms of rehabilitation. A wayward
youth, like any dependent youth, simply required firm family discipline.
In part, this undifferentiated response resulted from a reluctance to
31Starkey, 1949, p. 46.
32See Edwin Powers, Crime and Punishment in Early Massachusetts
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).
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apply the devil assumption to children not assumed old enough to willfully
choose deviant identities. In part, it resulted from the absence of any
reform orientation which would have required an analysis of individual
differences. In part, it resulted from a reluctance to differentiate
problematic youth by condition when no policy of differentiated responses
existed that would have affected practice.
The absence of distinction between deviants and dependents also
characterized age and sex differences. Dependent youth generally were
treated no differently than dependent adults. The sex of the child
required no major difference in response either. The first efforts with
children or adults of either sex was to offer care within their own homes,
or, if that was impossible, in the homes of relatives, friends or
neighbors. Only as a last resort were children or adults maintained in
the public shelter institutions. There, little separation was made by
age, sex or reason of admittance. Nor were great distinctions made in
sending youth to jail with adults. There were no separate facilities
for youths in need of detention and, if no other means could be found,
the jail served them as well as it served adults. Even the major
distinction between "indoor" and "outdoor" provisions was clouded by
efforts to organize the institutions like a household and the failure to
distinguish by any consistent policy who should receive which kind of
services.
Whether young or old, male or female, indigent or profligate,
persons in need of public services in colonial Massachusetts were not
treated in terms of clearly separate categories. Such persons were
generally handled on a case by case basis and the services they received,
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while as varied as the personalities of the care providers, were not
differentiated by even the crudest of public policy.33 Massachusetts
society was still predominantly a rural society and individual
delinquents, as problematic as they may have been in their own
communities, were simply too varied, too few and too infrequent to be
considered a social problem.
Section II: Chapter C
MORAL REFORM AND THE ASYLUM
The Refuge/Reform School as Structure. While the Boston House
of Reformation, Boston Asylum and Farm School, State Reform School, State
33The absence of a consistent public policy toward deviants and dependents
functioned only so long as the communities were small and intimate.
Kelso notes "for nearly a century it was usual to deal with each case
individually as it arose. And it was usual also to present the case to
the entire town in the regular town meeting, there to be discussed,
frequently to be haggled over, and finally disposed of by some
temporizing step." See Kelso, 1922, p. 93. The nineteenth century would
require a more formal policy approach.
1The New York House of Refuge was opened in 1824 and Philadelphia opened
its House of Refuge in 1826. When Boston opened its institution, the
name House of Reformation was selected because the city already had a
House of Refuge "for females of bad reputation who have resolved to
1.
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Industrial School for Girls and the Nautical School differed significantly
in details of structure, they were all related by their common devotion
to the principles of moral reformation. Throughout the various refuges
and reform schools there existed a basic set of principles and patterns
so integrated and coherent that they can be seen as forming a common
program of response organized around the asylum and the practice of moral
reform.
In terms of structural arrangements the House of Reformation
differed only slightly from the State Reform School that opened twenty
years later. Both offered delinquent youth specialized public shelter
in order to protect them from exposure. The shelter offered within the
refuge was short term. With the establishment of the reform school,
temporary shelter became enduring. The shelter of the reform school was
not merely a temporary protection of last resort. The youth who arrived
at these gates were expected to stay a while. An indeterminate sentence
meant a commitment for the duration of childhood and the only prescribed
exit from the institution was the placement.2
In structural form the refuge and reform schools merely adopted
the shelter prototype of the almshouse and local jail. The true significance
reform." See Robert S. Pickett, House of Refuge: Origins of Juvenile
Reform in New York State, 1815-1857 (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1969), p. 200. Generally, these early children's institutions
were referred to as refuges and the later institutions were called reform
schools. Both terms are used here.
2The indeterminate sentence meant a youth was to remain under state
supervision until the age of majority. This lengthy commitment was
advocated in order to provide adequate time for reformation throughout
the developmental years and to preclude too rapid a return of youths to
their former deleterious home environments. See arguments presented in
Mass., State Reform School, 2nd A.R., 1849, p. 4.
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of the asylum as a structural response lay in the separation, confinement
and differentiation intended within the concept.
During the later years of the eighteenth century, as the
almshouses and jails became congested halls of disease, filth, and
debauchery, the open, permeable access between institution and community
diminished. While the Boston Almshouse remained at the heart of the
inner city, a widening gulf separated its wretched interior from the
streets outside. The community, which a century earlier cherished its
dependents, now assumed the ethical prerogative of segregation. This
inward estrangement of dependents followed the response to devinats.
Like the Almshouse, Boston's Leverett Street Jail had filled to congestion
with the petty criminals for whom deportment and physical punishment had
no value. As if deviance could be contained by quarantine, the community
created within its confines a ghetto of villains. The world on the
inside developed a vicious culture of its own, separate and alien from
the world on the outside.
It was these two festering subworlds that Boston Mayor Josiah
Quincy, Louis Dwight, and the social reformers of the 1820's sought to
remove from the heart of the metropolis. They planned to move these
populations en masse from the inner city to a welfare compound newly
built upon the South Boston hill. Reminiscent of the separation practices
of deportment and warning out, the community was to be free of the menace
of its deviants and dependents by segregating them, not inward, but outward.
It was amidst this transition, this new spatial segregation, that
the refuge arose. The Boston House of Reformation, thus, commenced its
existence not in the heart of the city, near the homes and parents of its
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inmates, but geographically displaced in the South Boston compound. The
House of Reformation was thereafter located at South Boston and, at
other times, on the harbor islands, finally settling into permanent
quarters at Deer Island. When the Boston Asylum and Farm School opened
in 1835 it, too, abandoned the downtown Boston Asylum site for distant
Thompson's Island.3 The separation of the refuge from its community
and the estrangement of its inmates from their families was carried
further with the establishment of the reform schools. While both the
Westborough and Lancaster sites were selected because of their centrality
to the state, these rural locations all but guaranteed the major
separation of the inmates from their homes and communities. The nautical
school succeeded in carrying separation to its fullest extreme. But the
reform schools and nautical school achieved separation in more than
geography alone. While the populations of the institutions remained
primarily of urban backgrounds, the reform schools were deliberately rural
with no semblance of urbanity and the nautical school offered the full
antithesis of both urban and rural life in its maritime isolation.4
Figuratively, the reform schools were monuments to separation.
The early Westborough facility stood as an isolated edifice perched upon
the crest of a sylvan hill. Contemporary renderings depict a four-story
3The Boston Harbor islands have long served the city as the site of dumps,
prisons, sanatoria and other artifacts of social disrepute.
4In selecting a site for the new State Reform School, the appointed state
commissioners noted, "There are no manufacturing villages in the vicinity,
and the farmhouses are not more numerous than in most of the agricultural
towns in the State . . . The situation, therefore, is sufficiently retired."
See "The Report of A. D. Foster, Robert Rantoul and Samuel H. Walley, Jr.
to His Excellency, George N. Briggs, Governor of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts January 12, 1847," bound in Mass., State Reform School, 2nd
A.R., 1849, p. 23. Hereafter referred to as the "Report of the Foster
Commission."
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brick structure with two symmetrical towers set on the horizon at great
distance from the viewer and separated by a lake in the foreground.5
The separation of the refuge and reform school was seldom
voluntary. The urge to run away back home had to be countered by restraint.
The poorly implemented detention of the town and village jails had to be
perfected and incorporated into the asylums of the mid-nineteenth century.
But the social reformers went further. The passive concept of detention
--holding in restraint--was developed into the active concept of
confinement--building in limits. Confinement had a moral as well as
physical significance that appealed to the head and heart as well as the
feet. A. D. Foster and the state commissioners who researched and
planned the State Reform School looked forward to the time when
classes may be formed of boys who may, with safety, be
trusted to work in the garden or on the farm relying
upon the moral influence exercised, and ugon constant
inspection, to restrain them from escape.
Confinement under superintendents like Reverend E. M. P. Wells
at the House of Reformation or superintendents William Lincoln or Joseph
Allen at Westborough was more than restraint by force. A youth remained
even when the door was open, because there was something to remain within
--something of shelter and protection. Confinement was a group phenomenon.
Confinement encircled the youth, but within the company of others. It
gave comfort to the estrangement of separation. One was not merely
separated out, and, as an individual ejected from the community; one was
separated into a community of one's own.
5See, for instance, the frontpiece in Mass., State Reform School,
7th A.R., 1854.
6
'"Report of the Foster Commission," 1849, p. 28.
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The early youth corrections institutions developed two primary
forms of differentiation: by age and by sex. The central argument in
behalf of both the House of Reformation and the State Reform School was
the need to separate the young from the inmates of adult facilities.7
Structurally this differentiation occurred in steps. The House of
Reformation was first established as only a separate wing of the new
South Boston House of Correction. At that point, children between ages
eight and eighteen were admitted though they could still be committed
into the adult facilities. Only after 1836 did the refuge acquire a new
building separate from the House of Corrections, although it was still
on the same grounds.
In planning the Westborough facility, the Foster Commission
made a significant effort to consider the proper age range for commitment.
. . . there is such a variety in stature, temperament, and
character, among persons of the same age, that it is
difficult to select any one age as the limit, either maximum
or minimum. In a majority of cases, boys over sixteen years
of age would be unsuitable subjects, and the general rule,
it is thought, should be, not to send boys over that age to
this place. 8
7In arguing in favor of the House of Reformation, Louis Dwight condemned
the imprisonment of children:
"The greatness of the evil, if there is no injustice and
criminality in it, of placing a child and confining him there
with strong bolts and bars, among a den of thieves, where he
may be subject to any violence and not be permitted to utter a
complaint without hazard of his life, has surely not been
sufficiently contemplated."
See Boston Prison Discipline Society, 2nd A.R., 1827, p. 7.
8In preparing their report, the commissioners conducted a survey of several
prominent social reformers and among the questions was one addressing the
age range. In responding to this question, Theodore Lyman, who
anonymously donated ten thousand dollars to encourage the Commonwealth to
establish the institution, advised the commissioners to accept no boys
older than fourteen years. See "Report of the Foster Commission," 1849,
p. 64.
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The commissioners settled for limiting admittance to those between seven
and sixteen, but this age range soon proved to be too wide. Boys sixteen
years old were often so much more hardened than those of more tender
years that the younger boys were easily influenced and encouraged to
grow in daring and insubordination. This inter-mixing of ages was seen
as a major source of problems in the management of the institution and,
later, a reason given for the institution's failure to correct delinquency.9
The Nautical School was advocated as a means of age differentiation.
It was intended to divert away from Westborough those over fourteen,
creating, in effect, two age-graded institutions. Although this attempt
failed, the reorganization of the Westborough institution in 1885
finally did achieve a successful age segregation with those over fifteen
being diverted to the new State Reformatory at Concord which was opened
that same year.10
9 In his annual report of October, 1884, Joseph Allen identifies the age
of commitment as a clear correlate to the institution's quality of
internal management. From 1848 to 1859 boys were committed between the
ages of seven and sixteen. Allen notes that this period was "a gloomy
and painful disappointment to many of the most hopeful friends of the
noble experiment." After the fire of 1859 the maximum age was reduced
to 14 and the school ship established to receive the older boys. By
1866 Allen notes that the institution was in such good order as to win
the highest praise from E. C. Wines and Theodore W. Dwight in their
investigation of reformatories across the country. With the abandonment
of the school ships in 1872 the age of commitment was raised from 14 to
17 "since which time it has been a constant source of trouble and
anxiety." See Mass., State Primary and Reform School, 5th A.R., 1884,
p. 78.
10A further refinement in age differentiation occurred in 1908 with the
establishment of a second reform school for boys, the State Industrial
School for Boys at Shirley. When this facility opened, it accepted
those delinquents between ages fifteen and eighteen leaving the
Westborough institution with only those between ages seven and fourteen.
See Mass., Industrial School for Boys, 1st A.R., 1909.
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The refuges were not differentiated by sex. The House of
Reformation accepted both boys and girls but lodged them separately.11
With the establishment of the reform school, sex differentiation was
built into youth corrections policy. During the initial planning for
the Westborough facility, the Foster Commission considered a
coeducational institution, but rejected the design noting that girls
were more vicious and difficult to reform than boys. 12
With the opening of the girls' reform school at Lancaster,
sex differentiation was firmly established. Frances B. Fay, who
directed the planning commission for the girls' reform school and served
as its first superintendent, noted:
a feeling or sentiment prevailing in the community that girls
are much more difficult and unpromising subjects of reformation
than boys, and that, therefore, they would be less likely to
repay in benefit to the State the labor, care and expense
bestowed upon their training and education. Though there may
be some grounds for this idea, the Commissioners have reason to
suppose it is greatly exaggerated . . . there are no facts
known to them that can in their view excuse, much less justify,
the partiality of the State ln limiting its reformatory
provisions to the male sex.
11Originally little more than a wall separated male and female quarters.
In 1842 Boston was authorized to segregate girls into completely
separate quarters for living as well as schooling and work. See Mass.,
Acts of 1842, Ch. 22.
12". . . in fact, it is found in similar establishments, that the girls
sent to them are far more vicious, and more difficult to manage, than
the boys." See "Report of the Foster Commission," 1849, p. 30.
13See Mass., General Court, "Report of the Commissioners for the
Establishment of a State Reform School for Girls, January 19, 1858,"
House Doc. No. 43, Boston, 1855, p. 4. The report went on to recommend,
it is to be a school for girls--for the gentler sex. . . .
This circumstance is an important one and enters into and modifies
the plan of buildings and arrangement of rooms, with all the
details relating to employment, instruction, and amusement, and,
indeed, to every branch of domestic economy."
See p. 7.
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The internal structure of the House of Reformation differed
little in intention or destiny from the earlier shelter institutions.
The family ideal was espoused and the congregate form was achieved.
Superintendent Wells ran a relatively small institution with a close
parental style. After his departure, the institution increased rapidly
in size and the superintendents who followed achieved order in a more
military fashion. The problems of large populations and limited
resources forced the abandonment of the family ideal in all but rhetoric
and its substitution with a congregate system. The internal structure
of the State Reform School when it opened quickly developed this same
congregate military prototype. With an institutional census near double
the available accommodations, it was difficult to do otherwise.15 The
Nautical School expressed the congregate military prototype in the
extreme. The boys literally lived in the hold of the ship and performed
all their daily functions in accord with the rigors of nautical life.
When the girls' reform school opened at Lancaster, a new
internal organization was introduced into reform school structure:
Lancaster opened on the cottage prototype. The Fay Commission required
the creation of separate cottages where "Each house is to be a family
under the sole direction and control of the matron, who is the mother
14 "To follow the metaphors of superintendents of asylums and refuges,
the family was the model for institutional organization. . . . But
as is readily apparent, rhetoric and reality had little
correspondence. Except for these public declarations, one would
not have considered the family to be the model for the asylum.
Rather, from all appearances, a military tone seems to have
pervaded these institutions."
See Rothman, 1971, p. 235.
15The institution which had been planned to accommodate 300 boys housed
over 550 by 1856. See Figure 1.
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of the family."16 When Superintendent Allen attempted to implement a
modified cottage system in 1861 he envisioned a family-like
relationship: "the great design of the school should be to make it,
as much as possible, like a family,--to have the boys stand to the
officers in the relation of children to parents."17
The cottage prototype differed significantly from the congregate
prototype. The congregate system at the House of Reformation and the
State Reform School centered upon the personal interaction between the
superintendent and each individual youth. Such an organization could
operate effectively only when the institutional populations were small.
The increase in numbers doomed the congregate prototype. The cottage
prototype decentralized the provision of treatment. Cottage parents in
the various cottages became the focus of reformative practice. With
the cottage structure treatment could be more carefully differentiated.
Cottages could be organized by age group or degree of discipline.
The cottage organization permitted the treatment of large
numbers of youth with the closest approximation to the family. In
establishing the cottage form at the new Lyman School at Westborough,
the superintendent noted:
The Cottage system is intended to train juvenile delinquents
and not hardened criminals, and no place is so well calculated
to change the habits of a wayward boy as a pleasant,
delightful and well regulated home. We claim this for the
Cottage system. It is merely a place of detention, education
and discipline, and not punishment. . . . The principles of
16Mass., Industrial School for Girls, 1st A.R., 1857, p. 6. See also
Barbara M. Brenzel, "Better Protestant than Prostitute: A Social
Portrait of a Nineteenth Century Reform School for Girls," in
Interchange, 6:11-22 (1975).
17Mass., State Reform School, 14th A.R., 1861, p. 35.
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reforming by this system are that of trust, moral persuasion and
emulation. This requires skill , earnestness, caution, patience
and self control. All these requisites are fit qualities to 18pattern after by the pupils under the charge of such officers.
The cottages were referred to continually in terms of homes and families.
But the reality was inconsistent. Indeed, each cottage was the residence
of a husband and wife and frequently a couple of their small children.
But the boys numbered up to 30 or 35 per cottage. This number plus the
absence of sisters not to mention grandparents and other relatives made
for unnatural "families." The cottages were not even home-like. Though
reasonably small and self-contained with yards and kitchen gardens, the
buildings were architecturally larger and more severe than the standard
houses of their time. Rather than true cottages or families, the cottage
system offered a decentralized federation of small self-contained
institutions where a youth could be known intimately and could share with
other peers all of the daily tasks of running a "household."
2. The Moral Degeneracy Thesis. The theoretical perspective which
evolved during the reforms of the 1820's, while yet moral in flavor, cast
out the devil and predestination as generators of deviant and dependent
behavior. The new theory substituted moral degeneracy for the devil and
moral contagion for predestination. The origins of deviance were to be
found in the moral deterioration of the urban industrial community. This
new thesis was, at heart, a theory of environmental determinism. The
physical and social environment of deviant and dependent people became the
object of interest.
18Henry E. Swan in Mass., State Primary and Reform School, 7th A.R.
1886, p. 86.
124
Convinced that all men were born equal , the theorists of the
1820's were forced to locate the cause for human differences in the
accidents of environmental conditions. The civilized environment of
America in the Jacksonian period was viewed as undergoing great stress.
The old agrarian-mercantile economy of New England with its associated
small rural villages and bustling ports was being challenged by the
newer industrial and trade economy with its urban mill towns and
heterogeneous class segregated cities. Immigration brought new family
styles and expectations to America and the displacements brought on by
mobility and industrial labor needs tore at the traditional authoritarian
mode of family discipline. The social reformers reacted with moral
indignation.
In 1820 Josiah Quincy conducted a special survey of public
relief practices in the Commonwealth. This landmark report--commonly
called the "Quincy Report"--did not consider the causes of poverty and
vice directly, but in implication it indicated the immoral community of
the poor.19  In an address before the Suffolk County Grand Jury in 1822
Quincy stated his thesis.
Poverty, vice and crime, in the degree in which they are witnessed
in our day, are, in fact, in some measure the necessary
consequences of the social state. Just in proportion as the
higher and happier parts of the machine of society are elevated
and enlarged, those parts, which are, by necessity or accident,
beneath and below, become sunken and depressed.20
19See Mass., General Court, Report on the Committee on Pauper Laws,
Boston, Mass., 1821. Hereafter referred to as "Quincy keport."
20Josiah Quincy, Remarks on Some of the Provisions of the Laws of
Massachusetts Affecting Poverty, Vice and Crime (Cambridge: Hilliard
and Metcalf, 1822), p. 4.
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Of the various social problems concerning the social reformers
of the 1820's, youthful waywardness was most easily seen in environmental
terms. 21 The child was seen as the vulnerable victim of these
deteriorating conditions.
In every town, there are some, in the cities and large towns,
many, who exercise no salutary control over their children.
Vicious or thriftless themselves, their children follow their
example. And, in that tender age, when the mind and heart
most easily yield to the guidance of others, these children
and youth become "offenders" against good morals and the laws
of their country, hardened against truth and duty, and subject
themselves to the stern penalty of the law. How often have
the hearts of judges and jurors been moved with pity when they
have been obliged to condemn to ignominitious punishment some
bright intelligent boy who was born and reared under such
inauspicious circumstances! 22
Children were not viewed as responsible for their condition or
behavior. Their innocence had been perverted by the failure of their
families to innoculate them against the temptations of an immoral world.
Thus, like addicts, they moved from minor transgressions to more serious
offences. Where the devil paradigm postulated that characterological
conditions were predetermined, the moral degeneracy thesis saw
personality shaped and increasingly hardened into deviant status by the
temptations of an immoral environment. Thus deviance was achieved, not
ascribed, but achieved in an environment so corrupted as to all but
guarantee the inevitable conditions. All that stood between the child and
21 "The vices at loose in the community invariably brought the
unwary and untrained child to the prison gates. Delinquents'
careers demonstrated the debilitating influences of the
tavern, where they first began to drink, and the noxious
quality of theaters and houses of prostitution, where they
learned other corruptions."
See Rothman, 1971 , pp. 76-77.
22
"Report of the Foster Commission," 1848, p. 22.
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temptation was the adequacy of the family's moral discipline, and, all
too often, the family itself was in a state of moral decline.
3. Moral Reform within the Asylums. A new practice arose with the
reforms of the 1820's--moral reform. Guardianship was maintained as a
fundamental practice, but "moral reformation" or "moral guidance" or "moral
treatment," as it was variously labeled, was appended as a new response.
Moral reform went beyond guardianship. The misbehaving child became the
conscious focus of treatment. The offending behavior was to be eradicated
and the course of the child's life changed. All children were recognized
as malleable subjects. Having merely gone morally astray due to family or
community circumstances, they were capable of moral redirection, reclamation
and reformation. In the perspective of the Great Awakening, moral reform
became a Christian duty. After visiting the House of Reformation in 1840.
Massachusetts Chief Justice Parker observed:
How deeply does it concern the community to take these little
creatures by the hand, when they shall have committed their
first offence--withdraw them from contamination and guilt--
provide the means of industry and education--soften their minds
to the reception of moral and religious truths--and gradually
by gentle treatment and wholesome discipline, lead them into
the habits of order, truth and honesty. Is there any greater duty
in a Christian country than this? 23
Moral reform was a well-developed response to the concept of
youthful deviance formulated by the moral degeneracy thesis. Defining
the root of deviance in the moral conditions of the environment, it was
compelling to find its amelioration in moral terms as well. The practice
23Quoted in County of Suffolk, Report of the Inspectors of Houses of
Industry, Correction and Reformation, Boston City Document No. 26,
Boston, Mass., 1840, p.
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was, in reality, a rather eclectic mixture of principles focused upon
orderliness, affection and discipline.
The first principle of moral reform was orderliness. The moral
degeneracy thesis viewed the new urban industrial community as the
locus of chaos and sloth. Such disorderliness was equated with immorality.
The moral life was the well-regulated life. Therefore, the daily life of
the House of Reformation was a carefully planned routine.
The boys generally are required to rise at half-past five in the
morning. . . . They are required to attend religious services at
six; the next half hour is devoted to washing, combing, hands,
inspection and a few moments play. At half past six they are
required to attend breakfast for which twenty-five minutes are
allowed. At seven precisely school commences and continues till
nine . . . From 9 A.M. to 12, all are required to work at their
several employments, the smallest being allowed to recess at
10-1/2, of a few minutes to go to the yard. Dinner is provided
at 12-1/2 and at 1 P.M. work recommences as in the forenoon,
and continues till four. From 12 to half-past 12 and from 4 to
half-past 4 boys are allowed to play in the yard. . . . Supper
co ences at 4-1/2 and evening school at 5 P.M. and continues till
Regularity and order prevailed in the very movements of the
inmates. One visitor to the House of Reformation in 1832 reported
admiringly that the inmates were trained to march in drill formation
between activities, to stand at attention and answer questions in unison
and to perform drill exercises copied directly from West Point. 25
The extreme orderliness of the House of Reformation was
expressed in its system of inmate classification. Reverend Wells' system
24 County of Suffolk, Report of the Inspectors of Houses of Industry,
Corrections and Reformation, Boston City Document No. 26, Boston, 1840.
p.
2 5James F. Richmond, "The House of Reformation," New England Magazine,
3:382-390 (1832).
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of gradation provided for three "Bon Grades" and three "Mal Grades" with
ascending levels of privilege and descending levels of privation. Those
in the highest grade were permitted unsupervised visits outside the
institution; those in the lowest were deprived of play and conversation.
The passing from one grade to another either up or down was determined by
vote of the total inmate population. The rules and criteria and other
matters of inmate concern were in large part determined by the group
acting in self government.26 Superintendent Lincoln instituted a similar
system of merit grading and a rigorous daily routine when the State
Reform School first opened, but the rapid increase in size of the
population soon made it impossible to administer the practice adequately.
27
Next to orderliness stood affection. The religious foundations
of moral reform prescribed the love of God and the love of man as
antidotes to a life of sin and waywardness. The affection of the inmates
was to be drawn out in reciprocation by the affections of the superintendent.
Reverend Wells was a master of such endearment, often joining with the
children in their games and roughhousing.28  Figuratively moral reform
26A detailed review of this system of practice is reported in Superintendent
Wells' own words in de Beaumont and de Toqueville, 1833, pp. 216-223.
27Superintendent Lincoln's grade system paralleled that of Superintendent
Wells. Lincoln described the system in his 1850 annual report:
"The system consists of four grades, designated by the numerals
1, 2, 3, 4,--l being the highest grade. . . . We also have a
subdivision of the first grade, called the class of 'Truth and
Honor'--a degree which indicates the highest rank known in the
school. For punishment, we degrade from a higher to a lower, and
for encouragement, promote from a lower to a higher rank."
See William Lincoln in Mass., State Reform School, 3rd A.R., 1850, p. 28.
28Mary Carpenter, the British prison reformer, records Wells' own words:
"We live happily together as a family of brethren, cheerful, happy,
confiding and, I trust, to a greater or lesser degree, pious." See
Carpenter, 1853, p. 212.
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followed the pattern of a minister and his parishioners. A superintendent,
such as Reverend Wells, was assumed to be morally superior to his wards.
He commanded routine, respect, reason and affection from his wards on the
basis of his moral authority. The ideal ward grew within the moral
prescription of the superintendent and never deviated from his stern but
loving guidance. It is no surprise that many of the early superintendents
of the refuges and reform schools were trained in the ministry.
Orderliness stood only as discipline enforced it. "A month's
stay in the company of boys accustomed to systematic discipline and
obedience," officials at the Farm School estimated, "with a sense that
there is no escape from order and regularity, generally converts the most
wayward into good pupils." 29 James Talcott, the superintendent who
immediately followed William Lincoln at Westborough, wrote
The course of discipline we aim to pursue is chiefly moral
rather than physical, and it is our constant endeavor to
maintain as nearly as possible, a system of what might
perhaps be properly termed family discipline; causing each 30to feel that he has a personal interest in the welfare of all
Self discipline was encouraged within the wayward youth. External
discipline was to lead to internal self-control and self-respect.
Reverend Wells was able to maintain orderliness at the House of
Reformation without corporal punishment, but his was a unique practice.
Moral reform typically did not preclude physical punishment. In his
dedicating remarks, Judge Washburn continued, "All that we can hope for,
and perhaps all that we ought to desire is that punishment . . should
29Boston Asylum and Farm School for Indigent Boys, Annual Report,
1849, p. 12.
30James M. Talcott in Mass., State Reform School, 7th A.R., 1854, p. 28.
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be, as far as possible, parental in its character, and reformatory in
its tendency."31 Superintendent Lincoln tried to limit the frequency of
corporal punishments at Westborough, but increasingly his successors
turned to severe punishments.
Rigid discipline, severe and brutal discipline, discipline without
affection could turn moral reform into retributive punishment. Punishment
was anathema to reform. It reduced confinement to prolonged detention or
custody. Custody had no corrective meaning. No reformation was intended:
no community was created. By the 1860's the House of Reformation was
purely custodial. 32  Following the inmate riot of 1877 a legislative
investigation exposed the State Reform School as little more than a
junior prison complete with cells, punishment devices, gun toting guards
and brutal forms of corporal punishment. Increasingly, respect for
authority became the primary expression of discipline and affection receded.
The severe punishments of the later years of the State Reform Schools were
motivated more out of issues of deference than actual breaches of order.33
31Washburn, 1849, p. 22.
32In 1863 a controversial report by the Inspectors of Prisons concluded
that the institution was "too much of a prison, too little an
institution of instruction, too much the residence of law and
punishment, too little a home of grace and culture." See Boston Common
Council, Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate Alleged
Abuses at the Houses of Reformation and Correction, Boston, City
Doc. No. 35, Boston, 1864, pp. 22-23.
33During the legislative investigation in 1877 testimony was heard
concerning a boy named Watson which was typical. It was reported that
young Watson was beaten about the head with a chair until his skin was
swollen and broken and then sent for several weeks of solitary
confinement in the "Lodge." His offense was resisting a teacher's
attempted punishment. See Mass., General Court: Committees,
Investigation into the Management and Discipline of the State Reform
School at Westborough Before the Committee on Public Charitable
Institutions, House Doc. No. 285, Boston, 1877, p. 74.
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In its conclusions, the investigative committee reviewing the conditions
leading to the 1877 riot noted:
the evidence shows conclusively that the experiment of trying
to reform boys of all ages and degrees of crime by the same
means and in one institution, has proved to be impractical,
as well as contrary to the original intentions of the founders
of the school. 34
4. The Asylum Program of Response. The shelter, separation,
confinement and inmate differentiation of the refuge and reform school
were typical expressions of the asylums which were founded to respond to
various social problems during the middle of the nineteenth century. The
moral degeneracy of the urban industrial community was seen as the genesis
of many social ills and moral reform within the well-ordered asylum was
viewed as the remedy. But the institutions turned out to be a response of
mixed virtues.
The refuges and reform schools served to rid the communities of
their most obnoxious youngsters, but in congregating them together in
central institutions other problems emerged. Like the shelter institutions
of the colonial period, the delinquent asylums fell prey to the dilemma
of congestion. As commitments increased without a corresponding
increase in institutional resources the world inside the asylum became
an overly crowded, noxious ghetto in which orderly functioning could be
guaranteed only through the use of severe forms of discipline. This
discipline begot its own reactions and inmates and wardens became
contentious adversaries. With this transition the asylums' public
34See Mass., General Court: Committees, Committee Report on the State
Reform School at Westborough: 1877, Senate Doc. No. 93, Boston,
1877, p. 1.
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reputation diminished. Retribution threatened to replace charity as the
primary objective and only the most hardened offenders were not somehow
diverted from the asylum's doors.
The inner world of the reform school took on a separate reality
from conventional society. The tightly packed congregate environment
bred problems of youthful contagion. Older boys instructed and encouraged
younger boys in the skills and lore of vice and criminal behavior.
Homosexual promiscuity flourished where congestion and the absence of
privacy encouraged intimacies to develop in a sexually segregated
environment. Diseases spread easily among the residents and the number
of deaths during epidemics was exaggerated by the close packing. Violence
itself seemed to have a contagious quality. The potential for riots lay
barely dormant. A suicide at Westborough in 1910 was followed a month
later by a suicide at Lancaster.35 The internal culture of the institutions
were an unanticipated and undesirable consequence of the very shelter,
separation, confinement and differentiation that determined the asylum
pattern. Over the years, the institutions developed intensive public
antipathy. These early efforts to respond to youthful deviance became
viewed as social problems themselves.
Yet for all of their faults the asylums endured. They had
captured the essence of the reformative approach to youthful deviance.
The asylum was perhaps only one means of reforming delinquents, but it
caught within its structure, practice and theory the careful balance
between forgiveness and retribution upon which humane reformation could
be offered. The asylum program of response became identified as the
dominant reformative approach in youth corrections.
35See Mass., General Court, Investigation into the Suicide of John Newman and
the Conditions at the Lyman School for Boys, House Document, Boston, 1910.
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Section II: Chapter D
SUPERVISED PLACEMENT AND THE HEREDITY THESIS
1. The Appearance of the Preventive Ideal. The transformation
of Samuel Gridley Howe from an institution builder to a skeptic and the
critique he leveled at the institutions was indicative of changes
on-going in the broader climate of social welfare during the middle of
the nineteenth century. The great increase in urbanization and
immigration and the spread of the wage-based capitalist economy was
viewed as deteriorating the quality of family life at a rate much more
serious than that witnessed by the social reformers of the 1820's. The
traditional hegemony of the family which had been maintained since the
early colonial collapse of the community-based social structure was itself
in great jeopardy. "In-door" institutional responses to deviance and
dependency were seen as contributors to this undesired transformation.
Increasingly, the asylum pattern of response receded as the singular
dominant policy toward wayward youth. The notion of reformation of youth
after they were unquestionably identified as delinquent was not challenged
directly. Rather, a new pattern of response arose which shifted the focus
of attention to a time earlier in the youth's development. Interest
arose in preventive responses whereby potentially delinquent youths could
be identified before they fully confirmed their deviant status. This
preventive ideal, in structure and practice, was even more eclectic than
the reformative approach, although it did originate with one element of
response that the asylum pattern had never quite achieved: a state
policy-making authority structure.
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2. The State Board of Oversight. The early asylums were established
under separate boards of trustees. Typically six or seven prominent
citizens were appointed by the governor to serve on the boards with
rotating terms of office. The boards appointed the superintendents of
the institutions who in turn hired the staff. Formal accountability
ascended hierarchically up to the board as the final locus of policy.
Incrementally, over the first half of the nineteenth century, Massachusetts
had established a wide assortment of state charity and correctional
institutions, but had never established a central government mechanism for
overseeing them. 1 Each of these institutions operated under its own
board of trustees, independent of the other institutions. Co-ordination
among institutions was voluntary, piecemeal and limited.2 There was no
central location for considering state correctional or charity policy.
With no state-wide administrative organization other than the governor's
own immediate staff, state policy questions fell to the General Court
where such issues were handled on an ad hoc special committee basis.
1These included the State Prison at Charlestown (est. 1801); the General
Hospital in Boston (est. 1811); three institutions for the insane at
Worcester (est. 1834), Taunton (est. 1851) and Northampton (est. 1855);
four institutions for the poor at Rainsford Island (est. 1852),
Bridgewater (est. 1854), Tewksbury (est. 1854) and Monson (est. 1854);
an institution for dependent children, the State Primary School at
Monson (est. 1866); and the two state reform schools.
2Gerald Grob, in his history of Massachusetts mental health policy during
the nineteenth century, notes that the fragmented and irrational
administration of the institutions was not their only problem.
"Moreover, welfare expenditures had risen rapidly. In 1832 the state
spent $60,000 for welfare related purposes; by 1855 the figure had
risen to over $300,000." See his Mental Institutions in America: Social
Policy to 1875 (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 273.
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The reform school trustees were hardly organized to effectively
consider issues of state policy. They had little data-gathering or
evaluation capabilities. Until 1879 each institution had its own
separate board and the responsibilities of these boards was limited to
institution oriented issues. The trustees focused on the reformation of
identified offenders; they had no authority in matters of adjudication or
prevention.
While the need for a central state board was recognized for some
time, it was not until 1863 that the General Court authorized the
establishment of the Massachusetts Board of State Charities, the first
such state board in the nation.3 The new board was structurally weak.
The board consisted of seven unapid members, a salaried secretary and a
small staff, but the operations were clearly limited to an oversight,
fact-finding function. 4 The plan was to create an oversight agency
which would improve policy decision-making without interfering with the
administrative management of the institutions.5
3A special legislative study conducted in 1858 had reviewed the
inefficiencies and recommended a central state board. See Mass.,
General Court, Report of the Special Joint Committee Appointed to
Investigate the Whole System of Public Charitable Institutions of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Senate Doc. No. 2, Boston, 1859. But
the various institutional boards were loathe to give up any of their
jealously guarded independence. The bill that was passed in 1863 was
heavily compromised to protect the interests of the institutional boards.
4Mass., Acts of 1863, Ch. 240.
5The legislative committee which planned the Board stated clearly, "we
do not purpose to confer upon the central board power to interfere in
any manner with the actual management of the several institutions
otherwise than by offering counsel and advice." See Mass., Report of
the Special Joint Committee . . ., Senate Doc. No. 2, 1859, p. 7.
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Yet, the selection of Board members suggested otherwise. As
chairman of the Board, the Governor appointed Samuel Gridley Howe and, as
first secretary, the Board appointed Frank B. Sandborn, the noted Boston
journalist and social activist. Both men were dedicated social
reformers and both were particularly committed to changing institutional
care. In their hands the data collection and policy oversight functions
of the Board became weapons of reform. To this end the annual reports of
the Board of State Charities emerged as major compendia of data, analysis,
opinion and recommendations and, soon, both legislators and institutional
administrators were turning to the Board for guidance, co-ordination
and policy.6
As the new Board increasingly became the focus for state welfare
policy, it brought with it an early drive toward rationality, planning
and the bureaucratic ideal.
The philosophy of Howe and Sandborn imbued each annual report.
First, there was a firm commitment of public responsibility:
The helpless, dependent, idle consumers and destructives number
at least forty-five thousand, and make an enormous load that
6 In his review of the Board of State Charities, Gerald Grob concludes:
"While its authority was sharply circumscribed and limited and
its staff minimal, the new board had the potential for rapid growth.
. . . By the very fact that the functions were largely in the
policy making rather than the administrative domain, it quickly
overshadowed the individual welfare institutions. . . . That the
board was intended to preside over the dismantling of the state's
welfare apparatus proved of little consequence. Its early leaders
were strong willed and organizationally minded men who were
determined to introduce an element of rationality into welfare.
In so doing they inadvertently began to create a bureaucratic
apparatus that steadily increased its role and authority
despite the fact that this trend was a direct contradiction to
the original intent of thelegislation."
See Grob, 1973, pp. 276-277.
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can not be cast aside, cannot be left behind but must be
taken up and borne along on the body social.1
But the institutional response had proved inadequate:
In view of all the difficulties and expenses, and complications
of various kinds, which our great reformatories are producing,
and all of which, especially the first, are rapidly increasing;
and in view of the importance of enlisting wider public sympathy,
and a larger number of citizens in the work of reform, it is
proposed to modify the present system with a view of getting rid
of the central establishments all together; or, at least, of so
reducing the number of inmates, that they will be merely
temporary receiving stations. 8
And, in creating a new system, the directions were clear:
In providing for the poor, the dependent, the vicious,
especially for the young, we must take the ordinary family
as our model. 9
But this was not to be merely a contrived family:
. . . children need the human family as ordained by God,--
the family held together by ties of blood and of sympathy,
not imperfect imitations of it, made by gathering its
members for some special purpose.10
The family system that Howe and Sandborn advocated was a clear development
of Howe's thinking in regard to the girls' reform school ten years earlier.
Their plan envisioned the placement of youth in the good farm families of
the Commonwealth under the careful supervision of state agents. Given such
intensive preventive care, most youth would never need to be sent on to
the reform schools. This early strategy of diversion was to lay the
groundwork for the development of a preventive pattern of response.
7Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. xx.
8Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. xlxv.
9Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. xlv.
10Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. xlvi.
11In his analysis, Robert Kelso observes:
"The year 1864 which was the first year of activity of the new
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6. Supervised Placement and the Visiting Agent. Supervised family
placement developed as a practice with the advent of the state visiting
agent in 1866. Apprenticing young offenders had been practiced during the
eighteenth century, but not with the same expression of prevention apparent
after 1870 nor under the supervision of trained state visiting agents, or
probation agents, as they were later called.12
By the 1850's it was no longer possible to rely on the traditional
apprenticeship system. Urbanization and the rise of industrialization
made the master-student relationship and many craft skills obsolete.
Without the moral obligations of the traditional relationship, there was
little incentive to personally oversee the youth's moral lifestyle.13 Thus
Board of State Charities, stands as a great landmark in the
history of child care, for it was then that the various threads
of the practice of earlier years were sorted out and woven
by the State Board into a fabric of State policy. That which
had been done blindly before, without consistent plan, was now
subjected to analysis and such experiments as seemed clearly
advisable were adopted as part of a social program."
See Kelso, 1922, p. 182.
12From the time of their establishments both the Westborough and the
Lancaster institutions employed an informal placement system following
the termination of confinement. Boys from the State Reform School
were released either through a clear and non-conditional discharge or
through a "binding out" procedure whereby desirable boys were sent to
farm placements. These placements were not conducted under formal
supervision and they all followed a period of reformation and so did
not fit the newer interest in prevention.
13In 1846 the Directors of the House of Reformation noted:
"Formerly mechanics' apprentices served a full term of seven
years, resided in the families of their masters and received
moral as well as mechanical instruction. The system produced
thorough mechanics and well disciplined, thrifty young men. At
the present time mechanics employ boys and young men at
particular branches of trade, for limited or uncertain periods,
allowing them to board where they may, and conduct themselves
when away from the workshops, as they will."
See Boston, Directors of the Houses of Industry and Reformation,
Annual Report, Boston City Doc. No. 19, Boston, 1846, p. 9.
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if placements were to be more than merely indentured labor or the easy
abandonment of adult authority, state supervision was required. Such
supervision was meant to control the functioning of the placement. The
youth was not to be oppressed; neither was license to be granted.
The practice of supervised placement was based on the principle
of regulation. Regulation addressed the abuses possible within the
family contracts. While many families took to their charges with
affection and sympathy, there were others where the youth's welfare was
of secondary importance. In 1886 the Trustees complained:
Those who secure the services of boys on farms or in
workshops are human and often selfish, and are chiefly interested
to get the most possible service at the least possible cost, and
in very many cases seem to care little for the moral welfare or
intellectual improvement of those in their care. The boy fails
to receive the wise counsel and warm encouragement in well-doing
to which he is used, and soon comes to feel that nobody cares,14that it is not worth while to do well, and so . . . runs away.
As a means of regulation, supervision also monitored quality. With
systematic supervision it became possible to acquire feedback and the
rudiments of program evaluation. Both cross sectional and longitudinal
data were gathered and reported in the annual reports of the State
Visiting Agent. 15
Supervised placement was not hostile to moral reform. The
same humane and paternal care directed both practices. The visiting agent
14Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 8th A.R., 1886, pp. 10-11.
15In 1874 Gardiner Tufts wrote a five year review of the work of the
State Visiting Agent in which he presented lengthy statistical tables.
In conclusion, he noted: "Of the whole number of persons--five hundred
and twenty four-- . . . sixty-five per cent have done well; the
conduct of nine per cent of them has been doubtful or unknown; ten per
cent have done badly, and sixteen per cent are in the Primary School."
See Mass., Board of State Charities, llth A.R., 1875, p. 73.
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and his agents espoused the affection and sensitivity characteristic of
moral reform, but the real locus of treatment lay in the contracting family.
Whatever orderliness and discipline were required was rendered within the
placement setting. Supervised placement differed from moral reform not in
style, but in focus. The practice emphasized early intervention into the
lives of potentially wayward youth. The timely provision of a regulated
intervention would avoid the need for reformative treatment. That this
intervention was orderly and affectionate was not paramount. The quality
of the service was not as critical as the design of its delivery.
Timeliness, thoroughness and carefulness were the essential criteria in
effecting successful service delivery. The major problem lay in
predicting potentially deviant youth before they required reformation.
Howe and Sandborn thought that they had found the answer in heredity.
4. Genetic Causation. The new principles expressed by Howe and
Sandborn in the second annual report of the Board of State Charities
also included the suggestion of a new causal theory regarding deviance
and dependency. Where the Quincy Report had been critical in granting
legitimacy to the moral degeneracy thesis, the Board of State Charities
report was instrumental in legitimizing the heredity thesis. The roots
of deviance were no longer located in the dark, wretched alleyways of
the urban, industrial community, but, rather, deviance arose within the
bodily fluids that flowed through the consanguineous lines of kinship.
For Howe and Sandborn, "The causes of evil are manifold, but among the
immediate ones, the chief cause is inherited organic imperfection--
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vitiated constitution--or poor stock."16 Heredity played an important
role in determining deviance and dependency by bequeathing children who
lacked "vital force" and who "tended to vice."
Children may fall short of the average amount of vital
force, and may be feeble in body and mind, in consequence
of a low or vitiated condition of parentage.17
But such conditions were not purely deterministic:
. . . all these tendencies may be measurably controlled;
and man's reason is given partly that he may control them.
In a few generations with temperate life and wisely assorted
marriage, the morbid conditions disappear--the median line
is regained. 18
The dragon of predestination, put finally to rest in the reforms of the
1820's, arose again, although with less virility, as genetic
predetermination. People were not destined to deviance. The
predisposition to deviance was carried through the generations of "poor
stock." But this predisposition was not immutable. A few generations
of moral living might cleanse away the evil from the blood line. Yet,
more importantly, the continued practice of immoral living might seal in
the predisposition into a blood line that might otherwise have remained
pure. That choice belonged to the individual. As evidence Howe and
Sandborn observed:
Our people are not ignorant of the existence of natural law,
in virtue of which the sins of the father are visited upon
the children to the third and fourth generation, but not many
consider that the consequences of violating the law are
16Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. xxii.
17Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. xxix.
18Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, pp. xxix, xxxii.
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inevitable. . . . Nothing else accounts satisfactorily for
the fearful mortality among children, especially in the
least favored classes, or explains why, as a general rule, one
half of every thousand born in the class will die before they
are seven years old.19
While such inferences may appear sloppy by today's standards, the reliance
on a scientific research approach lay at the core of the heredity thesis.
The theory grew directly from phrenology, eugenics and the new
empiricism associated with Adolphe Quetelet and A. M. Guerry in their
studies of European crime statistics.20 But, of even greater importance,
was the new popular interest in biology and natural evolution which
followed directly from the publication of Origin of the Species in 1859.
The new evolutionary hypothesis took on ideological meaning as Herbert
Spenser developed it into a metaphor for all social development. Social
Darwinism both legitimated the genetic theory of deviance and a laissez-faire
approach to social welfare.21  Prevention was a sensible precaution, but
19Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866, p. xxix.
20Phrenology, the science of predicting character and behavior by
studying the shape and protruberances of the skull, was popular in
Massachusetts during the 1830's and 1840's. George Combe, the leading
Scottish phrenologist, visited the Boston House of Reformation in 1838
and, there, met and greatly impressed Samuel Gridley Howe. See Mennel,
1974, p. 79. The works of Quetelet and Guerry were available in
Massachusetts after 1860 and they quickly set the standard for the
budding new discipline of criminology. For a good review of the early
theory of the new discipline see Arthur E. Fink, Causes of Crime
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938 The important
impact of phrenology is considered in John D. Davies, Phrenology: Fad
and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955) and the contributions
of eugenics are reviewed by Mark H. Haller in his Eugenics: Hereditarian
Attitudes in American Thought (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1964).
21The foundations of the laissez-faire approach to social welfare are
well developed by Samuel Mencher in Poor Law to Poverty Program
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), see especially
pp. 57-92.
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reformation was not only impossible, efforts toward reformation were
tamperings with the natural selection process of social development.
During the 1870's the heredity thesis grew more rigorous and
substantial as major studies were conducted to support and defend it.22
One of the first studies in Massachusetts to specifically relate the
development of children to youthful misbehavior was carried out by Henry
Pickering Bowditch, a Harvard physiologist who pioneered the study of
juvenile anthropometry. Beginning in 1872, Bowditch conducted a
twenty-year study of Boston school children and inmates of the Westborough
and Lancaster institutions. The study included an enormous volume of
statistics on the size, shape, strength and intellectual development of
delinquent and "normal" children, but did not draw pejorative conclusions
about those within the institutions. 23
During the post-Civil War period the heredity thesis grew
increasingly popular among those advocating a preventive approach to
youth corrections. It was more difficult for those working within the
reform schools to find easy acceptance. It appeared absurd to seek
reformation among inmates if their deviance resulted from genetic
imperfection. Yet, the thesis did have some effect within the institutions.
22Cesare Lombroso published L'Uomo delinquente (Milan: Hoepli, 1876) in
1876 postulating that the habitual criminal was a specific biological
typewhich represented an atavistic throwback to earlier more primitive
forms of the human species. Richard Dugdale published "The Jukes": A
Study of Crime, Pauperism, Disease and Heredity (New York: G. P. Putnam s
Sons, 1877) in 1877 demonstrating how one family had for four
generations produced progeny of ill repute and depraved character.
23For an interim report see Henry P. Bowditch, "The Growth of
Children," in Mass., State Board of Health, 8th A.R., 1877,
pp. 275-309.
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In 1887, the superintendent at Westborough wrote:
. . . it will be seen that a very large percent of those who have
made up the population of the school during the past year have been
living within the influence of intemperate homes. Cannot the old
adage "blood will tell," be illustrated on this connection? Is it
not one of the strong lessons of nature that an individual is only
in a limited degree what would be termed a free agent. He inherits
from his oarents moral qualities in the same way that he inherits
physical attributes, and it would seem to show that the sins are
not confined in their effect to themselves, but are "visited upon
the children to the third or fourth generation." 24
Unlike the practice of supervised placement, the heredity thesis
that arrived in Massachusetts with the establishment of the Board of State
Charities did not assume a companion position alongside the responses of
the asylum pattern. It did not so much replace the environmentally oriented
moral degeneracy thesis as it did offer competition in the causal menu.
There was little accommodation between the two paradigms. Both maintained
clear and distinct traditions. Throughout the late nineteenth century both
paradigms co-existed in a state of respectful controversy.25
5. The Placement Program of Response. During the second half of
the nineteenth century the scope of youth corrections policy broadened
from the reformation of delinquents to encompass preventive responses
directed toward avoiding the need for institutionalization. The
placement program of response arose as a response to the critique
leveled at the asylums by prominent post-bellum social reformers. The
24Henry E. Swan in Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 9th A.R.,
1887, p. 69.
25Mennel argues that before the 1890's the popularity of the heredity
thesis rested more on social prejudices against immigrants than on
scientific acceptance. The major impact of the scientific studies
-was not felt until the last decade of the century. See Mennel, 1973,
p. 91.
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critique was not based on the faulty performance of the reform schools
--that evaluation evidence was insufficient--but, rather, the critique
rested on a broader disagreement. The newer generation of social
activists believed that institutions were not a proper structure for
child care. Only in real families--preferably, upstanding farm families--
could the tendencies toward delinquency be arrested. The trick lay in
identifying delinquency-prone children early enough, either by family
condition or biological indicators, and intervening with placement and
trained supervision.
The key to the trick, it was hoped, lay in the growing understanding
of heredity. A propensity toward deviance was thought to flow along
kinship lines. Crimes and immoral acts committed during one generation
were assumed to have consequences in future generations. Children of the
poor, the sick and the criminal were likely candidates for delinquency.
The thesis firmly rooted the parens patriae doctrine that permitted the
state to single out specific children for early and radical intervention.
Yet the implications of the thesis could not easily be extended further
into practice. Supervised placement could not be expected to correct
genetic damage. Biological remedies such as surgical operations and
sterilizations followed easily from the thesis, but such practices were
abhorent to the humanitarian doctrines of men like Howe, Sandborn and
Tufts.26  Rather, the Massachusetts reformers steadfastly supported an
environmentally based response--the supervised placement--for a genetically
26Toward the close of the century such remedies as sterilization were
attempted on a small scale in Indiana and elsewhere, but these efforts
were generally condemned. See Mennel, 1973, p. 100.
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defined problem. Howe offered some heroic conceptual leaps in his
reports, such as the notion that moral living could cleanse immoral
character, but for the most part, the logic and coherency of the
relationship could not be satisfactorily stated. For all that it was
commonly espoused, the heredity thesis was never integrated into the
supervised placement program of response. It remained a theoretical
gloss over a practice which relied almost entirely upon the same basic
principles of orderliness, affection and discipline as found in the
institutional practice of moral reform. The supervised placement program
primarily represented a change in the structural and authority forms of
Massachusetts youth corrections. There was no fundamental innovation in
practical treatment.
Section II: Chapter E
EDUCATION AND THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL
1. Vocational Education as Practice. Education had fully arrived
in the reform schools as a tool of youth corrections by the 1890's. It
did not supplant moral reformation as practice, but, rather, each
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accommodated to the other. The State Reform School had clearly been
identified as a school from its founding in 1847 and teachers and
classrooms had existed all along, but that teaching had been simply rote
exercises tied to the traditional academic subjects. Only after the
Civil War, when public school education became "scientific" and geared
toward vocational expectations, was education seen as a force to combat
idleness and waywardness.
The teaching of vocational skills arrived in two waves:
industrial training and manual training. David Snedden, the progressive
Massachusetts Commissioner of Education, wrote of the reform schools:
It had to be confessed that the industries which had proved
feasible and financially profitable in the institutions were
not such as to lead to industrial efficiency outside.
. . . early in the seventies the pressure of a different
ideal was felt by the schools. This was, at first, in the
direction of teaching trades which would be of considerable
profit to the inmate, morally and vocationally, on his
leaving the school. . . .
Finally came the manual-training movement. . . . The justification
of manual training . . . is that it possesses a more highly
educative value along all industrial lines than does any other
vocational work which can be given to children. . . . it is
believed to stand to industrial education in somewhat the same
relationship that arithmetic does to the varities of business
practice.1
Manual training addressed fundamental cognitive and physical skills. It
was seen as a prerequisite to learning specific industrial skills, but it
differed from the earlier industrial education in that it self consciously
taught skills separate from production requirements. 2
1David S. Snedden, Administration and Education Work of American Juvenile
Reform Schools (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1907),
pp. 92-94.
2The distinction was critical and controversial for it struck at the
heart of the apprenticeship form of artisan training. It was argued
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The generation of the post-Civil War period did not face
industrialism with the same hostility as had its predecessors. In fact,
they accommodated to the rising industrial order by trying to shape it
positively.3 The ability to hold a job and to labor competently and
efficiently became a critical indicator of normality, especially for
young men. Where the earlier reformers looked to the moral and upright
boy as their symbol of success, the reformers of the 1890's looked for
the skilled and employable boy.
In 1884 the Trustees of the reform school stated this
distinction clearly:
Any effort at reform which does not furnish such industrial
training as shall at least lay the foundation for some trade
or occupation is fatally defective. Persons not so equipped,
however good the intentions are very likely to drift back into
the old vicious criminal life and frequently are compelled to
do so. 4
The period marked most heavily by the education idiom at the Lyman School
extends across the long tenure of Superintendent Theodore F. Chapin who
held office from 1888 until his death in 1906. In 1889 Chapin introduced
the Swedish or Sloyd system of manual training exercises. A year later
that manual training would provide a youth with a well rounded skill
base which would permit vocational mobility, inventiveness and
entrepreneurship. See the history of manual training in Berenice
M. Fisher, Industrial Education: American Ideas and Institutions
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), especially pp. 66-77.
3Arthur Mann's study of late nineteenth century social reformers begins
noting: "Out of the urban and industrial revolutions came a fresh crop
of Bostonians to fashion conceptions of social reform for the machine age.
The smelting pot of the common milieu made them speak the same language
of rendering life more meaningful for the underprivileged." See his
Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1954), pp. 22-23.
4Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 6th A.R., 1884, p. 10.
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Chapin introduced the Swedish Ling system of physical gymnastics and the
military drill as a form of exercise. Both the Sloyd and the Ling system
were constructed as a sequence of individually mastered skills designed
from quite specific educational objectives and organized to permit
individually paced development.
Each of these programs proved popular among the boys and the
Trustees. 5 The emphasis on the education of the body fit well under the
heredity thesis while easily accommodating the principles of moral reform.
In 1892 the Trustees noted:
An integral element in the school system is the military drill
(all in uniform and armed with real swords and muskets), and
the physical culture drill after the Swedish or Ling system.
The latter is practiced daily, and is admirably adapted to
developing obedience, promptness and self control. Such exercises
valuable to everyone, are especially so to those who, as in the
case with many criminals, have ill developed nervous centers. 6
In fact, it was through the Instructor of Physical Training that the
anthropomorphic studies, so popular at the time, were conducted.7  By 1898
5The Trustees offered great praise for each of these programs. They noted
that systematic physical exercises "may induce a boy who is viciously
inclined to treat his body with decency and care, thus contributing a
most important element to his moral growth." See Mass., State Primary
and Reform Schools, 14th A.R., 1892, p. 14. Of the military drill they
noted that it "aids in securing prompt and cheerful obedience to commands,
not only on the drill ground, but elsewhere, to say nothing of
cultivating that erect, alert manly bearing so desired." See Mass.,
State Primary and Reform Schools, llth A.R., 1889, p. 9.
6Mass., State Primary and Reform Schools, 14th A.R., 1892, p. 14.
7The annual reports of the Instruction of Physical Training for this
period are filled with statistical records. The 1895 report includes
the results of a study of two groups of boys over a six-month period
comparing height, weight, girth of chest, waist, hips, thighs, calves,
and forearms and strength of chest, back, arms and legs all in metric
units. See Mass., Lyman and Industrial Schools, 1st A.R., 1895,
pp. 81-85.
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the famed Dr. Henry P. Bowditch was studying Lyman School boys and
advising upon the boys' physical condition.
Even as Superintendent Chapin championed education as reformative
practice, he also saw limits within the structural setting of the school.
The freedom of progressive education did not fit well in a prototype of
confinement.
There is an anomaly in the enforced detention of the boy who is
to be educated to the highest and freest use of his will. Modern
pedagogical ideas are at war with the very conditions under which
the boy is held. For the head of a reform school is set the
herculean task to find a method by which the boy shall be trained 8in just conception and use of liberty while in a state of bondage.
Chapin's dilemma, in fact, revealed the vulnerability of education as
practiced in a reform school. The question had been central to the
philosophy of all schooling since Horace Mann had advocated the development
of Massachusetts' common schools--"how does one free a child and shape him
at the same time?" 9 If moral shaping was a covert objective of public
school instruction, it was an overt objective of the reform school, and
in the reform school it remained a paramount dilemma.
Education made sense as a means to developing industrial skills
in reform school graduates. It made less sense as a means of correcting
children in confinement. Education was forward looking. Each youth was
approached as an ignorant child who one day must make a living in an
8Theodore Chapin in Mass., Lyman and Industrial Schools, 4th A.R., 1898,
p. 37.
9Lawrence Cremin follows this fundamental question from Horace Mann back
to Pestalozzi and Rousseau and, ultimately, to Plato. It remained a
primary dilemma of all moral instruction throughout the nineteenth century.
See Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in
American Education, 1867-1957 (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 11-12.
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industrial economy. Education was profoundly democratic as it asked
little of a youth's background and provided treatment similar to that
provided youth outside the institutional walls. Yet, the backward
blinders of education left it incapable of "correcting" something that
had gone wrong. Education remained insensitive and unresponsive to the
causes of youthful deviance. Preparation for the future, not correction
of abnormalities, underlay the idiom of education. For correctional
purposes moral reform yet remained the primary practice.
2. The Vocational Training School as Structure. The development
of education as reformative practice did not so much bring about changes
in the institutional structure of the youth correction institutions as
it did the internal organization. The institutions remained committed
to shelter, separation, confinement, and age and sex differentiation.
Internally, the cottage prorotype remained the primary mode of
organization, but, in part, it was compromised and adjusted to accommodate
an additional organization prototype--the vocational training school.
The school which Superintendent Chapin fought so hard to build
at Westborough during the 1890's expressed a new notion of centralization,
age grading and the classroom ideal. The advent of education brought
with it a critique of the cottage prototype. Superintendent Chapin and
the Trustees, while praising the cottage organization in some respects,
found the implied decentralization of education to be less than desirable.
Centralization became a key expression of the vocational training school.
Comparing the separate cottage organization of the institution
to a normal community the Trustees argued in their 1895 annual report:
Now the maintenance of eight ungraded schools in an outside
community having a school population of two hundred and fifty
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children, all living within a quarter of a mile circuit, would
be considered the height of folly from the point of view of
economy and efficiency.
This argument eventually proved persuasive and, in 1898, the legislature
authorized the construction of a central school building at the Lyman
School.
Centralization was tied closely to the principles of economy
and efficiency. The late nineteenth century was the seedbed of
scientific management. Industrialism, while maligned for its effects
upon the social order, was embraced for its rationalism and efficiency.
The public schools were experiencing a wave of school administrators bent
on rationalizing and economizing education.11  The efficiency of the
centralized school appealed to Chapin and he applied it to other of the
Lyman School functions. Having centralized the practice of education into
a common school, the Trustees went on to question other features of the
cottage prototype at Westborough.
The central laundry and kitchen are apparent departures from
the so called "cottage plan," but are not so in reality . . .
The essence of the cottage is the dividing of the boys into
small groups, in which close personal contact of masters and
pupils is possible; it is in the word, the "individualization"
of the boy and whether the cooking and washing are done in the
house or outside of it is of no consequence whatever.
An added footnote established the sex differentiated nature of these
functions:
Such is not the case in the girls reform school. Their 12training in housework is an important branch of education.
10Mass., Lyman and Industrial Schools, 1st A.R., 1895, p. 20.
11See Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962) and Michael B. Katz, Class,
Bureaucracy and the Public Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change
in America (New York: Praeger, 1971), Chap. 2.
12 Mass., Lyman and Industrial Schools, 5th A.R., 1899, p. 11.
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The age grading expressed in the school room advancement system
was a refinement on the age differentiation which underlay the original
reform school prototype. Both stemmed from the same desire to systematize
education through classifying youngsters by age and level of development.13
Classroom age grading simply became a further refinement in the
classification of youth. David Snedden notes:
In the work of the juvenile reform schools the idea of
classification carries with it the notion of segregation, even
isolation. The main purposes are, first, to prevent the
contamination of less hardened or less mature children by those
further advanced along undesirable lines; and, second, to make
it possible to adjust discipline, freedom and various educational
means to the more specific needs of classes, differing in their
character. . . . Classification, of course, had its beginning
with the establishment of children's prisons, for these were
organized primarily to prevent the contamination of children by
mature criminals. From that time to the present the process of
classifying children . . . has continued, until today the more
advanced of the schools manifest an extraordinary range of
division of children.14
Age grading not only recognized the differences in development and ability
within the institution's population, but, also, provided a clearly
visible status ladder for the practice of reformation. Advancement which
was based on merit in common schooling could be used as a reward for
the desired moral behavior in the reform school. The merit grading
of the early refuge was resurrected in the merit advancement of the reform
school vocational training school.
13Joseph Kett views age grading in the schools as an attempt to bring
order and control into nineteenth century schools and remove children
from the interference of industrial labor demands. See Joseph F. Kett,
"History of Age Grouping in America," in James S. Coleman, et. al.,
Youth: Transition to Adulthood (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1974), pp. 18-19.
14 Snedden, 1907, pp. 122-123.
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The classroom prototype was added to the family prototype as
an expression of internal structure. The classroom was more easily
obtainable in a reform school than was the family. By 1906 the Lyman
School offered eighteen different courses ranging from music instruction
to house painting and the school building had become the central focus
of the institution.15 The reform school classroom stood to the cottage
as the public school classroom stood to the family household.
The development of the vocational training school within the
reform schools served to create a tightening linkage between the reform
schools and the public schools. Increasingly, the staffs of these
separate institutions came to note their sharing of common problems.
Where the reform schools borrowed vocational education from the
developments of public education, the public schools borrowed the reform
school prototype for their disciplinary needs. In so doing, they
created an intermediary institution, the county truant school, modeled,
in large part, upon the reform school prototype. Compulsory attendance
created truancy and the problem of enforcement. State law permitted
"habitual truants" to be sent to Westborough, but in 1886 Boston
established its own institution, the Boston Parental School, as a
residential center for "habitual truants, absentees and school offenders." 16
By the 1890's the concept of an intermediate institution as a back-up to
enforcing proper public school behavior became widespread. County truant
schools appeared across the Commonwealth, funded by counties, but operated
15For course descriptions see "Superintendent's Report" in Mass.,
Lyman and Industrial Schools, 12th A.R., 1906.
16Mass., Acts of 1886, Ch. 282.
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under the supervision of the State Board of Education. 17 These institutions
operated much like small reform schools. They provided shelter, separation
and confinement and stressed moral reform and vocational education.
Together, the state reform schools and the county truant schools
became the prototypes for all vocationally oriented schools. During the
last decade of the nineteenth century the reform schools had become such
models of good vocational training schools that David Snedden could conclude
his survey of reform school education by stating, "However imperfect these
schools have accomplished their work, it is nevertheless true that they
represent to-day the most persistent, comprehensive, and effective
experiment in the domain of education that is available to the student."18
3. Ignorance, Heredity and Child Development. It would appear in
hindsight that education as a reformative practice should have inspired
a theory of delinquency causation based on ignorance. That no such
theory developed is due, in part, to the reluctance of education to
17At one point there were nine such institutions: Essex County Truant
School at Lawrence; Hampden County Truant School at Springfield;
Middlesex County Truant School at North Chelmsford; Norfolk, Bristol
and Plymouth Counties Truant School at Walpole; Suffolk County Truant
School (Boston Parental renamed) at West Roxbury; Worcester County
Truant School at Oakdale; Berkshire County Truant School at Becket;
Hampshire County Truant School at Goshen; and Bristol County Truant
School. The last three were operated for only a short period before
they were closed for lack of commitments.
18Snedden, 1907, p. 8. Michael Katz notes that the reform school was
the first and most advanced form of compulsory education in the
Commonwealth and that Massachusetts reformers looked to the reform
school as a model element in the state's education system. See
Katz, 1968, p. 164.
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recognize delinquents as unique and in need of special explanations and
is due, in part, to the continued dominance of the heredity thesis.
During the 1890's the fruits of positivist criminology had
fully ripened in America. The works of Lombroso, Tarde and Ferri were
well read and influential. Biological determinism was an accepted
tenet of the positivist tradition. By the turn of the century the
growing interest in eugenics, the science of improving human breeding,
had begun to mix with the heredity thesis and together they provided
scientific legitimacy to reactionary, nativistic impulses.19
In Massachusetts, the heredity paradigm was greatly tempered
by the influence of G. Stanley Hall and the child study movement. The
arrival of Hall at Clark University in 1889 marked a significant landmark
in the development of the theoretical approach to the cause of youthful
misconduct.20
Hall's basic thesis--the "general psychonomic law," which he
borrowed from Haeckel and Spenser--was that ontogeny, the development
of the individual organism, recapitulates phylogeny, the evolution of
19For the effects of the eugenics movement see Haller, 1964. A well
developed summary of the various scientific approaches to juvenile
delinquency during the late nineteenth century is provided in Mennel,
1973, pp. 78-101.
20Granville Stanley Hall (1844-1924) earned Harvard University's first
doctorate in psychology as a student under William James. He then
traveled to Germany to study in the laboratory of Wilhelm Wundt. In
1880 he accepted a position at Johns Hopkins University where he
established an important laboratory for the study of child development.
In 1899 he accepted the presidency of Jonas Clark's new university at
Worcester. From this position the prolific Hall spent the next thirty
years organizing research on child development and orchestrating the
child study movement. For a review of Hall's life and theory and
their impact see Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as
Prophet (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).
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the species. The individual child evolves through a series of stages
which correspond to the stages of human evolution from pre-savage to
civilized culture. The normal growth of the mind required that each
stage be lived through, for it, and it alone, contained the stimulus for
the emergence of the next stage. Hall regarded adolescence as a period
of "storm and stress" which must be lived through in order to achieve
the civilized self. This adolescent "crisis" was characterized by
"lack of emotional steadiness, violent impulses, unreasonable conduct
[and] lack of enthusiasm and sympathy. . . . The previous selfhood is
broken up . . . and a new individual is in the process of being born." 21
For Hall, much misbehavior and waywardness were to be expected
during this stage and he advised tolerance. He felt most adolescents
were "1more or less morally blind" and "essentially anti-social." "The
youth who go wrong," he wrote, were "in the majority of cases, victims
of circumstances or of immaturity, and deserving of pity and hope." 22
21G. Stanley Hall, "The Moral and Religious Training of Children,"
Princeton Review, 58:26-48 (January, 1882). This article long stood
as a landmark statement of the child study approach. Hall's theory
did not wear well with time. By the 1930's the study of adolescence
no longer bothered much with the recapitulation idea. Specifically,
the theory was impugned for: a) ignoring the influences of culture;
b) overemphasizing the importance of physiological functions in
adolescent development; c) viewing adolescence as turbulent due to
instinctual upheavals; and d) regarding the physical development of
adolescents as saltatory rather than gradual and continuous. See his
Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relation to Physiology,
Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, 2 vols.
(New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1904). For a sympathetic review see
Robert E. Grinder and Charles E. Strickland, "G. Stanley Hall and the
Social Significance of Adolescence," Teachers College Record, 64:390-
399 (February, 1963).
22G. Stanley Hall , Youth: Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene (New YorK:
D. Appleton, 1906), p. 135.
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The determinents of youthful deviance lay in the predetermined evolution
of the child's natural growth and in large part it represented a passing
condition.
Whereas Hall interpreted his thesis with hope for the future of
troubled adolescents, his students were less positive.23 George Dawson,
for instance, was hardly optimistic in his study of Massachusetts' reform
school youth. Dawson carried out an empirical study of the anthropomorphic,
physiological, sensory and mental aspects of sixty inmates of the Lyman
School and the Industrial School for Girls and a comparable group of
Worcester public school children. On many indicators, including size of
head, breadth of face, symmetry of ears, intelligence scores and
ability to work attentively through written tests, there was a
statistical difference between reform school and public school children.
Dawson concluded that, indeed, many reform school inmates were defective.
"In them," he wrote, "some at least of the forces of development are
acting retrogressively." Therefore:
Like tens of thousands of their kind throughout the world, they
will spend their lives in state institutions or under police
surveillance. They are out of harmony with their environment
and are . . . incapable of meeting the demands of a
civilization that exists only by assimilating the good and
eliminating the bad. 24
23J. Adams Puffer saw in the delinquent gang "an ancient virtue of
savagery" and Maxamillian Grossman saw youthful criminality as
"probably due to some form of arrested development during the
pubertal stage" which resulted in a "savage condition of mind." See
J. Adams Puffer, The Boy and His Gang (Cambridge: Houghton, Mifflin,
1912) and Maxamillian Grossman, "Criminality in Children," Arena,
22:235-237 (October, 1896). The quotations are from Mennel, 1973,
p. 82, and Hawes, 1971, p. 215.
24George E. Dawson, "A Study of Youthful Degeneracy," in Pedagogical
Seminary, 4:243-245 (December, 1896).
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The heredity paradigm which was heralded in Massachusetts by
Howe and Sandborn just following the Civil War grew and blossomed in the
Commonwealth under the anthropomorphy of H. P. Bowditch and the
developmental psychology of G. Stanley Hall. During this period, the
scientific, particularly empirical, approach to theory building was
firmly established, criminology became an accepted field of study, the
study of youthful misbehavior was closely linked to the study of normal
child development, and adolescence as a research category was clearly
separated from childhood and adulthood.
Yet for all the research and rhetoric the heredity thesis had
little direct effect on reformative practice. Heredity was frequently
acknowledged as one factor contributing to delinquency, but most
practitioners avoided giving it a central place.
G. Stanley Hall's evolutionary psychology, Lombrosian criminology,
eugenics--these sciences led the study of juvenile delinquency
into a cul-de-sac. Scholars who employed them reached generally
negative conclusions about the possibilities of reforming
delinquent children. Even the refutation of extreme determinism
by Boas and others did not lead to organized programs. Lombroso's
positivism shifted the focus of criminological study from crime
to the individual criminal or delinquent, but this new concern
was hardly compassionate; that is the individual delinquent
found little in this approach to give him hope. For while
scientific studies of criminals and delinquents were based upon
empirical observation and measurement, their pessimistic
conclusions tended to categorize the subjects as unfit for
philanthropic concern. 25
Moral reform and education remained the major idioms of organized practice.
Theory which did not support their relevance could not be accepted. The
heredity thesis was fundamentally anti-environmental in substance and too
close to the predestination paradigm of earlier times. Such a thesis
2 5Mennel, 1973, p. 100.
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appeared to render moral and social reform absurd. It simply could not
support an acceptable youth corrections policy.
4. The Vocational Education Program of Response. The vocational
training school had a significant impact on the asylum. Internally, it
served to mitigate some of the extreme decentralization of structure
mandated by the cottage system of organization. Through the establishment
of the centralized school, Chapin was able to reassert the immediate
involvement of the superintendent in reformatory practice, a function which
had been all but lost with the decentralization of the cottage system.
Within the wider community, the addition of the vocational training school
elevated the public image of the reform school to the level of a public
secondary school. The school became viewed more as a state experimental
laboratory for advancing vocational training than as a state correctional
institution for detaining and punishing young rogues. This more positive
public image helped to legitimate the institution as an acceptable place
to send young misdemeanents. These more tractable youngsters created the
youthful fix necessary to build the morally upright and self-regulating
community that Theodore Lyman and the early superintendents had envisioned.
The close association between the institution and the state
educational system introduced the professional teacher as an agent in
responding to youthful deviance. The teacher joined the warden and the
superintendent as an equal staff member, but different from them: the
teacher was a specially trained professional. The advent of the teacher
in the Massachusetts reform schools during the 1880's marks the beginning
of the inroads of professionalism in youth corrections.
161
Yet for all that the vocational training school affected the
asylum, education was never fully accepted as reformative practice. The
heredity thesis remained the paramount causal explanation of deviance.
Like the practice of supervised placement, education could not be
expected to correct genetic maldevelopment. Yet education never developed
its own theory of ignorance as a cause of deviance. Without such a
theory, education was not a reasonable means for correcting deviance. At
best, education meant no more than the training of youth for a vocation.
All that could reasonably be hoped was that a highly skilled youth with
good work habits would find plenty of work and, therefore, become
invulnerable to the temptations of vice and crime. Education never
became a central practice of reformation precisely because it never
responded to deviance. As a social response it simply was not relevant
to the social problem as it was then defined and it never seriously
attempted to reformulate the social problem. Thus, education was simply
grafted onto the stalk of moral reform as a maintenance service of the
reform school much like feeding, clothing and guaranteeing the good
health of the reform school inmates. The educational program of response
was fundamentally incomplete. It resulted in the addition of new forms
and new practices in the institutional setting, but it never seriously
challenged the traditional forms or practice as the dominant reformative
policy.
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Section II: Chapter F
CHILD PROTECTION AND THE JUVENILE COURT
1. Juvenile Delinquency and Legal Procedure. The 1906 legislation
that established the Boston Juvenile Court was procedurally significant
because it marked a clear reform in legal practice. Early legal practice
had not defined delinquency nor differentiated clearly among youth who
received corrective services.1
During the last half of the nineteenth century the Massachusetts
courts incrementally developed procedure differentiation in the handling
of youth and adult cases. Legislation in 1860 made special provisions for
the presence of an adult representative in cases involving children.
Where neither the father, mother or guardian could be located, the court
could appoint a suitable person.2 Legislation in 1882 removed youths
unable to raise bail from pre-trial detention in adult settings.
Instead, such youth were to be referred to an agent of the State Board of
Health, Lunacy and Charity. 3
1 Earlier definitions were primarily informal statements of aggregates.
The House of Reformation was to admit "all such children who shall be
convicted of criminal offenses, or taken up and committed under and by
virtue of an act of this Commonwealth for suppressing and punishing of
rogues, vagabonds, common beggars and other idle, disorderly and lewd
persons." In addition the institution was to accept "all children who
live an idle or dissolute life, whose parents are dead, or if living,
from drunkedness, or other vices, neglect to provide any suitable
employment, or exercise any salutary control over said children." See
Mass., Acts of 1826, Ch. 183.
2The representative was to appear at the trial to "show cause, if any
there be, why said child shall not be committed." Mass., Acts of 1860,
Ch. 75.
3 Mass., Acts of 1882, Ch. 127.
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The 1906 legislation went well beyond these embryonic procedural
reforms. It took a new philosophical position. The child was no longer
to be handled as a junior criminal and the procedure was no longer to
take the form of criminal proceedings. The preamble of the new law read:
This act shall be liberally construed to the end that the care,
custody, and discipline of the children brought before the
court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they
should receive from their parents, and that, as far as possible,
they shall be treated not as criminals, but as children in need
of aid, encouragement and guidance.4
The youth was to be handled in an informal "hearing" rather than a trial.
A youth would not be found "guilty" but, rather, "delinquent."
Delinquency carried no criminal sanctions. Rather than punishment, a
youth was to be provided assistance and guidance. The court was to act
in parens patriae and to render decisions "in the best interests of the
child." 5 To the degree possible the child's reputation was to be
protected. The hearings were conducted in relative privacy and the
judicial records were not generally available to the press. The hearings
were informal, standards of evidence were loose and due process safeguards
were waived because of the non-criminal character of the court.
Age differentiation was a clear intention of the 1906 juvenile
court act. It resulted from earlier efforts to provide legal separation
between children and adults, but, like the correctional institutions, it
4Mass., Acts of 1906, Ch. 413.
5See Gustave L. Schramm, "The Juvenile Court Idea," Federal Probation
13:19-23 (September, 1949). An extensive critique of the doctrine of
parens patria is included in Francis A. Allen, The Borderland of
Criminal Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). The
paternalism of the "in the best interests of the child" philosophy is
offered an equally extensive critique in Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud
and Albert Solent, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (New York:
Free Press, 1973).
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took some time to settle on the proper age of demarcation. While an 1860
law had set sixteen as the maximum age for childhood, an 1870 law raised
it to seventeen.6 The 1906 law set the age at sixteen but a new law in
1931 raised the age to seventeen again.7
The court served to formalize in judicial practice the
protective ideal in responding to children. The focus of the court's
hearings did not rest on the proving of the commitment of a deviant act,
but, rather, on the extent of a pre-criminal condition in the character
and social background of the child. The court examination included
personal motivation as well as criminal intent and moral reputation as
well as the nature of the offense. Judge Baker proudly wrote:
The court does not confine its attention to just the particular
offense which brought the child to its notice. For example, a
boy who comes to court for some such trifle as failing to wear
his badge when selling papers may be held on probation for
months because of difficulties at school; and a boy who comes
in for playing on the street may . . . be committed to a reform
school because he is found to have habits of loafing, stealing
or gambling.8
Judge Baker's court looked past the deviant act. The central question
was: how much is the condition of the child one which requires the
intervention of the state? The result of a delinquency determination
in the juvenile court was similar to a dependency or neglect finding in
the probate court. The state assumed a paternal role. Advice, guidance,
service and supervision were offered all but the most vicious youth.
6Mass., Acts of 1860, Ch. 75 and Acts of 1870, Ch. 359.
7Mass. , Acts of 1931, Ch. 217.
8 Harvey Humphrey Baker, "Procedure of the Boston Juvenile Court,"
Survey 23:643-652 (February, 1910), p. 649.
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These remaining youth, no matter what their age, were not to be treated
as juveniles or by the juvenile court. They were to be "bound over" to
Superior Court. 9 The juvenile court expelled retribution from responses
to youth. The retributive ideal was only to meet youth who were no
longer considered young.
The juvenile court was distinctly a Boston institution. The
Boston Juvenile Court was the only such special institution established
under the 1906 law. In other jurisdictions special "juvenile sessions"
were authorized in which trial justices sat in informal delinquency
hearings to consider cases brought against children. These trial
justices typically were not specially trained in the new orientation of
child protection. Cases were frequently held in the same courtroom as
adult sessions and the informality of the proceeding was not always to
the youth's advantage. While the focus of the new juvenile court law
centered on the Boston court, most youth brought before the courts of
the Commonwealth were heard in juvenile sessions of regular adult courts. 10
This discrepancy seemed not to have been highly significant to the Boston
reformers. The focus of child saving was on the urban immigrant child
and the locus of child saving charities was Boston. The value of the
Boston Juvenile Court was as much in offering a symbolic center to the
Boston child saving charities as it was in relieving adult courts of
9Children under fourteen could not be bound over except for "an offence
punishable by death or imprisonment for life." Mass., Acts of 1906, Ch 413.
10In 1915, 967 cases were begun in the Boston Juvenile Court while
5393 cases were begun in juvenile sessions. See Mass., Commissioners
of Prisons, 15 A.R., 1915, Tables, pp. 148-151. See also Figure 3.
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children or formalizing a protective orientation in the judicial
handling of children.
2. Child Protection and the Private Child Saving Charities.
Prior to the Civil War there were relatively few private formal charitable
agencies specifically directed to deviant and dependent children. Those
that did exist were significant, in their impact on charity and
philanthropic activities.11 The Boston Asylum and Farm School was the
only private institution particularly devoted to offering reformative
services to wayward youth prior to the war. 12
The role of the private charities was more developed in the
preventive services. In 1834 the Boston Children's Friend Society was
incorporated. 13 From its beginning the society maintained a home for
neglected children of both sexes first on Sheafe Street and, after 1845,
on Rutland Street. In 1885 a separate home for older boys was opened in
11The first institution specifically established for youth was the Boston
Female Asylum established for "the relief of female orphans ages 3-10"
in 1800. The Boston Asylum for Indigent Boys was established in 1814.
The Boston Young Men's Benevolent Association was founded in 1827
followed by the St. Vencent's Orphan Asylum in 1831, the Boston
Children's Friend Society in 1833, the Farm School in 1835, the New
Bedford Orphan Home in 1843, and Worcester Children's Friend Society
and the Boston Children's Mission to the Children of the Destitute in
1849 and the Nickerson Home for Children in Boston in 1850. A complete
listing can be found in Mass., State Board of Charity, 22nd A.R., 1900.
12A second such institution, the Plummer Farm School for Boys, was
established at Salem in 1855. The Boston Asylum and Farm School
changed its policy in 1860 and, thereafter, became more of a preventive
agency focused on dependent children.
13This organization developed from the efforts of several prominent Boston
women who found the public accommodations for neglected children
unacceptable. Reverend William Collier, a city missionary, and several
"female societies for missionary purposes" organized a joint meeting in
1833 at which the new association was formed. See Boston Children's
Friend Society, 80th A.R., 1914, p. 9.
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suburban Dedham. The Society relied heavily upon residential care and
indenturing. Parents signed papers of release, but these had no legal
binding and the Society was continually fighting with parents and relatives
over the right of supervision.
In 1849 a Children's Friend Society was opened in Worcester,
the Children's Mission to the Children of the Destitute was opened in
Boston and, the following year, the Nickerson Home for Children was opened
in Boston. Each of these institutions followed the same practice of
residential care followed by indenture first pioneered by the Boston
Children's Friend Society. Yet increasingly the system fell into
disfavor. When Howe, Sandborn and their associates developed their
critique of institutional care, they included the private charities in
their indictment. The Children's Friend Societies and the Children's
Mission, in particular, were overtly missionary in their approach. To
the Catholic community they appeared as eager to prevent the spread of
Catholicism as the deviance of children and this concern created
significant animosity.14 Finally, the economic depressions of the 1870's
resulted in an overabundance of neglected children which far exceeded
the residential capacities of the private charities. 15
14Following the war, the private charities became segregated by religion.
The Boston Children's Friend Society refused to accept any more Catholic
children. In 1859 the Church Home for Orphaned and Destitute Children
was opened under Episcopal aegis in South Boston and in 1864 the
Association for the Protection of Destitute Roman Catholic Children in
Boston was founded. A Jewish home, the Helping Hand Temporary Home
for Destitute Children, was opened in 1899. See Mass., State Board of
Charity, 22nd A.R., 1900.
15Nathan I. Higgins suggests there were other reasons for this
disenchantment as well. The private charities appeared capricious
in whanthey accepted. Catholics, blacks and illegitimates were
often discriminated against. Indentures proved harder to come by
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The period between 1865 and 1900 witnessed a major expansion in
the number and diversity of private charities in Massachusetts directed
at the plight of children. 16 Out of this growth appeared a new form of
preventive practice most commonly referred to as child rescue or child
saving. The founding of the Boston Children's Aid Society in 1865 marks
the beginning of this transition. 17 During the early period this new
Society bought and operated Pine Farm at West Newton. The farm was to
be a family, not an institution. It became a temporary home as the focus
of child saving practice shifted toward the supervised placement of
children in farm families. Critical to this practice was the "friendly
visiting agent" employed by the Society after 1883. Volunteer visiting
agents increasingly became important as the Society began to supervise
children in their own homes. By the 1890's the Society had developed a
during the antebellum economic depressions. Indenturing girls was
also risky, particularly in households where the husbands or sons
proved aggressive. Higgins offers one of the few adequate studies
of the development of Boston's private charities. See his "Private
Charities in Boston, 1879-1910" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass., 1962).
16In 1865 the Boston Children's Aid Society and the New England Home for
Little Wanderers were founded. In 1869 the Boston Young Women's Christian
Association opened, followed by the House of the Good Shepherd in Roxbury
in 1870, the Children's Home of Fall River in 1873, the Massachusetts
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in 1878, the Hampden
County Children's Aid Society in 1880, the Boston Working Boys' Home in
1884, the Boys' Institute of Industry in 1885, the Boston Girls' Friendly
Society Home in 1887, the Worcester Boys' Club in 1890, the Boston Working
Girls' Home in 1892, the Bunker Hill Boys' Club in 1894, and the Elizabeth
Peabody Home in 1896. See Mass., State Board of Charity, 22nd A.R., 1900.
17The Boston Children's Aid Society arose out of concern for the fate of
boys locked up at the Suffolk County House of Correction. The chaplain,
Rufus Cook, and several others organized the Society to accept boys
transferred from the prison into their care. See Higgins, 1962,
p. 202.
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highly diverse system of preventive care based on supervised work with
children in their own homes, supervised work with children in placements
and some residential care at the Society farms.18 With this diversity
it became possible to specifically tailor responses to the individual
needs of each youth. Such non-institutional child-saving became widely
accepted. The Children's Friend Societies and the various religious
charities followed the Children's Aid Society in adopting supervised
placement or home visitation as the preferred policy. By 1890 supervised
placement had become the accepted practice of most of the major private
charities of Boston.
The transition toward child protection begun as child saving
under the Children's Aid Society was carried into full practice by the
Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. This
third major society was established in 1878 in order to focus attention
upon child abuse and neglect and to use legal and legislative channels
to rescue exposed children. The Society maintained a temporary home
for children, and engaged in supervised placement, but the Society also
went further. The early directors envisioned the Society as a children's
advocate devoted to securing laws for the protection of children and making
certain of their enforcement.
18Higgins, 1962, p. 217. Additional farms were purchased in Westborough
and Foxborough.
19The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was established
through the efforts of several wealthy Boston women including
Sara W. Thorndike and Kate Garnett Wells. Originally chartered as the
Massachusetts Children's Protective Society in 1877, the organization
was renamed after the successful New York agency upon which it was
modeled. See Ray S. Hubbard, Crusading for Children, 1878-1943: The
Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
Boston, Mass., 1943.
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The rescue of exposed children was carried out through
legislative, legal and community action. The Society pressed for and
achieved legislation regulating the development of "baby farms," the
public display of deformed children, the importation of kidnapped
children as gymnasts, actors or beggars, the employment of truants as
newsboys and several other measures concerning child labor. The Society
used litigation in addressing hundreds of cases of child abuse and
neglect. By the turn of the century the Massachusetts Society broke
with other state chapters in expanding beyond child rescue to pursue
the organizing of preventive activities at the community level. This
break was significant because it committed the Massachusetts agency to a
community action strategy which few other agencies had dared to try. In
1907 the Society sealed this commitment by hiring a state-wide secretary
to help local communities form district chapters and by 1918 there were
twenty-seven local chapters across the Commonwealth. 20 These local chapters
served to awaken community interest and concern over the plight of
children and to organize local action to address abuses and change
institutional practices. 21
20 Hubbard, 1943, p. 26.
21Local communities were frequently found to be blind to local problems.
The first task of Society agents, then, was to transform the objective
conditions into a recognized social problem. Ray Hubbard writes:
"Mrs. Alice B. Montgomery . . . pioneered protective work in
Western Massachusetts. She possessed a dynamic personality
and thorough understanding of social work. Connecticut Valley
and Berkshire towns never dreamed that bad conditions existed
in their midst. But Mrs. Montgomery stirred them into action;
and as a result of her indefatigable endeavors, the Hampshire,
Berkshire and Franklin District organizations were founded."
See Hubbard, 1943, p. 26.
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As the emphasis in the Society's title shifted from "cruelty"
to "prevention," child saving emerged as child protection.
Child protection is a distinct form of social service to children.
. . . It aims to obtain results through advice, persuasion and
parental education, but, when necessary to take extreme
measures, its agencies are equipped for the effective use of
compulsion, discipline or punishment through a personnel trained
in the use of law and legal machinery for a social purpose. It
is the function of child protection to work for the elimination
or improvement of bad community conditions adversely affecting
child and family life. 22
Child protection focused upon the community in a direct way. Exposed
children were to be protected, but the means did not require separation
or confinement. Legal, legislative and community forces were to be
rallied to guarantee "the establishment of wholesome standards of family
life and the protection of childhood." 23
The rise of child protection as the dominant practice among
Massachusetts' private charities was paralleled by the rise of
professional social work. The debate over professionalism in youth
correction services had arisen as early as the 1870's when Howe and
Sandborn became critical of Gardiner Tufts's handling of the Office of the
State Visiting Agent. Among their concerns was Tufts's efforts to create
a highly professional office with full-time salaried agents instead of
relying on volunteer "charity workers." 24 The charity organizations
involved in child saving work often stressed the value of the volunteer
22Quoted in Hubbard, 1943, p. 38.
23 Hubbard, 1943, p. 38.
24 Wirkkala, 1973, p. 244.
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friendly visitors. The personal advice and guidance of the volunteer
visitor raised charity from mere alms-giving to a differentiated
scientific benevolence.25
But this faith in the personal character of volunteers did not
last into the twentieth century. With the advent of child protection the
moral supervision of the Children's Aid Society was replaced by the
gathering of social data. Diagnosis and prognosis were to become expert
functions founded on scientifically gathered data. The needs of the
"whole child" required the special knowledge of professionals. The
friendly visitor was replaced by the salaried case worker.26 Special
training was required to guarantee professional service either in a
professional social work school or by the Society, which developed a
two-year program designed to transmit that "understanding, proper
interpretation and treatment of individuals in need which is the task of
25In his analysis, Roy Lubove writes:
"Rejecting alms as an expression of the benevolent instinct, the
charity organization societies swung to the opposite extreme and
exalted the beneficial potentialities of personal relationship.
The urban poor required no resource so desperately as the
counsel of an intelligent and kind friend, whose primary
qualifications for the work were not technical but personal--
'all possible sympathy, tact, patience, cheer, and wise advice.'
Paid professionals lacked the spontaneity and zeal of volunteers."
See his The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a
Career 1880-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 12-13.
26 "The Society's high regard for casework skill evolved directly
from its emphasis on differential treatment, and it urged
contributors to consider 'the maintenance of a high standard
of service essential, even if such means a definite limiting
of work.' Not quantity, but quality counted, and the Society
tried to restrict each worker to forty or forty-five cases."
See Lubove, 1965, p. 44.
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a trained social worker."27 The growing professionalism spawned
professional organizations and in 1913 the Massachusetts Child Welfare
Committee was formed to coordinate the activities of some twenty-five
private agencies concerned with children.
The early child saving charities of the nineteenth century
inaugurated a new approach to private philanthropy in which intelligent,
efficient service to dependent children and families replaced the paternal
benevolence of wealthy donors with overtly missionary goals. Yet this new
scientific philanthropy could never be reconciled with the faith in the
personal character of the volunteer. As questions of skill and technique
influenced private charities after 1900, the value of voluntary service
was seriously questioned. Professional child protection required functional
specialization and the presumption of expertise.28 Child protection, as
the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children recognized, must go
beyond merely child rescue. The conditions which produced deviant and
dependent children lay in the community in which they were raised.
Prevention could no longer focus solely on the vulnerable and exposed
child; it required a direct assault on the malevolent conditions of the
community. But this recognition, first noted in 1907, was yet premature.
3. The State Supervisory Board. The last decades of the nineteenth
century also marked a change in the state administrative structure. As the
27Boston Children's Aid Society, 53rd A.R., 1917, p. 10, quoted in Lubove,
1965, p. 44. The New York School of Social Work opened in 1898 and the
Boston School for Social Workers was opened in 1904.
28Lubove, 1965, p. 49.
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state developed more and more costly welfare institutions, the legislature
increasingly began to look for more efficiency in organizing these
services. The Board of State Charities carried out a protracted battle
with the trustees of the various institutions attempting to rationalize
and co-ordinate their functions, but the Board was restricted in its
authority: oversight could have just so much effect.
Increasingly centralization became seen as the means of
achieving efficiency. In the Reorganization Act of 1879 the legislature
abolished the separate Board of State Charities, the State Board of
Health and the nine separate boards in charge of the various welfare
institutions and created in their place a central State Board of Health,
Lunacy and Charity.29 This new State Board consisted of nine unpaid
members and a paid staff. Oversight of the two reform schools and the
State Primary School at Monson, the state institution for dependent
children, was merged into one seven-member Board of Trustees of the
State Primary and Reform Schools. While these new boards represented
a major reorganization in state authority structure, in other policy
matters there was little change. 30 The reorganization resulted in
29See Mass., Acts of 1879, Ch. 29. This same centralization occurred in
other services as well. In 1879 the supervision of all adult
correctional institutions was placed under a central Board of
Commissioners of Prisons. Supervision of the institutions for the
instruction of the deaf, dumb and blind had been centralized under
the State Board of Education in 1875.
30This was due in large part to the retention of personnel through the
reorganization. Six of the nine State Board members had served on
the previous boards. The chairman of the new State Board had been
chairman of the Board of State Charities. Many of the major staff
members also made an easy transition, including Frank Sandborn, who
was named Inspector of Charities.
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little disruption or change in the administrative procedures or daily
functioning of the reform schools.
In 1870 the Board of State Charities began an effort to bring
the various private charities under state control. The board recommended
no further construction of state institutions. Instead, the board
recommended offering subsidies to private charities with the proviso
that the state assume a share of the directorates of these agencies.31
But the vast centralization of the State Board proved to be
too great. One board could simply not effectively establish policy
discretion over so many services and such a wide range of institutions.
The early years of the State Board were filled with administrative
conflict and political controversy. 32
In 1886 the legislature commenced dismantling the State Board
by separating out the health functions and re-establishing the State
Board of Health. The residual Board of Lunacy and Charity settled into
31See Mass., Board of State Charities, 7th A.R., 1871, p. lxvi.
Kelso sees this provision as critical for without it the Commonwealth
would have embarked "upon that same troubled sea of public subsidies
which has left the States of New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland,
among other virtually at the mercy of a swarm of lobbying directorates,
seeking by all means known to politics to secure a share of the State
grants." See Kelso, 1922, p. 152.
32Much of this resulted from an overly hostile governor. Benjamin F.
Butler campaigned for governor with open attacks on the State Board.
He advocated the Board be replaced by a civil service administrative
agency with a single administrator. See William D. Mallam,
"Butlerism in Massachusetts," New England Quarterly, 33:186-206
(June 1960).
33For an excellent history of the board, see Barbara G. Rosenkrantz,
Public Health and the State: Changing Views in Massachusetts
1842-1936 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).
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a less turbulent career with little change and ever-increasing professional
competence, bureaucratic rationality and national pre-eminence. 34
4. The Child Protection Program of Response. Child protection was
a central theme of the progressive era. 35 Protection, a principle which had
underlain the founding of the refuge and reform school, during the 1890's
became a defense against the abuses of laissez faire capitalist industrialism
particularly upon the lives of the poor and immigrant child. The child
saving activities of the late nineteenth century were guided by the protection
metaphor. The courts and the legislatures became the focus of the new
practice. The particularistic approach to saving specific children was
replaced by the universal prevention of abuse for all children.
In so doing the new court re-integrated the policy distinction
between deviant and dependent children. Delinquency was defined in
practice as a condition like dependency. The paternalistic and nurturant
practices advanced in the services to neglected and abandoned children
were extended to the delinquent. The key feature lay in probation.
Probation was to be to prevention as commitment was to reformation. It
was the legal and social basis upon which services could be rendered.
34In 1898 a separate State Board of Insanity was created. With the removal
of responsibility for the insane, the remaining board was reorganized as
the State Board of Charities. Robert Kelso, who served as Secretary of the
State Board of Charities from 1910 to 1919, claimed that continuity of
service through long tenure of office by qualified public-spirited
citizens made the Massachusetts board one of the two best in the nation.
See Kelso, 1922, p. 156.
35Robert H. Wiebe claims, "If humanitarian progressivism had a central
theme, it was the child. He united the campaigns for health, education,
and a richer city environment, and he dominated much of the interest in
labor legislation." See Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p.
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The Juvenile court was both a source of this development and
a product of it. The new court resurrected and extended the old chancery
provisions of the British common law and significantly expanded the
parens patriae doctrine. The restatement of the protectorate function
of the state over minors further reinforced the long-established
presumption of innocence thrown about children by the common law.36
Protection rendered the child as victim and buttressed the image of the
adult as defender, guardian and conservator. The victim-defender
relationship was ripe for the development of legal practice and legal
practice only further legitimized the protective intervention of the state.
The mechanism for the intervention was probation. Probation
was to be preventive much as supervised placement had been, although it
would seek to keep juveniles in their own family. It mixed the
administrative function of verification through periodic checks and
the absence of adverse reports with the meliorative practice of
casework treatment in order to prevent the child's further slide into
criminality.37 Yet probation was also something more than intended
under the protection principle. Probation officers became agents of
the court, and while the early judges attempted to maintain the child
protection stance, the probation officers, who quickly moved from
volunteer status to that of paid professionals, became the court's
informers. Research and fact-gathering became guises for spying. The
36See Robert G. Caldwell, "The Juvenile Court: Its Development and
Some Major Problems," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police
Science, 51 :493-511 (January, 1961).
37 See Diana Lewis, "What is Probation?" Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology and Police Science, 51:189-204 (July, 1960).
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mix between meliorative treatment and inquisition stretched the foundations
of trust and rendered much probation incredible.
For at root probation was coercive: behind its friendly facade
lay the sterner judge, the commitment and the reform school. And the
reform school was indeed a prison now. The juvenile court, probation and
the private charities generally diverted away the more tractable
youth and, like a great gate-keeper, permitted only the more hardened
to pass on into institutional confinement. While the Lyman School and
the newer Industrial School for Boys at Shirley which opened in 1909
operated efficiently, effectively and with little public disruption,
few did not recognize the life-chilling stigma of their reputations.
The Boston Juvenile Court held firmly to its central child
protection mission under Judges Baker and Cabot. Yet the years which
followed Cabot's death saw the court's solid preventive reputation slowly
sink to the same ambivalence with which most practitioners regarded
the "juvenile sessions" functioning throughout the remainder of the state.
Being "sent to juvenile court," being adjudicated "a juvenile delinquent,"
being "on probation" achieved the same public stigma as once was reserved
only for those committed to the reform school.
By the late 1930's the Boston Juvenile Court was considered as
a dilemma. Part social service agency, part legal tribunal, it appeared
to serve neither function well. 38 The judges that followed Cabot were
capable and well-intentioned individuals, but they struggled with an
38See Massachusetts Child Council, Juvenile Delinquency as a Public
Responsibility (Boston, 1939). For a more general overview, see
Benedict S. Alper, "Forty Years of the Juvenile Court," American
Sociological Review, 6:230-240 (April, 1941).
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understaffed court and an overburdened probation department.39 The
juvenile court was not the court envisioned by the progressive reformers.
And yet, for all its problems it did serve as the wellspring for the
next major program of response. The juvenile court served both as the
incubator for the new court clinics, and as the scientific laboratory
for the research upon which the psychodynamic theory of delinquency
causality was to be built.
Section II: Chapter G
CHILD GUIDANCE AND THE PSYCHODYNAMIC THESIS
1. The Psychodynamic Thesis. During the second decade of the
twentieth century the heredity thesis lost much of its popularity among
practitioners. Its inability to guide practice proved a fatal limit.
During this period a new theoretical approach achieved favor. Nurtured
in the early psychometric testing of school children and mental
39The judges who followed Cabot's death in 1932 included John Perkins
who held the office from 1932 to 1945, Joseph Connelly from 1945 to
1964, and Francis G. Poitrast from 1964 to the present.
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defectives and stimulated by the growing popularity of psychiatric
concepts in Europe, a new psychological approach to youthful misbehavior
developed.
The psychodynamic thesis located the cause of delinquent
behavior in the mental and emotional problems of the adolescent mind.
The focus on the psychological roots of deviance shifted attention away
from the heredity-environment debate and toward the unknown complexes and
irrational impulses of the unconscious and subconscious.
In Massachusetts, the formalization of the psychodynamic thesis
is marked by the arrival of William Healy and Augusta Bronner at the Judge
Baker Foundation. The orientation of Healy and Bronner found great
popularity among the psychologically directed social welfare community in
Boston. The Massachusetts social reformers had never embraced the
heredity paradigm as seriously as many in New York or the Midwest, and
the liberal attitudes and intellectual traditions of the Bay State offered
a conducive climate for a psychologically oriented theory.1
Healy's interest since his early training had focused more
broadly than delinquency. His psychological perspective was formalized
by studies of neurological disorders. His approach to delinquency in
Chicago had focused upon what he termed "conduct disorders." Healy's
research into the etiology of conduct disorders was not simply academic;
his basic objective was to improve practice. "It makes little difference
Jon Sondgrass has noted a general difference in perspective between the
New England and Midwestern communities which has significantly affected
the theory development of each area. See Snodgrass, 1972, pp. 10-11.
Sigmund Freud's only visit to the United States brought him to Clark
University in 1908. His popular acceptance in Massachusetts was no
surprise in an intellectual climate dominated by luminaries like William
James, G. Stanley Hall and Hugo Munsterberg.
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which theoretical point of penology is held," he wrote in 1915, "the
problem of society ever is to handle a given offender satisfactorily." 2
That year, he published his major text subtitled A Text-Book of Diagnosis
and Prognosis for All Concerned in Understanding Offenders. Healy did
not consider himself a theorist. He attempted only to present data and
conclusions with as few generalizations as possible.3  Even so his work
first became recognized for the formulation of what became known as the
"multiple factor" approach. Each case of delinquency was caused by a
plurality of factors in combination. The combinations were never
duplicated from individual to individual and, therefore, they were not
generalizable to a group or class. In opening The Individual Delinquent,
Healy noted "Our main conclusion is that every case will always need
study by itself."4
The best example of the multiple factor approach is found in
The Individual Delinquent. The study grew from an examination of one
thousand young recidivists received by the Chicago clinic between 1904
and 1914. In his summary of findings, Healy lists fifteen categories of
causal factors. The categories are loaded with moral assumptions and
the selection and priorities are left arbitrary and unexplained.
Delinquent behavior in one case appears to be caused by any number of
"factors" which, when present in another individual's case, could lead
to the most conventional of behaviors. Since anything could cause
2William Healy, The Individual Delinquent: A Text-Book of Diagnosis and
Prognosis for All Concerned in Understanding Offenders (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1915), p. 25.
3Snodgrass, 1972, pp. 81-82.
4Healy, 1915, p. 5.
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anything there was little generalized understanding.5 The multiple factor
approach was more significant in broadening the previous anthropomorphic
orientations than in actually offering a theory.
Healy's second major contribution to theory development was
brought about by the 1917 publication of Mental Conflicts and Misconduct
in which he selected one single cause and elaborated on its wide range
of behavioral outcomes. 6  In this view delinquency became a form of
psychoneurotic behavior. Healy postulated an "inner driving force" which
was neither reasonable nor prudent and which broke through individual
repressions as "mental conflicts" which resulted in delinquent misconduct.
For this Healy recommended a focus on the "mental environments" of the
individual through a form of "mental analysis" which was largely shaped
by the conventions of psychoanalysis. By 1935 when Healy's Roots of
Crime was published it was evident that another influence--the work of
Shaw and McKay in Chicago--had been included, for now mental conflicts
were viewed as displacements of emotional problems under unfavorable
5"On the other hand," Snodgrass observes,
"the idea that theory is unobtainable or unnecessary, that
facts can not be abstracted, that generalizations about the
causes of behavior in two or more persons is impossible,
constitute a set of propositions about the nature of behavior
and the nature of theory."
See Snodgrass, 1972, p. 93.
6William Healy, Mental Conflicts and Misconduct (Boston: Little, Brown,
1917). Joseph Hawes sees this selection as a psychoanalytical
redirection of Healy's earlier multiple factor approach, but Snodgrass
sees it only as an amplification of one factor within the continuing
multiple factor perspective: "Thus, for Healy, multiple factors
determined delinquency, and a single factor determined multiple
misconduct." See Hawes, 1971, p. 256, and Snodgrass, 1972, p. 93.
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social conditions.7  Yet Healy held tightly to the primacy of psychological
conditions:
The existence of slum districts alone does not explain
this high frequency of criminality; this also requires
a certain ps chological attitude on the part of the
inhabitants.
Environments may play their part in shaping character, but the causes of
deviant behavior lay in the torments of the mind.
Although Healy, early in life, had been a charter member of the
American Breeders Association, genetic causes were not prominent in his
work. He became a major antagonist of the Lombrosian and anthropomorphic
traditions and criticized them heavily for their presumptions. By holding
close to empirical evidence and eschewing theory, Healy challenged genetic
theory on its own positivist grounds. 9 His work became a major contributor
to the growing disenchantment with the heredity paradigm. 10  In its place,
Healy offered, and did much to develop, a psychodynamic thesis of
delinquency and crime.
7See William Healy and Franz Alexander, Roots of Crime (New York: Knopf,
1935).
8Healy and Alexander, 1935, pp. 4-5.
9Healy reports:
"I took hundreds of photographs of the heads and faces of the
delinquents we studied; made measurements of thousands of crania,
and looked carefully for mal-formed ears and hard palates. . . .
The story in short is that we found . . . there may be inheritence
of some physical condition or mental peculiarities which can have
significant bearing upon the development of delinquent trends, but
this is very different from the direct inheritence of
criminalistic traits, which can only properly be defined as
discrete and innately antisocial tendencies or drives."
See William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, "The Child Guidance Clinic,"
in Orthopsychiatry, 1923-1948: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Lawson
Lowry and Victoria Sloan (New York: American Orthopsychiatric
Association, 1948), pp. 19-21.
10In his review, Robert Mennel asserts that "More than any other man,
Healy was responsible for channeling scientific study of juvenile
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2. The Child Guidance Clinic. The psychodynamic response to
delinquency produced its own structural prototype: the clinic. The
clinic took two forms. It appeared among the preventive services outside
the correctional institutions and appeared as a separate division among
the reformative services inside the institutions.11
The Judge Baker Foundation was the preeminent clinic among the
private preventive services. It opened in a four-room office on Court
Street, but quickly outgrew this and moved to a separate building on
Milk Street. In 1936 the clinic, then renamed the Judge Baker Guidance
Center, erected its own four-story building complete with temporary
residential units on Longwood Avenue. As the clinic grew in professional
and national importance it continued to maintain a close and valued
relation with the Boston Juvenile Court.12 Bt it also offered its
services to other of the public agencies and many of the private child
protective services. 13
delinquency away from sterile efforts to quantify its relationship to
mental ability or bodily form." See Mennel, 1973. p. 162.
For a review of the origins of state supported child guidance services
see Helen L. Witmer, Clinical Psychiatry Under State Auspices (New York:
Commonwealth Fund, 1939). For a short survey of developments in
Massachusetts see Mass., Child Council, 1939, Chap. 5.
12In 1931, Judge Cabot wrote:
"I cannot imagine the Juvenile Court functioning properly without
the Judge Baker Foundation. The Court cannot make an intelligent
decision in any case without knowing the human material with
which it deals. To know that material calls for technical
knowledge, great expertise and skill. These the Foundation furnishes."
Quoted in Straightening the Twig: The Work of the Judge Baker Foundation,
Child Guidance Center (Boston: Judge Baker Foundation, 1931). Hereafter
referred to as "Straightening the Twig."
13By 1928, for example, less than half of the cases (44.7 per cent) came
from the juvenile court, while a fifth (18.9 per cent) came from welfare
agencies and a fifth (17.9 per cent) came from private children's
services. See Glueck and Glueck, 1934, p. 49.
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The Judge Baker Foundation and the earlier Chicago clinic became
prototype models for juvenile clinics throughout the nation including
several others in Massachusetts.14 These clinics, frequently called child
guidance clinics, were typically small private agencies which contracted
with local courts, schools and welfare agencies in providing psychological
testing and counseling sources. Other clinics were opened to address the
psychiatric needs of younger children. Modeled upon a child guidance
clinic established by Dr. Douglas A. Thom, nine so-called "habit clinics"
were opened by the Division of Mental Hygiene in and around Boston
during the 1930's. 15 Beginning in 1931 the Division of Mental Hygiene
began to sponsor traveling school clinics which rotated among local schools,
bringing psychiatric diagnosis and referral directly to the community.
Both the habit clinics and the traveling school clinics were viewed as
preventive responses to the problems of mental illness and juvenile
delinquency.
In 1931 a special commission was established by the legislature
to investigate laws relating to children. Upon this commission's
recommendations, a law was passed requiring psychiatric examination of
all children prior to court commitment. 16 After the passage of this law
14The Worcester Child Guidance Clinic opened in 1934 and a child guidance
clinic was opened in Springfield in 1938. Both clinics operated
independently but were supported in part by grants from the Massachusetts
Division of Mental Hygiene. See Mass., Child Council, 1939, p. 94.
15Mass., Commissioner of Mental Diseases, A.R., 1937, p. 54.
16Mass., Acts of 1931, Ch. 119. The commission report is Mass., General
Court, Report of the Special Commission to Investigate the Laws
Relative to Children, House Doc. No. 1200, Boston, Mass., 1931.
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outpatient clinics at the various state hospitals and schools for the
feebleminded commenced the routine physical and mental examination of
all adjudicated delinquents.
The psychodynamic thesis greatly affected the training schools
as well. Psychiatric testing and counseling required a structural
setting within the institutions that could serve as a clinic and
laboratory.17  The clinic which was established at the Lyman School
functioned much as the school infirmary. All incoming school residents
were sent to the clinic for initial testing. This testing served to
screen those who belonged in the institution from those who might be
directed elsewhere. Where such testing indicated the potential for
psychiatric treatment the clinic also served as the locus for such
treatment.
During the second and third decade of this century, the clinic
became a distinguished new structural form in youth corrections. It
functioned as a locus of treatment and a center for research and training.
The clinic was both a hospital and a laboratory. Both functions were
wedded together as a means of advancing and legitimating the psychodynamic
thesis. The scientific approach of the heredity thesis found legitimate
expression in the laboratory of the mental clinician. This quest for
17The psychological clinic form was not new in institutional settings.
As a prototype it was well established in mental institutions. The
first such clinic established in the United States was the psychological
clinic organized by Lightner Witmer in 1896 at the University of
Pennsylvania. Witmer's clinic became a center for the study and
treatment of mentally retarded children as well as a focus for the
development of intelligence testing in America. The first such clinic
in Massachusetts was opened by Dr. Elmer E. Southard and Mary C. Jarret
in the outpatient department at Boston Psychopathic Hospital in 1912.
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rationality in the examination and treatment of the irrational gave
birth to the new practice of child guidance.
3. The Practice of Child Guidance. Psychiatric practice developed
first as a treatment for mentally deranged people. From the early work
of Rush, Pinel and Turke through the later developments of Maudsley,
Kraeplin, Freud and Meyer, a language, a means of diagnosis and a
collection of techniques were developed for treating the chronic and
acute manifestations of mental illness. 18  Clinical and outpatient work
with mentally ill persons was formally established in Massachusetts in
the 1890's, first, by Dr. Walter Fernald at the Massachusetts School for
the Feebleminded and, then, by Dr. Walter Chandler at the Boston
Dispensary. 19
With the opening of the Judge Baker Foundation, psychiatric
treatment became available to juvenile delinquents in Massachusetts.
Healy's new clinic quickly evolved a practice that was later to be
called child guidance. This practice was composed of examination,
treatment and follow up. The examination was designed for diagnosis as
well as research. The Judge Baker clinic served many of the Massachusetts
18This history is well documented in works such as George Rosen's Madness
in Society: Chapters in the Historical Sociology of Mental Illness
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
19Mennel, 1973, p. 160. Outpatient work with children was first begun
by Fernald in a clinic established at Waverly. A similar service was
established at the Wrentham School in 1917. By 1928 there were
fifteen outpatient clinics operating from the state hospitals and
schools for the feebleminded. See Mass., Child Council, 1939, p. 90.
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courts, and, particularly, the Boston Juvenile Court as an examination
and diagnosis center. Typically, youth referred to the clinic by the
courts were brought by probation officers who hand delivered the youth's
full probation file. The clinic performed a "social examination" which
included the family background and history. This was followed with a
"physical examination" by a physician, a "psychological examination" by
a psychometrician and a "psychiatric examination" by a psychiatrist. A
staff conference often attended by Healy or Bronner followed these
examinations and from this a summary report was prepared and forwarded
back to the court. 20
The "mental analysis" techniques that Healy and Bronner
advocated at the clinic were psychotherapeutic in form and origin and the
Foundation maintained a staff of clinically trained psychiatrists and
psychiatric social workers.21 The treatment involved counseling and
guidance often with parents, but frequently with the youth alone. These
early psychotherapeutic sessions were often short in duration and quite
directive in form.
The follow up practices of the Judge Baker staff provided the
data necessary for an effective supervision of treatment. Three months
after the initial examination a check was made to determine the progress
20The psychological tests included several instruments including the
Binet-Simon intelligence inventories. The psychiatric examination
always included a chance for the clients to tell their "own story."
See Glueck and Glueck, 1934, pp. 50-56.
21The clinic actually did not provide direct counseling services to most
of its clients with the exception of those brought to the clinic
directly by parents or schools. Most of the counseling was done by
other private services under the direct supervision of the Judge Baker
Foundation staff. See Glueck and Glueck, 1934, p. 58.
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of treatment. On occasion the staff held supervisory conferences with
those involved in pursuing the clinic's recommendations. Annual reports
were filed in the clinic's records on all youth receiving treatment and
a final analysis was completed at the closing of each case.22 This
extensive record keeping facilitated the research objectives of the Judge
Baker clinic as well as the need for treatment supervision.
The mental hygiene clinic that Dr. Root and Dr. Kent set up at
the Lyman School also focused heavily on research. Large filing systems
were set up and records were meticulously kept. This data provided the
basis for identifying and classifying types of mentally defective
delinquents. Among these populations Doctors Root and Kent became
particularly interested in two types: the feebleminded, long recognized
as a problem, but the other, the psychopath, had not been labelled before.
They compensate for their scarcity by the enormous amount
of trouble they cause. They are children who are sensitive,
egotistical, often very immoral, always selfish and babyish;
they react to discipline by sulkiness and crying and temper
tantrums. . . . The general prognosis for these children is
bad; a few will become actually psychotic, a few will become
more stable, but most of them will remain all of their lives
unstable, irritable, troublesome individuals.23
22See Glueck and Glueck, 1934, p. 60.
23Dr. Manly Root in Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1926, p. 5. During
his first year at the clinic, Dr. Root wrote:
"In general, the attitude of this department is to regard
the boys and girls as suffering from psychological reactions
and bad anti-social attitudes which are to be treated and
improved, if possible. To be sure, real mental disease plays
a very small part and even mental deficiency never alone
wholly explains the delinquency, the reactions being natural
and usually quite explainable. We adopt, however, the
medical metaphor, which makes it easy for a physician to
consider his material. From our standpoint, therefore, the
schools are as hospitals."
See Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1926, p. 5.
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Indeed, classification became a primary function of the clinic and the
spirit of deterministic adjustment became an underlying theme. In 1929,
Dr. Root reports,
When a boy has reached his intellectual limit, as evidenced
by our tests and his actual performance in school, an effort
is made to find a trade or other work for which he is
better suited. 24
By 1931 Dr. Root had pursued his studies so far as to suggest that of the
Lyman School boys, 38 of the 87 mentally defective youngsters were such
discipline problems that a separate department for young defective
delinquents should be established to rid the school of their misbehavior.
The "defective delinquent" classification was not new in
Massachusetts. In 1911 the Commonwealth had been the first state to
recognize defective delinquents as a separate category of offender and to
authorize a special institution for their care. 25 By 1926 there were both
a male and a female Defective Delinquent Department set up at the State
Farm at Bridgewater. Defective delinquents were primarily mentally
retarded, feebleminded or psychotic persons who were either dangerous or
prone to criminal acts.
Psychiatric treatment grew out of medical practice. The "social
doctor" became the newest professional to invade youth corrections
practice. The relationship between professional and youth was modeled
upon the clinical doctor-patient relationship. Ultimately youth had to
be seen as "sick" in order that treatment could be provided to "cure"
24Dr. Manly Root in Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1929, p. 5.
25Although Massachusetts authorized a facility for defective delinquents
in 1911, it did not appropriate funds. New York State opened the
first institution for defective delinquents at Napanoch in 1921.
Massachusetts opened Bridgewater in 1922.
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them. Mental dysfunctions became the focus of practitioner diagnosis.
Although the causes might be in the family or community, the cure had
to be in the individual. Following the medical model, the individual was
seen as a highly integrated system of balances. Delinquents were somehow
"out of balance." Through a treatment directed at the individual--"the
total individual" as Healy and the child guidance professionals called
their case work clients--could delinquents be curbed from following a
long career of criminal behavior. The religious metaphors of degeneracy
and reformation were replaced by a language of "treatment" and "cure"
borrowed directly from medical and scientific practices. As professionals
wrote of "defectives" and "illness," "neurotics" and "psychopaths"
instead of "wayward" and "abandoned" children, the disease metaphor infused
reformative practice as well. Mental health became equated with
socially conventional behavior and the objective of correctional practice
became the mentally healthy, "normal" youth. The "skilled and employable"
youth of vocational education practice and the "well regulated, morally
upright" youth of moral reformation practice was now replaced by the
"emotionally and psychologically well adjusted" youth in the continuing
search for a proper criterion of reformative success.
4. The State Administrative Agency. Increasing professionalization
and administrative centralization in the state executive branch resulted
in a full reorganization in 1919 in which the executive administration
emerged as a bureaucratic system of departments. With the rewriting of
the State Constitution the public charities services were reorganized
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under a State Department of Public Welfare.26 The old unpaid board was
eliminated and replaced by a single professional commissioner and an
unpaid advisory board. With the reorganization, authority for public
welfare policy was centralized in a single individual. In organizing
the department into separate divisions the preventive and reformative
services were separated into a Division of Child Guardianship and a
Division of Juvenile Training, each accountable directly to the commissioner.
The youth corrections institutions were made a sub-unit of the new
department although they remained administered through a single board of
trustees, the Trustees of the Massachusetts Training Schools.
Under these new arrangements the Trustees retained their
executive secretary, but a new administrative position, the Director of
the Division of Juvenile Training, was created to oversee the daily
fiscal and management operations of the institutions. 27 This administrative
structure altered the traditional youth corrections authority structure.
Ideally, the boards of trustees had set policy under which administrative
issues, such as budget and personnel matters, were determined. In
actuality, the superintendents played a major role in policy making,
because they alone were knowledgeable about daily operations and because
they alone could juggle management conditions so as to encourage policies
they favored. In large part, policy followed administration. With the
establishment of the new Division of Juvenile Training, administrative
26Mass., Acts of 1920, Ch. 350.
27Evidence of the slow but steady growth of the central administrative
staff is suggested by a 1920 decision to move the central office from
the Back Bay to larger quarters at 41 Mount Vernon Street, much nearer
to the State House.
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questions were to be shared between superintendents and the central
office. In this reorganization it would appear that the superintendents
lost policy status. In fact, it was the trustees who lost. As policy
followed administration, policy questions increasingly were settled
within the administrative compromises between superintendents and the
central office and the trustees became increasingly ineffective. The
scientific rationality associated with the professional clinic was
mirrored by the increasingly rational and bureaucratic structure of
authority in the institutions.
5. The Child Guidance Program of Response. Child guidance was
defined as that "branch of the mental hygiene movement which is concerned
with the personality and conduct disorders of childhood and which takes
account of the complex interactions between the child and his environment
and seeks to help him to gain a workable orientation to the world." 28
The approach was subtle and intensive. A high value was placed on the
rational and "scientifically-supported" treatment strategies of
professional clinicians working in one to one relationships. The "total
individual" required an extensive commitment of professional energies.
Yet the child guidance practice of child guidance clinics rarely went
this far.
"Mental conflicts" were not amenable to simple cures. Intensive
"deep therapy" and extensive behavioral supervision were frequently
28Bernard Glueck, "Child Guidance," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
3 vol. (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 393. This term is reported to
have been selected in order to avoid the stigma associated with the term
"psychiatry" which was commonly associated with insanity. See Levine
and Levine, 1970, p. 236 fn.
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required to correct years of family abuse and deviant habit formation.
The "total individual" approach was much more than most clinicians could
afford to provide to all but a few youth. For the others, the clinics
were required to rely on court probation personnel and private agency
workers. Most often these practitioners were untrained and overworked.
Spelling out their dissatisfaction with the court's treatment agents,
Healy and Bronner wrote in 1926, "probation is a term which gives no
clue to what is done by way of treatment."29 How right they were to be
critical. The Gluecks' famous research well documented the inability of
probation workers to carry out the clinic's recommendations. 30 But the
Gluecks remained skeptical of "the psychiatric approach" even under the
best of circumstances. In their conclusions they wrote:
When we come to the "psychiatric approach" we find a still
less objective attack on the problems of criminology. . . .
Whatever may be said against psychoanalysis, its exponents
have made one contribution that is all important, namely
their insistence . . . that the problems of personality
distortion and antisocial conduct are far more deeply rooted
than psychologists, "mental testers," educators, and
sociologists have been wont to suppose. By that very point of
view, however, they have admitted that there still remains
much more to be learned about human motivation than has yet
been contributed by psychiatry.31
This skepticism was not uncommon. The child guidance approach
modified the moral reform practice of the institutions; it did not replace
29William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, Delinquents and Criminals: Their
Making and Unmaking (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 82.
300nly in 195 of the 908 cases under study were all of the clinic's
recommendations carried out. See Glueck and Glueck, 1934, p. 129.
3 1Glueck and Glueck, 1934, p. 282.
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the older practice. It was conceptually possible to define all youthful
misconduct under the psychodynamic thesis and, so, transfer all
misbehaving youth to established institutions for the mentally deviant.
This did not happen. The correctional institutions were firmly in
place. Moral reformation and vocational education remained primary
idioms of practice. Some misbehaving youth might be "sick," but some
were definitely "bad," or at least wayward, and the traditional correctional
institutions served such youth satisfactorily. Instead of replacing the
correctional institution with a hospital, a hospital prototype was
introduced into the institutional structure.
The new clinic proved of great value to the institutions.
Superintendent Keeler at the Lyman School noted its value for in
"fitting boys into their proper niches, necessary adjustment may be made
and friction reduced." 32 As central as the clinic, research, testing and
counseling were to the child guidance program, the program actually
served best to legitimize adjustment as a central concept of reformative
work. The well balanced, well adjusted youth was the youth who adhered
to conventionality. Adjustment became synonymous with treatment. Under
the rubric of adjustment, deviants were to be taught or guided or
counseled in how to conform in their daily behavior. Adjustment did not
address questions of the larger environment. The individual was the
object to be adjusted. Healy's treatment focused attention directly
upon the individual delinquent. He was not unmindful of social conditions,
but such conditions were not covered within his professional orientation.
32Charles Keeler in Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1930, p. 7.
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"Our task has been to accept the American scene as it is and work with
delinquents and their families in the midst of many conditions which we
regard as unfortunate. "33 The individual offender formed the "dynamic
center of the whole problem of delinquency and crime" and it was the
"total individual," not merely his moral character or employability, which
was to be adjusted to fit conventional expectations. 34
The economic depression of the 1930's curtailed the continued
development of the child guidance clinics. Financial resources diminished
and by 1931 even the Judge Baker Foundation was forced to open a major
fund raising campaign in order to survive.35 By the close of the decade
the clinics once again regained their fiscal strength. Yet the policy
climate had changed. The depression had curbed the dominance of the
child guidance program. A community rocked by a common threat to
individual security no longer chose to see social problems as purely
individual pathologies. Something more social, more structural was failing.
3 3Healy quoted in Snodgrass, 1972, p. 57.
34 Healy, 1915, p. 22.
35See "Straightening the Twig," 1931, p. 1.
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Section II: Chapter H
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AND STRUCTURALIST THEORY
1. Structural-Functional Theory as Causation. In 1927 Frederick
Thrasher published The Gang and two years later Clifford Shaw published
Delinquency Areas. These two volumes and several subsequent studies by
Shaw and Henry D. McKay sparked a major new approach to thinking about
delinquency causation.2 Originating in the work of the early Chicago
traditions of sociology, this perspective originated by considering the
distribution of delinquency (that is, apprehended delinquents) over
geographic space. After studying 1313 juvenile gangs in Chicago,
Thrasher located their existence in specific urban districts he called
"ganglands." In "gangland" small groups of youths establish organized
delinquent gangs as a response to the disorganized social life of the
slum. Shaw and McKay carried Thrasher's ecological conception further
specifying discrete "delinquency areas" in which disorganized community
life resulted in conditions where crime and delinquency became "more or
less traditional aspects of life" and where such "delinquent traditions"
were passed on from older to younger persons through personal and gang
contacts.3 The concept of transmitting deviant modes of behavior among
1Frederick M. Thrasher, The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927) and Clifford R. Shaw,
et. al., Delinquency Areas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).
2See, for instance, Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, Social Factors
in Juvenile Delinquency, National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement: Report on the Causes of Crime, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1931).
3See Shaw and McKay, 1931, p. 387. The idea of a delinquency area was
not truly new--Sophonisba P. Breckenridge and Edith Abbott considered
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peers was developed from the work of Edwin Sutherland who posed in 1924
that young delinquents pick up deviant norms and skills through
"differential association" with other delinquents whom they admire and
emulate.4
The Chicago sociologists saw juvenile delinquency as one of
several social problems which emanated from the social disorganization
of inner city life. Deviant behavior was not a product of biological or
psychological disturbance; it resulted from social pathology. Disintegrative
forces acting in a slum community damaged the community's power to act as
an agent of social control and deviant behavior arose uninhibited by social
sanction. Deviance was symptomatic of dysfunctions in the social order.
Sutherland, himself, opened a crack in the ecological image.
He too saw the natural areas of slum districts, yet he viewed them not as
disorganized, but, rather, as "differentially organized." Sutherland
opposed notions of deviance as a psychological or a social pathology.
Deviance grew naturally out of deviantly organized sub-cultures through
the differential association of members with other members. While not
willing to equate delinquent sub-cultures with socio-economic class,
Sutherland did formulate an ecological pluralism that went beyond consensus. 5
"delinquency neighborhoods" in their 1912 study, The Delinquent Child and
the Home (New York: Russell Sage, 1912), p. 150.
4See Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles of Criminology (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippencott, 1924).
5Sutherland continued to refine and develop his ideas over the many
editions of his famous text. For one of the best statements see
Principles of Criminology, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott,
1947).
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It was left for Albert Cohen to identify the delinquent
subcultures as a product of the lower class condition.6 Cohen, a
Harvard-trained, Columbia-based sociologist, assumed a structuralist view
of the delinquent subculture, itself. The subculture arose out of the
"status frustration" lower class adolescents felt in trying to measure up
to dominant middle class values. This stress produced a "reaction
formation" which inverted middle class values to form a subculture that
was "non-utilitarian, malicious and negativistic."7
In Boston structuralist theory took a different bent. The notion
of a disorganized social structure in lower class community was dealt a
serious blow by William Foote Whyte's three year study of Boston's
North End that revealed a highly structured and inter-dependent web of
kinship and friendship relations. 8 The cultural diversity and spatial
segregation of Boston's lower class gave class divisions a distinctive
positive characteristic. Walter Miller, a Harvard University trained
anthropologist, saw in Cohen's "delinquent subculture" an analogy of
all of lower class life. He disputed Cohen's image of the delinquent
6Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang (New York:
Free Press, 1955). Cohen graduated from Harvard University where he
studied under W. Lloyd Warner and Talcott Parsons. His work parallels
Robert Merton's "Social Structure and Anomie," American Sociological
Review, 3:672-682 (October, 1958).
7 ".* . . certain children are denied status in the respectable
society because they can not meet the criteria of the
respectable status system. The delinquent subculture deals
with these problems by providing criteria of status which
these children can meet."
See Cohen, 1955, p. 121.
8See William Foote Whyte, Street Corner Society: The Social Structure
of an Italian Slum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
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sub-culture as a mere inversion of the culture it opposes. Rather,
Miller posited a dualistic cultural setting in which the delinquent
subculture was an accentuation of a separate lower class culture which,
in fundamental ways, differed from middle class culture.
The standards of lower class culture cannot be seen merely
as a reverse function of middle class culture . . . lower
class culture is a distinctive tradition many centuries old
with an integrity of its own.9
Lower class delinquent behavior--exhibiting a focus on trouble, toughness,
smartness, excitement, fate and autonomy--was inferred from lower class
culture.
Following cultural patterns which compromise essential
elements of the total life pattern of lower class 10
culture automatically violates certain legal norms.
The delinquent was identified as deviant even as he pursued conventional
(for him) values.
Miller's experiences as research director of the Roxbury
Special Youth Project shaped his explanations of the causes of delinquency.
The theory grew easily out of the community prevention program. The
Boston Youth Opportunities Project, on the other hand, grew out of a
different causal theory. In 1959 Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin,
consultants to "Mobilization for Youth," a New York City community
prevention project, published their influential work postulating "an
opportunity theory of delinquency."11  Cloward and Ohlin also took off from
9Walter B. Miller, "Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milue of Gang
Delinquency," Journal of Social Issues, 14:5-19 (Summer, 1958), p. 18.
Hereafter referred to as "Miller, 1958b."
1 0Miller, 1958b, p. 18.
11See Richard Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity: A
Theory of Delinquent Gangs (New York: Free Press, 1960).
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Cohen's observation of a "delinquent subculture," but argued that such
subcultures arose wherever "opportunities for illegal activity are easily
accessible in the same social setting in which opportunities for
legitimate activity are limited."2 The Boston project, like all those
initiated and funded by the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency
and Youth Crime, was heavily influenced by this particular theory of
causation. 13
As different and conflicting as these various theories of
causation were in important elements and assumptions, they all derived
from a common perspective. The structure and functioning of the lower
class or inner city community within the larger social structure included
tensions that impelled some young residents to form gangs and conduct
themselves in behaviors that were illegal or illegitimate in terms of
middle class values. This view lay at the heart of the structuralist
theories. Whatever their differences in details, they commonly
directed the attention of practitioners toward preventing delinquency by
interventions at the community level.
2. Youth Work and Community Prevention. It was possible to translate
these new theories of delinquency directly into practice. A theory rooted
in the structural conditions of the community suggested a practice that
12Cloward and Ohlin, 1960, p. 150.
13 "Ohlin and Cloward's influential Delinquency and Opportunity
. . . did not so much create these preferences as rationalize
them, providing a measure of academic support for the assumptions
. . and providing as well a useful vocabulary with which
supplicants for demonstration grants could describe their purposes."
See Thernstrom, 1969, p. 170.
202
sought to reorganize community structure and status. The early
Neighborhood Child Councils of the 1930's, the Roxbury Special Youth
Project of the 1950's, and the Boston Youth Opportunities Project of
the 1960's, all attempted this translation. Although nearly thirty
years separated these projects they all shared several concepts in
common, particularly the idea of pre-delinquency and the community as
the locus of treatment.
The "pre-delinquent" or "delinquency prone youth" was a
central concept behind community prevention work. The juvenile court
identified the delinquent youth, but by that point preventive work was
no longer relevant. For community prevention to be effective, it was
necessary to identify pre-delinquents--youths whose behavior and life
patterns would soon result in court commitments. Pre-delinquency was
the raison d'dtre of community prevention. The pre-delinquent was the
gang youth who could yet be dissuaded from gang violence. The pre-delinquent
was the child of a broken home who could yet be taught the values of the
family. The pre-delinquent was the minor offender who could yet be
redirected from a criminal career. It was the propensity toward
delinquency that was bred in the lower class community and it was this
pre-deviant condition that attracted the community youth worker. 14
The pre-delinquent was to be prevented from future deviance
through interventions at the community level. The target of practice
was the dysfunctional neighborhood and its institutions. The Roxbury
14See A. Vollmer, "Predelinquency," Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, 14:279-285 (1923-1924).
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Special Youth Program called this the "total community" approach.15  It
differed significantly from the "total individual" approach of child
guidance practice. The unit of treatment was expanded beyond the
individual to the whole community. Delinquency was a result of social,
economic and cultural problems within the "total community." In order to
inhibit delinquency it was necessary to institute or restore a
constructive relationship between the individual youth and the gang,
the family and the community. The Boston Youth Opportunities Project
merely expanded this list to add community institutions such as the schools.
The Neighborhood Child Councils focused chiefly on recreation,
community improvement and the provision of general welfare services.16
Recreational programs were considered one of the most immediate means of
reaching delinquents and pre-delinquents. Recreational activities were
seen as a natural approach to organizing peer group social structure,
redirecting youthful energies into non-delinquent activities and providing
a respectabls means of constructing meaningful relationships between
neighborhood adults and youth. Ball clubs, hobby clubs, field trips
and athletic leagues were encouraged and sponsored by various neighborhood
organizations and existing private services. During the 1930's agencies
such as the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Boys' Clubs, Catholic Youth Organizations,
Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts and various settlement houses greatly expanded
their recreational services in such high delinquency neighborhoods as
Charlestown, the North End, the West End and Roxbury.
15For a full analysis of the approach see Miller, 1962.
16See Mass. Child Council, 1939, p. 141.
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Community improvement meant encouraging neighborhood self-help.
Neighborhood leaders were identified, encouraged and supported in
bringing together the concerned citizens of the community who could select
their own problems and plan and implement the programs they felt most
lacking in their own neighborhood. The key to this was the voluntary
neighborhood improvement organization which acted as a small special
purpose government in providing the participants a sense of self-confidence,
self-responsibility and self-respect.
The provision of general welfare services was central to
community prevention. The class-based analysis of delinquency suggested
that pre-delinquent youth were either blocked from receiving public
services or received a disproportionately inadequate amount. Significant
attention was made to improve and compensate education, health and
welfare services.
The Roxbury Special Youth Project had three foci also:
detached youth work with street gangs, social case work with families
and the coordination of youth services among existing agencies through
community organizing. Work with the gang, the family and the
community was to make up the "total community" approach. Detached youth
work in the Roxbury Special Youth Project was an innovation not found in
the older Neighborhood Child Welfare programs. Detached youth workers
were typically professional social workers who, although employed by the
project, conducted most of their work outside the agency in the streets
17See Walter B. Miller, Rainer C. Baum and Rosetta McNeal, "Delinquency
Prevention and Organizational Relations, Controlling Delinquents, ed.
Stanton Wheeler (New York: Russell Sage, 1968), p. 72. A research
component was included. This will be considered at the close of this
chapter.
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and clubhouses of the neighborhood. The objective of detached youth
workers was to use their "free agent" status to gain the trust of gang
members so as to "redirect the energies of gang members into constructive
channels."18  Strategic intervention was seen as focusing on the peer
group as the unit of treatment. Again the individual delinquent was
seen more as a piece of a larger socio-economic pattern that needed
"redirection." David Austin at the Roxbury project was a particularly
strong advocate of the detached worker approach and, at one point during
the project, he had seven detached youth workers working in four
sub-neighborhoods. 19
Family service was in large part a holdover from the more
traditional casework approach. It remained in the Roxbury project under
the gloss of supporting youth work in the streets, although six years
later it was viewed as anathema to the proposed practice of the Youth
Opportunities Project. The plan of practice in the Roxbury project would
have family service provided to those youths who were at the same time
getting attention from the detached youth worker. In actual practice
this proved difficult for the very families of most interest to the
project were typically those already receiving services from the Public
Welfare Department or the local family service agencies. Interventions
18Detached youth workers were typically products of social work schools.
The concept had first been developed by settlement house administrators
"detaching" some staff to work outside the house. For a comprehensive
review of the principles see Irving Spergel, Street Gang Work: Theory
and Practice (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1966).
19David Austin's approach to youth work is recorded in his "Goals for
Gang Workers," Social Work, 2:43-50 (October, 1957).
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in such cases either led to the duplication of services or to jurisdictional
competition among agencies. 20
Community organizing was the broadest of the three foci of
community prevention practice and it was the primary focus for addressing
the "total community" as a unit of treatment. Like the community
improvement component of the earlier Neighborhood Child Programs, community
organizing was to encourage neighborhood leadership and voluntary
neighborhood associations in addressing neighborhood defined problems.
It was this concept that would develop through the Youth Opportunities
Project into the "maximum feasible participation" requirement of the
"War on Poverty" Area Planning and Action Councils. 21
3. The Organized Community as Structure. Not only was the focus
of practice common across the community prevention approaches, the basic
principles of structure were common. Central to the practice of
community prevention was the indigenous neighborhood worker, the
neighborhood association and the agency coordinating council.
The West End Neighborhood League hired local residents to
organize and staff the sports clubs and hobby clubs it sponsored. The
indigenous workers offered several advantages to the program. First,
20David Austin attempted to resolve this problem at the Roxbury project
by creating a mini-coordinating council called the "Roxbury
Multiple-Problem Family Program" to which existing agencies loaned
staff for highly focused intensive services. See Miller, Baum and
McNeal, 1968, p. 73.
21For a provocative history of this direct development see Daniel P.
Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in
the War on Poverty (New York: Free Press, 1969).
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they were assumed to possess a "natural knowledge" of the local neighborhood
that outside professionals lacked. Second, they were hampered by none of
the communication barriers that blocked non-residents, particularly those
associated with "welfare work," from gaining local trust. Third, they
often had previously established relations with the pre-delinquents whom
the projects were most trying to reach. Finally, the indigenous worker
provided program professionals with an effective means of educating the
local community in the processes of organizing community activities and
utilizing existing social services.
The neighborhood associations themselves were established to
foster community confidence and provide local youth welfare. The Roxbury
Project was instrumental in forming about a dozen such local neighborhood
groups. Membership in these associations was based on residence within
small sub-neighborhoods. All these groups were loosely federated under
the aegis of a broader "community association." 22
The Greater Boston Council for Youth, like the West End
Neighborhood League before it, was established as an agency coordinating
council. The coordinating council was to bring together representatives
of relevant public and private services concerned with youth work and
focus their concerted attention upon the plight of the target community.
Not only was the coordinating council to coordinate activities by reducing
redundancy and inefficiency among services and to provide legitimacy to
the community prevention project, it was also to serve as a common forum
across which agencies could trade information and in which all could
contribute jointly in setting policy. In general, the community prevention
22Miller, Baum and McNeal, 1968, p. 72.
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projects expected to maintain good working relations with most existing
agencies and the coordinating councils were established to facilitate
this cooperative spirit.23 But such coordinating councils were seldom
integrated well enough to overcome inter-institutional competition and
ideological conflicts. The Greater Boston Council witnessed both forms
of fragmentation. The Roxbury Special Youth Project was a serious
operational threat to the municipal recreation department and the State
Division of Youth Services, and a serious ideological threat to the
Catholic and Protestant church representatives.24 The Council endured
a significantly conflict-ridden existence which, at times, rendered it
a major disbenefit to the project.
4. The State Youth Service Board. The Youth Service Board Act
passed in 1948 greatly reorganized the administrative authority of
Massachusetts youth corrections.25  First, the act abolished the independent
Board of Trustees of the Massachusetts Training Schools and created a
three-member Youth Service Board in its place. Second, the act
centralized the responsibility for correcting delinquent youth at the
state level. Previous to 1948 the Juvenile Court and juvenile sessions
committed delinquents directly to the institutions. Under the act,
23Austin expected that the Roxbury Youth Project would be well received
because it planned to work on the "tough kids," leaving the other
agencies free to work with the more tractable youth. See Miller,
Baum and McNeal, 1968, p. 76.
24See Miller, Baum and McNeal , 1968, p. 87.
25Mass., Acts of 1948, Ch. 310.
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delinquents could only be committed directly to the Youth Service Board.
The Youth Service Board, then, had central responsibility for the reception,
diagnosis, treatment, custody and parole of all state delinquents. Whereas
before dispositional discretion had rested with the various juvenile
judges at the county level, the new law centralized the responsibility
for all correctional practice decisions in one board at the state level.
Third, the new law created a radical split in administrative authority
between state policy toward treating delinquents and state policy toward
managing the institutions. Under the act, the Division of Juvenile
Training remained in the Department of Public Welfare. It assumed all
responsibility for the administration of the institutions and staff. The
Youth Service Board administered the youth and the Division of Juvenile
Training administered the institutions.
The centralization of the Youth Service Board satisfied the new
chairman, John Coughlin, but the administrative schism was unsatisfactory.
In the year following his appointment, Coughlin pressured the
legislature into reorganizing the Division of Juvenile Training into the
Division of Youth Service under the Board of Education, "but not subject
to its control" 26 and establishing himself as ex-officio director of
the new division. Serving as both chairman and director, Coughlin
managed to centralize all youth correction policy making into one
supervisory position. Having achieved this powerful position Coughlin
was secure in pressing his plans for institutional expansion.
Coughlin's campaign to expand the institutional web did not
produce simply more capacity. Each of the new facilities was designed
26Mass., Acts of 1952, Ch. 605.
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for a highly specialized population. The Institute for Juvenile Guidance
at Bridgewater, the John Augustus Hall at Oakdale, the Reception-Detention
Center at Roslindale and the Forestry Camp at Brewster offered the Youth
Service Board a highly differentiated set of institutional alternatives
in making dispositional decisions. The John Augustus Hall carried even
further the age segregation which had been a marked pattern of
differentiation since the founding of the asylums and permitted the
family-like nurturance that had long been advocated as proper care for
young adolescents. The Bridgewater facility was a further development
of the degree-of-viciousness differentiation which was a trend traceable
back to the nautical school. For all the rhetoric to the contrary, the
opening of the separate Bridgewater facility offered a legitimation to
punitive custody.27 Bridgewater could be a youth prison so that the
remainder of the correctional institutions could be free of manifest
penology. The forestry camp with its openness, fresh air, recreational
freedom and physical challenge, provided a highly prized reward as an
incentive for proper behavior. The Roslindale facility separated the
newcomers from long term residents and offered both the Youth Service
Board and the court the opportunity for adequate diagnosis before further
decision-making.
Yet for all that Chairman-Director Coughlin did to expand the
mix of institutional alternatives for the correction of delinquents, he
did relatively little to advance the prevention of delinquency. Community
27The reports of severe discipline and brutal forms of punishment during
the early 1960's provide the well recognized indicators of this
condition. See Mass., Youth Service Board, A.R., 1964, n.p.
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delinquency prevention was not a high priority with the chairman-director.
It was not that the state took no action in regard to delinquency
prevention.28 In 1953 Coughlin established a Bureau of Research and
Delinquency Prevention in the Division of Youth Service. Yet the bureau
remained relatively small and concentrated heavily on legislative
research.29  What delinquency prevention work was actually carried on
by the staff was primarily in the form of community consultation and
police training. Beginning in 1956, the Division of Youth Service began
to underwrite School Adjustment Counselors in some public schools, but
again the budget and administrative support remained relatively small. 30
While the period of Coughlin's tenure at the Youth Service
Board witnessed major developments in community prevention work in
Boston and elsewhere around the state, the state authority remained
relatively distant from these projects. In particular, Coughlin assumed
a hostile attitude toward the Roxbury Special Youth Project which he at
one point accused of encouraging rather than inhibiting delinquency.31
Although Coughlin participated in the early planning of the Boston Youth
Opportunities Project, he later grew critical and bitter over the emphasis
28The Youth Service Bureau Act did authorize the Board "to develop
constructive programs to reduce and prevent delinquency among youth."
See Mass., Acts of 1948, Ch. 310.
29By 1955 the Bureau included a director, four staff members and one
secretary.
30Although even with limited resources, the project director, Edna Sanford,
produced a well regarded program with seventy-three school adjustment
counselors in the schools by 1961.
31Coughlin had been a member of the Greater Boston Council on Youth during
the formation of the project, but relations worsened over time and
during the height of hostilities he forbade youths on parole to participate
in project activities. See Miller, Baum and McNeal, 1968, p. 82.
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on planning and research and the low involvement permitted the Division
of Youth Services. 32  For Coughlin, delinquency remained primarily an
individual and family problem. The community was not an effective or
proper location for state intervention.33
5. The Delinquency Prevention Program of Response. The Great
Depression of the early 1930's brought about a serious reappraisal of
social welfare policies. The sharp retreat of the social work profession
into case work during the previous decade was gradually replaced by a
re-awakened interest in social conditions and community action.34 The
structuralist theories of delinquency which originated out of "the
Chicago School" of sociology refined by Harvard-associated social
scientists were cautiously adopted by Boston social workers. Community
prevention required social action at the neighborhood level and
community organizing and neighborhood associations arose as innovative
responses. But the social welfare environment of Boston was unlike that
of Chicago. Two conditions set it apart: the dense pattern of private
social welfare agencies and the heavy tradition of psychologism.
32Thernstrom, 1969, p. 115.
33In 1957 Coughlin wrote,
"Since the effects of delinquency know no local boundaries, the
State cannot but concern itself with the statewide problems
resulting. On the other hand, delinquency has its origins in
family and neighborhood. Prevention is, therefore, primarily a
matter of local responsibility."
See Mass., Youth Service Board, A.R., 1957, p. 6.
34See Clarke A. Chambers' interesting reanalysis of the role the regression
to case work played in preparing the way for the major reforms of the
1930's in Seedtime of Reform: American Social Service and Social Action,
1918-1933 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963).
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Boston had a long tradition of private philanthropic services.
Its various ethnic and religious communities had established a wide
assortment of benevolent and fraternal agencies. There were a variety
of neighborhood and settlement houses. On top of these services were
piled the institutional artifacts of the child protective and child
guidance programs. Each of these services was fiercely independent:
many were openly hostile toward one another.35 New neighborhood
organizations were typically regarded with suspicion and jealousy.
As the home of William Healey and the Judge Baker Foundation,
Boston was a center of the child guidance program. Since the early days
of G. Stanley Hall's "child study movement" and the pioneering work of
Walter Fernald in studying "mental defects," Massachusetts had been a
hospitable locus for the heirs of William James. The Massachusetts
Conference of Social Work had a wide reputation for its psychiatric
orientation. 36 Psychiatric case work was a strong tradition in the
Commonwealth. In introducing the community prevention program into
Massachusetts, it was conditioned by this unique climate. A major element
of agency coordination and another of psychiatric case work were appended
to the neighborhood focus and community organizing practice of community
prevention. Community youth work assumed heavy doses of inter-agency
conflict and family case work.
35It was this serious inter-organizational rivalry that had necessitated
the establishment of the Associated Charities of Boston in 1880. It
was this same inter-organizational rivalry, unaffected by the Boston
Associated Charities, that provided grounds for the establishment of
the Massachusetts Child Welfare Committee in 1913.
36Two of the nation's leading schools of psychiatrically oriented social
work--Smith College and Simmons College--were located in Massachusetts.
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As accepted as community prevention was among the professional
social work community in Massachusetts, it remained rather coolly received
at the state level. The traditional reluctance of the Massachusetts
legislature to become deeply involved in the local communities was
perpetuated by John Coughlin's reluctance to support community prevention.
Nor was his caution unfounded. Contemporary studies of the effectiveness
of community youth work as preventive practice reported fairly
disconfirming findings.3 Chief among these effects was the
Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study which was established in 1935 for the
double purpose of preventing delinquency and examining the effects of
community youth work as a means of delinquency control. The project was
founded by Dr. Richard Clark Cabot, a social ethics professor at Harvard
University. Cabot, along with project director Edwin Powers and research
associate Helen Witmer, set up matched pairs among some 750 boys selected
from the working class sections of Cambridge and Somerville. Half of
these boys received treatment which included "friendly, regular attention
from counselors, as well as whatever medical and educational service
seemed necessary" until they reached age seventeen, and the other half
received no such treatment.38 The findings of this original study and
follow-up studies conducted in 1948 and again in 1956 failed to uncover
significant differences in future delinquency and adult criminality
37Early studies of community recreation programs as contributors to
delinquency prevention reported negative conclusions. See Andrew G.
Truxal, Outdoor Recreation and Its Effectiveness (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1929), and Frederick M. Thrasher, "The Boys Clubs
and Juvenile Delinquency," American Journal of Sociology, 42:66-68
(July, 1936).
38See Powers and Witmer, 1951. The research program is detailed in
Chapters 5 and 6.
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between the treatment and control groups. 39  Even Walter Miller's careful
evaluation of the Roxbury Youth Project failed to demonstrate very
supportive conclusions. While Miller's research was truncated by the
early termination of the project, he was able to show some reduction in
delinquent acts during the duration of the project, but this effect
appears not to have been long lasting. After the termination of the
project there was a general resurgence of delinquency, although for
some groups--those with the longest consistent worker contact--there
was some reduction in delinquent behavior.40
The community prevention program ran largely on moral fervor.
There was a "rightness" about re-directing pre-delinquent youth in the
community.41 The class-based theories offered a certain rebel spirit to
organizers in the community. There was a sense that they were close to
the root causes of social stress. Yet, the implications were potentially
overwhelming. It was possible to see the entire social structure as at
fault. Few went so far. The fundamental objective lay in re-organizing
the lower class community or the social services on which it relied.
39See Joan and William McCord, "A Follow-up Report on the Cambridge-
Somerville Youth Study," The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 332:89-96 (March, 1959), p. 95.
40See Walter Miller, "Preventive Work with Street Corner Groups:
Boston Delinquency Project," The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 332:97-106 (March, 1959).
41The Boys' Club slogan--"Better to Build Boys than Mend Men"--caught
the spirit of the times.
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Community work focused on the street, the family, the neighborhood
and, occasionally, the city. It never considered the entire social and
economic structure in which all these units were embedded.42
Section II: Chapter I
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES AND SOCIAL REACTION THEORY
1. Labeling, Social Reaction and the Institutional Critique. During
the mid-1960's a new theory of deviance achieved professional acceptance.
This new theory, which went under several names including "labeling,"
"interactionist" and "societal reaction," had early roots in the literature
of social psychology. 1
42See critique in Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, The New
Criminology: For a Social Theory of Deviance (New York: Harper
and Row, 1973), chap. 4. See also Harold Finestone's recent study of
the Chicago criminologists in Victims of Change: Juvenile Delinquents
in American Society (Westport, Cn.: Greenwood Press, 1976).
1While the thesis was evident in much of the early research on "symbolic
interaction" and "role theory," it was firstcodified as a theory of
deviance by Edwin Lemert in Social Patholog (New York: McGraw Hill,
1951). The publication of Howard Beeker's Outsiders: Studies in the
Sociology of Deviance (New York: Free Press, 1963) marked a critical
point in popularizing the approach. Other significant studies include
Edwin M. Schur, Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological
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According to the social reaction thesis deviance is not a
dimension of the individual character. The deviant condition of certain
persons is achieved through interaction with a larger audience who
"label" them as deviants. Initial selection of those to be labeled
deviant is better explained by the social reaction of the larger audience
to an individual act than by the psychological or socio-economic
conditions of the individuals involved. Certain people who are perceived
to perform certain deviant acts in certain situations will be identified
by others as "deviants." An early University of Chicago sociologist,
Frank Tannenbaum, observed:
The process of making the criminal . . . is a process of
tagging, defining, identifying, segregating, describing,
emphasizing, making conscious and self conscious; it
becomes a way of stimulating, suggesting, emphasizing,
and evoking the very traits that are complained of. . . .
The person becomes the thing he is described as being. 2
Individuals do not "become deviant" on their own. They must engage with
a social group who perceive their action as deviant. It appears that
"social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction
constitutes deviance, and by applying these rules to particular people
and labeling them as outsiders." Therefore, "the deviant is one to whom
that label has been successfully applied." 3
By viewing the creation of deviants as occurring in the social
interaction between individual actors and social audiences, the social
reaction thesis shifted focus away from the offender and community and
Significance (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), and Edwin Lemert,
Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall , 1967).
2Frank Tannenbaum, Crime and the Community (Boston: Ginn and Co.,
1938), pp. 19-20.
3Becker, 1963, p. 9.
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onto the social institutions that pass judgement on behavior and dispense
deviant labels.4 The responsibility for the persistence of deviance and,
particularly, its development among novices, belonged to the social
control institutions that organized particular responses to norm-violating
conduct. In terms of crime and delinquency, the police, the courts and
the correctional institutions became suspect as primary instruments in
maintaining and promulgating, instead of reducing, a large population
of law offenders. 5 The institutions in their efforts to respond to crime
unintentionally created criminals. The social reaction thesis led to a
powerful critique of social institutions.
The institutional critique stretched across all of the juvenile
justice institutions. The correctional institutions were faulted whether
they were reformative or punitive. Confinement in separation dispensed the
deviant identity regardless of internal form or practice.6 The court,
4Thus,
"Deviance is not a property inherent in certain forms of
behavior; it is the property conferred upon these forms by
the audiences which directly or indirectly witness them.
Sociologically, then, the critical variable is the
social audience . . . since it is the audience which
eventually decides whether or not any given action or actions
will become a visible case of deviation."
See Kai T. Erikson, "Notes on the Sociology of Deviance," Social Problems,
9:307-314 (Spring, 1962), p. 308.
5An application of the social reaction theory applied to delinquency can
be found in Victor Eisner's The Delinquency Label: The Epidemology of
Juvenile Delinquency (New York: Random House, 1969). The relationship
between delinquency and legal institutions is explored by Aaron V.
Circourel in The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice (New York:
J. Wiley, 1968).
6 "Nor does it seem to matter whether the valuation is made by those
who would punish or those who would reform. . . . The harder they
work to reform the evil, the greater the evil grows under their
hands. The persistent suggestion, with whatever good intentions,
works mischief, because it leads to bringing out the bad
behavior that it would suppress."
See Tannenbaum, 1958, p. 20.
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likewise, was indicted regardless of its intentions or due process
protections. "It is important . . . to recognize that when, in an
authoritative setting, we attempt to do something for a child 'because
of what he is and needs,' we are also doing something to him," wrote one
prominent lawyer. "We shall escape much confusion here if we are willing
to give candid recognition to the fact that the business of the juvenile
court inevitably consists, to a considerable degree, in dispensing
punishment.",
While the social reaction thesis was not incompatible with the
earlier structuralist theories, it grew in acceptance largely for where
it re-focused reform attention. Where the various structuralist theories
appeared to call for a major re-ordering of social structure, values or
opportunities, the social reaction thesis only called for a re-forming
of the institutions. The discontent so many had felt so long about the
institutions, suddenly had a sound theoretical explanation. Jerome
Miller clearly understood this connection:
The very nature of labeling youth as "delinquent" . . . is
related to the power of the definers and the powerlessness
of the defined. Society views the deviant as an outsider
and prefers to isolate him in the abnormal setting of an
institution. Administrators and the helping professions
administer "treatment" based on arbitrary definitions, thereby
fulfilling social and moralistic functions for the society
other than that of rehabilitation. The defined cannot escape
their definitions, which result in self-defeating social
roles and delinquent self-concepts.8
7See Francis A. Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964). p. 18.
8Jerome G. Miller, "The Politics of Change: Correctional Reform," in
Closing Correctional Institutions, ed. Yitzak Bakal (Lexington, Mass.:
D. C. Heath, 1973), p. 3. Miller was well committed to the social
reaction thesis even before his arrival in Massachusetts. See his
220
The institutional critique provided by the social reaction thesis in
the 1960's was far more solid than the arguments set forth against the
institutions by Howe and Sandborn in the 1860's. Correctional institutions
were not onerous simply because they could not provide family nurturance
and too easily led to undesirable commingling, they were disastrous
because they sealed in the delinquent label and guaranteed the criminal
future of inmates. It was one thing to argue the case on moral grounds;
it was quite another to question effectiveness. The institutional
critique provided the theoretical rationale for deinstitutionalization.
2. Community-Based Services. The structural alternative that was
explicitly advocated by Miller and the deinstitutionalization reformers
was community-based services. 9 These services ranged from traditional
foster care placements to innovative non-residential services in schools,
out-patient clinics and community youth service centers. The depopulated
youth corrections institutions produced a large number of delinquent
youth who could not be left without supervision. Operating on the
"purchase of service" provision of the Department of Youth Services Act,
Miller commenced distributing grants to a plethora of different private,
"The Dilemma of the Post-Gualt Juvenile Court," Family Law Quarterly,
3:229-239 (1969).
91n a strategy paper released in 1972, Miller wrote:
"Juvenile correctional institutions . . . do not: rehabilitate
anybody, produce lower rates of crime, or decrease chronic
recidivism. Community-based programs . . . will do no worse
than the incarcerating institutions, and the price to society
--in human and financial terms--is bound to be much lower."
See Mass., Department of Youth Services, "A Strategy for Youth in
Trouble," Boston, Mass., 1972, p. 16. (Mimeographed.)
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public and quasi-public agencies to provide services to delinquents in
community settings.
In order to administer these grants and supervise the youths in
these community services, Miller turned to his assistant commisioner of
the Bureau of After Care, Joseph Leavey. 10 Both Miller and Leavey felt
that a community treatment system required a decentralized administration.
They wanted a system whereby committed youth could be diagnosed, placed
and treated without leaving their own local area. In 1971 they moved to
regionalize the after care administration into seven state districts.
The early development of the regions was chaotic. Most were just getting
organized when the institutions were closed. Faced with large numbers of
youth who needed services immediately, the regional staffs soon fell to
allocating purchase of service commitments with a minimum of planning and
little central office coordination or supervision.11
Generally, what this rather chaotic funding produced was a
"mix" of alternative service types which included short-term detention
placements, residential group care, foster care, a forestry program,
non-residential services and secure and intensive care services.12
10Joseph M. Leavey (1937- ) had been director of the Department of Public
Welfare's purchase of service division before he came to join Miller in
the new department.
11Mass., "Post Audit and Oversight Report," 1974, p. 82.
12By the close of 1972, Bakal counted 13 federally funded group homes
used almost exclusively by D.Y.S. Other D.Y.S. residential placements
had been made in 27 group homes for emotionally disturbed youth, 14
group homes for drug therapy, 14 residential schools and 3 homes for
pregnant girls. From May to October of 1972, the foster care placements
jumped from 85 to 189. By October of 1972 there were 616 youths in
non-residential treatment programs. See Bakal, 1973, p. 164.
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By the fall of 1973 there were ten residential detention centers of
which three provided secure detention facilities. Services provided in
these centers varied significantly. The residential group care services
were divided into five categories. Residential treatment programs
provided bed, board and intensive social and psychological serivces.
Services were somewhat less specialized and intense in group home
programs. Specialized boarding schools were used for youth with special
physical or psychological handicaps. Regular boarding school programs
and residential camp programs were used where youths needed only the
most limited of special services. The forestry camp at Brewster
remained open and averaged a population of twenty-five boys per two-month
phase. Foster care was divided into two types: family placement with
D.Y.S. case work services and family placement with special services
from private service agencies. The non-residential services were also
of two kinds. Day school programs focused exclusively on learning
difficulties while the general recreational, employment training and
individual counseling services were more varied in their composition.
Three secure intensive care units provided less than 100 slots all under
private contract, the largest being "the Andros program" operated by the
Boston Mental Health Foundation in the old Reception-Detention Center
at Roslindale.13
Community-based services were not only developed as an
alternative to incarceration. There was a growing number of court
diversion programs and youth service programs developed as pre-hearing
alternatives to court probation. In 1971, seven "youth resource bureaus"
13Mass., Department of Youth Services, A.R., 1973, pp. 12-16.
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were set up under federal funding in five of the major cities of the
Commonwealth.14  These bureaus accepted youth referred to them by police
and pre-trial screening officers. They offered non-residential and
employment counseling programs in hopes of preventing youths from further
contact with the legal and law enforcement system. Courts, also, began
to set up in-house counseling clinics and diversion programs.
By 1972 diversion had become a basic principle in the design of
community-based services. Viewing the juvenile justice system as a major
element in the selection and confirmation of delinquency, the objective
was "to minimize the penetration" of youth into the system. Thus,
police could divert youth from further processing by "diverting" them
into community-based services, court probation officers could "divert"
youth at court intake sessions and judges could "divert" youth by
"referring" rather than "committing" youth to D.Y.S. Diversion at the
court was significantly increased by the establishment of the Court
Liaison Program in 1972. Following the closing of the correctional
institutions the district court judges, and particularly Judge Francis
Poitrast of the Boston Juvenile Court, grew increasing hostile to the
deinstitutionalization. Concerned over the inability of D.Y.S. to
provide secure facilities for incarcerating dangerous youth, Poitrast
14This was a response to the recommendations of the 1967 federal "Crime
Commission" report. See U.S. President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1967). For an insightful study of one such bureau in Cambridge
see Gerald Croan, "The Youth Service Bureau Strategy: Community Based
Diversion and Delinquency Prevention Reconsidered" (Masters thesis,
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1973).
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and others threatened to increase the "bind overs" of youth to adult
courts. In order to placate the judges and improve organizational
coordination, Miller and his staff set up the Court Liaison Program,
which offered special court liaison officers to aid in the most heavily
over-loaded juvenile courts and sessions. 15 With a special authorization
from the State Attorney General, D.Y.S. funds were made available for
providing community-based services to "referred" youth who yet remained
on court probation and the court liaison officer became the principle
agent in implementing this court diversion process. Diversion was viewed
as beneficial because, in theory, it provided state supported social
services without requiring court processing or the stigma of the
delinquency label. But such diversion was not without critics. Some
felt that diversion relieved the state of the responsibility of providing
effective services; some suspected that the selection of particular
youth for diversion was open to questions about fairness and the absence
of due process protections; and some argued that diversion diverted the
pressure for court reform from the fundamental problems of the court. 16
Diversion was insidious. While it may well have decreased the number of
youth who penetrated the juvenile justice system, it may overall have
increased the number of youth actually receiving youth correction services.
15A short history of the program can be found in Joseph Hadzima,
"Diversion Strategies in Juvenile Justice: The Court Liaison Program"
(Bachelor's Thesis, Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1973).
16See Paul Nejelski, "Diversion: Unleashing the Hound of Heaven?"
Justice for the Child (Revisited), ed. Margaret Rosenheim (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975); and Donald Cressey and Robert
McDermott, Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System, National
Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Mich., 1973.
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Youth who might previously have been "released with a warning" or
referred to conventional services, such as schools or churches, or to
private agencies, increasingly became drawn into the publicly supported
community-based services.
3. Youth Service as Practice. The new practice which arose with
community-based services, best described as youth service, varies
significantly across a wide range of treatment modes from conventional
foster care placements to "Synanon games" and primal scream therapy. 17
Nearly all of the drug therapy programs either provide individual, group
or family counseling. Various residential and day schools provide
advanced and remedial schooling for those with special learning conditions.
Special training is provided the physically, emotionally or mentally
handicapped in outpatient clinics.
Much of youth service work is based on short term assistance
commonly called crisis intervention. The long term residential services
with their slow and cumbersome admissions processes have been replaced
by a service both more temporary in intention and more immediately
accessible. In the more efficient regions of D.Y.S., a youth referred or
committed to D.Y.S. may be diagnosed and placed in a service program on
the same day. Apprehended youth awaiting trial are provided specialized
detention placements where immediate services and counseling can begin.
Much of this crisis intervention and short term counseling is based on
therapy principles developed in drug treatment centers.
17See Yitzak Bakal, "The Massachusetts Experience," in Delinquency
Prevention Reporter, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, Washington,
D.C., April, 1973, p. 5. Hereafter referred to as "Bakal, 1973b."
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Self determination and self-responsibility are central
objectives of youth service practice. The focus of group residence
practice centers on attempting to re-direct feelings of failure, fatalism
and injustice which serve to "neutralize" the acceptance of personal
autonomy and self esteem. Some programs offer variations of behavioral
modification principles to effect behavior change while others, so-called
"concept houses," offer group and self criticism as an avenue for
attitude change. Prior to the closing of the institutions, a "Homeward
Bound" program, modeled in part on the "Outward Bound" programs of Maine
and Colorado, was established at the Brewster Forestry Camp.18 These
outdoor physical skill and challenge programs have been designed to
instill a sense of competence and self esteem.
For all their variation the community-based services share
many features of youth service practice in common. First, they all provide
treatment in small intimate settings. No congregate forms exist. There
are no fucntions carried on in any size larger than the small group.
Second, they are generally informal. Even in the more highly structured
programs, rules, routines, directives, "red tape" and formalized authority
are kept to a minimum. No special clothes are required, no rigorous
staff hierarchy prevails. Typically, care is provided in relaxed,
sensitive surroundings with wide latitude for personal self expression.
Third, the services are located in community settings. Typically, the
18In 1964 five Lyman Schools boys were sent to the Colorado "Outward Bound"
program and this proved so successful that twenty-five more were sent to
"Outward Bound" programs the following year. The "Homeward Bound"
program was established in 1968. See Herb C. Willman, Jr., and Ron
Y. F. Chun, "Homeward Bound: An Alternative to the Institutionalization
of Adjudicated Juvenile Offenders," Federal Probation, 37:52-58
(September, 1973).
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services are provided in old houses, storefronts, church basements,
schools or community clinics. The services may make use of other
community institutions and youth are left free to experience the community
whenever reasonable. The services may be available to community members
who are not under D.Y.S. supervision. The services are not typically
community controlled or "of the community," but they are "community-based."
Fourth, professional status, expert knowledge and professionalism are not
highly salient. Many of the services are staffed by trained social
work, psychiatric, psychological or medical professionals, but there is
also a tendency to hire para-professionals, pre-professionals and
non-professionals. Professionalism is seldom used as a significant
feature of organization. Staff openness, shared knowledge and participatory
program development are frequent elements of staff relations.
The youth service of community-based services is fundamentally
a supportive and affectionate practice reminiscent of the moral
reformative practice of the nineteenth century:
. . . the kind of trusting relationships needed to help
an individual gain insight into his attitudes and actions
can be best established in a small close setting where
staff, too, are free to contribute their own personal
investment . . . without being encumbered by narrowly
devined roles and responsibilities.19
And like moral reformation, youth service remains primarily a reformative
practice. The selection and confirmation of delinquency may reside in
the institutions designed to socialize and control youth, but the focus of
treatment remains primarily centered upon the individual. The larger
19Quoted in Mass., General Court, Committees, Report of the Joint
Committee on State Administration to Evaluate the Programs and
Facilities within the Department of Youth Services, Boston, Mass.,
1972, p. 7.
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goals of youth service as a national strategy may involve institutional
change and youth advocacy,20 but the practice offered in the majority of
Massachusetts community-based services reveals a retreat from such broad
preventive concepts. Instead, the individual delinquent is once again
the object of practice. While there is more awareness and sensitivity
to the role of the community and social class structure in producing
delinquency than found in the child guidance clinics of the 1930's, the
focus on adjustment and "the development of coping skills" has again
become the dominant principles of youth corrections practice.
4. The Department of Youth Services. The new Department of Youth
Services was intended to provide one central focus for the administration
of institutions and the supervision of youth. For this purpose it was
originally organized into four departments: clinical services;
educational services; institutional services and after-care; and delinquency
prevention and community services. 21 Before these divisions could even
begin to formalize their functions, the department was changed both in
structure and intention.
The deinstitutionalization and the private "purchase-of-service"
curtailed institutional administration. Without institutions, their
administration was unnecessary.22 Instead the department became more
20In 1972 the federal government tried to establish "youth service systems"
as a national strategy. See Robert J. Gemignani, "Youth Service Systems:
Diverting Youth from the Juvenile Justice System," Delinquency
Prevention Reporter, July-August, 1972.
21Mass., Acts of 1969, Ch. 838.
22
"The Department, in eliminating training schools . . ., deliberately
eliminated its own functions as a 'correction' agency. Central now
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concerned with the regulation and coordination of private services. The
department remained committed to the supervision of state wards, but
regulation and coordination became increasingly significant concepts.
Regulation was required to guarantee that private services delivered
the services that were contracted. The regulative function and purchase-
of-service contracts required an effective monitoring and evaluation
capability. Late in 1972 D.Y.S. set up an Evaluation Unit within the
central office and negotiated for the creation of a computerized
tracking and information system. Although the new evaluation unit was
provided a staff of nine organized into three teams, its task was
overwhelming. During its first year the evaluation unit examined
forty-seven private services and recommended the termination of four. 23
Coordination of services, attempted in the community prevention program
on a private voluntary basis, was now to be shifted to the state. It
was hoped the inducements of state funds might overcome the conflicts in
philosophy and jurisdiction that had doomed the earlier efforts.
Coordination was to be carried out by the regional offices.
Local communities through their mental health agencies,
schools, vocational education programs, hospitals, drug
treatment programs are to a large measure equipped to
provide multiple services to children. Through Youth
Services regional offices, the Department intends to
encourage that delivery, provide funding where necessary,
and coordinate efforts to maximize efficiency.24
. is the concept that 'delinquent' children are in need of
service." See Bakal, 1973b, p. 5.
23Subsequently, placements in these four services were discontinued.
See Mass., Department of Youth Service, A.R., 1973, p. 8.
24 Bakal, 1973b, p. 6.
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The "purchase-of-service" arrangements created an entirely new
pattern in state authority. While responsibility for supervising youth
remained within the Department, its ability to do so directly was
sacrificed in order to achieve the flexibility, variation and competitive
innovations offered within the private service market. The old child
protective agencies of the nineteenth century, at least those that now
survived, plus a whole new generation of services, have become the locus
of youth corrections services. The state has, for the most part, pulled
out of direct services. Instead the Department of Youth Services has
become predominantly a planning, decision-making and watchdog agency.
5. The Community-Based Services Program of Response. Community-based
services were consistently argued to be less costly, more effective and more
humane than the institutional approach. Commissioner Miller and Governor
Sargent were fond of noting the cost savings of community-based services.
Under the old system, we found ourselves supporting an entire
system at a level only a small minority of the population needed.
We spent approximately $10,000 a year to keep a child in an
institution. For this money we could buy a child a complete
wardrobe at Brooks Brothers, give him a $20 a week allowance,
send him to a private school and, in the summer, send him to
Europe with all expenses paid. . . .
If on the other hand, we invest in a community treatment program,
we can provide individual services, personal counseling, job
training, specialized education, and healthy group home settings
for about half the cost. 25
Fiscal conditions were a major consideration in providing Miller's support
25Quoted from Francis W. Sargent in Benedict S. Alper, Prison Inside-Out:
Alternatives in Correctional Reform (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974),
p. 162.
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among legislators. The cost of maintaining the institutions had begun
to increase rapidly during the 1960's. 26 The old physical plants needed
to be replaced or seriously rehabilitated. The state finances themselves
were beginning to appear more strained as rising public service costs
were rapidly outstripping revenues. In economic terms the state was
approaching a fiscal crisis. 27 In this climate deinstitutionalization
was seen as an attractive alternative. Yet the total budget of the
department has required substantial increases following the
deinstitutionalization.28 This has been justified by a large increase
in the number of children receiving services which has rendered the per
capita costs lower. 29 The number of youth receiving services has greatly
increased not because of a sudden rise in youthful deviance or delinquent
apprehensions, but rather because the D.Y.S. services are more attractive
to judges, probation officers and private agencies faced with the problems
of the less serious offenders. 30 While diversion has increased the number
26In 1964 budget expenditures stood at $5,245,195; by 1966 the figure was
$5,764,634; and by 1971 the figure had jumped to $10,196,404. Figures
are computed from Mass., Financial Reports, A.R., 1964, 1966 and 1971.
27 See James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1973).
28In 1969 the budget was $7,227,012. By 1973 the budget was $12,090,863
and the 1974 budget was $15,198,819. These later figures did include
the costs of maintaining the vacant institutions as well. Yet the
proposed 1975 budget computed without the cost of the institutions was
set at $16,956,986. See Mass., Department of Youth Services, A.R.,
1973, p. 43.
29In 1970 the Department serviced 932 youths. By May of 1973 the number
had jumped to 2125. See Mass., Department of Youth Services, A.R.,
1973, p. 39.
30Mass., Department of Youth Services, A.R., 1973, p. 10.
232
of youth receiving public services outside the juvenile justice system,
the D.Y.S. conversion to community-based services has increased the number
of youth receiving public services inside the juvenile justice system.
The entire community-based service program has served to expand the number
of youth receiving state financial services. The expansion of these
services has not come at the expense of private services because private
services have been the primary beneficiaries of the public contracts.
Indeed, as private services switch over from a primary reliance on private
charity to a reliance on public contract, they generally achieve an
improvement in fiscal condition. 31
The same paradox of congestion that plagued the corrections
institutions plagues the community-based service system as well. Whereas
congestion had more immediate impact in the institutional system because
superintendents quickly protested as populations reached the capacity
of the facility, congestion in the newer system is more subtle. There
is no hard limit of capacity among private services. New services can
always be established. There is not now, nor has there ever been, a hard
limit on the number of youths in need of services.32 The only limit is
the fiscal limit of the state to supply these services. There is here a
danger that public support of private services through "purchase-of-service"
agreements may reduce the inducement of private services to maintain
310f course, this was not true for the services that filed bankruptcy
due to the inadequate conversion of D.Y.S. from one system to the
other.
32Nor can D.Y.S. impose one. Leavey notes, "Since intake is determined
by the number of referrals and commitments made by judges, the
Department cannot place arbitrary limits on services to be provided."
See Mass., Department of Youth Services, A.R., 1973, p. 11.
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private revenue resources. Under such conditions the private services
would be private in legal definition only, the state fiscal crisis might
be further aggravated and the regulative control of D.Y.S. over its
private vendors might be inverted as the private vendors developed a
politically powerful state-wide organization.
Beyond costs and their potential for spiralling upward, how
effective are the comunity-based services? The question is yet very
much unanswered. As with earlier programs, there have been few evaluations.
A Harvard Law School study that closely followed the deinstitutionalization
suggests that the youths in community placements report more favorable
responses and that recidivism is lower for youth in the community
settings than in the institutions. 33  "Bind overs" to adult courts did
increase, although the number of youth actually committed to state
correctional facilities decreased.34 Treating delinquent children like
dependent children again raises the question, "Why draw a distinction?"
Recent reports from the Governor have suggested converging the two
groups in a superagency for children reminiscent of the 1841 reorganization
of the Boston House of Reformation and the 1879 creation of the State
Superintendent of State Minor Wards. But a superagency may stigmatize
33See Coates, Miller and Ohlin, 1973. For a critical review of these
findings, see Andrew T. Scull, Decarceration: Community Treatment
and the Deviant--A Radical View (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1977), p. 101.
34In 1969 and 1970 the Dorchester District court and the three juvenile
courts bound over 66 youths. During the following two years this
figure jumped to 246. See Boston Globe, November 11, 1973. On the
other hand the number of youth aged 17 and younger committed to the
state adult correctional institutions during 1970 was 38 or 4.4 per
cent, during 1971 it was 47 or 4.3 per cent, and during 1973 it was
6 or 3.0 per cent. See Ohlin, Coates and Miller, 1974, p. 103.
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dependent children as easily as it may reduce the stigma of delinquent
children. A larger agency may also tend more easily to "lose"
individuals and become overstructured with a patronage-filled
bureaucracy.
Only in terms of an increase in the humaneness of community-based
services is there common agreement that the new approach is a definite
improvement. Community-based services may be a step in the desired
direction, but they clearly remain unproven as the ultimate solution in
responding to juvenile delinquency. Already the voice of caution can be
heard:
Unquestioning support is granted for projects describing
themselves as community-based or as youth service bureaus
without careful examination of the quantity or quality of
services rendered in group houses or half-way houses, or
examination of whom they accept or exclude. . . . When the
promise of community services results in lost children,
and there is a failure to plan adequately for children who
are a danger to themselves or others, communities become
angry and take repressive measures. . . . These may be
inevitable difficulties of a transitional period, but they
will be surmounted only if those responsible for new
programs remain vigilant and honest about what they can
and cannot do. 35
35Justine Polier Wise, "Myths and Realities in the Search for Juvenile
Justice: A Statement by the Honorable Justine Polier Wise," Harvard
Educational Review, 44:112-124 (February, 1974), p. 123.
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Section II: Chapter J
THE CONTENT OF SOCIAL REFORM
1. Consideration of the community-based services program of the
1970's bring this analysis to a close. Each of the seven programs of
response that have dominated Massachusetts youth corrections policy over
the past century and a half has been considered. In reviewing the
analysis, the evidence of change is apparent. Changes in the conceptual
features of the four program categories indicate changes in the programs
themselves. Changes in the programs provide the necessary evidence for
a "succession of differences over time." Therefore, it can be said
what surely must have been evident all along: that change has occurred
in Massachusetts youth corrections policy during these past one hundred
and fifty years.
But just what kind of change has occurred? What has changed?
The answer to these questions lies in reviewing the developments within
the four categories. The case history has offered several kinds of
evidence of change in each of the categories. Much of this evidence
can be categorized into conceptually clear indicators. For each program
category general indicators of change can be derived from the evidence
used to describe the content of the category. Indicators of change in
structural forms include changes in planned forms and changes in achieved
forms. Indicators of planned form include architectural designs and
spatial layouts, guidelines on client population size and characteristics
and plans for treatment organization and daily routines. The Foster
Commission report on the State Reform School and Commissioner Miller's
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"Strategy for Youth in Trouble" provide such evidence. Structural forms
achieved through actual implementation may vary significantly from these
stated plans. While the Westborough institution continued to be
discussed as a school and refuge, the correctional wing opened in 1877
included cells, bars and bolted doors. The treatment schedule in this
new wing was certainly not organized educational enterprise. Riots and
brutal discipline prevailed. Thus, achieved forms are better indicated
by the actual use of physical space, the annual reports of client
population size and characteristics and investigative testimony on the
actual organization of the service.
Changes in authority traditions are indicated by formal guidelines
and informal rules of practical conduct. Legal, legislative and
administrative guidelines reveal the normative mandates under which
administrative and staff organization is formally constructed. Thus,
the Board of State Charities was legislated as a purely oversight
authority and the Department of Youth Services Act was intended only to
lead to a reorganized and rationalized institution-based corrections
system. Yet, the administrative and staff organization, particularly by
informal means, may deviate widely from these normative guidelines. Thus,
Howe and Sandborn and, a century later, Jerome Miller reorganized their
authority into quite different forms than their legislative mandates
required. Administration and the procedures of authority as practiced
may differ significantly from the "espoused code of authority." Authority
as practiced may create its own "practical code of authority" in order to
function reasonably, effectively and, occasionally, surreptitiously.1
1This distinction is well recognized in the literature of organization
theory as the difference between "formal" and "informal" structure. See
237
Practice traditions, like authority traditions, are indicated by
both behavioral and normative indicators. And, in similar manner, there
appears a disjuncture between the espoused and practical codes of the
normative indicators. 2 The "espoused code of practice" associated with
moral reform in the reform schools clearly mixed orderliness, affection
and discipline, yet, frequently, during the nineteenth century the
practical code of moral reform emphasized retributive discipline quite
beyond the mandates of the espoused code.
These codes of authority and practice are prescriptive systems
of principles and rules developed to guide action. They offer a diagnosis
of the problems to be addressed, a prognosis noting who should do what to
address the problems, and criteria for determining whether the results of
action are successful. For instance, the espoused code of practice which
served to guide the practice of moral reform assumed the causal theory of
moral degeneration as the basis for its diagnosis. It advocated a practice
Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1938), chap. ix; and Philip Selznick, "Foundations of
a Theory of Organizations," American Sociological Review, 13:25-35
(February, 1948). The notion that theory guides practice and that the
formal and informal characteristics are attributes of espoused and
practical theory is developed in Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon,
Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness (Chicago:
Jossey-Bass, 1974). The term "code" is used here to denote a system of
principles or rules for right action and to differentiate this meaning
from the term theory as employed in "theory traditions."
2It is convenient to describe three indicators here: the conventions of
practice as practiced, the espoused code of practice and the practical code
of practice. This analysis views both practice and authority as composed
of these three elements. Methodologically this is more difficult than
conceptually. Espoused codes are typically well revealed in documents.
The actual functioning of authority or practice can be gleaned from
observation or historical narratives and testimonials. Practical codes, on
the other hand, typically must be inferred from such observations or
testimonials. Not only are such inferences open to serious methodological
biases, they are so fully dependent upon the descriptions of actual functions
and conventions of behavior that they hardly can be said to be a separate
indicator.
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organized around the principles of orderliness, affection and discipline
and conducted by individuals of high moral standing and a deep concern
for the moral life of children. The clean, obedient, upstanding and
morally pure child was the image of successful practice. The espoused
code of child guidance is revealed in the writing of Dr. Healy and
Dr. Root. The diagnosis is borrowed from the psychodynamic thesis of
mental conflicts. The prognosis and counseling by trained pyschiatric
personnel and success is represented by the well adjusted, socially
integrated, hard working youth.
The evidence of change in theory traditions is also signified
by particular indicators. Causal theories of youthful misbehavior
typically include a causal focus, or set of independent variables, a
problem focus, or set of dependent variables, and mediating or
conditional processes. Thus, misbehaving youth were the problem focus
of the moral degeneracy thesis and the causal focus centered upon the
intemperance, idleness, vice and immorality found in the urban industrial
community. The only mediating influence specified was the moral
character of the youth's family. The problem focus for the structuralist
theories was the delinquent gang with the causal focus shifting from
the disorganized local community to the class segregated opportunity
structure, to the class segregated value system. Various mediating
conditions included race and sex differences, the provision of local
welfare services and the access to meaningful economic opportunities.
In more closely examining these program categories it is possible
to see how specific concrete events of the case history can be used as
indicators of change within the categories. Changes in these attributes
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indicate changes in the categories. But, such indicators may be of two
kinds. Some indicators represent the intended program and some better
represent the resultant program. The subtle distinction between planned
and achieved forms of structure and espoused and practical codes of
practice and authority reveals this disjuncture. Where the objective of
this study is to focus on intended and attempted programs and policy, the
thrust of this analysis has been on the planned and espoused features of
program responses. It is this focus which has led to the recognition of
generative concepts as the fundamental features in each of the program
categories.3
Within the program categories there appear to be organizing
concepts which are so pervasive over time that, although personnel and
clients may change and minor refinements of form or code may transpire,
the particular response remains consistent and recognizable from time
period to time period. The organization of the response persists over
time regardless of the succession of minor differences that occur. Just
as significantly, it is these same organizing concepts that, when they
no longer exist, as when Miller closed the reform schools, show that
the new response is fundamentally different and expresses fundamentally
new expressions of organization. These organizing concepts are the basic
3The notion of "generative concepts" follows Donald A. Schon's
Displacement of Concepts (London: Tavistock, 1963). In developing the
notion of generative concepts as basic units for the analysis of social
policy, it is not intended to discredit the use of concrete indicators
as the reasonable units for evaluating the output or product of policy
programs. Such indicators still serve well as measures of effect.
Generative principles serve as a means of clarifying and concretizing
the description of the "treatment" side of the evaluation equation. It
is as a means of specifying the content of a given social policy without
alluding to abstract "objectives" or "goals" that generative principles
find their great value.
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elements of social problems and social responses. Throughout the case
history such organizing concepts have been identified and discussed in
terms of principles and patterns. Organizing or generative principles,
such as shelter, separation, supervision, affection, orderliness, curing,
supporting, training, protecting, degeneration or disorganization, are
the basic units of program categories.4 Such principles are active, that
is, generative, in that they perform like a genetic code to guarantee
that the "tradition" of organization inherent in a given response remains
fundamentally invariant regardless of specific refinements and minor
adjustments. 5
The genetic metaphor works well here. The generative principle
acts as a kind of chromosome code by which generations of forms are
reproduced without variation. Generative principles thus act as the
guardians of tradition. They are ontologically fundamental to
organization. But, as organizing features of organization, generative
principles are not identical with organization. Various configurations
of generative principles may generate several somewhat different
4The term generative principle is used here instead of several other
potential candidates. A generative principle is less comprehensive, more
active and more overtly normative than what Thomas S. Kuhn calls a
"paradigm." I use the term paradigm to identify the basic form or
pattern of a theory tradition which is derived from generative principles.
This is more in keeping with my understanding of Kuhn's definition. See
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962). Generative principles not only
describe; they proscribe. A generative principle implies an attitude as
well as a concept. Fact and value merge in a single unit.
51n terms of epistomology, generative principles are similar to the notion of
essence. It is only by recognizing cognitively that the form or tradition
under observation expresses the same generative principles associated with a
named response that the immediate phenomenon can be classified as a member
of that familiar form or tradition. In writing of the juvenile court,
Edwin H. Sutherland lists three principles which "are stated to be
absolutely essential, so that a court without them is not a juvenile court."
See Sutherland, 1947, p. 305.
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organizational forms. Thus, the congregate reform school, the cottage
reform school, the nautical reform school and the vocational training
(reform) school were all derived from the same basic generative principles
of structure that constituted the foundationstof the asylum program. In
this example the same generative principles produced different patterns
of organization. Throughout the case history several different words have
been used to suggest these common patterns of organization.6 In structure,
the pattern of organization has been called a prototype. In practice and
authority the patterns have been called codes or idioms depending upon
their referrent. In theory, the pattern has been labeled as a thesis or
paradigm.
The generative principles of structure, therefore, serve as the
determinants of spatial prototypes and guarantee that one reform school or
one clinic appears fundamentally like another. In practice traditions
and authority traditions, generative principles are the organizing features
of the codes and idioms of convention which serve as precedents in keeping
practice and authority consistent over time. In the theory traditions,
generative principles provide the frame of reference and guides for analysis
6 Anthropolists refer to such ideal models of cultural forms as
configurations, archetypes or prototypes. See, for instance,
H.G. Barnett's classic study of innovation: Innovation: The Basis
of Cultural Change (New York: McGhaw Hill, 1953). Donald Schon's
"concepts" has this same character. See Schon, 1963. I have used
the term "pattern of organization" as a generic term for such
"concepts" as they appear in each of the four categories. By "pattern"
I intend to suggest the same looseness that exists in Kenneth Boulding's
use of "image". Both uses suggest "ways of seeing" organization, although
Boulding's "image" is more extended than my own. See Kenneth Boulding,
The Image: Khowledge in Life and Society (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1956).
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which characterize particular theoretical paradigms.7  Thus, principles
guide and constrain the design of the specific responses in the program
categories. They serve as basic design criteria. Generative patterns
are the graphic resolutions of the design problem posed within the design
criteria. These patterns are the fundamental archetypes of response
forms and traditions. They provide the conceptual blueprint upon which
the specific responses are constructed.8 Figure 5 presents this model as
a hierarchy of elements, suggesting how policy programs can be seen as
constructed from fundamental generative concepts.
The case history reveals some overlap between structure and
practice (for instance, in supervised placement the two categories are
indistinguishable) and between practice and authority (the role relations
of the practice prognosis are also indicators of codes of authority).
This more detailed construction of the categories reveals a certain
arbitrariness and imprecision in their formulation. Frustrating as this
lack of clear distinction may be in terms of conceptualization and
methodology, it pointedly demonstrates how fundamentally interdependent
In some theory traditions there is evidence of a particular thesis such
as the psychoanalytic thesis or labeling thesis. In other cases there is
an absence of well codified theory. It is a strength of Kuhn's formulation
that the paradigm offers "something that can function when the theory is
not there." The paradigm taken in this sociological sense is only one of
three conceptions Margaret Masterman finds in Kuhn's formulation. See her
"The Nature of a Paradigm," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed.
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press,
1970), pp. 59-89.
8This architectural design metaphor is somewhat misleading because it
incorrectly implies a temporal sequence connecting principles to patterns
to "designed" response. The case history suggests that these various
elements all emerge synthetically, each shaping and in turn shaped by the
others. This will be take up in the following section. For an analysis
of architectural design which does suggest this synthetic process see
Christopher Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1964).
Figure 5: Model of a Social Policy Program of Response
Social Policy Programs of Response
Program Categories: Structure Practice Theory
Generative Concepts:
(Principles and Patterns)
Prototypes Codes
or
Idioms Paradigms
Na3
Authori ty
Theses
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Codes
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the categories of a policy program may be. Some programs, for instance
the moral reform/asylum program and the psychodynamic program, exhibit
such a substantial interdependence among the four categories of response
that they appear to have the character of a unified system.9 The logic
which underlies the policy program is so strong that changes in the
concepts of one category affect concepts in other categories. For example,
the focus on the family as a mediator in the moral degeneracy thesis gave
rise to the cottage as an expression of the family ideal in the structure
of the reform school, which in turn permitted the decentralization of the
responsibility for the orderliness, affection and discipline of moral
reform practice from the superintendents to the cottage supervisors. In
this case, the increase in interest in the family as a causal mediator
affected the organizing features of moral reform practice which, in
turn, affected the organizing features of the reform school structure.
This system-like character of programs of response suggests
that the generative concepts associated with a particular program display
some interdependence and coherence. Ideally, the concepts underlying
the program categories all perform together to fashion and present a
coherent and consistent program. Where there appears significant
dissonance among the concepts, as in the case of the supervised placement
program into which Howe attempted to integrate the heredity thesis, the
program appears less compelling. In such cases strong efforts may be made
to reduce the dissonance and achieve conceptual coherence within the
9The term system here is defined loosely as in Ludwig von Bertalanffy's
"sets of elements standing in interaction." See his General Systems
Theory: Theory, Foundations, Applications (New York: Brazilier,
1968), p. 38.
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program. Gardiner Tufts struggled hard to rid the supervised placement
program of the genetic theory.10 Walter Wheeler, the man who finally
formalized "the Massachusetts system" of supervised placements, saw
little genetic causation in the youth he placed and visited.11
Ideally, programs of response are total "systems of response."
They create a comprehensive and integrated policy climate in which
rational and systematic practice and research can be conducted. Figure 6
presents each of the programs of response with its generative concepts
listed in outline form. The page numbers reference the pages of this
study where each of the concepts are considered. The theory concepts in
the supervised placement and vocational education programs appear either
poorly integrated or absent. The authority concepts in the community
prevention program remain dissonant with the other program concepts. Yet,
in several of the cases, notably the asylum, child guidance and
community-based services programs, the generative concepts appear
consistent and well integrated and yield fairly compelling programs of
response.
2. With this descriptive model of policy programs it is now possible
to examine the effects of reform on the content of social policy. Consider
the different modes of change manifest in each of the four program categories.
10See Gardiner Tufts, "Family Visitation of the Wards of the State as
Practiced in Massachusetts," in Transactions of the National Conference
on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline, ed. Enoch Wines (Albany, N.Y.:
Weed, Parsons, 1871), pp. 360-369.
11In 1911 Wheeler write, "The more I study the problem of the reformation
of boys . . . the more I am convinced that it is personality that counts."
See Mass., Training Schools, 1st A.R., 1911 , p. 62.
Figure 6: Expanded Programs of Response in the History of Massachusetts Youth Corrections Policy
THE ASYLUM PROGRAM
Moral Degeneracy Thesis
Conception of Deviant: wayward youth "born and reared under.. .inauspicious circumstances" (p. 125)
Origin of Deviance: the morally degenerate community where poverty, vice and intemperance
abounded (p. 124)
Moral Reformation
Target of Treatment: the youth
Criteria of Success: the morally upstanding youth marching forward in "the dignity of true manhood"
Conception of Service Provider: morally exemplary male superintendents and officers of great
"skill, earnesiness, caution, patience and self control" (p. 123)
Plan of Practice: a "well ordered life" under the strict "family discipline" of an affectionate
superintendent and his officers
Refuge/Reform School
Plan of Structure: a shelter, separated from the community, in confinement and differentiated
by age and sex (p. 115)
Internal Organization: like acottage at a "well managed boarding school" (p. 46)
Board of Trustees
Plan of Authority: an autonomous board sets policy and a fully responsible superintendent
administers within policy guidelines
THE SUPERVISED PLACEMENT PROGRAM
Heredity Thesis
Conception of Deviant: wayward youth who "fell short of the average amount of vital force" (p. 141)
Origin of Deviance: "poor stock"; "low or vitiated condition of parentage" (p. 141)
Moral Reformation
Target of Treatment: the youth
Criteria of Success: morally upstanding youth having regained "the median line"
Conception of Service Provider: the Chritian farm family..."the natural reform schools of the
Commonwealth" (p. 49)
Plan of Practice: a rigorous well ordered, well disciplined farm life under the periodic
supervision of a visiting agent
Supervised Placement
Plan of Structure: a farm family under the supervision of a visiting agent (p. 138)
Figure 6: Page two
Internal Organization: visiting at least once per year
Board of Oversight
Plan of Authority: visiting agent operates under state board policies (p. 134)
THE VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAM
Theory (Ignorance?)
Conception of Deviant: untrained, low skilled youth
Origin of Deviance: ?
Vocational Education
Target of Treatment: the youth
Criteria of Success: highly skilled, employable youth who manifests "prompt and cheerful
obedience to commands" (p. 148)
Conception of Service Provider: the male or female professional teacher
Plan of Practice: differentiated manual training, Sloyd, physical education and military
would instill skill, discipline and obedience (p. 149)
Vocational Training School
Plan of Structure: a centralized school house among the cottages organized for economy a
efficiency
Internal Organization: the classroom permitting age graded advancement (p. 153)
Supervisory Board
Plan of Authority: Board of Trustees set policy within guidelines of state board; super
administers (p. 173)
THE CHILD PROTECTION PROGRAM
Child Vulnerability
Conception of Deviant: the "juvenile delinquent" (p. 163)
Origin of Deviance: ?
Child Protection
Target of Practice: the youth; the law
Criteria of Success: curtailment of law breaking behavior
Conception of Service Provider: the "fatherly" judge; the "brotherly" probation officer
drill
nd
intendent
Figure 6: Page three
Plan of Practice: a "juvenile judge" in an informal "hearing" found youths "delinquent" and
"placed them on probation" often in "private child protective services" (p. 164)
Juvenile Court
Plan of Structure: an age specific chancery court acting under the parens patriae doctrine and
"in the best interests of the child" (p. 163)
Internal Organization: the "juvenile hearing" or "juvenile session"
Authority (see Supervisory Board)
THE CHILD GUIDANCE PROGRAM
Psychodynamic Thesis
Conception of Deviant: psychologically and emotionally maladapted and dysfunctional individual
Origin of Deviance: mental conflicts arising from early childhood and infancy experiences (p. 182)
Child Guidance
Target of Practice: the individual youth
Criteria of Success: the emotionally well adjusted youth (p. 195)
Conception of Service Provider: professional trained psychiatric clinicians and psychometricians
Plan of Practice: examination, diagnosis, prognosis and consultation supervision;
research and classification (p. 188)
Child Guidance Clinic
Plan of Structure: a diagnostic and evaluation center
Internal Organization: the hospital laboratory (p. 184)
Administrative Department
Plan of Authority: the state administrative department sets policy, centralizes administration;
the superintendent as bureaucrat (p. 191)
THE COMMUNITY PREVENTION PROGRAM
Structuralist Theories
Conception of Deviant: the pre-delinquent gang member (p. 202)
Origin of Deviance: growing up in lower class "disorganized community"; "differentially organized
community" in a sub culture in defiance of middle class values; in conformance with lower
class culture (p. 197)
Figure 6: Page four
Community Prevention
Target of Practice: the gang, the community (p. 204)
Criteria of Success: the reduction of recidivism among youth, the reduction of delinquency rate
in community
Conception of Service Provider: professionally trained social worker (p. 205)
Plan of Practice: detached work to re-direct gang behavior, family counseling and community
organizing, opening up educational and employment training opportunities (p. 201)
Organized Community
Plan of Structure: organizing "the total community" using indigenous community workers and
community action councils (p. 206)
Internal Organization: the organized gang, the neighborhood association and the agency
coordinating council
Youth Service Board
Plan of Authority: a dispositional board responsible for youth corrections and an administrative
division responsible for institutional management (p. 208)
THE COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES PROGRAM
Social Reaction Thesis
Conception of Deviant: the labeled delinquent
Origin of Deviance: youth serving institutions identify some law breaking youth as "delinquent" and
the youth react by accepting the label (p. 217)
Youth Services
Target of Practice: the youth, the youth serving institutions
Criteria of Success: the reduction of recidivism among youth, the reduction of delinquency rate in
community
Conception of Service Provider: social workers, counselors and community para-professionals
Plan of Practice: diversion to small, informal community centers which stress self-respect and
self-responsibility (p. 220)
Community-Based Services
Plan of Structure: informal, small scale community-based services (p. 222)
Internal Organization: the group home, foster care, the forestry camp and non-residential services
Regulatory Department
Plan of Authority: regionalized monitoring and evaluating state department overseeing private
purchase-of-service vendors (p. 228)
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The increase in popularity of moral reform as practice did not result in
the abandonment of the older principles of guardianship. Rather, the
principles of moral reform and guardianship were adjusted such that each
practice accommodated to the other. The strong commitment to order,
affection and discipline associated with moral reform were appended onto the
protection and control associated with guardianship. Nor did the rise of
vocational education as practice result in the abandonment of the then
traditional practices. The principles of vocational education and the
older reformative principles were adjusted such that each accommodated to
the others. This form of additive change appears throughout the reforms
of practice. Neither the advent of child guidance practice nor the rise
of youth service practice resulted in the abandonment of previous
principles of practice. Reforms in practice appear to be characterized
by a pattern of adjustment and accommodation, whereby new practice
traditions were added on to existing traditions with only minimal loss
of the older principles.
This additive form of change does not appear to hold true for
reforms of authority. While the Board of State Charities was specifically
intended only to add an oversight function to the existing state policy
making process, Howe and Sandborn developed the board so as to usurp
policy making functions from both the legislature and the boards of
trustees. In effect, the Board of State Charities replaced the fragmented
boards of trustees in major state policy making. This replacive form of
change was even more evident in later reforms of authority. The State
Board of Health, Lunacy and Charity replaced the Board of State Charities,
as did the Department of Public Welfare replace the State Board of Charity.
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The reforms that led to the Youth Service Board/Division of Youth Services
and the Department of Youth Services were also characterized by
replacement. In reforms of authority, new forms of structure appear to
replace older forms by the complete substitution of one form for the other.
The replacive form of change apparent in the reforms of
authority differs in still another way from the additive form of change
associated with reforms of practice. In reforms of authority, the
replacement of one form with another was viewed as a continuous effort
to improve upon the principles of older forms. While each form replaced
its predecessor, its principles grew directly from the needs of the older
form. Thus, the State Board of Health, Lunacy and Charity achieved the
policy supervisory authority that Howe and Sandborn had advocated earlier
and the Department of Public Welfare achieved the administrative
authority that the State Board of Charity considered desirable. Likewise,
the Department of Youth Services achieved the regulative authority which
had been advocated by the Youth Service Board. This continuity is not
true with reforms of practice. Moral reform did not grow organically
from the principles of guardianship; nor did vocational education develop
naturally from the principles of moral reform. Rather, moral reform,
vocational education, child guidance and youth service developed
independently and in a manner discontinuous with previous practice. Only
through careful adjustment and accommodation were these new practices
grafted onto earlier practices. New traditions of practice appear to
develop in a discontinuous mode whereas new forms of authority arise in a
continuous mode.
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Reforms of theory, like reforms of practice, appear to arise in
a discontinuous manner, but they are not accepted as additions to
existing theory. The moral degeneracy thesis not only replaced the
predestination thesis, it was a fully discontinuous development. The
principles of predestination were antithetical to the principles of moral
degeneration. There could be no adjustment or accommodation between the
two theories. The reform, therefore, was a complete transformation and,
as such, it was discontinuous with the past. The relation between the
heredity thesis and the moral degeneracy thesis was also antithetical.
Had there ever been a full acceptance of genetic causation, such a reform
would also have had to be discontinuous. The increase in popularity of
the psychodynamic thesis may have borrowed a few bits of the heredity
thesis and the moral degeneracy thesis, but it clearly did replace both
as the dominant theory of causation. Again, the socio-economic theories
of the 1930's and 1940's, had they achieved full acceptance, would have
been discontinuous replacements. This has been well borne out by the
acceptance of the social reaction thesis which is both discontinuous with
psychodynamic theory and has served to replace it. Reforms of theory,
then, appear to occur through a process of discontinuous replacement,
whereby new theories arise frequently in contradiction with existing
theories and eventually come to fully replace them in professional and
popular acceptance.
Reforms of structure are hardest to categorize in this manner.
The refuge/reform school was discontinuous with traditional forms of
youth correcting structure and, in terms of reformative services, it did
replace them. The cottage organization likewise was discontinuous and,
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eventually, a replacement. Yet the nautical school, the reformatory and
the other age-graded institutions were not discontinuous with the
reform school--which was itself an age-graded institution--nor did they
serve to replace the reform school. Neither the vocational training
school, the reception center nor the medium security institution were
discontinuous replacements. Each arose from the same structural
principles as the reform school prototype and each was adjusted to
accommodate to the reform school. The same cannot be said of the clinic.
It arose in the preventive services and was, thus, discontinuous, but it
was easily added into the training school without replacement. Finally,
the deinstitutionalization replaced the reform schools with community-based
services which, as structural forms, were discontinuous with the
developments of the institutions. Reforms of structure appear to have
taken many forms. They were both continuous and discontinuous with
earlier forms and they served both as additions to and replacements of
the earlier forms.
In all, the changes manifest among the various program categories
appear to have taken four different forms. These four modes of reform
may be represented by a simple two-by-two matrix as constructed in
Figure 7. The two co-ordinates of the matrix form four cells each
representing a mode of reform noted in the case history: continuous
addition, continuous replacement, discontinuous addition and discontinuous
replacement. Each cell can be given a label. Reforms that result in
additions that are continuous with previous developments may be called
refinements. Reforms that result in the replacement of a previous pattern
with a new pattern, but one that develops directly from the earlier pattern,
Modes of Social Reform in Social
Additive
Policy Developmaent
Rep lac ve
Continuous
Discontinuous
FiSure 7:
re-finements accessions
re-constructions trans-formations
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may be called reconstructions. Reforms that result in additions to a
given pattern, but whose development arises outside the specific pattern,
may be called accessions. Finally, reforms that result in the replacement
of one pattern with another which has developed outside the earlier
pattern may be called transformations.
Following this typology, most of the reforms of practice
appeared as discontinuous additions or accessions. Most of the reforms
of authority appeared as continuous replacements or reconstructions.
Most of the reforms of theory appeared as discontinuous replacements or
transformations and the reforms of structure appeared to provide evidence
of all four modes of social reform.
The question "what changes in the reform of social policy?" can
now be answered. Social responses to social problems continuously
produce social policy. This history of Massachusetts youth corrections
policy can be characterized as a sequence of dominant programs of
response. These programs can be considered as composed of four program
categories: structure, practice, theory and authority. Specific
responses in each program category may be characterized by their unique
generative concepts. These concepts take the form of generative
principles and generative patterns. Social reforms of social policy
change the generative concepts that organize responses in policy programs.
Such changes may either add to or replace previous concepts and such changes
may be either continuous or discontinuous with these previous concepts.
Only where such changes are both discontinuous and replacive can social
reform be said to have fully transformed a social policy. Generative
principles and their derivative generative patterns of organization serve,
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then, as the basic units of analysis for studying social policy. They
characterize social policy in such a manner that policy programs may be
evaluated and improved by refinements or may be confronted, critiqued,
challenged and replaced with clarity and definitiveness.
Having developed a means of identifying change in a social
policy and a frame of analysis for examining the content of social reform
as it affects social policy it is next necessary to consider the means
by which the social reform of social policy occurs.
SECTION III
THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL REFORM
Section III: Chapter A
SOCIAL REFORM AS A FRAME OF ANALYSIS
In the preceding section the history of Massachusetts youth
corrections policy has been presented in "snapshot" form. Specific
periods of policy history have been abstracted from the running flow of
the historical chronicle and examined as discrete states of youth
corrections policy. By comparing one state with temporally earlier
states it has been possible to document change along certain categories
of analysis and to suggest certain attributes as units for analysing
these changes. That analysis has been completely static. No attempt
was made to consider the actual processes which have brought about the
changes. It is toward these processes that the study now turns.
How is it that social reform happens? What are the immediate
actions and events that constitute the mechanics of the reform of a social
policy? Under what conditions and due to what motivation does social
reform arise? There are two interlocking questions here. The first
concerns the actual mechanics by which social reform occurs and the
second involves the conditions which are necessary antecedents of social
reform. Conceptually these two questions can be considered independently,
but among the concrete phenomena of the case history the distinction is
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often blurred. Action which brings about change can also be seen as
the immediate antecedent of change. Conditions which appear to render
change inevitable are frequently the result of actions and events intended
to bring about change. This section, which begins with the concrete
phenomena of the case history, begins by considering the two questions
without distinction. As the analysis moves further away from the
specifics of the case, the questions will be separated in order that they
may offer independent avenues of exploration.
Studies of social policy change have viewed the phenomena from
several different perspectives. Each perspective, or frame of analysis,
has led the analyst to select different phenomena for primary study, to
interpret these phenomena with different meanings and to explain change
with different metaphors in mind. The selection of frames of analysis
is, then, a critical variable in "shaping" and explaining the data of
historical analysis. 1
It is common in literature reviews to present these frames in
comparative fashion, often advocating one over the others. 2  Instead of
exploring the frames of analysis comparatively in order to choose a
"winner," this study will use various frames cumulatively. The strengths
At this level of abstraction, the framework follows Gregory Bateson's
conceptualization of "psychological frames" as devices for delimiting
a class of messages or meaningful phenomena. See his "A Theory of Play
and Fantasy," in his Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Chandler,
1972). For a more recent application of the concept see Erving Goffman,
Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York:
Harper and Row, 1974).
2An excellent attempt to evaluate reference frames in terms of their
actual service in explaining an historical case is found in Graham T.
Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston; Little, Brown, 1971).
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of each frame can then be accepted and employed to shape and explain the
phenomena that it handles best. Not only will this permit the exploration
of several frames of analysis, it will provide a fuller, more rounded
analysis of the processes of social reform.
In explaining the processes of change within the case history,
four overlapping reviews are presented, each presenting in turn its own
frames of analysis. In the first segment, which includes Chapter B, the
formation and implementation of social policy is examined by considering
the decision-making, administrative and political details of three
separate cases of policy change drawn from the case history. In Chapter C,
the origin of new ideas and their flow into Massachusetts youth corrections
policy are examined from the perspective of innovation and diffusion.
Chapter D, then, presents an exploration of the role of social movements
in the process of social reform. In Chapter E, the role of ideas and
social organization are examined within social reform movements. Finally,
Chapter F provides a summary for the section by stating the accumulated
model of the mechanisms and conditions of social reform.
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Section III: Chapter B
SOCIAL POLICY FORMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
1. Decision Making in Policy Formation. It is conventional to
think of social policy as the result of specific decisions. 1 In order
for a social organization, such as the state, to adopt or change its
policy toward some social problem, it is easily assumed that a decision
making actor or body makes a choice. While it is possible that such
choices might be made inadvertently or without specific intention and
that such choices need not be unitary, the assumption that social policies
are fundamentally the result of specific decisions is central to
conventional explanations of policy development.
The assumption is not unreasonable. Most policy making
processes involve decisions: typically, many decisions. Skepticism
arises only where it is assumed that the decision or decisions account
sufficiently for the entire policy making process. It is an easy
oversimplification to conclude that social policies arise or are altered
by decisions alone. Such oversimplification isolates policy decisions
from the total process of policy formation and invests in them unwarranted
importance. Where policy decisions are separated from their historical
context the developmental perspective of policy formation is lost and each
policy making event comes to appear more unique and independent than it
is felt to be by those who experience it. This reifying of decision making
For conventional decision-oriented approaches to policy formation see
Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell , eds., The Policy Sciences
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), and Yehezkel Dror,
Public Policy Making Re-examined (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968).
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in social policy analysis fragments the policy making process and, until
recently, relegates the implementation of policy to the class of
uninteresting residuals. 2 The recent efforts to study policy
implementation, while much needed, also suffer from a reluctance to
re-integrate policy formation and policy implementation into a single
historical process. It is not necessary to do such radical surgery on
the policy making process. The activities which lead up to a major policy
decision are similar to those that follow it. Policy formation and policy
implementation are both pieces of the long broad process by which social
policies develop.
Consider the case history. Of the various decisions that have
set the course and shaped the future of Massachusetts youth correction
policy, three stand out as landmarks for which Massachusetts is well
remembered and often cited. These three include the decision to open the
nation's first state reform school, the decision to establish a supervised
placement system that would prevent delinquency by nipping waywardness
while it was yet nascent, and the recent decision to close down the state
institutions and rely, instead, on a network of community-based services.
Because each of these decisions has been viewed as highly significant, the
conditions of their occurrence have been well documented. Through reviews
of primary sources and secondary analyses it is possible to reconstruct in
2For a good study of implementation which views it as a distorting process
in the conduct of new policy programs, see Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron
Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1973). Martha Derthick's New Towns In-Town (Washington, D.C.: Urban
Institute, 1972) is less clear, but also views implementation problems
as distortions. A more positive approach is suggested in a paper by
Martin Rein and Francine Rabinovitz, "Implementation," Joint Center for
Urban Studies, Cambridge, Mass., 1974. (Mimeographed.)
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some detail specific case studies that recount the events and actions
which led up to and immediately followed each of the three decisions. In
the remainder of this chapter, each of these three decisions will be
reviewed and analyzed in the broader context of its historical environment.
2. Case I: Establishing the Asylum Program. The effort to develop
a successful institutional system of youth corrections in Massachusetts
took nearly forty years. The problem was primarily one of implementation.
The patterns of organization were described in detail long before they
could be implemented in structure and practice. The State Reform School
arose from the same generative principles as the House of Reformation,
but, like the House of Reformation, it did not long remain true to those
principles.
The general deterioration of the House of Reformation and the
resulting disenchantment of Boston's leading social activists laid the
seedbed for sprouting the reform school prototype. Both New York and
Pennsylvania offered financial support to their municipal refuges. The
antipathy of the General Court toward Boston blocked such aid in
Massachusetts. Forthermore, many prominent citizens, including those
active in the Boston Prison Discipline Society, felt that the care of
delinquent children should be a state, not a city, function. 3 The
reluctance of the Commonwealth to support municipal refuges left it
vulnerable to pressures for the establishment of a state institution.
3 See Boston Prison Discipline Society, 4th A.R., 1829, p.15, and Quincy,
1852, p. 107.
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In 1846 the legislature received two memorials which stimulated
interest in a state institution.4 The receipt of these petitions prompted
the legislature to establish a special legislative investigating committee.
Noting that a "radical change" was required in the existing care of young
offenders and that a state supported institution had the best potential for
such results, this committee recommended that the state establish "a
manual labor school." 5 The legislature responded on April 16 by directing
the governor to appoint a three man commission to locate and purchase a
site and prepare plans for a school building and by allocating up to
$10,000 for the task. The governor then appointed three commission members
with Alfred D. Foster as chairman.
For several years prior to 1846, Theodore Lyman, the president
of the Directors of the Boston Asylum and Farm School for Indigent Boys on
Thompson's Island, had been attempting to convince the directors of the
Farm School to accept boys from outside the city. But the directors of the
Farm School, like those of the House of Reformation, were reluctant to take
on a responsibility that so many believed fell to the state. Thus, when
Lyman heard of the Foster Commission's efforts to locate a site for a state
reform school, he wrote to Foster offering the commission a $10,000
donation which he asked Foster to accept as an anonymous gift.
4 Francis G. Shaw, the Foreman of the Second Jury of Trials of Norfolk
County, addressed the legislature claiming that the County House of
Correction, where Norfolk County youth were then confined, was not "a
fit or suitable place for the confinement and detention of juvenile
offenders." The second petition sent by the Town of Roxbury in
conjunction with the Norfolk County petition noted the alarming rise
in the numbers of juvenile offenders. See Katz, 1968, pp. 167-168.
5See Letter from Governor George N. Briggs to the House of Representatives,
January 15, 1847, bound in Mass., State Reform School, 1st A.R., 1847, p. 20.
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In January of 1847 the Foster Commission submitted its report
noting the use of the anonymous donation for the purchase of the Lovett
Peters farm in Westborough.6 On April 9, 1847, the Massachusetts
legislature authorized the establishment of the State Reform School at
Westborough, ordered the state to take control of the Peters property,
allocated another $10,000 for construction and directed the governor to
appoint a three member Board of Trustees.
3. The State Reform School as a Policy Response. A decision was
reached on April 9, 1847, by the members of the General Court to authorize
the establishment of a state reform school. This decision represented an
important event in the implementation of the asylum program. If the Great
and General Court of Massachusetts were assumed, for the moment, to be a
basic problem-solving unit, then it might be possible to examine the
decision in terms of the rational problem-solving model.
The rational problem-solving frame of analysis in the policy
sciences rests upon a simple problem-solving model. A stress is perceived,
a problem statement is formulated, alternative responses are considered
and one response is selected as the resolution.8  In order to employ this
6 See "Report of the Foster Commission," 1849, p. 24.
7For those who know well the Massachusetts legislature it does stretch
the imagination.
8For the best early formulation of this model , see John Von Neumann and
Oscar Morganstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1944). Further developments can be found in
Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: J. Wiley,
1957), and Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values
(New York: J. Wiley, 1963).
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model some unit of analysis must be assumed capable of problem solving
in a unified manner similar to that of an individual actor. This unit
of analysis is conceived to act as a "black box" into which the problem
statement and alternatives are "fed in" and out of which a selection is
"fed out." This selection is assumed to be based on a rational logic
organized by a given set of objectives across which comparative utilities
can be computed.9
Given this frame of analysis, the two local petitions in the
General Court would be seen as presenting the stress and defining the
problem.10 Whatever search among alternative responses that occurred
was completed by the time that the special legislative committee set the
mandate for the Foster Commission to establish "a state manual labor
school." For the Foster Commission, the problem and the solution
arrived together.
At the time, no other state had committed itself to a state
reform school. 11  What, then, motivated the legislature to approve such
an institution? It might be argued that the legislature looked with such
pride upon the national reputation of the Worcester State Lunatic Hospital
9Some analysts have attempted insight into the inner workings of this
"black box." See W. Ross Ashby, Design for a Brain (New York: J. Wiley,
1952), and George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter and Karl H. Pribram, Plans
and the Structure of Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).
10Michael Katz notes, "The two concerns that combined to form the argument
that the Commonwealth should create a reform school were the evils of
mixing juvenile delinquents with mature criminals in the same jail and
apprehension at the increase in crime. Each of the two petitions sent
the state legislature in 1846 stressed one of these two concerns." See
Katz, 1969, p. 167.
11New York State had been providing state subsidies to the New York House
of Refuge since 1832, but the institution was not under state control.
See Pickett, 1969.
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which it had authorized in 1833 that it assumed that it might do as well
with an institution for young offenders. But the legislature was, at
best, divided concerning the state hospital. 12 Moreover, the state also
operated the prison at Charlestown which was hardly considered a success.
Rather, the legislature was reluctant to enter social services.13 Besides,
Boston already maintained ayouth corrections institution and there was a
private venture in the Farm School. The decision to open the State
Reform School is only viewed as rational when accounting is made for the
political pressures that were placed on the legislature in order to
force the state takeover and expand the services which were generally
considered a failure in Boston.
Louis Dwight of the Prison Discipline Society, Francis Shaw of
Norfolk County and the selectmen of Roxbury were instrumental in
elevating the issue to the state legislature. Neither Norfolk County
nor Roxbury nor the remainder of Massachusetts was served by the Boston
House of Reformation. While the refuge pattern had become attractive
throughout the state, most other jurisdictions could not afford to
provide separate facilities. Further, many in Boston, particularly the
city councilors, were eager to shift their financial burden over to the
state. Lyman, himself, became attracted to the state auspices when it
became apparent that the Farm School Board of Directors were resistant to
accepting other than Boston youth. But Lyman was politically trapped.
12See Gerald N. Grob, The State and the Mentally Ill: A History of the
Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts, 1830-1920 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1966).
13 Even by 1855, when the City of Lowell opened a House of Refuge, the
state refused to provide financial assistance.
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His support of the new idea would embarrass his fellow Farm School
directors and jeopardize the idea when it came before his political
enemies in the General Court.14 Thus, he offered his philanthropy
anonymously. The Lyman gifts were critical in matching the original
legislative funds and drawing out additional state appropriations for
construction. Foster and Washburn strategically offered the funds as
a carrot to the reluctant legislature and easily won their appropriations.
It would be convenient to assume the 1847 legislative decision
to authorize the State Reform School as the quintessential policy decision
in establishing the new institution and look no further at the subsequent
events. To do so would require isolating this one decision from the long
series of decisions that were required to produce a fully operational
reform school and to seriously inflate its significance. The 1847
decision is important in that it does mark the official state recognition
of the reform school prototype, but this recognition did not guarantee
that the principles of the asylum program would immediately achieve
dominance. Just as there appeared a long developmental period for the
generative concepts of the asylum program prior to the 1847 decision,
there followed a long period of development after the decision during which
the concepts were further refined and finally realized in the Lyman School
of the 1890's. This subsequent implementation period is not significantly
different from the period that preceded the major policy decision. Efforts
to properly understand the problem and properly formulate a response which
characterized the earlier period also characterized the implementation
14See "Theodore Lyman," American Journal of Education, 10:5-10 (March,
1877).
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period. The successful implementation of a policy program as dominant
policy is the result of a long sequence of decisions of which the central
state recognition decision is only one such decision and not always the
most significant one.
4. The Lyman School as a Policy Response. Had men like Foster,
Washburn or Robert Rantoul stayed on to construct and develop the new
institution it might have achieved a more lasting success. Instead, the
task fell to the first superintendent, William R. Lincoln. Lincoln had
previously served as head teacher at the Boston House of Reformation and,
rather than look widely for prototypes, he strove to replicate the refuge
system at Westborough. Although he alone was not responsible for the
form achieved, it was this, and similar planning, which caused the reform
school to inherit most of the flaws which existed at the House of
Reformation--specifically, the congregate pattern of organization.
Lincoln responded to the overcrowding that soon engulfed the
State Reform School by increasing the size of the congregate facility.
While this only temporarily relieved the overcrowding, it had the
immediate disadvantage of creating an institution far larger than the
original plan and much bigger than could reasonably be administered
wihtout siginficant staff brutality. The fire of 1859 that destroyed
half of the building and the public scandal that arose over the shackling
of disobedient boys in "the lodges" provide blatant evidence of the
degree to which the institution envisioned as a place of affectionate and
well-ordered moral reformation had been perverted from its originating
principles. Only the firm and confident administration of Joseph Allen
could restore the fallen institution.
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Allen's chief success during his first term was the establishment
of the Nautical School and the reduction in the age of commitment at
Westborough such that the older, more hardened youth could be separated
from the younger population. This lower age limit was an important feature
that the Foster Commission was aware of, but had not gone far enough in
advocating.
The rational frame of policy analysis focusing on the decision
to open the Nautical Branch would view the fire and scandal over "the
lodges" as precipitating incidents leading to a problem definition. The
problem was formulated by the two investigating committees as the
presence of the older boys. The Nautical Branch would then naturally
be the result of the decision to divert away the older boys. In this view
the decision responded to two objectives. First, by ridding Westborough
of the older boys, it would reduce the potential for their contaminating
younger boys and then provoking the officers to severe forms of discipline.
Second, the nautical life would provide more rigorous discipline for the
older boys as well as marketable skills for their entry into employment.15
The decision seems to have proved some success. With the older
boys diverted away, Superintendent Allen was able to re-establish the
practice of moral reform and greatly reduce corporal punishment. Severe
forms of punishment are not again noted until after 1870 when the
"Massachusetts" was closed and older boys are re-introduced at Westborough.
15See M. L. Elbridge, "History of the Massachusetts Nautical Reform School,"
in Transactions of the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory
Discipline, ed. Enoch Wines (Albany, N.Y.: Weed, Parsons, 18/1)
pp. 352-353 for just such an analysis.
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But the hope that the Nautical Branch would provide the older boys a more
challenging discipline and more employable skills falters.
The nautical reform school which had been established as a
youth corrections institution became the object of a major displacement
of purpose.16 By the middle of the 1860's the indenturing system of
the Nautical Branch whereby private ships could contract for boys as crew
members had become extremely popular among whaling companies which
required cheap inexperienced crews with a willingness to carry out two to
four year voyages. The New Bedford whaling interests were eager to take
advantage of this Boston Harbor resource. In 1867, when the Massachusetts
Nautical School was established as an independent institution separate
from the State Reform School, these New Bedford interests were able to
force the transfer of the "Massachusetts" to the New Bedford Harbor.17
This capturing of the nautical reform school by the whaling interests
made the institution more the recruiter of cheap seafaring labor and less
the reformer of wayward boys. In becoming more pointed in his criticism
of the nautical reform school , Frank Sandborn hinted at these other
problems with the institution:
. . . juvenile reformatories are established to make of
boys, good men and not to replenish any branch of
industry supposed to be languishing.18
16 In 1861 the legislature authorized the arming of the "Massachusetts"
and the stationing on her of a customs agent for the deterrence of
smuggling in the Boston Harbor.
17Mass., Board of State Charities, 3rd A.R., 1867, p. 169. This year
also marked the high point of these indentures. In twelve months 64
boys were "shipped out" on 27 whalers. See Wirkkala, 1973, p. 141.
Unrest and disorders were common on the two vessels and escapes and
attempts at arson were frequent.
18Mass., Board of State Charities, 7th A.R., 1871, p. xxxix.
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Not only did the majority of boys not want to become seamen, there
really was little future in the trade due to the declining position of
the mercantile and fishing sectors of the economy. By 1867, even the
whaling industry, into which most of the boys were "shipped out," was
rapidly deteriorating. 19
The rational frame of policy analysis does not handle these
issues of organizational interests and segmented decision processes well.
Where no single actor makes final decisions, where no one decision
persists, where issues of implementation compromise and displace basic
policy objectives, attention must be turned toward the organizational
context in which policy programs are developed.20
Thus, the failure of the reform school to meet its original
objectives is seen as the result of an organizational constraint dictating
the makeup of the client population. The result of Allen's efforts to
eject the older boys and the Trustees' desire to establish a separate
institution was the nautical reform school. The nautical reform school,
in turn, was captured by the legislature to serve as a means of customs
19Wirkkala, 1973, p. 142.
20For considering such complex cases, policy analysts have developed another
frame of analysis focused upon administrative processes rather than
decision making logic. From this perspective new policy is seen as the
outcome of the aggregate of various small decision making processes. The
units of analysis are formal organizations in which emphasis is placed
upon the inter-bureau functional relationships. In focusing upon
planning, coordination, conflict resolution, motivation and incentives,
attention is directed toward structural constraints and the priority of
persistence in organizational behavior. This approach finds its earliest
formulations in Barnard, 1937, and Herbert Simon's Administrative
Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1947). Its best codification appears in
James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: J. Wiley,
1958), and Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of
the Firm (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
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control and by the whaling interests as a source of cheap labor. By the
1870's the questioning of such blatant misuse of the institution,
particularly by the Board of State Charities, resulted in its fall from
public acceptance and its eventual demise.
The reintegration of the older boys back into the Westborough
institution after 1870 undid most of what Joseph Allen had been able to
accomplish during his first term as superintendent. The riot and
investigation of 1877 reveals a return to the pre-Nautical School pattern
of organization. The discipline abuses revealed in the 1877 investigation
were only the symptoms of the custodial and punitive character of the
staff and the institutional ambiance. In his testimony Joseph Allen often
referred to the staff as "low quality." But in 1877 neither the Trustees
nor the investigating committee would clearly rebuke the staff for fear
of damaging the institution's reputation and angering the Westborough
townspeople.21 The disastrous efforts of Superintendents Sheldon and
Dooley to gain administrative control of the reform school staff clearly
reveals the degree of staff insubordination. Events broke in 1881, not
because the Trustees suddenly discovered the institution's failings, but
because the Trustees finally were forced to confront the staff-townspeople
coalition and note the "radical defects in the system." Certainly, Joseph
Allen would never have returned to Westborough, where he had previously
resigned because of the lack of Trustee support , unless he had been
guaranteed a free hand and the authority of the Trustees to deal with the
staff. Indeed, Superintendent Allen did clean house. He paroled and
transferred inmates and discharged and reorganized staff. He demanded and
21Mass. , Senate Doc. No. 93, May 7, 1877, p. 3.
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got the commitment age lowered to fifteen, and a totally new facility
based on the cottage plan. The Trustees for their part threw their
support into coalition with the State Prison Commissioners in pressing
the legislature for an intermediary reformatory which would serve young
men and boys over the age of fifteen. The 1885 legislation that
authorized the establishment of the Lyman School also authorized the
State Reformatory at Concord. The Trustees negotiated a deal with the
State Board of Health, Lunacy and Charity to convert the old Westborough
facility into a state hospital so as to clear potential opposition in
the legislature against the re-establishment of the reform school. Rather
than one simple decision, the re-establishment of the State Reform School
was the result of a collection of negotiations between Joseph Allen, the
institutional staff, the Trustees, the legislature, the Prison Commissioners
and the State Board of Health, Lunacy and Charity.
5. Case II: Establishing the Supervised Placement Program. The
establishment of the non-institutional program advanced as slowly and
clumsily as the institutional program. Beginning in a formal way in 1866
with the authorization of the State Visiting Agent, the implementation was
finally successfully achieved in 1895 with the establishment of the
Superintendent of Visitation.
The visiting agent was first set up as an informal administrative
agent of the Board of State Charities. In September of 1866, following a
recomendation set out by Howe and Sandborn in the first annual report, the
Board authorized one man, Gordon Fisk, to serve as a special visiting agent.
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The duties of this special agent initially were limited to the placement
supervision of the various indentured and adopted children of the state
almshouses. The following year this supervision was extended to cover
boys "placed out" from the reform school. 22 This additional responsibility
provided Fisk with more children than he could possibly visit, particularly
as it likewise fell to him to interview and screen prospective placement
families. Fisk soon began to express irritation at his lack of assistance.
Accordingly, the Board brought pressure on the legislature to officially
establish the Office of the State Visiting Agent and provide an adequate
appropriation. In June of 1869, the legislature approved the new bureau,
permitted the hiring of staff and added to the office the duty of
attending court whenever a juvenile case was to be heard. 25 Ironically,
for all his labors, Gordon Fisk was passed over in the Governor's
selection of Gardiner Tufts to head the new office.
Gardiner Tufts was a strong administrator with an enormous task
and under his direction, the Office of the State Visiting Agent soon
became an effective professional bureau. From its inception, the
Trustees of the reform school remained hostile to the new office. During
these early years the Board of State Charities soundly supported Tufts.
The anti-institutional bias bound Howe and Sandborn together with Tufts in
a somewhat uneasy alliance. But by 1874, the relations between the Board
and the visiting agent had become more distant. In that year Sandborn
concluded: "It would appear . . . that the extreme limit of prudence in
22Mass., Board of State Charities, 7th A.R., 1871, p. 83.
23Mass., Acts of 1869, Ch. 453.
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discharging and placing on probation the children complained of, has
been reached."24
This shift in Sandborn's position marked a far broader shift in
the Board's principles. While it would be incorrect to call this shift a
total reversal of its previous position, after 1874 the Board appears more
positive toward the reform schools and more willing to see the necessity
for their services. Beginning in 1876 the Board sought to curtail the
activities of the visiting agent by cutting its budget. In outrage Tufts
circumvented the Board and went directly to the Governor to acquire
operating funds. With this the schism between the two parties became
irreparable and the conflict escalated into a public debate. This debate
only added to the growing controversy over the Board of State Charities
that eventually resulted in the 1879 reorganization act. The
reorganization did not jeopardize the visitation system. Although the
Office of the State Visiting Agent was terminated, visitation continued
under the Superintendent of State Minor Wards as an important function
of the State Board of Health, Lunacy and Charity.
In 1893 the Lyman School participated in a survey of modern
reform school practice for the Chicago World's Fair. In preparing for
this presentation, Superintendent Chapin conducted a comprehensive
evaluation of the institution's performance by surveying the situation
of Lyman School boys as they reached age 21. The results showing that of
the graduates, thirty-five per cent went on to other penal institutions
so concerned the Trustees that they determined that some better method of
follow-up was necessary. Since 1889 the State Board had employed a
24Mass., Board of State Charities, lth A.R., 1874, p. lxvii.
276
specific visiting agent under the Superintendent of State Minor Wards
whose primary duty it was to visit Lyman School boys placed out on
probation. The Trustees viewed this commitment as inadequate and grew
increasingly critical of the State Board's handling of the post-release
placement and visitation functions. 25  In 1893 the Trustees petitioned
the legislature for permission to employ their own visiting agents. The
finance committee rejected this petition noting that there was no
appropriation. The Trustees then turned to the Attorney General for a
ruling on their claim. The Attorney General affirmed the right and duty
of the Trustees "to exercise a general oversight and supervision of all
children committed to these schools during minority or until their
discharge."26 On this basis the Trustees returned to the legislature and
achieved approval to hire a Superintendent of Visitation and one
assistant. 27
6. Supervised Placement as a Policy Response. The implementation
of the placement program is not well revealed by the rational frame of
analysis either. The central decision would have to be the determination
of who best should supervise post-release placements. It would appear
25It was not that the Superintendent of State Minor Wards failed, but
"the members of the Board, occupied with many other important duties
assigned them, have little opportunity to see and know the children
or to observe where their methods or their agents may be at fault."
See Mass., Lyman and Industrial Schools, 1st A.R., 1895, pp. 9-10.
26Mass., Lyman and Industrial Schools, 1st A.R., 1895, p. 10.
27Mass., Acts of 1895, Ch. 428.
277
that the legislature, as the central actor, would have finally determined
the Trustees to be the most effective and, on that basis, authorized the
Superintendent of Visitation. But this is not true to the events. Neither
the decision nor the decision-making event is so clearly defined. Nor was
the Superintendent of Visitation simply the result of a set of incremental
decisions and organizational procedures. The transition from the State
Visiting Agent to the Superintendent of Visitation displayed controversy
and serious conflict. 28
The Trustees had never fully accepted the loss to the State
Visiting Agent of the follow-up monitoring of youth "placed out" from the
reform school. The Trustees initially had been granted responsibility
for the reformation of youth until the age of majority. During the early
years of the visiting agent's development this responsibility for the
supervision of post-release placements had been lost to the Board of
State Charities. Gordon Fisk began his supervisory visiting with almshouse
children because there was no competing service for such children and
almshouse managers were eager to have him conduct the work. But Howe and
Sandborn saw family placements as a good means of moral reform as well as
guardianship and, gradually, they pushed Fisk upon the post-release placements
28Where conventional policy analysis has been forced to approach conflict
as a significant category of study, a third orientation, a political
bargaining frame of analysis, has been developed. New policy is seen as
the result of negotiations and bargains established among individuals,
organizations or coalitions. Power and other forms of political
resources become significant variables in determining the amount of
influence various units will have in affecting a particular policy result.
An early formulation of this approach can be found in David Truman's
The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). Further
developments can be found in Charles E. Lindbloom, The Intelligence of
Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965), and Martin Meyerson and Edward
Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1955).
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of the reform school. After three years Fisk had succeeded in subjugating
the reform school placements.
With the formalization of the office, Fisk was replaced by
Gardiner Tufts. Tufts was the Governor's man and less deferential to
Howe and Sandborn. Yet, like the Board, Tufts was anti-institution and
during the following decade he consistently sought to divert youth from
the institutions and to extract them from the institutions once they had
been committed. The future development of the Office of the State Visiting
Agent reveals it as a highly political strategy to depopulate the
institutions and to close them. This strategy may have succeeded except
for the withdrawal of the Board's support.29 The transition from the State
Visiting Agent to the Superintendent of State Minor Wards actually meant
little. The Trustees maintained that post-release supervision should be
under their control. For them there was no central decision. The only
real issue concerned the best timing for gaining control and this was
merely a strategic decision.
The implementation of the supervised placement program extended
for a period of nearly thirty years following the state's 1866 decision to
adopt the pattern as state policy. Over this long period Gordon Fisk,
Gardiner Tufts, Frank Sandborn, Superintendent of State Minor Wards
29Nothing that this shift in the Board's position did not result from a
change in the membership of the Board, John Wirkkala sees the transition
as a result of two developments. First, by 1874, the Board finally came
to see that the deteriorated conditions at the reform school were in
part the result of the Visiting Agent's efforts to divert away the more
reformable boys. Second, by 1874, the Board had grown resentful of
Tufts' repeated efforts to gain operating autonomy from the Board due to
their divergent ideas about proper practice. The Board tended to follow
Howe's belief in organized voluntary action. Tufts put his faith in
full-time, salaried professionals. See Wirkkala, 1973, pp. 237 and
244.
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H. B. Wheelwright and Hiram Shirtleff, who followed Wheelwright as
Superintendent of State Minor Wards, attempted several different strategies
for stabilizing and formalizing the program. All of these efforts proved
inadequate largely due to the hostility of the reform schools and their
Trustees. The Trustees maintained their uncompromising position because
without the control of placements their ability to freely move youth in
and out of the institutions was inhibited. This ability was seen as
critical to maintaining the internal order within the institutions. Their
dependence upon the Superintendent of State Minor Wards meant constant
negotiations over every youth transferred. Furthermore, as long as the
non-institutional system remained beyond the control of the Trustees, the
institutions remained vulnerable to the same strategy of depopulation that
developed under the State Visiting Agent. The 1893 survey was critical,
for, in throwing doubt upon the effectiveness of the Superintendent of
State Minor Wards, it determined the opportune timing for a fast grab. In
fact the Trustees' initial petition to the legislature was so ill-conceived
that it died in committee on its own merits. Undaunted, the Trustees then
turned to the Attorney General to acquire a ruling which defined their
mandate as dominant over that of the State Board. Even with this added
legitimacy, the Trustees won their authorization only in the bargaining
over the closing of the State Primary School, the institution for dependent
children. With the Primary School out from under the Trustees and the
dependent youth safely under the Superintendent of State Minor Wards, the
State Board was willing to trade off the reform school youth. Miffed
over the loss of the Primary School, the Trustees hired its last
superintendent, Walter Wheeler, as the first Superintendent of Visitation.
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With the careful balance re-negotiated between providing preventive
services to dependent children and reformative services to delinquent
children, the institutions were once again secure.
7. Case III: Establishing the Community-Based Services Program.
The implementation of deinstitutionalization and the recent emergence
of community-based services marks the third policy formation case. Again
the problem and response are seen as developing jointly over a long period
of time. The concepts do not appear new, but, rather, appear as borrowed
and re-formulated to meet the specific conditions of Massachusetts youth
corrections. Unlike the previous case, the deinstitutionalization does
offer a central policy decision and a central decision making actor in
the person of Jerome Miller. It is also reasonably possible to separate
the case into two phases: a policy formation phase prior to the
January, 1972 closing of the institutions and a policy implementation
phase following the January, 1972 event.
In first considering the policy formation phase, the rational
frame of analysis would focus on the deinstitutionalization decision.
Input into the decision would include the wording of the 1969 Act, the
mandate that the Miller administration assumed that it received from the
Governor, and the rising costs and long-recognized ineffectiveness of the
institutions. Conventional analysis would only require stating the input
conditions as obvious reasons for the output decision. But was the choice
so obvious? The input conditions alone are insufficient to explain why
closing the institutions rather than re-organizing them was the outcome.
How about the therapeutic cottage strategy? Was it merely an early
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policy choice sabotaged by a malevolent staff or was it a destabilizing
and provocative manipulation in a larger Miller strategy?
From the beginning, Miller made no effort to hide his general
disdain for the old line staff. For most of the new D.Y.S. officers,
Miller did not look to the existing administrative staff. Instead, he
recruited from outside the department including several loyal friends
from Ohio. Early on Miller commenced a practice of showing up unannounced
at the institutions to talk with the children--a practice not easily
accepted by staff members who traditionally ran rather autonomous institutions.
On one such occasion, Miller, accompanied by the Governor's wife, arrived
unannounced at Bridgewater in time to witness staff members assaulting
several boys who had attempted to abscond. The difficulties that followed
as Miller attempted to discipline the staff involved in this incident only
widened the growing cleavage between the Commissioner and the old line
staff.30
Yet Miller's anitipathy found an easy target in the beleaguered
Bridgewater facility. The lease on the Bridgewater facility was up for
renewal.3 1 With the lease running out and the public hostility of the
Committee for Youth in Trouble toward the Institute for Juvenile Guidance,
Miller found an easy environment for simply closing down the facility,
relocating the staff and paroling or transferring the youths.32 This
30Rutherford, 1974, p. 7.
31The institution had been operating at Bridgewater in temporary quarters
leased from the Department of Corrections since its opening in 1954.
32Many of the boys transferred were relocated into a secure cottage at
Shirley known as "Cottage #9" which was the same solution for such
youths used fifteen years earlier before the Bridgewater facility opened.
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effort was carried out quickly and efficiently and, as such, it became
a model for future procedures. By October of 1970 the Institute for
Juvenile Guidance was closed.
The therapeutic cottage strategy was Miller's attempt to reform
the institutions through staff development. Reasoning that the milieu
therapy he had seen conducted by Maxwell Jones in England might work in
the Massachusetts institutions, Miller convinced the reluctant superintendent
of Shirley, John Hastings, to reorganize the cottages into self-contained
groups. Miller then persuaded Maxwell Jones to come to Massachusetts in
March of 1970 and lead a three day workshop explaining the principles of
the therapeutic community to both youth and staff. The workshop only
tended to create further tensions. The day following Jones' departure,
sixteen boys absconded from Shirley. Miller was quick to see in this a
staff/youth conspiracy and he publicly denounced it as "sabotage."33
Although in the months that followed Harry Vorath, a consulting expert in
"guided group interaction" from Minnesota and Yitzak Bakal, himself, tried
to support the therapeutic community model at Shirley, generally it was
conceded that the experiment was a failure.34
Elsewhere, Miller found more success. Convinced that there was
excessive brutality at the Reception-Detention Center, yet uncertain of
33Boston Globe, November 7, 1971.
34 In retrospect, Bakal notes:
"The Maxwell Jones training sessions . . . symbolized the beginning
of a strong and visible staff alienation. . . . Some of this
resistance became overt as in the writing to snare legislators and
the press, as well as covert sabotage as inducing runaways, work
stoppages, misuse of sick leaves and early retirement. However,
these staff confrontations had a limited negative impact on the
department because they were skillfully used by Miller to elicit
sympathetic support from the press and reform groups."
See Bakal, 1973, p. 159.
283
its extent or origin, Miller permitted a young Harvard graduate student
to pose as a detainee under the alias "Ernie Manning." "Manning" spent
four days at Roslindale and his resulting report, which documented
numerous instances of staff impropriety, laid the basis for discharging
four employees. During the following weeks, the frequency of escapes
at Roslindale skyrocketed.35 Miller again called this sabotage and
suspended and discharged more employees. 36
Set into such a history the deinstitutionalization decision must
be seen as an outcome of a protracted struggle between the central office
and the institutional staffs over control of the institutions. The
conflict format was clearly established from Miller's early displays of
antipathy. The Bridgewater incident which he used as a basis for closing
the Institute for Juvenile Guidance and the "Manning" incident at
Roslindale signaled the intended relationship. In that environment it
would be naive to accept the therapeutic cottage strategy on its merits
alone. Instead, the strategy was a direct test of authority. It failed
not on its merits, but precisely because both sides equated it with a win
or lose battle. The policy of closing the institutions did emerge as a
result of the failure of the therapeutic cottage policy, but control of
the institutions was the objective in both cases.
35Forty-eight escapes accumulated over four successive Sundays.
See Boston Globe, November 7, 1971.
36 Boston Globe, April 4, 1971.
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8. Deinstitutionalization as a Policy Response. The control of the
institutions became a serious controversy during the first years of
Miller's administration because Miller, unlike John Coughlin before him,
brought to the state policy making position programmatic concepts that
were fundamentally different from those held by the reform school staffs.
It was possible to graft Coughlin's institutional expansion strategy onto
the existing institutional programs because his vision of youth corrections
was basically an extension and refinement of the existing traditions.
Coughlin's practical grasp of policy authority was never a critical
issue, because he and the institutional superintendents differed little
on their commitment to the institutional programs. Miller's vision was
not of this same continuum. The social reaction perspective informed
Miller's skepticism of the institutional program: Miller did not believe
that youth could be treated in institutional settings. In his belief
he was supported by a growing movement of professionals, politicians and
social activists. The early critics of John Coughlin including David
Hollenbeck of the Committee for Youth in Trouble, Martha Elliot of the
Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth, and Senator Beryl Cohn
who had written the Department of Youth Services bill, had grown critical
of the basic structure of the institutions. By the early 1970's their
critique was joined by the new governor, his wife, several leading
Boston criminologists, the Massachusetts Parent Teachers Association, the
Massachusetts League of Women Voters and key members of the state
legislature. Miller's antipathy for the institutions was widely shared.
Governor Sargent's selection of Miller as the first commissioner of the
new department was intended to bring about reforms many felt were long
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overdue. Sargent's decision was a part of a larger process of reform.
Miller's arrival in Massachusetts served to focus the existing institutional
critique and to commence serious consideration of institutional changes.
The institutional staffs were correct in coming to view Miller and his
administration as symbolic of a growing threat to their continued
maintenance of the long traditions of institutional care for youthful
delinquents.
By early 1971 it had become apparent to Miller and his staff
that if any big reforms were to be implemented large blocks of fairly
flexible funds were needed. For this Miller turned to the state and
federal government. Federal funds were obtainable from the Law Enforcement
Assistance administration (L.E.A.A.) through the Massachusetts Governor's
Public Safety Committee. At first the new chairman of the Governor's
Committee was quite attracted to Miller's plans. Miller's early proposals
in 1970 netted the department three L.E.A.A. grants totalling $110,000 for
service programs and planning.37 With the L.E.A.A. planning grant, Miller
created a Planning Capability Unit that soon began to formalize a strategy
and lay the ground work for major structural reforms. By the summer of
1971, closing down the institutions as exemplified by the Bridgewater
closing had become the chief organizing objective. From this point on,
deinstitutionalization became a key word for department policy.38
Yet a strategy as major as deinstitutionalization required an
enormous massing of "no strings" money. For this Miller turned to the
37Mass., Department of Youth Services, A.R., 1973, p. 20.
38 In June, the director of the Planning Capability Unit, Arnold Schucter,
circulated an "in-house draft" entitled "A Framework for a Purchase of
Service Approach to Accelerated Deinstitutionalization."
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state. The Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate and the
Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on State Administration were
all interested in Miller's notion of reform through deinstitutionalization.
In 1971, the Speaker of the House submitted a supplemental appropriation
request for a one million dollar residential care program to permit the
department to establish nine regional community treatment centers.
Governor Sargent, his wife, the League of Women Voters, the Committee for
Youth in Trouble and MCCY strongly demonstrated their support, and by
August the one million dollar supplementary appropriation was approved by
the legislature with only minor opposition. The stage was set for closing
the institutions.
Consistently Miller had been more clear about closing the
institutions than about what would replace them. At first, he envisioned
small regional community treatment centers run by D.Y.S. This idea underlay
the request for the one million dollar state supplemental appropriation.
Yet as he became increasingly skeptical of state run institutions and
state employees, he turned more toward private contracting. Leavey's
successes with purchase of service arrangements encouraged Miller's faith
in the private non-profit group home. Thus, the supplemental appropriations
plus another $235,000 L.E.A.A. grant in 1972 did not go to state run
community treatment centers as originally intended, but rather were
converted into a large pool of resources for the purchase of private
market services. Once this money became available, there was a rush of
non-profit corporations eager to open placement slots in existing facilities
or open totally new facilities. Foster care placement potentials also
increased, but not as rapidly. The problem which developed in early 1972
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was not the lack of placement potentials, but the speed with which the
department could inspect, evaluate, approve and fund placements. The
central office machinery was completely overburdened. Throughout the
year the administrative and reimbursement processes ran far behind the
purchase of service commitments Miller and the regional staffs arranged.
By late 1972 the new comunity-based services program was
beginning to take shape in the Department of Youth Services and Jerome
Miller and the Massachusetts deinstitutionalization were developing
international acclaim. Yet, by this time, the untidy pieces and unresolved
problems of implementation were creating a vocal and effective opposition.
First, there were the institutions and their functionless staff.
Miller, who until then had been fairly insensitive to these staffs, moved
now out of concern for the political leverage their existence might
create. To some he offered early retirement, to others he offered a
transfer to the regional offices or other parts of the new system, and
to others he offered transfers to positions in the new private services. 39
Yet many employees remained at the institutions drawing pay and doing
little work.
Then there were the institutions, themselves. Not only did
their maintenance cost severely limit the department's budget, but their
very existence threatened the entire deinstitutionalization experiment.
Sitting there vacant, it was only a matter of time or change of
administration before they would be reopened. Miller and the central
office staff sought extensively to transfer the properties out of D.Y.S.
3 9 This latter situation was blatantly illegal and only brought Miller
more criticism. See Mass., "Post Audit and Oversight Report," 1974,
p. 132.
288
to corrections or mental health or to private purchasers. Further, there
was Lancaster which somehow got missed in the closings. While the
population had been reduced down, Lancaster did not close. In February
plans were made to close it by May. In May the plans were delayed until
the fall, and by the close of the year Lancaster was still open. The
high priority given boys' institutions throughout the history of juvenile
corrections seemed to have left Lancaster still standing when the other
institutions fell.
There also remained several issues unresolved which angered
the judges, Judge Poitrast of the Boston Juvenile Court in particular.
If the Roslindale facility were to close, where could D.Y.S. guarantee
secure setting for youth who were a physical threat to themselves or the
community? Without being specific the juvenile judges were threatening
detention in adult settings and increased "bind overs" of dangerous youth
to Superior Courts. In fact, Roslindale did stay open. The secure
cottage which had moved to Lyman when Shirley closed now moved to
Roslindale under a private contract. Then there was the natural but
volatile issue of ineffective supervision of D.Y.S. wards. Since the
closing of the institutions the frequency of runaways, always a problem
before, increased significantly. Further, such escapes had begun to
result in death--of the youths as well as of their victims.40
Finally there were the growing revelations of mismangement,
fiscal irresponsibility and large budget overruns in the Miller
administration. Not only did Miller continually violate regulations and
40In 1971, eight state wards under D.Y.S. supervision died violently.
See Mass., "Post Audit and Oversight Report," 1974, pp. 236-238.
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act without authority, he also seemed to consciously commit obligations
for which the resources simply were not there. While Miller may have
merely considered this "borrowing against the future," many in the state
legislature saw in this criminal irresponsibility.
Miller could see well enough the growing opposition. While
much of it was derived from the problems of rapid deinsitutionalization,
most of it was focused around himself, personally. Reasoning that
consolidation cannot be carried on by one who had so polarized a situation,
Miller decided to resign. Although the Governor pressed him to stay on,
Miller was convinced of his choice. In January of 1973, Jerome Miller
resigned as Massachusetts' first Commissioner of Youth Services.
9. The Process of Policy Reform. Changes in social policy can be
viewed as a process that appears like social reform. Social reform as a
means of policy formation and implementation does involve central policy
decisions, but it sets such decision making into the context of a rich
and complex policy making process. The central focus on decision making
was valuable in the case studies in those situations where an identifiable
actor was faced with a clear choice and made a clear decision. The
Trustees' decision to recommend the Nautical Branch was a fair example,
as was their decision to close the State Reform School. Yet in both
cases the specific decisions were viewed as rational only within the
larger political framework. In none of the cases studied did the rational
problem-solving model appear. The discrete specification and the temporal
linearity implied in the model are illusory. First, singling out the
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central problem-solving actor or problem-solving moment is typically
difficult. Did the Superintendent of Visitation appear because the
Trustees finally decided that the time was right to act, or because the
State Board finally decided to give in to the pressure of the Trustees
once the State Primary School was closed? Second, problems and solutions
do not appear out of historical context. Policy problems are typically
generated by past solutions and there is no natural beginning or conclusion
to the process. Third, every resolution is emergent in the developmental
formulation of the problem. Both problem formulation and resolution
develop concurrently and synthetically. The decision to oust Director
Coughlin evolved as the problem grew to focus on him. The older boy
problem at the reform school was developed in conjunction with the
resolutions attempting to divert and separate them.
Fourth, alternative resolutions are seldom developed. The
reform school prototype was the only structural pattern considered in
1846. The nautical school was the only pattern considered in 1859.
The concurrent development of problem and resolution shapes the problem
around a single resolution.42 Fifth, implementation does not stand
temporally independent of the problem-solving process. Both problem and
resolution are developed around what is feasible to implement and the
4 1Frequently problems and resolutions appear in a manner that is organic
and interdependent. Each shapes the other. Process and product merge.
See Alexander, 1964, pp. 84-131 for a comparable argument.
42Herbert Simon's attempt to "bound rationality" by substituting for the
comprehensive search among alternatives his "satisficing principle"
under which the first satisfactory alternative is selected, is more true
to the evidence, but it represents a weakening of the model to
accommodate the evidence. See his Models of Man: Social and Rational(New York: J. Wiley, 1957), pp. 241-260.
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synthetic engagement of problem and resolution continues on through the
implementation activities. Thus the State Reform School developed toward
the refuge prototype during its implementation as Superintendent Lincoln
came to equate the reform school problem and resolution with his earlier
experience at the House of Reformation. Similarly, the decision to employ
the rapid closing strategy in the deinstitutionalization grew out of
Miller's learning from the failure of implementation with the earlier
gradual closings. The policy selection process in the social reforms
studied displays much more complexity and ambiguity than the rational
frame reveals and the approach offers little value in addressing
implementation activities after policy selection.
The concept of social reform offers a richer means of viewing
social policy development. Social reform suggests that policy formation
is the result of social processes. Single actors may make central
decisions, but they do so only as the embodiment of a broader social
process. Social reform reveals policy formation to be a piece of a
larger process which includes the dissolution of past programs and the
implementation of new programs. No hard lines are drawn separating the
advocacy of new programs from the efforts to formalize and institutionalize
them once they have been approved. Finally, social reform implies that
policy formation is a continuous and ongoing process. No program is ever
fully completed or absolutely dominant. Every program exhibits a life
span and its demise is as much a part of that life as is its conception
and establishment.
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The remainder of this section will pose a vision of social
reform in social policy. Such a vision reveals the implementation of
social reform in Massachusetts youth corrections policy as the result
of a series of recurrent social reform movements arising from general
reform ideologies which serve to diffuse new problem formulations and
responses across geographic and social policy areas. In order to develop
this vision it is necessary to demonstrate, first, that new programs of
response are the result of diffusion processes; second, that such
diffusion processes are the product of organized social movements; and,
third, that such social movements are rooted in social action which is
organized by generalized belief in systems of reform. In the chapters
which follow each of these assertions will be explored in detail.
Section III: Chapter C
DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL REFORM
1. The Diffusive Frame of Analysis. Neither the Massachusetts
reform schools nor the non-institutional services arose without precedent.
The reform school, the juvenile court, the child guidance clinic were all
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innovations in Massachusetts youth corrections policy. But these
innovations were not Massachusetts inventions. Instead, they were
pieces of ongoing national and international social reforms where the
implementation of any one such innovation was well recognized as related
to previous innovations in youth correcting or other social policy areas.
New ideas, practices or institutions which were innovations in Massachusetts
were borrowed and adapted or copied from previous models. In many of these
innovations the Commonwealth was seen as an early adopter. The
implementation of an innovation in Massachusetts was frequently a key
factor in determining the eagerness with which other state governments
followed in adopting the innovation. But the adoption of policy
innovations in Massachusetts was only one step in the larger process by
which new innovations in youth correcting were developed and diffused
throughout the world.
This chapter considers the origins of several of the innovations
that appeared as reforms in Massachusetts youth corrections policy. The
review employs a frame of analysis developed in anthropology for considering
the processes by which innovations diffuse across or within cultures.1
Where the frames of policy analysis focused upon decision making, the
diffusive frame focuses upon the adoption of innovations. An innovation
IMuch of the early formations come from the work of Franz Boas, James
Frazer and A. L. Kroeber. More recently, the paradigm underlying the
diffusion school has appeared in other disciplines, notably political
science, sociology and organization theory. The classical review of
this literature is Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York:
Free Press, 1962) which, aside from its title, focuses heavily upon the
adoption process. A more recent review with particular emphasis upon
organizational behavior is offered in Gerald Zaltman, Robert Duncan and
Jonny Holbeck, Innovations and Organizations (New York: J. Wiley, 1973).
294
is here defined as any generative principle or pattern that is new to the
unit of adoption.2  In this study the unit of adoption is the aggregate
of traditions and programs defined above as Massachusetts youth corrections
policy.
The adoption of an innovation necessarily implies some type of
social reform. In some cases such reforms may be only refinements and in
others the adoption may signal a full transformation. It is possible for
reforms such as personnel changes or client population changes to occur
without alterations in any of a program's generative concepts. In such
cases there is no innovation. Yet in each of the major changes noted in
the case history, the transition in dominance from one program of response
to another required the adoption of an innovation. Some innovations may
be considered inventions. Inventions are a sub-type of innovation.
While an invention is specifically intended to denote the creation of new
material or organization, it is here marked as the adoption of generative
concepts specifically created within the unit of adoption.3 Innovations
2H. G. Barnett defines innovation as "any thought, behavior or thing
that is new because it is qualitatively different from existing forms."
See Barnett, 1953, p. 7. This definition is more solid than more recent
definitions because it defines newness. Yet it lacks the relativeness
achieved by stating newness in terms relative to the unit of analysis.
Everett Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker in Communication of Innovations:
A Cross Cultural Approach (New York: Free Press, 1971) note: "An
innovation is an idea, practice or object perceived as new by the
individual. It matters little . . . whether the idea is 'objectively' new
as measured by the lapse of time since its first use or discovery .
(p. 19). Accepting this meaning into Barnett's definition resolves the
unit of analysis problem. What appears as an innovation in a particular
institution may not appear as an innovation in terms of a state system of
institutions or the set of similar institutions.
3Historians, in particular, are noted for exhaustive searches of records
in attempts to locate the earliest appearance of an invention. Here we
will be somewhat sloppy, only asking if an innovation was an invention
within Massachusetts youth correction services or whether its adoption
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spread across geographic areas by diffusion. Diffusion is a transmission
process whereby generative concepts are transmitted from one unit of
adoption to another.4  Diffusion requires a medium for transmission. In
sociological terms such a medium takes the form of communication channels.
A communication must flow through existing social patterns or networks in
order for an innovation to diffuse. These social networks are a precondition
of diffusion.5 A new principle or pattern may appear in a unit of
adoption due to invention or diffusion . . . or tradition. Tradition need
not require an adoptive decision. It is a conservative process whereby
generative features persist through time.6  Herein lies the meaning of
tradition as used in "practice tradition" or "theory tradition." The
tradition refers to the maintenance of principles and patterns unaltered
over time.
resulted from diffusion. They by "earliest" we will mean "earliest known
within Massachsuetts youth correction services."
4Kroeber defines diffusion as "the process, usually, but not necessarily
gradual, by which elements or systems of culture are spread; by which an
invevtion or a new institution adopted in one place is adopted in
neighboring areas." See A. L. Kroeber, "Diffusionism," in The
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1937).
Rogers is a bit more simplistic--"Diffusion is the process by which an
innovation spreads." See Rogers, 1962, p. 13.
5An excellent study of the role of social networks in the diffusion of
innovations can be found in James S. Coleman, Elihu Katz and Herbert Menzel,
Medical Innovation: A Diffusion Study (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
6Kroeber compares diffusion and tradition as fundamentally conservative
processes in contrast to invention.
"As usually understood . . . tradition refers to the transmission
of culture content from one generation to another of the same
population; diffusion, from one population to another. Tradition
therefore operates essentially in terms of time, diffusion in
terms of space."
See Kroeber, 1937, p. 319.
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Adoption is the last category of the diffusive frame. It
suggests the process by which an adopting unit decides to accept an
innovation as dominant policy. Typically, the adoption process is posed
as a set of staged sequences including awareness of need and/or
innovation, formation of attitude, decision to adopt and implementation
of adoption. In this formation it is quite similar to the choice
process in the rational frame of policy analysis. The adoption process
is analogous to the policy formation process and it serves to set that
process into its historical context. This perspective can be seen from
the following examples taken from the case history.
2. The Asylum Program. The first appearance of the refuge/reform
school prototype is an important structural innovation in youth
corrections policy. Structurally, the State Reform School at Westborough
was modeled upon the earlier refuges. The geographic separation was
greater and the firm commitment to sex segregation was new, but these
were only minor refinements. The Foster Commission had carefully sampled
the opinions of several of the prominent social reformers of the day and
studied the details of many existing institutions before recommending
policy for the new reform school. 8  In adhering closely to these opinions
7Rogers includes a trial or evaluation stage. See Rogers, 1962. Several
authors also see a legitimation or routinization stage as well. See
Thomas Robertson, Innovative Behavior and Communication (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1971).
8The commission visited Houses of Refuge in New York and Philadelphia,
the Boston House of Reformation and the Farm School, and surveyed many
persons including Frederick Packard in Philadelphia, Daniel Chandler at
South Boston, Francis George Shas of West Roxbury, Samuel B. Woodward at
Worcester and Theodore Lyman. See "Report of the Foster Commission," 1849.
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and models, Foster and his fellow commissioners recommended policies which
differed little from the best principles of the day. The final report of
the commission, while sensitively drawn and carefully considered, is
hardly innovative.
With little to differentiate the State Reform School from
existing refuges in structure, there was little incentive to significantly
alter the internal organization either. The appointment of William
Lincoln as the first superintendent at Westborough only added to this
absence of discontinuity. Superintendent Lincoln all but copied his
earlier experience directly into the internal organization of the State
Reform School. The open congregate system maintained in a single
monumental building persisted.
Nor in practice did the refuge or reform school deviate far from
existing models. Lincoln was a firm disciple of moral reform. He set up
a graded honor system, maintained a rigorous daily schedule and minimized
corporal punishment in a manner imitative of superintendents Wells and
Chandler at the House of Reformation. The Westborough institution traced
its concepts of practice directly back to the refuge: both the Boston
House of Reformation and its antecedent, the New York House of Refuge.
Moral reformation first appears as self-conscious practice in
youth correction policy under Superintendent Curtis in New York9 and
Superintendent Wells in Boston. But the practice did not originate in
youth corrections. Both Curtis and Wells were aware of moral treatment
techniques used in contemporary mental asylums. Moral treatment likewise
required a disciplined, well-ordered, affectionate and moralistic
9Curtis's philosophy of practice is well spelled out in Pickett, 1969.
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behavioral setting.10 The origins of moral treatment grow from the
earlier work of Philippe Pinel in France and William Tuke in England
during the close of the eighteenth century. Pinel and Tuke and their
contemporaries pioneered in releasing the lunatics and madmen from their
confinement in dungeons and hospitals and providing a treatment based
upon patience, kindness, guidance, and the building of a new morally
ordered environment. This practice was first introduced in American mental
asylums at New York's Bloomingdale Asylum which was separated from the
parent New York Hospital in 1821. The practice soon spread to other
hospitals including Massachusetts' McLean Asylum and Philadelphia's
Friends' Asylum. 11 The efforts of Wells and Curtis, while innovations in
terms of youth correcting services, were not inventions in terms of
meliorative services or the new American Republic.
The State Reform School and the Boston House of Reformation both
appeared during a major wave of institutional development that spread
across several social service areas and most of the northeastern states.
The period between 1820 and 1850 is marked by the construction of many
large formal public service institutions throughout the new nation. Prior
to 1820 there were less than five separate institutions for the mentally
ill in America. Between 1820 and 1840 only Massachusetts, Vermont and
Ohio opened public mental instiutions. But in the next decade state
10For a thorough accounting of the theory of moral treatment, see
Ruth Caplan, Psychiatry and the Community in Nineteenth Century
America (New York: Basic Books, 1969).
Grob notes the important role of the Quakers and the writings of
Benjamin Rush in transmitting these ideas from Europe to America.
See Grob, 1973, pp. 40-44.
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institutions for the insane were opened in Maine, New Hampshire, Georgia,
New Jersey, Tennessee, Louisiana and Indiana. 12
New York State opened the first prison organized upon the new
penitentiary principles in 1819 at Auburn. Pennsylvania followed with
its own plan at Pittsburgh in 1826 and Philadelphia in 1829. Thereafter,
large state penitentiaries were opened in rapid succession in
Connecticut (1827), Maryland (1829) and New Jersey (1830). Ohio and
Michigan opened penitentiaries in the 1830's, and Indiana, Wisconsin and
Minnesota followed during the next decade.13
In juvenile corrections this process of state institutionalization
followed the same pattern. Prior to the 1820's there were no separate
public institutions for criminal youth. The New York House of Refuge was
established in 1824 and the Boston and Philadelphia institutions opened in
1826. The innovation did not immediately spread to other municipalities.
But by the 1840's a second wave of institutional openings appeared. The
Westborough facility was first in 1847, although that same year Rochester,
New York opened a refuge. Refuges then opened in Cincinnati (1850)
and New Orleans (1847), and during the 1850's they appeared in Providence,
Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Chicago and St. Louis. The state reform school
prototype also spread during this period with institutional openings
in Maine (1850), New Hampshire (1852), Connecticut (1854), Michigan (1856),
and Ohio (1857).
In the care of the indigent, in treating the mentally defective,
in reforming the adult criminal and the wayward youth, the mid-nineteenth
12Grob, 1973, p. 112.
13This history is traced well in Lewis, 1922, and McKelvey, 1936.
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century marks a major period in the growth of public institutions.14
Thus, the adoption of the institutional system of response in Massachusetts
youth corrections policy was less a unique event than it was an important
step in the wider process of the diffusion of the institutional response
to the social problems of deviance and dependency.
3. The Supervised Placement Program. Where Massachusetts youth
corrections can lay only small claim to originating the institutional
system, it has more claim with the non-institutional form. The supervised
placing out practice initiated under State Visiting Agent Gardiner Tufts
was actually inspired by the advocacy of Samuel Gridley Howe. Not only
did Howe campaign long and hard for the system when it finally was
approved by the legislature, it was set up under the Board of State
Charities where Howe served as secretary.
Howe, for his part, was greatly inspired by the work of Charles
Loring Brace, the secretary of the New York Children's Aide Society.
After its founding in 1853, the New York agency pioneered in the placing
out of New York City's wayward and vagabond children into the homes of
Midwestern farmers. While sharing Brace's views on youthful misbehavior,
Howe never advocated the extreme distance of the New York placements.
Instead Howe turned to other Massachusetts prototypes.
14It is the relative frequency with which such institutions appeared
during this period that brings Rothman to cite these years as "the age
of the asylum." See Rothman, 1971, p. xiv.
15For an excellent review of this system, see Miriam Langsam, Children
West: A History of the Placing-Out System in the New York Children's
Aide Society, 1853-1890 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964).
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For one, there was the placement system of the Children's Mission
to the Children of the Destitute which began operation in 1849. The
Children's Mission, founded by Unitarian clergymen and maintained by
Sunday school donations, provided a temporary home from which children
were placed in jobs and foster homes.16 Where the Children's Mission did
not technically care for criminal children, the Boston Children's Aid
Society, which was established in 1864, did. Unlike its New York counterpart
and more like the Children's Mission, the Boston Children's Aid Society
maintained a home at Pine Farm where children were housed temporarily,
disciplined and trained before being placed out. The Boston Children's
Aid Society, soon after its opening, established a special working
relationship with the Suffolk County Court where Rufus R. Cook, Chaplain
of the Suffolk County Jail, agreed to act as agent to the Society. Cook
maintained an informal probation system for children brought before the
court and as agent for the Society, was frequently able to divert wayward
children from the court to Pine Farm. As the informal probation officer
to the court, Cook was actually the successor of John Augustus, the man
who is credited with the invention at the Suffolk County Court of the first
court probation system in the country. 17
16Mennel , 1973, p. 41.
17In August of 1841, John Augustus (1785-1859) happened to be in one of
Boston's municipal courts where he noticed "a ragged and wretched
looking man" in court as a "common drunkard." As an abstainer, Augustus
approached the man, found him contrite and willing to reform, and
persuaded the judge to release the man into his supervision. Thus,
John Augustus began his career as the first court probation agent in the
nation. At first he accepted only drunkards, but soon he began to aid
juveniles. In 1843 he accepted responsibility for an eleven year old
boy and two little girls. See Hawes, 1971, p. 174.
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Thus, the origin of the non-institutional system of response to
wayward youth actually did develop within the Massachusetts context. The
innovation grew slowly from the early court probation efforts of John
Augustus, through the placement system of the Boston Children's Aid
Society, into a prototype which attracted the admiration of Samuel Gridley
Howe who fought to establish it under the State Visiting Agent. There
Gardiner Tufts developed it into the efficient and effective service which
under State Superintendent of Visitation, Walter Wheeler, would become
the often imitated "Massachusetts system."
Like the institutional program of response, the non-institutional
program was not merely an innovation in practice or structure, but rather,
was new in its entirety. Moral education and the moral degeneracy paradigm
made the old apprenticeship system an innovative new response to youthful
misbehavior. This explicit combination of responses appeared as an
"invention" in Massachusetts. Recognizing the success of the "Massachusetts
system," state after state modeled their non-institutional approach after
the Commonwealth and the concepts diffused outward throughout the country
and across the Atlantic.
4. The Juvenile Court. Massachusetts has an early claim to the
establishment of a separate court for children, but the invention did not
catch on. Instead, Chicago claims the birthplace of the juvenile court
and the Boston Juvenile Court resulted from a clear diffusion process.
In 1899 the Illinois legislature, under pressure from activists in the
private child welfare organizations of Chicago, accepted a bill drawn by
the "Juvenile Court Committee" of the Chicago Bar Association. After a
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lengthy debate, the legislature passed "an act to regulate the treatment
and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children" which
established a separate court for minors in Cook County. 18 A year later
Judge Benjamin D. Lindsey set up an informal juvenile court in the
Arapahoe County Court at Denver. Judge Lindsey, Judge Richard Tuthill,
first judge of the Cook County Juvenile Court, and Timothy Hurley, the
chief probation officer at Chicago, became travelling missionaries in
an effort to establish juvenile courts throughout the nation. The
diffusion literally swept the states and by 1917 juvenile court legislation
had been passed by all but three states. 19  The law enacted by Massachusetts
in 1906 clearly reflects Judge Lindsey's influence as the preamble is
almost a duplicate of the Colorado law of the time.
Although the juvenile court prototype found easy adoption in
the liberal Boston setting, it did not readily diffuse into the hinterland.
While several government studies suggested establishing other juvenile
courts in Massachusetts, for the most part the judicial community
remained satisfied with the various "juvenile sessions" associated with
municipal, police and district courts.
5. The Child Guidance Clinic. Like the juvenile court, the juvenile
guidance clinic was invented in Chicago, not Boston, and appeared in
Boston as the second such clinic to be set up in the country. This diffusion
resulted from the efforts of Judge Baker, Judge Cabot and other prominent
18Excellent studies of this event can be found in Platt, 1969, and
Hurley, 1907.
1 9 Platt, 1969, p. 10.
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Bostonians to attract Dr. William Healy to Boston.20 Healy had been
the central figure in the development of the Chicago clinic and it was
his move to Boston which transferred the idea and implanted it in
Massachusetts soil.
The Judge Baker Foundation and the child guidance clinics in
Massachusetts were but one response to a long-recognized problem in youth
corrections policy. The child guidance clinic was a response to the
problem of mental defectives in the court population which had been
paralleled by other responses to the same problem in the institutional
resident population. The problem of mentally abnormal children in the
reform schools is first noted in the reform school annual reports of the
1880's. Superintendents such as Allen and Chapin simply noted that
mentally abnormal inmates were a problem and should not be committed to
reform schools. Little seems to have been done until the turn of the
century when the Fernald study was carried out.
The first response to the long-recognized problem did not occur
until 1900. In that year the first girls from Lancaster were transferred
to the Massachusetts School for the Feebleminded. Such diversion
collapsed as an effective response as quickly as it arose. The institutions
for the feebleminded were overcrowded and the reform schools themselves
were forced to resolve the problem internally. In 1902 a separate cottage
for defective girls was set up at Lancaster. While the problem continued
20This social network included in addition to Judge Frederick Cabot,
J. Prentice Murphy, the director of the Boston Children's Aid Society;
Jessie Hodden, the Superintendent of the State Women's Reformatory;
Herbert C. Parsons, the Commissioner of the State Probation Commission;
Edith Burleigh, the Superintendent of the State Girls' Probation
Department; and Francis Stern, Director of Food Services at the Boston
Dispensary. See Lubove, 1965, p. 90.
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to plague the Lyman School as well, the separate cottage approach was not
adopted there until 1916. The in-house mental hygiene clinic set up
under Dr. Manly Root during the 1930's was the third response to this
same problem. This clinic was modeled upon the same generative principles
as the court-based child guidance clinics of the 1920's.
The clinic, like the court, did not originate in Massachusetts,
but the Commonwealth was in both cases the second adopter. After the
adoption, the institution became a major model in determining the character
of future diffusion. During this period the social reformers of Chicago,
particularly those around Jane Addams and Hull House, provided the national
focus of innovation in youth corrections, but the reformers of
Massachusetts were early followers and the spirit of innovation was
only slightly less than a half century earlier.
6. Deinstitutionalization and the Community-Based Services.
Massachusetts does stand first among the states in its commitment to
total "deinstitutionalization" of the youth corrections system. The 1972
decision to close all of the custodial institutions was the first such
policy to appear in American youth corrections. The 1967 U.S. President's
Crime Commission report had called for "community-based corrections,"21
but the total state conversion to "purchase-of-service" community-based
services envisioned a qualitatively different prototype. In general, the
popular policy of the late 1960's was to develop a mix of correctional
treatment facilities. Community-based correctional facilities were to
21"U.S. President's Crime Commission Report," 1967, pp. 165-171.
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augment and relieve, but not replace, custodial institutions. This notion
was borrowed from the more advanced developments on-going in mental health.
Following World War II, a new wave in theoretical writings on
mental health practice developed the concept of "community psychiatry" as
a new preventive approach to mental illness in the community.22 This
thesis, plus the widespread availability of psychotropic drugs, which made
it no longer necessary to confine many mental patients, created a
momentum away from the large custodial institutions. Under pressure from
the National Association for Mental Health and the National Institute of
Mental Health, the Congress established the Joint Commission on Mental
Illness and Health in 1955 to review state efforts in providing mental
health services and to provide federal recommendations. In the final
report, the Joint Commission recommended the establishment of community
mental health centers for "reducing the need of many persons with major
mental illness for prolonged or repeated hospitalization." 23  In February
22The initial ideas were generated in the writings of Karl Menninger, Eric
Lindeman and Jerome Frank. These ideas were refined and developed into
the "community mental health" ideology by Gerald Caplan, Elaine Cummings
and Leonard Duhl. For a review of the history see David Mechanic,
Mental Health and Social Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
23Upon receiving these recommendations, President Kennedy appointed a cabinet
level task force under Anthony Celebrezzi, then Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare. It was this task force that gave voice to the
deinstitutionalization policy.
"From its beginning, the Celebrezzi Committee favored a radical break
with the past and the creation of an alternative service system,
for the most part independent of the mental hospital system.
Disregarding those reccommendations of the Joint Committee that
suggested improving state hospitals, the Committee pressed for the
translation of the community care ideology into practice..."
See Franklin D. Chu and Sharland Trotter, The Madness Establishment:
Ralph Nader's Study Group on the National Institute of Mental Health
(New York: Grossman, 1974), p. 17.
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of 1963 President Kennedy delivered to Congress his "Message on Mental
Illness and Mental Retardation," throwing his support behind the
community mental health bill, then under draft.
With this as impetus, community care in mental health services
became the priority policy across the states. In retrospect, the
innovation can be seen as a reaction to contemporary conditions:
The community care ideology developed from the growing
realization that the mental hospital, as it existed, did
much to isolate the patient from his community, to retard
his skills, and, in general, to induce a level of
disability above and beyond that resulting from the
patient's condition. 24
This same reaction appeared around other institutional services, particularly
juvenile reform schools. Throughout the late 1950's and 1960's there was
a series of influential expos6s and critiques of existing conditions in
the nation's youth corrections institutions.25 The criminology of the late
1960's was filled with critiques of the institutional approach to deviance.
Alternative community-based services were appearing throughout the country,
particularly for the care and rehabilitation of young drug abusers and
runaways. The new generation of social welfare professionals was
decidedly anti-institutional, idealistic and conmitted to informal milieu
or "rap" therapy. The halfway house and group home were seen as the wave
of the future.
24Mechanic, 1969, p. 82.
25See Albert Deutsch, Our Rejected Children (Boston: Little, Brown,
1950). In 1967 James Howard, a Christian Science Monitor reporter,
toured various facilities and wrote a popular critique in Children
in Trouble: A National Scandal (New York: David McKay, 1969). In
1965, the New York Times Magazine article reviewed the statistics on
reformatory failures and brutalities and called the conditions a
crisis. See New York Times Magazine, November 21, 1965.
308
Pre-trial diversion, pre-commitment alternatives, and youth
service bureaus increasingly came to be seen as priority policy.
California developed the Probation Subsidy plan, Minnesota commissioned
an extensive program of depopulation and community care facilities, and
Kentucky attempted several institutional closings. The formalization
of the problem in Massachusetts was a result of a much wider attitude
prevalent throughout many of the states. Moving toward a community-based
service system was distincly an anti-institutional policy and closing the
institutions soon achieved the policy label deinstitutionalization. A
new policy was born. Massachusetts youth corrections became the most
committed adopter of the deinstitutionalization strategy and other states
watched to evaluate the consequences in consideration of their own adoption.
7. The Diffusion of Social Problems and Social Response. Each of
these cases illustrates a major reform in Massachusetts youth correction
policy. Each reform required the adoption of a response or set of
responses which were innovations in policy. In only one case, the case
of the non-institutional system, is there evidence that the generative
concepts were actually invented in Massachusetts and in this case, the
development of the program of response was clearly affected by events in
New York and Europe. In each of the other cases the generative features
of the innovations owed much to earlier developments in other places or
other areas of social policy.
In three of the cases reviewed here, the innovation first
appeared in other states, particularly New York and Illinois, and arrived
in Massachusetts with the Commonwealth as second adopter. In several
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other cases Europe served as the source of innovations which diffused into
Massachusetts policy.26 In three of the cases reviewed, the innovations
first appeared in other service areas. The practice of institutional
moral treatment, the child guidance clinic and the community-based services
all appeared first in the care and treatment of the mentally ill. The
diffusion into youth corrections often took over a decade. Further
innovations often appeared under private auspices first, with the state
adopting prototypes only once the risks proved minimal. 27 The original
refuges were either private or municipal. The early visiting systems were
first tried in private agencies and the child guidance clinics also began
in the private sector. In each case, Massachusetts youth correction
policy stood as a unit of adoption for ideas generated elsewhere.
Viewing the reform of policy in this diffusive frame of analysis
provides an historical context to the Massachusetts events, elucidates
the origins of policy innovations, and frees the analysis of policy from
the constricted focus on decision-making which the frames of policy
analysis mandate. The diffusion of social policy reforms from state to
26The cottage system of internal organization which, after its adoption
at Lancaster in 1855, became a model for the nation, was first developed
at the Rauhe Haus in Germany in 1833 and later at Frederick Auguste
Demetz's famous institution at Mettray, France. The ideas were
transferred to American soil through the travels of Mary Carpenter and
Horace Mann. See Mass., Board of State Charities, 2nd A.R., 1866,
p. 125. The Nautical School was developed along lines similar to the
Liverpool School Ship aboard the "Akbar" in England. See Mass., Board
of State Charities, 1st A.R., 1865, p. 233. The Ling system of
physical training and the Sloyd system of manual training, both popular
in the reform schools of the 1890's, were consciously imported from
Sweden.
27Although Massachusetts was not as resistant as other states, both the
Boston House of Reformation and the State Reform School were the first
public institutions of their type.
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state has been considered by several other writers, but none of these
studies has attempted to interlace the diffusion of problem formulations
with the diffusion of resolutions. 2 8
Problems do not always arise from the perceived needs within a
given system of response. The awareness of problems and the formation
of the problems themselves may diffuse across states much as social
resolutions do. Problem formations, like the resolutions that resolve
them, have historical determinants. The formulation of a problem in
Massachusetts seemed affected in both timing and content by problem
formulations in other places and other areas of social policy. The need
for a public house of refuge and later a state reform school occurred
during a very active period of institution building in several different
social service areas in most of the states along the Eastern seabord. The
problem of reform schools beset with mentally defective youth was commonly
recognized in many other states as well, long before the clinic became
common as adjuncts to courts and correctional institutions. Some social
28Two early attempts can be found in Ada J. Davis, "The Evolution of the
Institution of Mothers' Pensions in the United States," American Journal
of Sociology, 35:573-587 (1930), and Edgar McVoy, "Patterns of
Diffusion in the United States," American Sociological Review, 5:219-227
(1940). E. H. Sutherland's study of the spread of sexual psychopath
laws in the 1940's is the only study to consider directly criminal
justice policy. See "The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws,"
American Journal of Sociology, 56:144-156 (1950-1951). In 1969,
Sharkansky published his study of the regional affinity of geographical
sub-sets of states. One type of evidence he used was the similarity of
policy and the common history of its adoption within each region of
states. See Ira Sharkansky, Regionalism in American Politics
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). Jack Walker has carried this
further in disaggregating policy decisions into types and analysing
diffusion of types of policy innovations across states. He finds
several cohesive regional groups and several "leagues" of non-contiguous
states. See "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States,"
American Political Science Review, 63:880-899 (1969).
311
problems such as the intermixing of children and adults in correctional
facilities and the long-berated failure of the reform schools to
successfully reform were recognized long before successful responses were
adopted. In such cases the recognition of the problem and its formulation
diffuse across units of adoption in a fashion similar to the diffusion of
resolutions.
In other cases, problem formulation and resolution formulation
appear to diffuse jointly. In such cases, there appears to be a close
correspondence between the advent of a new response pattern in one state
and the recognition in other states of a problem so formulated that that
particular response is the best resolution. Such resolutions have almost
a fad-like quality.29 Their adoption among states takes on the character
of emulation and competition.30 The historical relationship between New
York, Illinois and Massachusetts (and more recently, California) has
this character. In some cases, adoption may occur where the problem was
barely recognized. The most blatant example is the juvenile court. During
the 1870's, Massachusetts established and dismantled a juvenile court
system on the basis that the problem--youth being tried in adult courts--
was not a problem worth that particular response. Thirty years later,
29The disturbing quality of this situation has been drawn out by political
scientists studying the rather inappropriate adoption of dense Eastern
forms of local government into the sparsely settled and arid states of
the Great Plains. See Herman Walker, Jr. and Peter L. Hansen, "Local
Government and Rainfall," American Political Science Review,
40:1113-1123 (1946).
30Such processes have also been noted as factors in urban policy
innovations. See Robert L. Crain, "Fluoridation: The Diffusion of
an Innovation Among Cities," Social Forces, 44:467-476 (1966), and
Thomas M. Scott, "The Diffusion of Urban Government Forms as a Case
of Social Learning," The Journal of Politics, 30:1091-1108 (1968).
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Massachusetts adopted a juvenile court and separate juvenile sessions
with almost no legislative study to determine the nature of the problem.
Instead, a policy which proved successful in Chicago was all but stampeded
across the nation's legislatures, with Massachusetts proud of her second
adopter status.
In summary, innovations appear in both problem formation and
response formation. In some cases they diffuse separately; in other cases,
they diffuse as an integrated unit. The diffusion of problems and
responses sets the historical background for the adoption process. The
adoption process takes the form of policy decision-making in that it can
be the result of a choice or series of administrative negotiations.
Inventions of problems or response types do occur but they are typically
greatly indebted to existing principles and patterns. Massachusetts youth
corrections policy has been the locus of several such policy inventions.
The adoption of an innovation in Massachusetts has been only one event,
although an important one, in the larger collection of events which make
up the biography of youth corrections policy.
The diffusive frame of analysis reveals the adoption of an
innovation within the historical perspective of its transmission from
invention through each of its adoptions, but this way of seeing social
reform does not provide a social embodiment for the mechanics of diffusion.
The maintenance of tradition has been seen as requiring a social institution
organized around a particular program of response. Diffusion requires a
social reality as well. Some social unit is required for the analysis of
the mechanics of diffusion. The following chapter will consider social
movements as the social manifestation of diffusion in the process of
social reform.
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Section III: Chapter D
SOCIAL REFORMS AS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
1. Social Movements in Youth Corrections. The process of diffusion
requires as a precondition the existence of a social network. But the
diffusion process in social reform is not a random or accidental event.
Its occurrence is the result of concerted social activity on the part of
persons within that social network. Such social action requires social
organization. Some social unit must act as a means by which problem and
response concepts are propelled along social networks. Such a social unit
can be described as a social movement. Social movements provide the
organizational means by which new generative concepts are diffused across
geographic and social policy areas. These social movements are critical
to the processes of social reform.
The functioning of social movements is evident in the social
reforms of youth corrections policy. For instance, a social movement
appears in the early years of the refuge. The opening of the House of
Refuge in New York City resulted from the efforts of an organized group
of doctors, lawyers and philanthropists within the New York Society for
the Prevention of Pauperism.1  This group included men such as John Griscom,
a noted educator who had toured European youth institutions, James Gerard,
a young lawyer, Cadwallader Colden and Stephen Allen, both former mayors,
Isaac Collins and John Pintard. In 1823 this group split from the parent
1 Robert Pickett's study of these events is the most complete, though it is
quite narrow in conception and loose in construction. See Pickett, 1969.
For a briefer and equally light rendition see Hawes, 1971, chap. 3.
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Society and formed a separate organization, the Society for the
Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, to plan and advocate the establishment
of a separate institution for wayward and vagrant youth. In so doing they
formed a coalition with the Almshouse Commissioners and within ayear they
prevailed upon the state legislature to authorize (later to fund) the New
York House of Refuge.
With the opening of the institution the group's influence spread
rapidly, largely facilitated by the social network of the Society of
Friends. 2 Griscom was a Quaker and a close friend of fellow-Quaker
Thomas Eddy, a leading prison reformer. John Pintard and Isaac Collins
were also Quakers. In 1828 Collins moved to Philadelphia. There he became
involved with Robert Vaux and other Quakers of the Philadelphia Society for
Alleviating the Miseries of the Public Prisons in their plans for the
Philadelphia House of Refuge.3 Louis Dwight of the Boston Prison
Discipline Society, although not a Quaker, maintained close contact with
these New York and Philadelphia social reformers.4 Through the Prison
Discipline Society he supported and encouraged the growing refuge movement
in Boston. The movement in Boston was organized around Mayor Quincy and
included Louis Dwight, City Marshall Benjamin Pollard, Ralph Waldo Emerson
and the noted physician, William Alcott.
2
"The movementto establish the House of Refuge, and its management after
it opened, was guided by Quaker reformers who had gained prominence
through earlier works of charity and reform," notes Sanford Fox, who goes
on to observe, "An important factor accounting for the judgement of
traditional history that the House of Refuge was a great achievement in
child welfare and a benevolent reform in juvenile penology was the
reputation acquired by the Society of Friends." See Fox, 1970, pp. 1188, 1202.
3Mennel , 1973, p. 4.
4 See Boston Prison Discipline Society, 1st A.R., 1825.
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This New York-Philadelphia-Boston network of social reformers,
many of whom had close personal ties through the Society of Friends and
all of whom professed a common interest in establishing refuges for
wayward youth, composed a social movement. For some five years from 1823
to 1828 this social movement guided the establishment and development of
America's first houses of refuge.
Several authors have identified the diffusion of the juvenile
court idea with the existence of a social movement.5 This movement is seen
as developing from a broader "child saving" movement that arose among
Chicago's social reformers and charity workers in the late nineteenth
century. The movement coalesced around the Chicago Women's Club in 1893.
It formulated its position during the debates of the 1898 Illinois
Conference of Charities. From a growing critique of the John Worthy
School, the Chicago House of Correction section for delinquent boys,
the analysis developed into a drive to establish a separate juvenile
court so that children "might be saved from contamination of association
with older criminals." 6
The social network of prominent Chicago women was critical to
the early part of the movement. Jane Addams, Julia Lathrop, the Abbott
sisters and Florence Kelly were all active in and around Hull House.
5Anthony M. Platt states "The juvenile court system was part of a general
movement directed toward removing adolescents from the criminal law process
and creating special programs for delinquent, dependent and neglected
children." See Platt, 1969, p. 10. In particular see his "The Rise of the
Child Saving Movement: A Study in Social Policy and Correctional Reform,"
The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, 381:21-38 (1969).
See also Fox, 1970, p. 1222; Mennel, 1973, p. 134; and Caldwell, 1961,
p. 495.
7Quoted by Platt from a Chicago Women's Club report. See Platt, 1969, p. 129.
316
Louise de Koven Brown was the link between Hull House and the Chicago
Women's Club where Lucy Flower and Mrs. Perry Smith were the central
figures in the campaign.7 In attempting to broaden the base of advocacy
the women pressed the Chicago Bar Association into coalition. Judge
Harvey Hurd of the Bar Association drafted a bill to be carried to the
legislature. With the effective lobbying of men such as Timothy Hurley
of the Catholic Visitation and Aid Society, and Hastings Hart of the
Children's Home and Aid Society, the bill was easily passed into law in
1899. But the movement did not then die. Instead, it attracted national
figures including early juvenile court judges such as Richard Tuthill in
Chicago, Benjamin Lindsey in Denver, and Harvey Baker in Boston. Of
these, Judge Lindsey became a veritable missionary in the movement,
traveling and lecturing extensively throughout the country.8 Along with
Tuthill, Baker and Hurley, who had been appointed Chief Probation Officer
in Chicago, Judge Lindsey maintained the central focus of a social movement
organized to establish juvenile courts in every state.
2. Social Movements as a Frame of Analysis. It is not uncommon to
think of social reforms in terms of social movements. The activities of
the Populists and the Progressives at the turn of the century are commonly
characterized as social reform movements. Particular reform efforts, such
as those associated with temperance, women's suffrage, Free Silver and
7The social network is well documented in James W. Linn, Jane Addams: A
Biography (New York: Appleton-Century, 1935).
81n 1902 Judge Lindsey presented lectures in Detroit and Kansas City; in
1903, in Atlanta; in 1904, throughout California; and in 1905, in St. Louis.
See Hawes, 1971, pp. 241-243.
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social security, are typically referred to as movements.9 Some historians
have employed the concept of social movements as an organizing category
for examining the social history of the United States.10 Yet, throughout
these various studies little effort has been made to consider the
implications of using social movements as a frame for analyzing the
material of their study. There does exist a reasonable body of literature,
particularly in the field of sociology, which focuses on social movements
as a subject of analysis, and that literature is useful to review here.
Not all social movements can be considered social reform
movements. Some social movements arise to resist reform or to bring about
changes much more fundamental than that which could be called policy reform.
Yet the history of reform efforts in social policy frequently reveals the
existence of a form of social organization which could be called a social
movement. 1 Social movements are here defined as collective enterprises
9An excellent study linking social reform and social movements is
Joseph R. Gusfield's Symbolic Crusade: Politics and the American
Temperance Movement (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963).
10Roberta Ash in her Social Movements in America (Chicago: Markham,
1972) reviews the social movements which marked each of six periods of
American history. Thomas H. Greer surveys the history of reform movements
among farmers, workers and the middle class from 1865 to 1940 in
American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern Since 1865 (Port
Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1949).
11 In his analysis of the development of the state mental hospital in the
mid-nineteenth century, Gerald Grob notes an identifiable social reform
movement. See Grob, 1973. In the early development of the social work
profession, Roy Lubove notes the importance of the charity organization
movement. See Lubove, 1965. This movement is the focus of study in
Frank D. Watson, The Charity Organization Movement in the United States:
A Study in American Philanthropy (New York: Macmillan, 1922). Allen F.
Davis discusses the critical contributions of the Progressive movement in
his Spearheads of Reform: The Social Settlements and the Progressive
Movement, 1890-1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). Lawrence
Cremin identifies the role of a social movement in the development of
progressive education during the twentieth century. See Cremin,
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which arise in order to promote or resist change.12 As a "collective
enterprise" social movements fit within the conventional category of
collective behavior. Social movements, by this definition, are a form of
purposive social action which exhibit social structure, although, often,
a loose and informal social structure. This loose social structure
establishes social movements as a sub-type of social organization
comparable to social institutions. 13 But, wheras institutions exist
to maintain traditions, movements arise to change or resist changes in
traditions. 14
1961. Finally, the civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth century
is covered in Arthur I. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-in (New York:
Doubleday, 1966).
12The alleged father of social movement analysis, Herbert Blummer, defined
social movements as "collective enterprises to establish a new order ef
life." See his "Social Movements" in Studies in Social Movements: A
Psychological Perspective, ed. Barry McLaughlin (New York: Free Press,
1969). Hans Toch, a social psychologist, is a bit more specific in
defining a social movement as " an effort by a large number of people
to solve collectively a problem they feel they have in common." See
his The Social Psychology of Social Movements (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1965), p. 5. In their study of collective behavior Ralph
Turner and Lewis Killian note the oppositional character of movements
as well. For them a social movement is "a collectivity with some
continuity to promote or resist change in the society or group of
which it is a part." See their Collec tive Behavior (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1957), p. 308.
13Wheras social movements are conventionally classified as a form of
collective behavior along with riots, panics and crazes, functionalist
analysis tends to dismiss them as episodic irregularities in an otherwise
integrated institutional order. See the critique of Neal Smelser's
theory of collective behavbor in J. A. Banks, The Sociology of Social
Movements (London: Macmillan, 1972). It is only in recent years that
sociologists have begun td look at social movements as forms of social
organization comparable in significance with social institutions.
Tom Burns has recently stood the conventional image of social movements
upon its head, viewing institutions as"epi-phenomena" of social movements.
See his Organization and Organizations, London, 1974, unpublished paper.
14For movements which arise to resist reform see James W. Vander Zanden's
study of desegregation resistance movements in the South in "Resistance
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Four conditions are necessary for a social organization to be
considered a social movement. These include 1) the existence of a
self-conscious social network 2) which persists over a reasonable period
of time, 3) which holds to a common purpose, and 4) which acts to promote
or resist change. The collection of people need not be spatially
proximate, but they should be reasonably conscious of one another. The
time period may vary, but a year appears as a minimum. While the general
purpose may be elaborate or simple, unified or dissonant, broadly consensual
or frequently debated, at minimum it must include the promotion of or
resistance to change. Yet it is not enough simply for a social movement to
exist; it must sponsor action. This action must be intended to mobilize
public sentiment, influence public action, legitimate a particular cause
or impede on-going public processes.
These criteria make no note of the degree of organization that
must be manifest in a social movement. Both the general "child saving
movement" of the late nineteenth century and the Massachusetts Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children would meet these standards, yet
they differ significantly in their degree of formal organization. In his
classic essay on social movements, Herbert Blummer distinguished two types
of movements: the general and the specific.16 In order to differentiate
and Social Movements," Social Forces, 37:312-315 (1959) and Harold
Fleming's study of the same subject reported in "Resistance Movements
and Racial Desegregation," The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 304:44-52 (1956).
15For an excellent textbook approach see John Wilson, Introduction to
Social Movements (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
16Blummer, 1969, p. 8. Blummer identifies a third type in his analysis:
the expressive social movement. Because expressive social movements are
not defined in terms of social change they are not considered here.
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the two types, Blummer postulates a continuum of collective behavior which
is differentiated by degree of organization. At one end lies "the
cultural drift" which is too ill organized to be considered a social
movement. A "general social movement" exhibits a rudimentary structure
and a "specific social movement" exhibits a more highly formalized
structure. More recent formulations of this typology have added a fourth,
even more organized type, which is called the "movement organization."1 7
In this typology the child saving movement would be a general social
movement and the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children would be a movement organization. This typological hierarchy is
useful in explaining how social movements function.
3. The Functions of a Social Reform Movement. The diffusion of a
new policy tradition and its rise to dominance requires the mobilization
of many individuals. Some people must invent new concepts; some must
communicate the concepts; some must be attracted to the concepts; and some
must become convinced and accept the new concepts as dominant policy. A
social reform movement serves as the mechanism for mobilizing, organizing
and coordinating these many individual efforts.
For example, when the Commonwealth Fund approached the National
Committee for Mental Hygiene in 1920 proposing the joint sponsorship of a
national delinquency prevention program, the psychodynamic thesis was
well established as a major contender for policy dominance in delinquency
prevention. William Healy's writings were widely read and the private
17Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organizations," Social
Forces, 44:327-341 (1966).
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clinics associated with the Chicago and Boston courts offered well
developed prototypes for a nation-wide program. The basic ideas for the
new program had already been "invented"; the major task was one of
diffusion.18
In January of 1921 a planning conference was organized at
Lakewood, New Jersey, and Healy and Augusta Bronner were invited to
participate. The five year demonstration program for the "Prevention of
Delinquency" that emerged was clearly built upon the pioneering work of
the Boston couple. The core of the program centered upon the development
of demonstration "child guidance clinics" in eight different cities and
the establishment of a Bureau of Children's Guidance at the New York School
of Social Work to provide technical training and support for the clinics. 19
The demonstrations proved to be a remarkable success. The clinics became
centers for technical consultation and training and, by 1927, when the
program was completed, it is estimated that -there were some 102 similar
clinics established throughout the country. 20  In Massachusetts child
18Psychiatric social work had already been established with professional
training programs opening at the New York School of Social Work in
1917 and Smith College in 1918. Observing this the Levines note "the
model which was to be propagated in the 1920's was a model developed in
the previous generation. The Fund intended to direct its efforts to
adding to the resources already available in the field." See Levine
and Levine, 1970, p. 238.
19The Levines' study suggests that the term "child guidance" was selected
to avoid the sickness stigma of psychiatry. See Levine and Levine, 1970,
p. 236 fn. Other histories of these events can be found in Lubove, 1965,
pp. 89-100; George S. Stevenson, "Child Guidance and the National
Committee for Mental Hygiene," in Orthopsychiatry, 1923-1948: Retrospect
and Prospect, ed. Lawson Lowrey and Victoria Sloan (New York: American
Orthopsychiatric Association 1948).
20
Lawson G. Lowry and Geddes Smith, The Institute for Child Guidance,
1927-1933 (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1933).
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guidance clinics were established in Springfield in 1938 and in Worcester
in 1934. Such child guidance clinics as these aided the diffusion of the
psychodynamic thesis into the juvenile sessions of the Commonwealth courts,
into the reform schools and into the many private child protective agences.
Further they served as models for the establishment of "habit clinics"
advocated by Dr. Douglas Thom to address the behavioral problems of younger
children. 21
In 1923, Healy joined with other leading child psychiatrists
and counseling practitioners to found the American Orthopsychiatric
Association and launching its professional journal , the American Journal
of Orthopsychiatry. The child guidance principles developed by Healy,
Herman Adler, Healy's successor at the Chicago Institute for Juvenile Research,
Bernard Glueck, medical director of the New York Bureau of Children's
Guidance, and David Levey were diffused throughout a broad international
audience through this professional association and the pages of the new
journal. By the 1930's most of the major juvenile courts had access to
psychological clinics and psychologists, psychiatrists and their clinics
were rapidly becoming standard components in the structure of progressive
youth corrections facilities across the country.
The process by which the child guidance program or response
diffused from the early efforts of William Healy at Chicago and Boston fits
well the criteria of a social movement. An identifiable collection of
people who persisted over some ten years performed a whole series of actions
in order to promote the psychodynamic thesis, child guidance practice and
child guidance clinics as the preferred policy for responding to delinquent
21Mass. Child Council, 1939, p. 95.
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youth. What began as an invention in Chicago and Boston gained popularity
and acceptance among juvenile judges and child protection practitioners.
They formulated a general movement. Between 1915 and 1921, Adler in
Chicago, and Healy and Bronner in Boston refined the two model clinics
and Healy published his major treatise. During this period the social
problem of juvenile delinquency was reshaped by the psychodynamic thesis
and the social response was recast by the principles of psychiatric
practice, psychological testing and the clinic prototype. An emergent
program appeared which was new and attractive but vague. A formal program
statement was yet required. The Lakewood Conference and the Commonwealth
Fund's program were significant in converting the general movement into a
specific movement. The Lakewood Conference report refined the emergent
program into a formal program statement. Healy, Bronner, Adler, Glueck,
Levy and Salmon emerged as core figures in the movement. During this
period significant diffusion of the principles and patterns occurred as
clinics appeared throughout the nation and professional schools seriously
began to train practitioners in the principles of child guidance. Specific
movement organizations appeared as the National Committee for Mental
Hygiene established a separate Division on the Prevention of Delinquency
and the American Orthopsychiatric Association was founded. By 1926 a
specific social reform movement was in full swing.
The emergence of a specific social movement from a general social
movement is characteristic of social reform movements. Herbert Blummer
notes this dynamic as a component of his typology:
Indeed a specific social movement can be regarded as the
crystal ization of much of the motivation of dissatisfaction,
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hope and desire awakened by the general social movement and
the focusing of this motivation on some specific objective.22
Thus, there appears a progression, or "career" in Blummer's terminology,
of social movements from less organized forms to more organized forms.
The career of a social movement depicts the emergence of a
new order of life. In its beginning, a social movement is
amorphous, poorly organized and without form. . . . As a social
movement develops it takes on the character of a society. It
acquires organization and form, a body of customs and traditions,
established leadership, an enduring division of labor, social
rules and social values. 23
This notion of a developmental progression in organizational formality has
been identified by other writers as following the canons of a "natural
history."24  Cultural drifts may spin off general social movements which
in turn may generate specific social movements. Specific social movements,
then, may develop movement organizations and social institutions. This
latter form--the social institutions--although a natural projection of the
tendency toward increasing organizational formality in the social movement
progression, is a distinctly different form of organization than its social
22Blummer, 1969, p. 11.
23Blummer, 1969, p. 8. This notion of a career in social movements is
not unique to Blummer. For further examples see Turner and Killian,
1957, p. 481, and Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, Collective Dynamics
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961), p. 532.
24A classic model is developed by Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys.
A movement is seen as beginning in a "preliminary stage of social
unrest," passing through a "popular stage of collective excitement"
and a "stage of formal organization" and, finally, reaching a terminal
point of "institutionalization." See their Introduction to Sociology
(New York: Ronald Press, 1929), pp. 787-803. Crane Brinton's study
of four political revolutions finds a comparable natural history. See
his The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1958). In the
orientation taken here these stage-specific natural histories are too
linear and mechanical. Instead, the emergence of one type does not
require the demise of a more general type. Specific social reform
movements exist in conjunction with more general social movements and
cultural drifts.
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mcvement antecedents. Some irrevocable boundary is crossed in the
increasing formalization of the social movement whereby the organization
is no longer a social movement directed toward change and is, instead,
a social institution directed toward stability and persistence. Thus
the Judge Baker Foundation, the Worcester Child Guidance Clinic and the
Springfield Child Guidance Clinic all became stable institutions directed
toward the delivery of services, rather than the diffusion of the generative
concepts which had created them.
4. The Social Reform Movement as the Mechanism of Diffusion. It has
already been suggested that the diffusion of the refuge prototype and the
juvenile court prototype into Massachusetts youth corrections policy
resulted from something like a social movement. The social network of
reformers and philanthropists that refined the concepts and advocated
and lobbied for their acceptance exhibited the requisite "we-consciousness,"
the duration, the common purpose and the direct action necessary to meet
the definition of a social movement.
Social movements are evident elsewhere as well.25 The introduction
of vocational education into the late nineteenth century reform schools
paralleled the reform efforts directed toward the elimination of the
contract system of convict labor used and abused excessively in some states. 26
25In reviewing his participation in the Roxbury Special Youth Project--which
he calls the "Midcity Project"--Walter Miller writes: "For most of its
staff members the Midcity Project had the character of a true social
movement." See Miller, Baum and McNeal , 1968, p. 72.
2 6Massachusetts juvenile reform schools never seriously developed this
practice, although the adult prison and state reformatory did. For a
critical discussion of its misuse see William Letchworth, Industrial
Training of Children in Houses of Refuge and Other Reformatory Schools
(Albany: Argus Co., 1883).
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These reforms, led by William Letchworth and William Rinelander Stewart
of the New York Board of State Charities, merged with the growing
vocational education movement in the public schools associated with
Calvin M. Woodward at Washington University and John D. Runkle at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The movement attracted national
figures in juvenile corrections such as Homer Folks of the Pennsylvania
Children's Aid Society and Hastings Hart of the Russell Sage Foundation,
who saw in vocational education a means of teaching reform school youth
skills without the abuses of private contracts. The vocational education
movement generated two conflicting specific movements--the industrial
education movement and the manual training movement--whose ardent
supporters in youth corrections waged serious debates within the state
boards and the annual meetings of the professional conferences. 27
The vocational education movement which swept the education
profession of the 1880's fits well the typology laid out by Blummer. The
two specific movements were in every sense a "crystalization of much of
the dissatisfaction, hope and desire awakened by the general social
movement."
An even finer example of the social movement hierarchy is found
in the child protection movement of the late nineteenth century. The
general movement was recognized as child protection. There appeared two
specific movements: one commonly called "child rescue" or "child saving"
27See, in particular, C. A. Gower, "Industrial Training in Juvenile
Reformatories," Proceedings of the National Conference on Charities
and Corrections (1888); A. J. Hutton, "Industrial School for Delinquents,"
and Guy C. Hanna, "Vocational Training in Boys' Correctional Institutions,"
Proceedings of the National Conference on the Education of Truant,
Backward, Dependent and Delinquent Children, 13 (1916).
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and the other, somewhat more recent in timing, concerned with "child
advocacy" and community delinquency prevention. Each of the two specific
movements produced even more highly organized movement organizations. In
Massachusetts, the Boston Children's Aid Society, especially during its
earlier years, represents well a child saving movement organization as do
the Boston and Worcester Children's Friend Societies. The Massachusetts
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, especially after the
turn of the century, is the best example of a child advocacy movement
organization. The child rescue movement was organized around people like
Kate Garnett Wells, John H. Dixwell and Sarah W. Thorndike of the early
Massachusetts Society. The child advocacy movement centered around
practitioners such as Carl C. Carstens and Alice B. Montgomery of the
Massachusetts Society and Judge Harvey H. Baker and Roy M. Cushman of the
Boston Juvenile Court. The general child protection movement manifested
an emergent program which viewed children as vulnerable, oppressed, abused
and neglected. The program statement of the specific child rescue
movement is revealed in the annual reports of the child rescue agencies. 28
The group homes and country farms of the various private charities were the
resulting institutions of the child rescue movement. The formal statement
of the specific child advocacy movement is embodied in annual reports like
28For example, the quarter-century report of the Boston Home for Destitute
Catholic Children concludes:
"It is a delicate duty to deprive parents of their children, and the
work must be done with caution, and only in cases of necessity. . . .
But, our duty demands that, while we appreciate the loss of the
parents, we think of the gain to the children. We strive to keep
our hearts tender, and to be as kind as a just enforcement of the law
will permit."
See Boston Home for Destitute Catholic Children, Statement of the Work
from Its Incorporation in 1864 to Its Quarter Century Celebration in
May, 1889, Boston, Mass., 1889, p. 31.
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those of the Massachusetts Society. 29 The juvenile court and the various
local chapters of the Massachusetts Society are examples of the
institutions created by the child advocacy movement.
5. Social Reforms as Social Movements. For each of the changes
examined in the case history there exists evidence of a social reform
movement which has functioned so as to diffuse new social problem definitions
and new social response formulations across geographic and social policy
areas. Typically, these social reform movements have displayed a
developmental dynamic whereby general, loosely organized social action
manifesting vague, emergent program orientations has created more formal,
more coordinated, more effective social action rationalized by more formal,
better argued program statements. These social reform movements have arisen
from established social networks existing among professionals,
practitioners, philanthropists and social activists. Often, the movements
have served to develop those networks into formal associations and
institutions. The institutionalization of a well organized social reform
movement appears to divert the diffusion mission into a more stabilized
delivery-of-service mission which no longer offers such high salience to
the need for change. Instead, the associations and institutions which
result as a social reform movement achieves policy dominance focus upon
29For example:
"Child protection . . . attacks the various problems of serious
child neglect and abuse from the standpoint of parental and
community responsibility for care and protection . . . its
agencies are equipped for the effective use of compulsion,
discipline or punishment through a personnel trained in the use
of the law."
Quoted in Hubbard, 1943, p. 38.
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the implementation of a routinized and rationalized bureaucracy which
guarantees its own self-maintenance. This process, this natural
transformation of the social reform movement, is taken up in the next
chapter.
Section III: Chapter E
THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENTS
1. Movement Organization in Social Reform. The previous chapter
has considered social reform movements as a mechanism which "appears" or
"emerges" according to some unspecified developmental logic referred to
as a "career." This analysis results from examining social reform using
social movements as a unit of analysis. In order to understand how
social reform movements develop it is necessary to decompose the movements
into component units and examine their internal anatomy and the means by
which they "work." This chapter considers the internal mechanics of
social reform movements.
Social reform movements arise to diffuse new programs of
response which are deemed necessary because old programs have failed. Yet
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movements are not merely the result of conditions or "forces." Human
action and human motivation are required to mobilize participants.1  The
increasing formalization of social reform movement organization occurs as
social reformers attempt to broaden the acceptance of the movement,
legitimize the new program of response and mobilize the discontent
experienced by those dissatisfied with current policies. Social reformers,
such as Quincy, Dwight, Lyman, Howe, Sandborn, Baker, Healy, and Miller,
can not achieve social reform alone. They must convince others of the
"rightfulness" of the new program of response. Where policy formulation
is not the result of one central decision, many persons must be convinced
of this "rightfulness." To do this, many more must be mobilized to accept
and advocate the new program. The program must become popular.
The popularizing of a new program occurs at the expense of
existing programs. For the new program to achieve dominance it must be
accepted as better than existing programs. New programs develop most
easily where existing programs are commonly held in disrepute.
New programs have a kind of "honeymoon" period immediately
following their adoption. Enthusiasm for the new program runs high,
overshadowing natural skepticism and potential detractors withhold their
criticism or find that it falls on deaf ears. Typically, this honeymoon
period does not endure. After a period, perhaps no longer than several
months, the disjuncture between high expectations and low performance
begins to appear and, thereafter, the program is supported with a certain
1
"The outcome is, then, never determined finally by remote variables, but
it is always influenced by the processes of interaction which reflect
the coming-into-being of the movement." See John Wilson, 1973, p. 90.
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level of anxiety and discontent. Superintendent E. M. P. Wells' tenure
at the new Boston House of Reformation demonstrates such a period of good
will. For several years the institution had international praise and the
sharp criticisms of members of the Common Council were ineffectual. As
the honeymoon period receded these criticisms proved incisive and Wells
resigned. Thereafter, the refuge was supported by an ambivalent public.
In order to popularize a new program, it is necessary to build upon such
popular ambivalence and mobilize the passive discontent into active unrest.
This shift from potential impulse to overt action occurs during the
emergence of a general social reform movement.2
The mobilization of participants requires the appearance of an
identifiable group of social reform leaders advocating common
programmatic concepts. These leaders may be either inventors of new
program concepts as in the case of E. M. P. Wells, or disseminators of
already invented concepts as in the case of Samuel Gridley Howe and Judge
Harvey H. Baker, or a combination of both as in the case of William Healy.3
These social reform leaders articulate the program, advocate its adoption,
and participate, if no more than symbolically, in the organizing of the
social reform movement.
2 "The major difference between discontent and unrest lies in the
different interpretations given to the same objective situation.
. . . The step from impulse to act is managed through the
interpretation of discontents in a way that makes social activism
an attractive way out. The shift from discontent to unrest is
affected by a withdrawal of legitimacy from present social
arrangements and the legitimation of non-institutional solutions."
See John Wilson, 1973, p. 91.
3Everett Rogers identifies three types of actors in the adoption process:
innovators, opinion leaders and change agents. Innovators are "early
adopters," opinion leaders are "individuals who are influential in
approving or disapproving new ideas" and a change agent is a "professional
person who attempts to influence an adoption decision in a direction that
he feels is desirable. See Rogers, 1962, pp. 199, 209 and 254.
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This is particularly the case with general movements. Without
a formal dues collection association, there are no material incentives
for participating in a social movement. It is true that for many
practitioners the adoption of a new program as dominant policy may have
long run material benefits in terms of future employment, but this potential
accrues to individuals whether or not they participate in the social
movement.4 Thus, individuals generally choose to participate in social
reform activities for other than material gain. The shared objective of
the social reform movement and the commitment to its "moral rightness"
provide meaning to daily action or what can be called the purposive
incentives of the movement. This clarity of sight and action attracts and
recruits new participants. Thus, the attractiveness of "compellingness"
of new concepts is a critical factor in maintaining the "moral commitment"
of movement participants. The needs of individuals become subordinate to
the needs of the movement. Thus, members of the Massachusetts Committee
on Children and Youth, the Massachusetts League of Women Voters and the
Massachusetts Parent and Teacher Association supported the
deinstitutionalization without any sense of personal gain.
But purposive incentives are not all that mobilizes participants.
Jerome Miller brought to the Department of Youth Services friends from
Ohio. The central office in Boston was dominated by a closed clique of
"insiders" all of whom shared in the halo of Miller's charisma. "Outsiders"
4This problem of inducing participation where the reward is a collective
good equally available to participants and non-participants will be
recognized as "Olson's dilemma of collective action." See Mancur Olson, Jr.,
The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken, 1965), p. 21. This
analysis of the "incentive systems" of social reform movements is informed
by the model developed in Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive
Systems: A Theory of Organizations," Adminsitrative Science Quarterly,
6:129-166 (Summer, 1961).
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within the department, in other government agencies and in the various
private associations struggled to attract Miller and to receive his
personal sanctions. Both "insiders" and "outsiders" were motivated by
incentives of solidarity. Friendship, personal loyalty, admiration and
a sense of being "in" on events of history provided further incentives
for the mobilization of participants. Such solidary incentives are
particularly salient for those participants most closely associated with
social reform leaders. As the social distance increases between the
leaders and movement participants, solidary incentives decrease in
importance and participation is motivated primarily by purposive incentives.
Social reform leaders may rely on existing social networks as
the early refuge advocates relied on the sectarian relationships of the
Society of Friends, or they may organize separate new movement organizations
for the single purpose of advancing the movement. The Boston Prison Discipline
Society, the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children and the Friends of Youth were all formal organizations specifically
set up as movement organizations. The establishment of a movement
organization frequently signifies the generation of a specific social reform
movement. A movement organization is a purposive, voluntary association
formally organized to advance the objectives of a specific movement. As
a voluntary association, such organizations court members with purposive
and solidary incentives just as the social movement courts participants,
only with more formalization and rationality.5 This more highly refined
5For the "incentive systems" approach applied to voluntary associations
see James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books,
1973), pp. 30-55.
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formalization and rationality results from the creation of an executive
component in the organization which reduces the reliance on charisma,
formalizes mobilization procedures, routinizes reform activities,
establishes a formal program statement and collects revenues in order to
maintain material incentives. 6 The movement organization becomes the core
of the specific social reform movement and it is this organization that
offers the sanctions of legitimacy to the various patterns of structure,
practice, theory and authority that are implemented in the name of the
new program.
2. Program Statements in Social Reform Movements. Ideally, programs
unite problem definitions and response formulations into logically
integrated systems of activity organized around the program concepts of
structure, practice, theory and authority traditions. The asylum program
during the early refuge period and the child guidance program during the
1920's provide excellent examples of well integrated systems. Yet, such
programs do not merely arise and achieve dominance as fully developed
systems. The emergence of a program and its implementation occur in a
long developmental process which has here been described as a diffusion
process conducted under the aegis of a social movement. The developmental
character of social movements which describes them as arising out of the
nebula of cultural drifts and undergoing progressive formalization suggests
the model by which programs develop as well.
6Zald and Ash see this rationalization as producing a "routinization of
moral incentives." See Zald and Ash, 1966, p. 338.
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The development of programs is dependent upon the development
of the social movements that arise to diffuse and advance them. Their
development is inter-dependent. Prior to the emergence of a social reform
movement, when the environment consists primarily of vague cultural drifts,
programs are typically unclear, unformulated and obscure. As a general
social movement develops, an emergent program begins to take shape. Several
generative concepts may be recognized. Specific patterns of organization
may be invented. Rough formulations of the social problem and the social
response appear together, but specific inconsistencies and logical
discontinuities remain unresolved.7 As a specific social reform movement
emerges from the general movement, the emergent program is refined into
a formal program statement. Indeed, one of the principle means of
recognizing the emergence of a specific social reform movement is the
appearance of a formal program statement. 8  Frequently, no one program
statement embodies the whole logic of the program, but some even somewhat
incomplete statements are frequently looked to as seminal statements. 9
The second annual report of the Board of State Charities was such a program
statement for the supervised placement program. Howe and Sandborn formulated
In his essay on social movements, Hans Blummer recognizes these
pre-theoretical formulations:
"A general social movement usually is characterized by a
literature, but the literature is as varied and ill-defined
as the movement itself. It is likely to be an expression
of protest, with a general depiction of a kind of utopian
existence. As such it vaguely outlines a philosophy based
on new values and self conceptions. Such a literature is
of great importance in spreading a message or view."
See Blummer, 1969, p. 10.
8While the appearance of a formal program statement typically indicates
a specific movement, not all specific social movements produce formal
program statements.
9For a parallel use of the "program statement" concept see Mullins, 1973.
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the social problem and social response around the genetic thesis and the
placement practice and laid out most of the principles and patterns that
later came to characterize the supervised placement program. Likewise,
the Lakewood Conference report was the seminal statement for the child
guidance program and Shaw McKay's Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency
was critical to the community prevention program.
Such program statements are the summation of the generative
principles and patterns of organization and their derivatives in the
categories of response. These program statements make up the general
belief system of the social reform movement. As the repository of the
values, assumptions, beliefs and rationalizations of the social movement,
these program statements offer a cognitive map of the participants'
expectations and the hierarchy of values by which standards of success can
be posited. A good program statement tells a great deal about the
espoused aspects of a social policy program. Program statements are both
explanations of social reality and a guide to acting upon it. They are
significant in legitimating a social problem definition, advocating a
particular response, clarifying and focusing the social movement, setting
a common purpose and reducing dissonance among the categories of response.10
10Although Blummer uses the term "ideology" to refer to these program
statements, his conception is similar:
"The ideology of a movement consists of the body of doctrine,
beliefs and myths. More specifically it seems to consist of
. . . first, a statement of the objective, purposes and premises
of the movement; second, a body of criticism and condemnation of
the existing structure which the movement is . . . seeking to
change; third, a body of defense doctrine which serves as the
justification of the movement and of its objectives; fourth, a body
of belief dealing with policies, tactics and practical operations
of the movement; and fifth, the myths of the movement."
See Blummer, 1969, p. 19.
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It is within the development of the program statement, constrained,
channeled and energized by the development of the social movement, that
the definition of the social problem, the formulation of the social
response and the logical relations between the categories of response
are refined and honed down to their parsimonious best.
3. Practitioners and Professionals in Social Reform Movements. The
early social reform leaders who advocated and established the refuges
and reform schools were economically independent philanthropists and
middle-income doctors, lawyers and politicians. They were frequently
self-made men and women who, out of self-interest and concern for the
future of the new Republic and the plight of its poor and unfortunate, gave
their energies to a multitude of charity and reform efforts. Their interests
were frequently legion and their names appear in the histories of many
social services. They acted through a wide range of voluntary associations
and benevolent societies which were seldom coordinated and often competitive.12
By the close of the Civil War a different form of charity and charity
organization had begun to emerge. Hailed as the "new charity" or
"scientific philanthropy," this new form signified both a major expansion
in the magnitude and multitude of benevolent outpourings, and the
development of a more rational concern for method and practice in charitable
11See Donald H. Calhoun, Professional Lives in America: Structure and
Aspirations, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
12Robert Bremner quotes one observer of the day as noting that Boston
boasted "such a number and combination of charities as has never before
been found in any city of its size." See his American Philanthropy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 45.
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giving. The basic principles of scientific philanthrophy were actually
quite traditional. The concern for the abusive consequences of well
intentioned benevolence persisted, but questions of practice and technique
in the coordination of the community's welfare services and the stimulation
of voluntary friendly visiting became salient. 13 A concern for organization
and coordination is evident in the appearance of federations of charity
organizations and the rapid adoption of state level boards of charity
oversight throughout the progressive states.14 The creation of national
conferences and coalitions such as the National Conference of Charities
and Corrections (1874) and the National Prison Association (1871) helped to
further the coordination and dialogue among charity and correctional
practitioners.
During this period practitioners and social reformers became more
clearly differentiated. Those who practiced inthe institutions as a life
career became trapped by the institutional needs and stigma. Social
reformers, such as Samuel Gridley Howe, who previously had advanced the
movements that created the institutions, now became the leaders in movements
which challenged and threatened institution affiliated practitioners. The
crusades of Franklin Sandborn, Frederick Wines, Dorothea Dix and Horace Mann
demonstrate this separation between social reformers and conventional
practitioners.
By the late nineteenth century both social reformers and
institutional practitioners had begun to feel the effects of professionalization.
13Lubove, 1965, p. 1; Bremner, 1960, p. 66.
14For a review of the federations see Watson, 1922.
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The reliance on the friendly state visiting agent gave way to the
recruitment of trained probation agents. The institutional staffs were
becoming increasingly differentiated by professional category. National
professional associations and journals specific to reform schools appeared.
In 1904 reform school practitioners broke with the National Conference of
Charities and Corrections and formed their own National Conference on the
Education of Truant, Backward, Dependent and Delinquent Children which met
annually and published its own Proceedings.15
Professionalism requires the mantle of expertise based upon special
skill and the existence of a self conscious group identity.16 Each of the
programs that appeared during the twentieth century manifested these two
qualities. The child guidance program was a professional movement
organized by psychiatrists, clinicians and psychiatric social workers trained
in the techniques of psychological testing, psychiatric diagnosis and
psychotherapeutic counseling. The community prevention program which arose
during the 1930's and 1940's was associated with community social workers,
community organizers and neighborhood case workers trained in family and
community dynamics. Professionalism affected social reformers as well as
practitioners. The leaders of social reform movements during the first half
of the twentieth century were trained professionals and the movements they
supported were based in large part upon professional associations and social
networks among professionals.
15See Mennel, 1973, p. 107.
16See Howard S. Becker, "The Nature of a Profession," in his Sociological
Work (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 87-104; and Lubove, 1965, chap. 5.
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The rise of professionalism formalized the group identity of
practitioners and rationalized the incentive system by which social
reformers (now professional reformers) could mobilize action. The group
consciousness of professionals offered the solidary incentives for
developing and supporting strong professional associations such as the
American Orthopsychiatric Association. But professional organizations also
offered the purposive motivation for legitimizing the "moral rightness" of
specific problem and response formulations and rendering professional growth
and aggrandizement as ends in themselves. Social reform leaders such as
David Austin and Jerome Miller needed to do little more than tap existing
professional animosities in order to find the discontent necessary to
attract and recruit participants to the professional advocacy of new programs.
What had been simply popular and charity reform movements during the
mid-nineteenth century became, in this century, primarily professional
reform movements.
4. Theorists and Researchers in Social Reform Movements. It is not
so unconventional to think of practitioners and professionals advocating
new programs, establishing promotional practice-oriented associations and
participating actively in social reform movements. It is less conventional
to think that theorists and researchers behave in similar fashion. Recent
studies in the sociology and history of science support the idea that
social organization is as important in theory formation and diffusion as
it is in the development of practice.17 Diana Crane has suggested that
17There are at least three approaches to this subject. Merton's early work
and Joseph Ben-David's work have attempted to extend Weber's and
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modern scientific communities are socially organized at two levels:
groups of collaborators who work on common problems with a high degree of
solidarity, and social networks of geographically dispersed researchers
who work upon similar orientations, but on different problems and who
maintain communication through key individuals. The first she calls a
"social circle" and the second, an "invisible college." 18 The collaborative
social circle is not unlike a movement organization. It exhibits a
collective self-consciousness, a temporal duration, a common purpose and
it supports group legitimated research which is directed at advancing or
resisting some theoretical transformation.
The scientific study conducted under the heredity thesis was the
first theory tradition in criminology to exhibit significant social structure.
A loosely organized social network of phrenologists existed around George
Combe in Scotland and England. Combe worked in a social setting with the
character of a social circle. 19 In America the study of juvenile
anthropometry evolved from collaborative groups of colleagues and students
Mannheim's interest in the relation between science and political and
economic institutions. See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social
Structure (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957); and Joseph Ben-David, "Scientific
Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth Century Medicine,"
American Sociological Review, 25:828-843 (December, 1960). W. Hagstrom
in The Scientific Community (New York: Basic Books, 1965) and Robert W.
Friedrichs in A Sociology of Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1970)
have focused directly upon the social organization of science. Finally,
Thomas Kuhn has approached the history of science from an organizational
perspective. See Kuhn, 1962.
18Diana Crane, Invisible Colleges: Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific
Communities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 34-35.
The "invisible college" concept originates in Derek J. deS. Price,
Little Science, Big Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
19See David A. DeGuistino, "Phrenology in Britain, 1815-1855: A Study of
George Combe and His Circle" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, Wis., 1969).
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into a social network centered around H. P. Bowditch at Harvard and Franz
Boas at Columbia. The eugenics researchers formed a loose network around
Charles Benedict Davenport and his genetics research center at Cold Spring
Harbor, Long Island. 20
Yet the best evidence of social organization comes from the
child study approach. G. Stanley Hall with his social circle of
researchers at Clark University and Johns Hopkins clearly stood at the
center of a widely dispersed and influential social network. Historians
reviewing the approach frequently cite this network as a "movement."21
Indeed, the social network does appear as a social movement. There was a
significant group consciousness which endured over time and around which
research was conducted explicitly attempting to challenge conventional
notions of child development. The Worcester and Baltimore laboratories
formed organizational centers and the journal, Pedagogical Seminary,
served as a formal means of communication. Thus child study as a
collective enterprise among researchers and academicians can be identified
as a social reform movement within theory traditions.
The same conclusion can be drawn concerning the psychodynamic,
structuralist and social reaction theory traditions. Healy, Bronner,
Glueck and Adler, along with the American Orthopsychiatric Association
and its journal, stood at the center of a research network which in
structure and function appeared as a social movement. Thrasher, Shaw and
20See Haller, 1964, pp.
21John and Virginia Demos, "Adolescence in Historical Perspective," Journal
of Marriage and the Family, 31:632-638 (November, 1969); Ross, 1972; and
Grinder and Strickland, 1963.
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McKay and Sutherland in the midwest, Cohen in New York and Walter Miller
in Boston were pivotal in a social movement which, while internally
conflictual, commonly sought to displace what was perceived as the
psychological determinism in the dominant thought of delinquency
causation. The internal conflicts evident among the structural-functional
theories graphically display the particular character of the theory
traditions which arise as social policy responses. Several of the research
traditions show a tendency to be relatively closed systems turned inward
upon continuing disputes over theoretical interpretations and empirical
findings.22  New theory paradigms diffuse across geographic and social
policy areas propelled by social organizations which appear as social
movements. These theoretical movements develop with increasing formal
organization and specificity into "social circles" or "schools" which,
as they achieve dominance, take on the character of the stable, routinized
and defensible social institution referred to as "normal science. "23
5. The Transformation of Social Reform Movements. Social reform
movements among theorists and researchers as well as practitioners follow
a similar pattern from the general to the specific; from the global to the
detailed; from the informal to the formal. The motivation for this
developmental pattern lies within the needs of the movement itself. In
22The heredity thesis and the psychodynamic thesis were particularly
closed and contained theories which neglected and downplayed threatening
evidence. Such relatively closed theories resemble Kuhn's formulation.
23 Kuhn describes "normal science" as "research firmly based upon one or
more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular
scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation
for its practice." See Kuhn, 1962, p. 10.
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order to grow in size and degree of effect a central leadership must emerge
to mobilize active participants. Because such reform leaders can only
offer solidary incentives to a limited population of close colleagues, they
must turn to articulating the objectives of the movement in such a way
that others will be attracted through purposive incentives.24 The articulation
of the reform movement requires the formalization of the program of
response in such a way that many individuals and organizations will come to
recognize it, understand it and accept it. Put simply, the program of
response must become compelling. In so doing it is frequent that the
reform leadership establishes a movement organization which further
formalizes and rationalizes the movement and, perhaps, defines membership
and collects dues in order to provide for material incentives.
This tendency of social reform movements to become more
formalized and rational in their functioning involves increasing refinements
in structure. While this development produces refinements in the program,
it may also bring about transformations of the program. These transformations
in the program may occur either because of the mobilization needs of the
social movement or the maintenance needs of the resulting social institution.
In either case, such transformations may divert or alter the practical
program from its espoused concepts. It is this process that creates the
distinction between the espoused and practical codes of authority and practice.
24Joseph Gusfield differentiates two functions here which frequently
conflict. Mobilization refers to the re-affirmation of movement goals
and values in order to promote participation. Articulation refers to
the integration of the movement with other social organizations in order
to broaden coalitions and achieve policy impact. See Joseph Gusfield,
"Functional Areas of Leadership in Social Movements," in Studies in
Leadership, ed. Alvin Gouldner, rev. ed. (New York:
Russell and Russell, 1965).
345
Transformations may occur during the development of the program.
Superintendent William Lincoln reconstructed the espoused asylum program
during the early implementation of the State Reform School. The child
guidance program articulated in the report of the Lakewood Conference was
significantly altered from a community approach to an individual case
approach when implemented under the Commonwealth Fund's demonstration
program.25 The neighborhood organizing program originally developed by
Shaw and McKay in Chicago in the 1930's became community case work in the
Cambridge-Somerville project and street gang work under the Roxbury
Special Youth Project. The transformation of the program of a social reform
movement during the development of the movement is common. 26 The need to
mobilize participants through the manipulation of purposive incentives
requires the development of a program which is relevant to their personal
sense of discontent. This transformation may broaden and confuse the
generative concepts of the program, may narrow and constrain them, or may
divert and warp them into tangential directions.29
25The Levines see this redirection as a part of a much larger professional
trend away from community and institutional change and toward building
professional competence and status in diagnosis and the development of
professional treatment plans which it was expected that others would carry
out. See Levine and Levine, 1970, pp. 242-244.
26For other examples see Mayer N. Zald and Patricia Denton, "From
Evangelism to General Service: On the Transformation of the Y.M.C.A.,"
Aministrative Science Quarterly, 8:214-234 (June, 1963); Sheldon
Messinger, "Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a
Declining Social Movement," American Sociological Review, 20:3-10
(1955); and Eliot Rudwick and August Meier, "Organizational Structure
and Goal Succession: A Comparative Analysis of the NAACP and CORE,
1964-1968," Social Science Quarterly, 51:9-24 (1970).
27Sanford Fox argues that the child saving movement which arose in Chicago
> during the 1890's was directed at corrections reform, but was diverted
by the lawyers into court reform. See Fox, 1970, p. 1227.
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Transformations in the program may also develop as the social
reform movement achieves success. Success of the movement in achieving
policy dominance often entails the establishment of a new social institution.
Such an institution, while developmentally linked to its sponsoring social
movement, marks a significant break with the movement. Whereas the
movement was developed to advance social reform, the institution is
promoted to establish and stabilize the new program. This discontinuity
in the developmental pattern of the social reform movement represents a
transformation of the movement and often it is accompanied by a transformation
of the program. The mobilization activities of a movement are now
traded for the maintenance activities of an institution. Solidary and
purposive incentives decrease in favor of material incentives and the
program now becomes shaped by the practitioners' needs to stabilize their
employment setting and expand their share of the client and service
market. The program ceases to look so like a mechanism of challenge,
and comes more to appear as a mechanism for rationalization and, ultimately,
defense.28
In this analysis, social movements are not merely counter-
institutions--they are the social machines by which new institutions are
manufactured. 29 They function as the mechanisms by which concepts are
28These processes are similar to those described by Max Weber as the
"routinization of charisma" and offer evidence of what Roberto Michels
called "the iron law of oligarchy." See From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, ed. Hans J. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1946), pp. 297-301; and Roberto Michels, Political
Parties (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949).
It is in this sense that social movements are epi-phenomena of social
organization. See Burns, 1974.
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converted into social organization. Yet, social movements are more than
merely neutral mechanisms. They have a developmental pattern of their own
which constrains and channels the possibilities for social reform. In so
doing, they may divert and displace the original generative concepts of
new programs. The displacement of program concepts is, thus, a natural
result of the processes of social reform. The transformation of social
reform movements transforms the programs which contend for policy
dominance.
Section III: Chapter F
THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL REFORM
The task of this section has been to describe the process by
which the social reform of social policy occurs. The mechanisms of social
reform can now be considered separately from the conditions.
The mechanics of social reform have been characterized as
following the model of a social movement. New program principles and
patterns arose as inventions in one geographic or social policy area.
They were diffused among regions and policy areas by social reform
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movements which were organized to advance social policy reform. New social
policy programs were seldom the result of single decision by pivotal
actors. Instead, the formation of new policy more often resulted from an
aggregation of small incremental decisions and negotiations among
conflicting actors and organizations. Singular critical decisions were
evident and important, but they were typically set within the context of
many smaller negotiations and, thus, served symbolic functions as much as
practical functions.1  The formulation of new social policy was not an
isolated event performed to cope with the infrequent eruption of new
social problems. Policy formation was, instead, a constantly developing
process in which old and new programs competed for policy dominance. The
ascent and descent of particular policy programs occurred in a general
pattern similar to the growth and decay cycles of a natural history. The
aggregate of the various small events necessary to advance new policy
programs and diffuse them across service and geographic boundaries composed
a social movement.
Employing a social movement as the model for the reforms of social
policy provides a developmental mechanism for organizing the data of the
case history. The process of social reform becomes identified as a sequence
of steps which advance and, at the same time, constrain the forces of change
which lead to social policy reform. Social policy reform involves five
In regards to nineteenth century mental health policy Gerald Grob notes:
"the shift that occurred in the manner in which dependent groups
were cared for did not reflect a sustained or systematic analysis
of existing problems or the future ramifications of particular
programs. The debate over policy, on the contrary, was generally
characterized by concern for immediate or short run issues. . . .
The result was that the broad framework of public policy was for
the most part not the conscious choice of legislators and officials,
but rather the sum total of incremental decisions."
See Grob, 1973, p. 95.
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steps: 1) the conversion of latent discontent into active unrest,
2) the embedding of this unrest in a general social movement, 3) the
emergence of a specific social reform movement, 4) the adoption and
institutionalization of the new program and the specific social reform
movement, and 5) disaffection and the reappearance of discontent.
The sequence begins when a general discontent is converted into
self-conscious dissatisfaction. Typically this is expressed as a
dissatisfaction over the perceived incongruence between the expectations
and the performance of current social policy programs. The second step
begins when the dissatisfaction becomes embedded in a general social
movement with an informal emergent program. At this point generative
principles and patterns of organization may become apparent and the
character of the problem formulation and the resolution may be roughly
sketched. The emergent programs are shaped and molded by the mobilizing
requirements of the growing social movement. The program and the movement
develop interdependently through increasing specification and formalization.
The emergence of a specific social reform movement with a formalized
program statement marks the third step. At this point a movement
organization may appear, core leadership becomes established and significant
debates among protagonists may arise. The acceptance of the new program is
pending. The fourth step is marked by the acceptance of the new program as
dominant policy and the transformation of the social movement through the
institutionalization of the program concepts. The period may be marked by
the establishment and construction of new physical structures and a kind
of "honeymoon" during which consensus, enthusiasm and optimism prevail.
The fifth step is recognized as the "honeymoon" period is replaced by a
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growing disenchantment and disaffection with the new program of response.
The incipient leadership dissolves and its place is taken by managers and
administrators. The spirit of reform subsides into a general discontent.
Yet it is this discontent which prepares the climate for the emergence of
a new cycle of social reform.
This, then, is the developmental dynamic which underlay the
changes in Massachusetts youth corrections policy. At any moment the
state policy was the result of the developmental logic of social reform.
The ongoing tension between established policy and its several contenders
was a continuous condition, and every new program was as much a reaction
to the failures of past policy as a thrust toward new frontiers.
What then are the conditions necessary for the social reform of
social policy? Several conditions have been suggested in this section.
Stated generically, these include a specific discontent, responding
participants, a social network, and generative concepts. 2
First there needs to be a specific discontent. Social discontent
may arise from many sources. Where it is directed at specific norms or
2This formulation has been significantly influenced by Neal Smelser's
excellent analysis of collective behavior, although the categories and
perspective differ. See Neal J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior
(New York: Free Press, 1962). It has already been established that
social movements are a subtype of collective behavior. Smelser's thesis
is therefore relvant here. The conception of social movements used in
this study is congruent with the "norm-oriented movement" described in
Smelser's taxonomy. Yet the analysis developed here differs from Smelser's.
Smelser views all forms of collective behavior as deviant, episodic
interruptions in the equilibrium of an otherwise stable social structure.
I prefer to see collective behavior as the flip side of stable structure.
Social movements and social institutions are both equal sub-types of
social organization. Both are locked together in a developmental
dynamic. Each requires the other. Each determines the creation of the
other.
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patterns of behavior, it may be converted into social action directed
toward social change. In this case discontent typically arose over the
recognition of the plight of deviant and dependent youth and the
perceived ineffectiveness of current programs to respond to this problem.
Another condition appears to be responding participants. Without active
leadership, without advocates, persuaders, demonstrators and opinion
leaders willing to initiate action, new programs would not arise.
Leadership in responding to perceived problems is critical both in terms
of the actual effort such persons put out in order to articulate the
issues and mobilize others into action, and in terms of the symbolic
significance their appearance has on others in making new concepts
acceptable and legitimating social action. A social network is necessary
to provide the communication web through which new concepts can be diffused
and social reform leaders may attract and recruit movement participants.
Generative concepts are a necessary fourth condition. Without new concepts
social reform has no meaning. Attractive and compelling concepts are
essential. The peculiar quality of such concepts is their ubiquity.
Historical records are filled with allusions, metaphors, ideas and
principles, yet only a few ever generate programs which achieve policy
dominance and, then, those few are often held dominant with a tremendous
resistance to change.
These four conditions offer the basic foundations upon which
social reform movements are built. Each of the conditions is necessary,
but even together they are not sufficient to bring about a social reform.
These four conditions were frequently evident in Massachusetts, but major
social reforms of the state youth corrections policy were relatively rare.
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Some other factors must act to condition the timing of social reform.
Other determinants which are more historically scarce are required to
explain the initiation of effective social reform movements. These
will be considered in the following section.
SECTION IV
THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REFORM
Section IV: Chapter A
THE PATTERN OF SOCIAL REFORM
1. The Developmental Logic in Social Policy. It is quite possible
to think of change in social policy as a purely random event. All that
has been written so far might well be valid. Social reforms arise as
social movements and change the generative concepts of social policy. But
beyond that social reforms have no further meaning. Their conditions and
success are merely fortuitous. Such an argument would negate the idea of
social policy as the result of a developmental logic. It would suggest
that the right mix of temporal conditions and new concepts could appear at
any time and that their very appearance is enough to induce social reform.
The case history suggests otherwise. The reform schools existed
throughout the past thirty years in a state of public disrepute. Discontent
was ubiquitous. The concept of deinstitutionalization was known and
applied almost a century earlier. The private services had been in place
at least since the turn of the century. The social reaction thesis was
not that different from several of the structuralist theories. Yet
deinstitutionalization had to wait until the early 1970's. Something more
must have been required than the conditions of discontent and the concept
of community-based services.
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This fourth section of the study considers the dynamics of
social reform in the on-going development of social policy. The focus
is on the "forces" or motivations which guide and condition social reform.
Throughout the study this focus has been referred to under the metaphor
of development. Development is a rich concept with a long history.1 As
a metaphor, development has significant biological connotation.2 Along
with growth, development implies a change process of expansion and
differentiation. It has the character of evolution, maturation and
unfolding. Development implies that something--some persisting identity--
develops. Change defined earlier as a succession of differences in a
persisting identity is in sympathy with this notion of development.
Whatever it is that has a persisting identity--social policy, programs of
response or random phenomena--that goes through a succession of differences
without losing its persisting identity must experience that process called
development. In development, persistence and change are sibling processes.
Development suggests a logic and order to change. Specific
changes are endowed with meaning and purpose when viewed in aggregate
across significant time periods and from broader levels of analysis. The
logic of development implies that change is natural , directional, imminent,
1From Aristotle's physis conceived as growth and generation, and Augustine's
conflict between genesis and decay, Hegel and Kant laid the eighteenth
century foundations for social and biological development. Compte, Marx,
Darwin and Sir Henry Maine all explored and employed the metaphor
extensively, but it was in Herbert Spencer's work, and particularly his
"development hypothesis," that the concept reached the peak of its
explanatory power. See Nisbet, 1969, for an extensive review of the history.
2The metaphor of development has long held a central place among
developmental psychologists. Discredited in the critique of G. Stanley
Hall's developmental theory, the metaphor has experienced a resurgence
of utility in the work of Jean Piaget, Bernard Kaplan and Heinz Werner.
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continuous, necessary and arising from uniform causes. 3  Causality, the
last of these, is to be simple and universal. Development is a "grand"
metaphor closely associated with the "grand" social theorists of the
nineteenth century. It requires "grand" causes. But in historical analysis,
such "grand" causes are more easily posited than proved. The issue of
historical causality in social change is controversial. Functionalist
analysis seeks the causes of social disruption in the immediate conditions
of the event. 4 Conflict analysis relies more heavily upon the inherent
"blooming" of fundamental contradictions. The "final cause" lies in the
earliest formations of conditions. 5
In this study the issue of causality is muffled in the imprecision
of the analysis. Conditions and co-variance are considered without
reference to causality. A more rigorous study is required to test these
sketches in the fires of quantitative analysis.
In order to explore the dynamics of social reform it is
necessary to shift the level of analysis from the examination of specific
programs and specific social reforms to a more global perspective. The unit
3Nisbet, 1969, pp. 166-188.
4 For instance, Emile Durkheim in his The Rules of Sociological Method
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1938) locates the sources of all social
change in the "social milieu." For Durkheim, "The antecedent state does
not produce the subsequent one, but the relation between them is
exclusively chronological. . . . The stages the humanity successively
traverses do not engender one another." See p. 117. The continuity of
change lies in the reconstruction of history.
5For Aristotle, the "final cause" represented the seed from which the
remainder of the plant's development is totally determined. See Nisbet,
1969, p. 27. For the role of causality in history see Patrick
Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1961).
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of analysis becomes, instead, the entire one hundred and fifty year period
viewed as one long, continuously developing entity. In order to do this it
is necessary to return to the case history. The detailed accounts of the
case history are now aggregated into textures, abstracted and idealized, to
be sure, but textures in which holistic patterns can be discerned and
considered in terms of their interpretive meanings.
The focus is on long term development. The duration of the term
under study is significant because it is only in terms of this "long term"
that trends can be differentiated from "periodic fluctuations." The
"long term" perspective reveals periodic fluctuations as changes that are
matched with counter changes so that conditions return to an original
state. These periodic patterns of recurrent returnings appear as cycles
and are typically defined in contrast to longer term patterns or so-called
"secular trends." A secular trend would be indicated by long periods of
directional continuity, while a cyclical pattern would be represented by
a periodic returning to a common point.6 It is also possible that in
developing phenomena certain elements appear as cyclical fluctuations
"piggybacking" on long term secular trends.7  It is this image which best
describes the development of Massachusetts youth corrections.
To differentiate these patterns, changes over the long period of
time need to be considered graphically. This section, therefore, deals in
6The 1922 "Conference on Cycles" sponsored by the Carnegie Institution
opened noting, "In general scientific use of the word [cycle] denotes
a recurrence of different phases of plus and minus departures, which
are often susceptible to exact measurement." See "Report on a Conference
on Cycles," The Geographical Review, 13:657-676 (1923), p. 657.
7This was the schema that Max Weber suggested for viewing societal
change. See "Introduction," this study.
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historical interpretation and speculation. Because its units are more
abstracted, the section is less analytical than the previous sections.
In assuming such a broad overview of the development of Massachusetts
youth corrections policy the various pieces of the study, so dismembered
in the previous analyses, will here be re-united into a more systematic
whole.
2. The Regularity of Social Reform. The natural history model of
the mechanisms of social reform movements suggests the rise and fall of a
collective action. Within the residual disaffection of a once new program
lies the discontent necessary for the rise of a subsequent social reform
movement. The model implies a cycle. Like the tide passing over a sandbar,
each reform rises and falls leaving behind a differently arranged policy.
Each policy persists only until the next wave of reform. The cycle of
new policy programs is the most distinctive feature of the case history.
Over a century and a half of policy development some seven new programs
rose to policy dominance, left their developmental heritage and receded
before the ascendancy of newer programs.
The analysis in Section II presents these programs as temporally
detached phenomena arrayed in sequence, but only generally fixed in date.
It is difficult to provide precise dates for the ascendancy or dominance
of most of the programs. Arbitrarily certain event dates can be used as
indicators that fix the time when a new program is officially recognized
as dominant policy. 8  For instance, the opening of the Boston House of
8Often official recognition is a better indicator that a new program is a
strong contender and it would, therefore, typically precede the
achievement of dominance by some few years. For purposes of this study,
official recognition will stand as the general indicator.
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Reformation in 1826 marks the official recognition of the refuge program
in Massachusetts and the opening of the State Reform School at Westborough
in 1847 marks the official recognition of the reform school. The year
1866, which marks the Board of State Charities appointment of the first
visiting agent, may represent the official recognition of the supervised
placement program. The official recognition of the vocational education
program can be dated at 1885 with the reorganization of the State Reform
School, and the establishment of the Boston Juvenile Court in 1906 can
mark the official recognition of the child protection program. The year
1917, the date marking the establishment of the Judge Baker Foundation, can
be used to indicate the official recognition of the child guidance program.
Official recognition of the community prevention program is harder to
document. The Gluecks published 1000 Juvenile Delinquents in 1934. The
Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study began in 1935. The Civilian Conservation
Corps began operation in 1933 and the first neighborhood association
meetings began in the West End in 1934. Arbitrarily, 1934 could be
selected as the central date. The 1953 establishment of the Bureau of
Research and Delinquency Prevention and the 1954 commencement of the
Roxbury Special Youth Project could mark the second phase of the community
prevention program. Finally, the deinstitutionalization of 1972 clearly
marks official recognition of the community-based services program.
What is distinctive about this sequence when fixed by date is
the general regularity of the period between recognitions. Particularly
during the nineteenth century, new policy programs appear to achieve
official recognition on a regular basis roughly every twenty years. The
regularity of this period is maintained during the twentieth century with
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the exception of the recognition of the child guidance program, which
follows the recognition of the child protection program by only eleven
years. The exception is not enough to invalidate the pattern.
Of the eight periods that lie between the dates of official
recognitions, seven have durations of seventeen to twenty-one years,
and the average duration for all eight periods is 18.25 years. There
appears to be a fairly continuous rhythm to the period of social reform
with a frequency of roughly two decades. The identification of this
pattern leads easily to the question of why it exists. How can such
periodicity in the rise of social reform movements be explained? This
question is central to the analysis presented in this section.
The chapters that follow describe the conditions of social reform
in Massachusetts youth corrections policy as lying both inside and outside
the programs of response. The internal dynamics of program development
provide the basis for the discontent needed to condition social reform.
But the timing of social reform movements and the conceptual content of
new programs is largely the product of dynamics external to program
development. Chapter B considers the dynamics of program development as
a generator of discontent. Chapter C considers the role of structural
and demographic forces in determining the timing of social reform in
Massachusetts youth corrections policy, and Chapter D considers the role
of larger ideological factors in determining the generative concepts which
appeared in new programs of response. Finally, Chapter E provides a
summary by applying this frame of analysis to the rise and fall of the
institutional response as dominant policy.
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Section IV: Chapter B
THE PATTERNS OF PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
1. The Patterns of Program Maintenance. The social reforms that
convey new programs of response into policy dominance exhibit a cyclical
pattern. The natural history model of the development of social reform
movements suggests the cycle. Social reforms arise from discontent in
order to advance new programs into policy dominance and then recede again
into the intertia of prolonged discontent. The first cycle in the
biography of a policy program can be regarded as a special stage of
program establishment. The stage of program establishment is completed
when the program is institutionalized and is commonly regarded with a
reasonable amount of ambivalence and disaffection.
The stage of program establishment has been examined in detail
in the previous section. This chapter focuses upon cycles in program
maintenance which occur after program establishment. The central interest
here is the degree to which patterns of program maintenance may explain
the periodic emergence of social reform.
The career of a program of response is characterized by two types
of patterns after program establishment. The maintenance of the program
exhibits frequent short term fluctuations that appear as cycles and longer
term projections that appear as secular trends. In order to consider
these various patterns it is necessary to identify indicators of program
behavior which represent the vitality of programs. The annual commitment
rate for the reform schools indicates program utilization. Graphs of these
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reception rates have already been presented in Figures 1 and 3. The
court appearance rate for the juvenile court serves as a reasonable
indicator for the child protection program. A graph of this rate has
been presented in Figure 2.1 Figure 8 superimposes the three reception
rate graphs for convenience in consideration. The solid line in Figure 8
represents the annual commitment rate for the Westborough reform school
for boys ages 8 to 14. The year 1885, the year in which the institution
was re-established as the Lyman School, marks a reasonable date for
separating the stage of establishment from the maintenance stage. The
period between 1885 and 1905 has been noted as a time of stability and
consensus. This period is marked by a long trend of gradually increasing
commitments. The slump in the graph marked around 1910 is most likely
the result of the diversion effects of the early juvenile court law.
There appears to be a peak in commitments at 1918, a slump at 1922, a
peak at 1925, a slump at 1933 which lasts until 1941, a peak at 1944 and a
slump at 1948. The dotted line which begins at 1910 represents the
commitment rate for boys ages 15 to 20 committed to the Industrial School
for Boys.
Finally, the dash-dot line in Figure 8 indicates the appearance
rate for all children before the Boston Juvenile Court and the various
juvenile sessions throughout the Commonwealth. 2 The stage of program
1Reception rates for other programs would also be of interest. Generally,
data for other programs is more difficult to acquire and for purposes
here rates for the institutional and protection programs serve as adequate
examples.
2Because the juvenile court law sought to minimize record keeping, the
data is not easily disaggregated by age or sex.
Annual Utilization of the Westborough and Shirley Institutions and the Juvenile Court
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establishment is not so noticed with regard to the court program, because
the large percentage of children appearing before the court appeared
before juvenile sessions of existing municipal, district and trial courts
which, because they required little more than rearrangements in court
scheduling, experienced a very easy and rapid period of establishment. 3
The graph, then, begins at 1908 and slopes down to a depression at 1912,
then ascends to a peak at 1918, followed by a descent to 1923, an ascent
to 1933, a descent to 1942, an ascent to 1946, a descent to 1948 and a
long rapid ascent to a peak at 1966.
2. Short Term Fluctuations in Program Maintenance. The graphs of
the reception rates for the two reform schools and the juvenile court all
exhibit a common form. Like the graph of a radio signal, short term
cyclical fluctuations appear to ride as secondary waves upon longer term
primary waves. Each of these waves warrants separate consideration.
It is possible to look at the short term fluctuations separately
from the longer term trends. Where the three reception rate graphs are
superimposed upon the same horizontal time axis, as in Figure 8, it is
possible to see that there is a significant sympathy among these short term
fluctuations. They appear to vibrate together. Increases in reception
rates at the courts are matched by increases in reception rates at the
reform schools. Increases in the number of court appearances appears to
3As evidence to the point, it is relevant to factor out the graph of court
appearances for the Boston Juvenile Court alone. The Boston court was a
new institution and it did require a period of establishment. That period
of establishment is evident from 1908 to 1912 in the graph of its
appearance rate. See Figure 2.
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increase the number of youth committed to the reform schools. Where
reception rates at the reform schools are dependent upon reception rates
at the courts it is not surprising to see such parallels. But what
factors bring on the initial fluctuations in the reception rates at the
courts? Court reception rates are dependent upon referrals from the
apprehension sector. Some factors must provide a differential effect on
the apprehension sector which in turn sends short term waves of youth
through the interrelated programs.
Occasionally, the Trustees of the reform schools note in the
annual reports how changes in the number of commitments are the result of
economic conditions in the society as a whole. For example, in 1917 the
Trustees noted:
The causes of the marked increase in commitments during the
past year are difficult if not indeed impossible to determine.
That the increase is in some measure related to participation
of the United States in the war--with the attendant excitement,
social and industrial activity, and the departure of fathers
and brothers--is quite likely.4
Such observations are not difficult to verify. Figure 9 presents
a graph of the natinal annual business failure rate from 1870 to 1970.5
The relationship between the institutional and court reception rates and
even this crude indicator of economic health is easy to demonstrate. The
economic depressions of 1873, 1882, 1893 and 1907 are marked by significant
4Mass., Training Schools, A.R., 1917, p. 13.
5The data is available in Dun and Bradstreet, Reference Book and Failure
Statistics, New York, New York. See individual years 1870 to 1919.
For the period 1920 to 1970 see Dun and Bradstreet, The Failure Record
Through 1971, New York, New York. See compilation in U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times
to 1970, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1975), pp. 912-913.
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increases in the reform school commitment rates. The depressions of 1920,
1929 and 1937 are marked by major decreases in the reform school commitment
rates for boys ages 15 to 18 (i.e., commitments to the Industrial School
for Boys). Wars also appear as determinants of short term fluctuations in
reception rates. World War I and World War II are marked by major
increases in commitments for boys ages 8 to 14. The Civil War is also
marked by a significant increase in the commitment of younger boys. 6
The short term fluctuations in program utilization appear to
bear close relationship with the short term fluctuations of business
conditions. Economic depressions brought more youths into the correctional
system. Wars, on the other hand, appear to draw older youth out of the
correctional system. Yet as much as business conditions may affect the
short term cycles of program maintenance, these conditions do not appear
to explain well the longer term cycles. These longer term cycles appear
better explained by dynamics internal to the programs themselves.
3. Long Term Trends in Program Maintenance. The short term
fluctuations in reception rates of the three graphs under consideration
appear independent of their longer term patterns. The longer term trends
represent the overall social reputation or the social legitimacy of the
6The relationship between crime and the economy has been considered by
several theorists. Chief among these has been William Bonger. Bonger,
a Marxist criminologist, spent much of his life attempting to develop
the relationship between economic conditions and the emergence of
"criminal thought." See his Criminality and Economic Conditions (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1916). Delinquency and the economy have been considered
by Belton M. Fleisher in The Economics of Delinquency (Chicago:
Quadrangle, 1966), and by Daniel Glazer and Kent Rice in "Crime, Age
and Unemployment," American Sociological Review, 24:679-686 (1959).
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program. Each of the programs appears to have periods where legitimacy
is high, marked by long term increases in the reception rate, and periods
where legitimacy is low, marked by long term decreases in the reception
rate.
The long term utilization curve of the Westborough reform school
rises to a peak during the second decade of this century and then gradually
falls until the middle of the century. The long term curve of the Shirley
institution likewise rises to a peak during the 1920's and then declines.
The long term curve of the court appearance rate exhibits this same bell
shape, with an apex at 1934. In addition it shows an enormous upsweep
beginning in 1948.
Central to the rise and fall of program legitimacy are the twin
dilemmas of program congestion and decongestion. Programs are not
merely expandable plans which can be enlarged to any size. There are
optimum levels in the scale of utilization. Overcrowding is a serious
assault on program dominance for with it comes an almost irreversible
deterioration of program legitimacy.
The State Reform School offers an excellent example. The first
years of the institution were marked by high program legitimacy and a
tremendous growth in the institutional commitment rate. But this increase
occurred without a parallel increase in the institutional release rate.
This led to a large increase in the population that overcrowded the
institution. Such overcrowding not only strained the physical facilities
and the internal organization of the institution, but it also overwhelmed
the limited staff and precluded the effective practice of moral reform.
Simply housing, feeding, clothing and caring for the physical and health
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needs of 500 boys consumed the limited resources of the staff and
superintendent. Mass processing of all boys under conditions of rigorous
discipline became the norm. The increase in the ratio of inmates to
staff was a continuous threat even where adult men were larger and
stronger than the individual boys. The natural defense of the staff
officers was an increased concern for discipline and a decreased tolerance
for rule infraction. Congestion alone bred a volatile and unhealthy
atmosphere which was a significant departure from the principles upon
which the institution had been established. Custody, severe discipline
and retributive punishment arose as principles of practice and solitary
seclusion and physical constraint emerged as principles of structure.
This transformation within the program marks the dilemma of congestion:
overcrowding results in a transformation of program principles. The
State Reform School of 1868 was no longer a prototype reform school. It
was becoming a junior prison.
This transformation of program principles could not long remain
a secret within institutional walls. As the congested and severe
conditions inside the institution became public knowledge, the social
reputation of the institution suffered. This resulted in the erosion of
legitimacy as indicated by the significant decrease in the commitment
rate after 1858 and 1868. These decreases in commitments are reflective
of the longer term legitimacy cycle. The decrease in legitimacy is marked
by a biased decrease in population characteristics. Prior to 1860 a
general mix of wayward boys was committed to the State Reform School.
Perceiving the transformation, local and district courts began to be more
selective in their commitments, diverting away all but those youth for whom
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a junior prison was relevant. This biased commitment population further
confirmed the junior prison prototype by populating the institution
with only the more hardened junior criminals. After 1878 the institution
was no longer congested, but the decongestion process had worked to
worsen, not better, the degree to which the institution lived up to the
principles of its establishment. This is then the dilemma of decongestion:
reducing overcrowding confirms the transformation of program principles.
By 1878 the no-longer-crowded State Reform School was a prototypical
junior prison.
The ascent and descent of a program of response marks its life
and death. It is fundamental to any program born into policy and reared
to dominance that it will eventually degenerate into quiet senility. The
institutionalization of a program marks its legitimation and the growth
of discontent marks its de-legitimation. The long term trends in program
utilization for each of the three programs considered illustrates this
pattern. In large part the trends can be explained by the degree to which
the programs operated within capacity or were stretched beyond their
effective limits through client congestion. Yet the actual crisis of the
programs is not found in mere congestion alone. It is the degree to which
that congestion damages the sensitive balance among program principles
and transforms the program into a less desirable program that commences
serious de-legitimation of the program. By this time simple refinements
are inadequate. Indeed, naive decongestion appears to aggravate the
unintended transformation. A sensitive trust has been broken between the
program and its advocates and only replacive reform can re-establish
program legitimacy.
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4. The Pattern of Program Development. The development of programs
of response displays both short term fluctuations and long term trends.
The short term fluctuations appear as responses to the fluctuations of
economic activity. Generally economic depressions appear to increase
program utilization particularly for younger delinquents. The same can
be said for wars: they increase the program utilization by younger boys.
While the observed phenomena appear clear, the implications could be
quite varied. Both economic depressions and wars appear as major economic
dislocations which may affect basic family and community life. During such
periods of major dislocation it may be that conventional patterns of child
discipline break down, families and communities are more vulnerable and less
able to tolerate the stress of youthful misbehavior, or law enforcement
officials are more willing to look to formal programmatic solution. The
reasons for the increases in program reception rates during major economic
dislocations may include all of these and several others. However it is
seen, though, external economic fluctuations do not appear to affect the
longer term program trends. The long term dynamics of program development
appear to be based on the social acceptability of the program. In each
program there appears an initial period of high legitimation during the
stage of establishment. This is followed by a long period of maintenance
during which legitimation may rise and fall one or several times.
Thus program development is influenced both by externally
generated conditions and internally generated determinants. Programs are
also affected by each other's development. This third relationship has
significant value particularly as other programs reach high levels of
legitimacy. The large increase in popular acceptance of the placement
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program during the 1870's parallels the decreasing commitment rate at
the reform school and the asylum program's falling legitimacy. The two
programs were viewed, at least by Howe, Sandborn, Tufts and the Trustees,
as in direct competition for the wayward youth client population. The
establishment of the juvenile court in 1906 leaves a noticeable impact
upon the reception rates of the institutions. Judge Baker initially gave
strong priority to the court probation system over commitment to the reform
schools, as did other judges in the juvenile sessions. The dip in the
reception rate for younger boys between 1908 and 1911 reflects this
inter-program effect (see Figure 8).
For all of these relationships, there is a surprising lack of
evidence that program development conditions social reform. The two
decade cycle of program reform is invisible in the timing of program
dynamics. The short term fluctuations are too frequent and the long term
trends generally well exceed the social reform cycle.
The pattern of program development does not, then explain the
emergence of new social reforms. The period of development is simply too
long. Social reform does not wait around until a program of response has
run its course. The discontent which provides the necessary ferment for
the generation of a new social reform appears long before the previous
program of response has lost legitimacy. In some cases, such as the
emergence of the supervised placement program, the new program appears
even before the previous program has been successfully implemented. While
new programs of response must find discontent in order to discredit older
programs and replace them in policy dominance, they can nctbe said to
arise simply as responses to the failures of previous programs. Instead,
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new programs arise from outside the social policy system and enter the
system before they are required by the natural demise of existing programs.
The emergence of new programs of response on the basis of a twenty year
period in Massachusetts youth corrections history must be determined by
conditions external to the on-going development of existing youth
corrections policy. It is to these external conditions that the next
chapter turns.
Section IV: Chapter C
THE PATTERNS OF SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT
1. The Structural Foundations of Social Reform. Conditions within
the life cycle of programs of response appear to set the stage for the
emergence of social reform, but they do not provide the opening cues. The
discontent that grows upon an old program pre-conditions its demise, but
factors external to the program determine the emergence of a new program.
The process of social reform, considered in the previous section, revealed
the workings of broader, more general social movements and broader, more
general belief systems in fostering particular social reform movements.
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This chapter considers the relationship between specific social reform
movements in Massachusetts youth corrections policy and the broader
general movements that occasionally sweep the larger society. In so
doing, the analysis strays some distance from its empirical roots in the
case history and courts the speculative boundaries of the study. This
is a limitation in the case method: the world must be viewed as if seen
from inside the case. Thus, much of what is suggested here is offered
as avenues for further exploration.
The cyclical pattern in the rise of social reform is not a
unique insight. Several penological historians have likened reform efforts
to the swinging of a pendulum. 1 Orlando F. Lewis, in his history of adult
prisons up to 1845, notes three "reform periods" separated in time by
"sags."2 Political scientists have noted a tendency for the formation of
associations to occur in waves. Some decades such as the 1840's, the
1860's, the 1880's and the 1900's were noteworthy for the founding of
large numbers of voluntary associations.3
1Max Gr'nhut in Penal Reform: A Comparative Study (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1958) notes, "Prison discipline is a history of 'ideals
and errors' . . . Prison discipline seems to be in a permanent state of
reform. . . . This makes a periodic swinging of the pendulum almost
inevitable." See p.
2The first reform period dates from 1790 with the founding of the Walnut
Street Jail in Philadelphia. A "second wave of prison reform" swept the
new republic beginning in the 1820's, and the third period commenced in
the 1840's. See Lewis, 1922, pp. 324-327. These cycles correspond to
those found in the early years of case history in this study.
3David Truman was an early observer of this phenomenon. See Truman, 1951,
p. 59. The general twenty year cycle is suggested but not stated in the
writings of James Q. Wilson. Wilson does pose one tentative generalization
concerning these periods: "Periods of rapid and intense organizational
formation are periods in which the salience of purposive incentives are
sharply increased. Organizations become more numerous when ideas become
more important." See Wilson, 1973b, pp. 195-203. Quote is from p. 201.
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Common to all of these writers is the observation that certain
periods of history exhibit more social reform activity than do
intermediate periods. The "Jacksonian Period" is frequently cited as a
major period of social and political reform.4 The years preceding and
during the Civil War are filled with highly volatile reform activity.5
The close of the nineteenth century is also seen as a time of significant
social ferment, particularly among farmers and laborers. 6 The turn of
the century is marked by the "Crusade for Social Justice," a period of
extensive progressive reform. The 1930's witnessed a wide collection
of political movements on the left, on the right and, under the federal
"New Deal," in the middle.8 Finally, the 1960's are designated a reform
period marked by major changes in civil rights and social welfare.9
Each of these periods of highly active reform is marked by the
appearance of broad general social movements along with a varied collection
of more specific social reform movements. 10  The specific social reform
4See Ash, 1971, p. 91; Pickett, 1969, p. 6; Rothman, 1971, p. xiii; and
Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1957).
5See Ash, 1971, p. 100; Gusfield, 1963, pp. 53-54; and John L. Thomas,
"Romantic Reform in America: 1815-1865," American Quarterly, 4:656-681
(1965).
6See Ash, 1971, pp. 119-134; Greer, 1949, p. 61 ; and Wiebe, 1967,
pp. xii-xiv.
7See Ash, 1971, p. 154; Hofstadter, 1955, p. 3; and Davis, 1967, "Preface."
8See Ash, 1971, p. 195; and Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal,
1933-1938 (New York: Creative Age Press, 1944).
9See Morris and Rein, 1967, p. 208. Few adequate histories of the period
exist. A reasonable report by a federal participant is provided by
James L. Sundquist in Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and
Johnson Years (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968).
10Roberta Ash poses a hierarchically-ordered typology for considering
375
movements are not independent of the more general movements. The state
penitentiary movement that followed the establishment of Pennsylvania's
Eastern Penitentiary and the mental hospital movement that followed the
establishment of the Worcester State Hospital were companion movements
sponsored and nurtured by the experimental atmosphere of Jacksonian
democracy.11  The specific social reform movements arose within the
environment of these general movements.
The refuge and reform school movements emerged from the broader
populist movement during the Jacksonian period. The juvenile court
movement was a specific manifestation of the general progressive movement
of the 1890's. The community prevention program derived from the larger
social recovery efforts of the "New Deal." As noted previously, the
specific social reform movements that swept Massachusetts youth corrections
policy were infused and motivated by broader, more general movements that
swept other geographic and social policy areas. Each of the social reforms
in Massachusetts youth corrections corresponds to a more general movement
from which it derived. Those youth corrections programs that did emerge
during national reform periods were uniquely shaped by their innovative
contexts. The refuge and reform school were easy derivatives of the
asylum concepts that diffused across the northeastern states during the
second quarter of the nineteenth century. The community-based services
in small, decentralized informal group homes and clinics were easy
adaptations of the communes, "collectives" and alternative drug abuse
and health services clinics popular during the late 1960's.
social movements in American history. See Ash, 1972, pp. 9-10. See
also Greer, 1949, pp. 274-287.
11See Lewis, 1922; Grob, 1973; and Meyers, 1957.
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But what, then, brought on these broad national reform movements?
Roberta Ash ties her analysis of American social reform movements to
fundamental transformations within the economic "sub-structure" and
ideological "super-structure."12 The social ferment of Jacksonian
democracy has been identified as an outcome of an expanding mercantile
economy.13 Richard Hofstadter argues that the populist movement of the
1890's arose from dislocations within the agrarian economy.14 It is
common knowledge that the "New Deal" was a specific response to the
economic hardships of the Great Depression. The "Great Society" programs
of the 1960's and the social turmoil that refocused reform attention
on the poor, the community and the failures of traditional social and
municipal services may also be seen as arising from structural conditions.
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward argue that the "poverty programs"
of the 1960's were aimed at curtailing civil disturbances in cities and
capturing and stabilizing the voting power of the new black population
that migrated from the rural South into the cities.
12Ash, 1971, p. 4. Ash's analysis is basically indebted to Marx, although
she elaborates with much that comes from other sources.
13See Peter Temin, The Jacksonian Economy (New York: Norton, 1969).
14The populist movement which Hofstadter sees as the seedbed of
progressivism and "the first such movement to attack seriously the
problems created by industrialism" arose as a response to an international
crisis in the agrarian market. "It was an effort on the part of a few
important segments of a highly heterogeneous capitalistic agriculture to
restore profits in the face of much exploitation and under unfavorable
market and price conditions." See Hofstadter, 1955, pp. 50-61. Quote
is from p. 58.
15See Piven and Cloward, 1971, chaps. 8 and 9. Piven's and Cloward's
analysis is unconventional. James L. Sundquist argues that the "poverty
program" arose from discontent alone. Dissatisfaction with traditional
programs in mental health, urban renewal, job training, and public
relief led federal "brain trusters" to seek new concepts. The general
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Even where policy reforms do not nest easily into more general
social movements they do follow periods of severe economic dislocation.
The severe economic depressions of 1893 and 1929 are easy to identify
in the business failure graph presented in Figure 9. The progressive
period and the "New Deal" have already been linked to these crises. The
graph also indicates the major depressions of 1873 and 1913. While
conventional histories do not consider the periods following these
dislocations as major eras of social reform the appearance of the
vocational education movement in popular education and the appearance of
the child guidance movement in mental health services suggest that these
periods also were conducive to social reform. The vocational education
program and the child guidance program in Massachusetts youth corrections
policy were manifestations of these specific social movements in education
and mental health.
It is possible to consider a causal connection between severe
economic dislocations, general social movements and specific social reform
movements in Massachusetts youth corrections policy. Depressions and wars
would be seen as creating structurally conducive environments for the
emergence of broad general social movements which, in turn, nurture and
support specific social reform movements. The first nationwide depression
in 1819 would be seen as important in explaining the appearance of the
refuge movement, the financial panics of 1837 and 1839 would be noteworthy
'poverty program" arose from a convergence of discontent with the
failure of several specific social movements. See Sundquist, 1968,
especially pp. 111-134. The analyses put forward by Moynihan (1969)
and Marris and Rein (1967) also focus more on ideational origins than
structural origins. Both studies explore the role of the professional
advisors and social scientists who "thought up" the new concepts.
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in the development of the reform school movement, and the Panic of 1857
would be critical in explaining the rise of the supervised placement
program. Wars, too, would be seen as potential motivators. The relation
between the Civil War and the placement program, World War I and the
child guidance program, and World War II and the community prevention
programs of the 1950's would be potentially significant linkages.
The difficulty with relying on severe economic dislocations
such as depressions or wars as an explanation for the rise of social
reform movements is that there are more of them than needed. The
appearance of social reform movements in Massachusetts youth corrections
policy on a two decade period requires a similar pattern in the independent
variable. The economic crises of 1825, 1847, 1884 and 1920, while not
comparable to those of 1873 and 1929, were significant financial depressions
and this analysis would tend to ignore them. While some connection between
economic conditions and social reform movements is highly probable,
economic conditions alone do not appear to determine the emergence of
social reform.
2. The Cyclical Pattern of Reform Generations. Economic fluctuations
appear to render periods following major economic dislocations as rich in
reform potential. Yet not every period of structural conduciveness has
erupted with significant social reform. In Massachusetts youth corrections
history only those periods where structural conduciveness has appeared
roughly two decades after the last major social reform have witnessed the
ascendancy of a new program of response to policy dominance. It appears
that some conservative force must operate that blunts the potential for
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social reform when structural conditions appear ripe too frequently, and
that it is a conservative force that wears down on something like a
twenty-year frequency.
Where social reform movements require the mobilization of
influential participants for the effectuation of program ascendancy, it
is quite possible that these social reformers once committed to a new
program later become a conservative force defending the program once
accepted as dominant policy. The very mobilization of many active
participants of various ages around a particular new program may create a
kind of reform generation which acts as a unified body in advocating and,
later, defending a new program. A generation of professionals and
practitioners might wear down and lose dominance after some twenty years
of program maintenance. What would once have been a generation of
zealots would, after two decades of practice, be likely to be a generation
of intransigent administrators weakened by time's passing. A new social
reform tried earlier may not have succeeded against such a dominant
generation. A new social reform tried after two decades might attract
all the dissident and discontented opponents of the dominant policy,
young and old, and weld them together into a new generation of social
reformers.
Generation is perhaps a misleading term. A reform generation need
not be an age cohort. More like a social movement, membership in such a
generation is not limited by age. Rather it is outlook which gives social
movements generational qualities. Mobilization of participants in a
social reform movement encourages a conflict perspective where those within
the movement perceive themselves as advocating the "new" against those who
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are perceived as defending the "old." A conflict between program
approaches and policy perspectives becomes recast as if it were an
inter-generational struggle. This competition between "generations"
serves to aid a new movement in its development. The conflict
perspective sharpens a new program and galvanizes the mobilization of
participants. 16
Consider the case history. Howe, Sandborn, Fisk and Tufts
perceived of themselves as protagonists of the reform school Trustees
and staffs. With the supervised placement program they sought to replace
the asylum program. Howe's solitary effort ten years earlier had failed
to achieve dominance, in part, because the reform school prototype was
still supported by the dominant generation. The efforts of Miller and
his allies were seen as a direct confrontation with the older associates
of the training schools. The conflict came to appear generational: the
young and "the right" against the old and "the wrong."
Miller orchestrated the conflict orientation to his advantage.
Both he and the institutional staffs recognized that control of youth
corrections policy meant success. The struggle for power was couched in
terms of the moral sentiments. For latent in the spirit of social reform
is a conflict orientation and a compulsive drive for power. Social
reforms achieve dominance only through competitive engagement and the
search for power is the key to success. AVreform generation is one in
16For an insightful analysis of the integrative and disintegrative
functions of inter-generational conflict, see Shmuel N. Eisenstadt,
From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure
(New York: Free Press, 1956), chap. 6.
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which the need for power is high. 17  The motivation may be transferred
from self interest to altruism, but the basic challenge of advocacy and
struggle remains immutable.
Section IV: Chapter D
IDEOLOGIES IN SOCIAL REFORM
1. The Functions of Ideology in Social Reform. If each generation
of reformers has reacted to the current failings of past generations of
reformers, they have done so in words as well as deeds. Not only were
young reformers out to create new structures and embrace new practices and
theories, they also sought to legitimate new languages and new belief
systems. When considering the process of social reform in the last
section it was noted how new program statements and new reform movements
emerge out of more generalized belief systems and more general social
movements.
17See David C. McClelland, Power: The Inner Experience (New York:
Irvington, 1975), pp. 346-350. McClelland posits a 15 to 20 year
cycle in which social reform and war follow each other as reciprocal
motivating conditions.
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These broad general social movements offer more to specific
social reform movements than energy and legitimacy alone. They also
establish the ideational climate in which new generative concepts are
evaluated and selected as foundations for specific social reform movements.
These ideological climates, or ideologies, arise from secular social and
economic developments within the social structure. Various terms have
been used to suggest the long term trends in the development of American
society. Modernization, urbanization, industrialization, the rise of
capitalism, the emergence of nationalism, bureaucratization, centralization,
secularization, the rise of the welfare state and the emergence of
consumerism and monitization all have marked American social development.
Throughout history various of these processes have served as engines of
social transformation and, at various times, these processes have become
the focus of broad national anxieties. The ideational climates associated
with the various national social movements have been constructed as
reactions to these transforming processes. The ideas and values of the
national social movements have developed from anxieties and insecurities
associated with social development. The generative features which have
appeared in each reform movement are, therefore, directly linked to the
processes of national social and economic development through the
ideologies of reform generations.
The emergence of the supervised placement program provides an
excellent example of the ideological underpinnings of youth correction
programs. Following the diffusion process backwards from the specific
social reform movement of Howe, Sandborn and Tufts, it has been noted that
ten years earlier, Howe had advocated a similar program for the girls'
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reform school. At that time, there was no specific movement and Howe's
actions were ineffectual. Yet, even at the time a social movement was
beginning to emerge. As this movement began to form it came to focus
around Charles Loring Brace at the New York Children's Aid Society, John
Augustus and Rufus Cook at the Suffolk County Court and the Boston
Children's Mission to the Children of the Destitute. The emergent program
described children as morally exposed and in need of resettlement with
good Christian families. Prior to the efforts of Brace, Augustus and Cook
there was no significant movement for child placement and no recognizable
program outline. Yet, there was something in those early "cultural drift"
years. Something motivated Brace, Augustus, Cook and, later, Howe,
Sandborn and Tufts that stood in the place of a recognizable program
statement. That motivating orientation from which the earliest generative
features emerged was not focused on refining the social response to
wayward youth. Instead, it arose from a repugnance for the conventional
asylum program and a firm ideological commitment that children, even
problematic children, should not be raised in segregated state institutions;
rather, they too required the firm and loving context of human families.
The roots of the supervised placement program statement lay in an
ideological commitment. This ideology arose from a fundamental anxiety
over the perceived deterioration of the family confronted with urbanization
and a wage based means of production.
The supervised placement program was not unique in its origins.
Each of the programs that have achieved policy dominance in Massachusetts
youth corrections can be traced back to fundamental ideological
orientations. These ideological orientations reflect basic conceptions
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about the proper relationship between citizens and the social order.1
Figure 10 outlines the various ideological components recorded as
significant in each of the various general social movements which have
emerged during the periods of active social reform in America. The
synopses of belief systems presented in Figure 10 are well generalized
and highly idealized. Yet, if these abstracts are compared to the
concepts associated with Massachusetts youth corrections programs (see
Figure 6), the nested relationship between general ideologies and specific
program statements is well illustrated.
The vocational education program emerged out of the interests
of teachers and industrial managers who sought to create a skilled,
dependable and mobile labor force that would benefit and achieve success
in the rapidly industrializing economy. They were deeply disturbed by
the growing ranks of idle urban youth, unskilled, unproductive and
potential audiences for anti-capitalist and pro-union demagogues.2 These
reformers were not appalled by industrial expansion or the new economic
order.3 Instead, they hoped through state intervention into the lives of
the young, both in public schools and state reformatories, to produce a
generation of workers who could master and use the new technologies for
their own social well being and independence.4
1This relationship between ideologies and criminal justice policy has been
explored elsewhere. See Leon Radzinowicz, Ideology and Crime (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966) and Walter B. Miller, "Ideology and
Criminal Justice Policy: Some Current Issues," Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, 64:141-162 (1973). For the role of ideology in other areas of
social policy see Mencher, 1967 pp. 241-266; and Wilensky and Lebeaux,
1965, pp. 33-48.
2See Snedden, 1970, pp. 90-98.
3See Mann, 1956, p. 231.
4 See Katz, 1968, pp. 213-218.
Figure 10: Detailed General Social Movements Affecting the History of Massachusetts Youth
Corrections Policy
JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY
Substructural Changes
Emergence of commercial capitalism and commercial agriculture
Ideological Concepts
Transcendentalism and inner enlightenment
Moral Entrupeneurship and religious revivalism
Social Gospel and voluntary Christian philanthropy
Quakerism and humanitarianism
Anti-industrialism
Democratic participation
Manifest Destiny
Complimentary Specific Movements
Communal experimentation: Brook Farm, Fruitland, Onieda, New Harmony and Modern Times
Workingmen's co-operatives
Prevention of pauperism: almshouses and workhouses L,
Lunatic Asylums
Penitentiaries
ABOLITIONISM
Substructural Changes
Industrialization, urbanization, immigration and the rise of the factory
Ideological Concepts
Immeadiatism and Emancipation
Quakerism and humanitarianism
Chiliasm: New Inner Light, post-Reformation
Ill-liberalism
Moral revolution and self discipline
Complimentary Specific Movements
Universal education
Reconstruction: Freedman's Bureau, Sanitary Commission
Figure 10: Page two
POPULISM
Substructural Changes
Development of industrial capitalism, massive urban immigration, rapid urbanization, the closing of
the frontier and the concentration of wealth and financial power
Ideological Concepts
Social Darwinism and Laissez Faire economics
Individual progress: Horatio Alger
Victorianism
Nativism, nationalism and Americanization
Anarchism and Agrarian Socialism
Anti-urbanism, pro-agrarianism
Complimentary Specific Movements
Commercial agrarian movements: the Grange, Farmers Alliance
Public Health
Temperance
Women's Suffrage
Charity Organization and Federation
Trade unionism and labor activism: National Labor Union, Knights of Labor, "Molly Maguires"
Industrial education
PROGRESSIVISM
Substructural Changes
Development of monopoly capitalism, industrial expansion, specialization and bureaucratization and
urban differentiation
Ideological Concepts
Good government: efficient, professional, uncorruptable, centralized, budget-controlled and
accountable
Scientific management and scientific charity
Industrial Socialism: I.W.W., C.I.O.
Anti-immigration, nativism and restrictionism
Protection: child labor, widows' benefits and pensions
Exposing: muckraking and yellow journalism
Complimentary Specific Movements
Civic reform: Municipal Research Bureaus, Voter Leagues, Commercial Clubs, National Municipal League
Prohibition
Settlement Houses
Playgrounds, housing, "City Beautiful" and city planning
Negro advancement: N.A.A.C.P., Urban League
Union Federation: A.F.L.
Figure 10: Page three
NEW DEAL
Substructural Changes
Development of welfare capitalism, state-industrial co-ordination and suburbanization
Ideological Concepts
Recovery and rebalancing: N.R.A.
Federal involvement, federal planning and federal administration
Economic security: social insurance, labor protection and public assistance
Corporate regulation
Anti-communism, pro-intellectualism, liberalism
Complimentary Specific Movements
Public works, public assistance: P.W.A., C.C.C.
Public relief and unemployment assistance: T.E.R.A., F.E.R.A.
Public housing
Towsend's National Recovery Plan
Bohemianism and the New Wave
GREAT SOCIETY
Substructual Changes
Development of post-industrial capitalism, automation, multi-national corporations, significant
expansion of service sector and metropolitan and regional development
Ideological Concepts
Community action, community organizing and participatory management
Decentralization and regulation
Civil Rights
Compensatory treatment, advocacy and institutional change
Consumerism
Complimentay Specific Movements
War on Poverty, Economic Opportunity and Model Cities
Civil Rights: Black nationalism, school desegregation and voting rights
Women's Liberation and the "sexual revolution"
Counter-culture: communes, alternative life styles, drug experimentation
War resistance, civil disorder and the"New Left"
Youth programs: Peace Corps, Job Corps, Head Start, Upward Bound, VISTA
References: Ash, 1972; Bremner, 1960; Davis, 1967; Greer, 1949; Hofstadter, 1955; Mencher, 1967 and
Trattner, 1974.
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The child protection program originated in the distress of middle
class (particularly female) civic activists over the significant powers for
social abuse which arose unbridled in the urban industrial production
economy.5 They saw the child, particularly the poor immigrant child, as
exposed and vulnerable to the exploitation of corrupt and greedy industrial
"robber barons" and urban "political bosses." They saw in legal action by
the state and coordinated voluntary services by middle class charity
workers a means of protecting the child and acculturating the family
without pauperizing the laborer. 6
The child guidance program emerged from professional practitioners
who sought to aggrandize scientific rationality and yet put to rest the
biological notion that character was inherited. They feared the irrational
impulse in human motivation and attempted to enshroud it in a litany of
psychological pathologies. They attempted to locate the origin of deviance
firmly in the individual psyche and to prevent its infectious development
by providing early counseling and redirettion while youth remained
within their own families. The clinics and psychological tests stood as a
defense against the continued generational transference of poor family
socialization and non-healthy psychological and behavioral habits. 7
The community prevention program originated in the social thought
of academicians and professional community workers. They witnessed a
society increasingly class segregated with decreasing mobility for the
lower classes. They saw in the disorganized slum life of urban ethnics
5See Platt, 1969, pp. 75-100.
6See Lubove, 1965, pp. 7-9, and Watson, 1922.
7See Levine and Levine, 1970, p. 271.
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and "Negroes" the seeds of violence and social unrest. 8 They avoided a
direct confrontation with the economic order by laying the blame for
youthful deviance on the faulty social organization of the lower class
community and the malfunctioning of social welfare services. They sought
through community organizing and the redirection of delinquent gang
incentive systems to bring lower class youths into the mainstream of
legitimate economic opportunities.
These capsulized statements are admittedly oversimplified.
Yet, they do suggest the derivative qualities that link programs in youth
corrections to broader ideological orientations which are based in
historical social and economic conditions. It is as if scraps of broad
contemporary socio-political ideologies were torn loose and progressively
re-molded into formalized programs for concrete action in responding to
pressing social stresses.
2. The Conservative Impulse in Social Reform. The derivation of
program concepts from socio-political ideologies provides a frame of
analysis for describing social reforms in terms of political interests.
Ideologies as a category of political analysis have conventionally been
identified as political weapons in class conflict. Karl Mannheim, in
his classic treatment of the subject, describes ideologies as masks of
deception and self-deception which cover over the private interests of
dominant groups in the social structure.9 Because such groups are
8See Snodgrass, 1972, pp. 206-208, and Finestone, 1976.
9In this formulation, Karl Mannheim follows Karl Marx in viewing ideologies
as a part of the superstructure designed to rationalize the economic
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dominant and prefer to stay so, ideologies bear a significant conservative
tendency, functioning as rationalizers and legitimators of the existing
social order.
As conservative deceptions, it should appear odd, then, if
ideologies served as motivators of social reform. Such a situation would
throw progressive claims of social reformers under skepticism. The
situation is better revealed by considering the directional tension within
social reforms. David Rothman views the reforms of the Jacksonian period
as originating in both a sense of loss and a sense of hope.10 These social
reforms were both forward looking and backward looking; both progressive
and regressive. The past was painted as the ideal, but it was transposed
onto the future. This is, indeed, the nature of conservatism in the
sense of a progressive conservatism. Forward progress is directed by
principles assumed as lost properties, or soon to be lost properties, of
the past. For the reform generations of the mid-nineteenth century, it
was the loss of community, common values and a stable social order which
impelled them toward institutions and family placements. All around them
were indications of social decay and impending crisis.
substructure:
"The concept 'ideology' reflects the . . . discovery . . . that
ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensely
interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able
to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of
domination. There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight
that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain
groups obscures the real conditions of society both to itself and
to others and thereby stabilizes it."
See Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge,
trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1936). p. 40.
10 Rothman, 1971, p. xix.
IIFor further evidence supporting Rothman see Meyers, 1957.
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Theodore Lyman had been mayor of Boston from 1834 to 1836, a
rather violent time in the city's history during which anti-Catholic riots
had broken out in Charlestown and on Broad Street, and William Lloyd
Garrison was attacked by an anti-abolitionist mob. Lyman, the "silk-stocking
Federalist," therefore, drew his interest in crime and the problems of
delinquents from a deep concern over the erosion he saw in the social
order of the city he loved. 12  Samuel Gridley Howe was born of Brahmin
background. He was the social activist par excellence. His involvement
in American abolitionism and civil wars in Greece and Santo Domingo arose
from a deep passion for social justice which he feared lay highly vulnerable
throughout the world. 13 Frank Sandborn was also of Puritan ancestry. He
lived in the rarified atmosphere of Concord where he wrote extensive
biographies of his friends: Emerson, Thoreau, Channing, Hawthorne and
Bronson Alcott. He was an outspoken abolitionist and a close friend of
John Brown. Sandborn outlived the "transcendentalists" and lived long
enough to see the erosion of the cultured world and the repudiation of
his own ideas.14
Judge Baker and Judge Cabot were both products of Brahmin Boston.
Both were born in Brookline, attended Harvard, remained bachelors and
lived much of their lives among the gentlemen's social clubs of Boston.
It was hardly the world of the poor and wretched who appeared in their
courtrooms. Both men saw in the young faces of those who appeared before
12See Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston, 1822-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967), pp. 26-34.
13See Schwartz, 1956.
14See Smith, 1917.
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them the human scars of the processes of industrialization, urbanization
and immigration.15 William Healy was also a product of a Harvard training.
His introduction to social ills came from his associations with the
"Hull House circle," but he never developed the awareness of lower class
life which characterized the settlement houses. Instead, Healy viewed
the world through highly moralistic eyes. While he little considered the
social order as a causal factor, he saw in the troubled minds he examined
the seeds of social destruction and chaos. 16
The social reformers most responsible for policy changes in
Massachusetts youth corrections were bound by a continuous tension.
They acted offensively toward the future, but defensively toward the
present. Like the juvenile delinquents they sought to aid, they were
innovators who reacted against the established patterns of conventionality
in order to protect themselves. Clifford Griffen, in his analysis of
nineteenth century philanthropists, refers to them as "conservative
reformers." Such reformers, coming from prosperous and respectable
families, saw themselves as heirs to the colonial theocrats and Federalist
revolutionaries. As "God's Elect" they saw benevolent activity as a
part of moral stewardship--their trusteeship to relieve the suffering of
the needy and correct the behavior of the deviant so as to salvage mankind
and secure their proper place in the "life hereafter."17
Such benevolence grew easily from a political ideology based on
natural status. Jacksonian philanthropists were motivated by conservative
15See Cushman, 1920, and Howe, 1932.
16See Snodgrass, 1972, p. 196.
17See Griffen, 1960, chap. 2. For the role of religious evangelism in these
early reforms see Timothy L. Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform: American
Protestantism on the Eve of the Civil War (New York: Abington, 1957).
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concerns for the preservation of the social order.
They feared imminent social upheaval resulting from the explosive
mixture of crime, disease and intemperance which they believed
characterized the lives of poorer urban residents. Without
relieving the poor of their responsibility for their condition,
these philanthropists saw in their benevolence, ways of avoiding
class warfare and the disintegration of the social order. The
French Revolution reminded them . . . that the costs of class
struggle were highest to advantaged citizens.18
The social order these reformers struggled so to preserve was one already
undergoing deterioration from its more stable past.
Many Americans in the Jacksonian Period judged their society
with eighteenth century criteria in mind. . . . They were
embarrassed about the cruelty and shortsightedness of earlier
punishments, and hoped to be humanitarian reformers. Yet
they also believed that their predecessors, fixed in their
communities and ranks, had enjoyed social order.19
But the generation that followed looked back on the 1820's with an equal
sense of loss and desire.
Americans in both North and South responded to changes
brought by the Civil War by looking back on the years
preceding Sumter as a golden age, a time of virtue and
innocence, after which the nation . . . moved away from the
South's idyllic "Greek Democracy" and the North's peaceful
"agrarian republic." The nation seemed to forget the
sense of malaise of the generation after 1830. . . .
Instead, the former golden age, the Revolutionary generation,
was lengthened and the two generations after 1815 came under
the enlarged halo of innocence. 20
And a generation later, the populists revealed this same conservative ideal.
The utopia of the Populists was in the past, not the future.
According to the agrarian myth, the health of the state was
proportionate to the degree to which it was dominated by the
agricultural class, and this assumption pointed to the
superiority of an earlier age. The Populists looked backward
18Mennel, 1973, p. 6.
19Rothman, 1971 , p. 69.
20Bernard Wishy, The Child and the Republic: The Dawn of Modern American
Child Nurture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvannia Press, 1969), p. 81.
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with longing to the lost agrarian Eden, to the republican
America of the early years of the nineteenth century.21
This same regressiveness appeared among Progressives as well.
Radical or moderate in their proposals, the Boston progressives
were conservative in their assumptions. They wished to preserve
the older ideas of American life wrapped up in the one idea of
the open society. Fearful that America would follow Europe in
developing a class-ridden society, they cherished the ancient
doctrine of the oneness of the human race.22
Recent reconceptualizations of ideology as a political category
have attempted to provide it with an expressive as well as instrumental
function. In this reformulation, ideology is seen as a catharsis for
anxieties created by social stresses and a means of understanding and
coping with such tensions.23 While this strain theory of ideology yet
admits the existence and functions of dominant carrier groups, the class
oppression is downplayed. All segments of the social structure experience
social stress and the ideological response, while formulated and maintained
by dominant groups, benefits non-dominant groups as well and among them
finds active acceptance and voluntary support.24 The conservative impulse
21Hofstadter, 1955, p. 62.
22Mann, 1956, p. 238.
23Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman call this additional function of
"putting everything in its place" the "nomic function" of ideology. See
their The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology
of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 91. Clifford Geertz
observes, "In the interest theory, ideological pronouncements are seen
against a background of universal struggle for advantage; in the strain
theory, against the background of a chronic struggle to correct
socio-psychological disequilibriums. In one men pursue power, in the
other they flee anxiety." See his "Ideology as a Cultural System," in
Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964),
p. 52.
24In this formulation lies the basis for viewing the ideological hegemony
of capitalism in American history.
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in American social reform views loss and change as more significant
threats to personal and social well being than inequality and the
mal-distribution of power, status and wealth.25
This particular bias in American social policy reforms appears
because the formulation of social policy has been the province of the
upper and middle classes. All of those figures who have been considered
in this study have been among the social and economic elite of the
Commonwealth. They have acted in behalf of the less advantaged, but
they have always done so within their own status bound visions. The
sense of loss and grief these reformers experienced in witnessing the
consequences of secular trends in the social structure was the angst of
their particular class. They struggled to improvise new progressive
responses to the plight of the poor and deviant, but they did so only
by means that confirmed and reinforced their own position and their own
values. Their antidote to fundamental loss lay in reformist action:
action directed toward alleviation and protection. But this altruism
was a mixture of charity and confirmation, benevolence and reinforcement.
No matter how it failed the disadvantaged, it served those who felt that
advantage carried with it social responsibility.
While the development of a youth corrections system may well
have served to guarantee the stability of a class segregated social
structure, the social reforms of youth corrections policy did not arise
from class conflict. Indeed, the hopes, fears and dreams of the poor
easily converged with the motivations of their middle class caretakers.
25See David K. Cohen, "Loss as a Theme in Social Policy," Harvard
Educational Review, 46:553-571 (November, 1976). For a provocative
consideration of loss and the conservative impulse in social policy
see Peter Marris, Loss and Change (New York: Pantheon, 1974).
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If class control was a consequence of social reform actions, it was not
among the manifest objectives.26 Instead, the conflicts inherent in the
reforms of youth correction policy pitted one generation of caretakers
with one scrap of reform ideology against an older generation of caretakers
with an older scrap of reform ideology.27 Nor were the conflicts simple
expressions of progressive inspiration against regressive intransigence.
For it is not so much that old reformers convert reform into reaction,
but, rather, that within social reform ideologies both progressive and
regressive impulses exist in a delicate tension.27  New social reformers
merely confront old reform ideologies as if the tension had dissolved
into pure reaction. The conflict between reform generations is most
often one of authority, power and dominance among social elites and not a
contest over social progress.
3. The Pattern of Social Reform. The socio-political ideologies
from which the Massachusetts youth corrections programs sprang were
innovation oriented, but tempered by a conservative impulse. This
conservative impulse resulted from the life positions of the social
reformers themselves. In some cases blunt economic anxieties propelled
social reformers, in other cases, cultural and ethnic issues, religious
26The generational quality of history explains the reactive character of
concept selection:
". . . what, from the point of view of imminent intellectual
history, appears to be the 'inner dialectic' in the development
of ideas, becomes, from the standpoint of the sociology of
knowledge, the rhythmic movement in the history of ideas as
affected by competition and the succession of generations."
See Mannheim, 1936, p. 270.
27Richard Hofstadter makes this same point in considering populist reforms.
See Hofstadter, 1955, p. 21.
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issues, issues of national security and domestic order, issues of empathy,
compassion and justice and feelings of loss, grief and bereavement
motivated social reform.
The innovations of youth corrections policy were, thus, a
class-based response to loss. The fundamental motivations of social
reformers were derivatives of a conservative impulse at once progressive
and regressive. The frustration of elite reformers faced with secular
transformations they distrusted was resolved in an aggressive moral
entrepreneurship which pitted them not against the forces they felt
powerless to alter, but, instead, against the social policies of the past.
Action gave purpose to floundering identities and sustained political
commitment. That the legitimacy of new programs does not last remained
either unknown or irrelevant. Personal and social investments in new
programs are large and there is significant resistance to the acceptance
of program demise even where there is reasonable ambivalence and discontent.
It appears that major economic dislocations helped to loosen that
resistance and to convert passive discontent into active unrest. Even
then it is not every economic cycle that brought with it social reform.
There is a natural period to the rise and fall of a generation and it
appears necessary to depose a generation to finally achieve the dominance
of a new program. And this only happens every twenty years or so.
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Section IV: Chapter E
THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REFORM
Social reform in youth corrections policy arose from various
sources. Long term secular trends internal to program developments led
to program discontent and set the stage for policy reform. But conditions
internal to programs did not determine the final timing or content of
social reform movements and new programs of response. The appearance of
social reform in social policy was determined by broad transformations in
both the structural and ideological sectors of the society. Significant
upheavals in the economic sub-structure were mediated by the generational
constraints of reform generations in rendering particular time periods
conducive to broad general social movements. The more secular developments
of the social structure, such as industrialization, urbanization or
immigration, produced certain reactive-progressive ideological orientations
among high status individuals and these constrained and guided the
selection and development of the generative concepts in new program
statements. Only where discontent was high and structural and ideological
climates were ripe did social reform arise to change youth corrections
policy.
The study closes where it began--staring at the deserted
cottages and farmhouses of the Lyman School. We have traced the story
of that institution from inception to termination. Above all else, the
case history has revealed the rise and fall of the institutional response
to deviant youth.
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The rise and fall of the institutional response marks the most
significant transformation of the case history. The period between 1820
and 1850 witnessed a significant break with the undifferentiated responses
of the past. A bold new social reform was implemented in Massachusetts
youth corrections policy. The refuge and reform schools were unique
innovations. The vocational education movement of the 1880's was never
intended to create a replacement for the reform schools. In recasting the
reform schools as training schools, the movement sought no more than to
reconstruct the prototype to more effectively achieve the original
conceptions of Quincy, Wells, Foster and Lyman. The child protection and
child guidance programs to the degree that they had an effect on the
reform schools, were adjusted and modified to enhance and refine the
institutional prototype. Neither program was intended to replace the
existing institutions.
This was not the case with the supervised placement program.
Howe, Sandborn and Tufts clearly intended a transformation in dominant
youth corrections policy. They almost succeeded. Instead, the preventive
placement response was aborted and defused of its replacive potential.
The parole system implemented under Superintendent of Visitation, Walter
Wheeler, bore resemblances to the early visiting system in form and
function, but not in intent. The placement program was compromised in the
negotiated unification of 1895. The preventive mission was lost in the
professional developments of child protection and child guidance and did
not emerge again as a potential threat to the institution's legitimacy
until the rise of the community prevention program. But this prevention
program never directly confronted the institutional hegemony. Instead,
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it could not quite shake the psychodynamic tradition of Boston's eminent
child guidance community.
It was only in the rise of the community-based services program
and the passion for combat of the reform activists of the late 1960's that
the seeds of a true transformation in youth corrections were finally sown.
The deinstitutionalization of the Miller administration was wrenching and
destructive precisely because it was replacive and discontinuous. The
institutional program which had so long served as the backbone of
Massachusetts youth corrections policy was finally destroyed. The Lyman
School and its sibling institutions were closed.
The corrections institutions were the result of a specific social
reform movement as surely as was their closing. But why did these
separate, almost contradictory, movements arise? What does this frame of
analysis offer in explaining the rise of the institutional response in
America and, even more so, its demise? This one case, bounded by
geography and social service area, can not be expected to provide a
definitive answer, but it can, and does, offer some interesting insight.
The rise of the institutional response and the rise of the
non-institutional response were parallel phenomena. The non-institutional
response was not merely the repeal of the institutional response. The
institutions degenerated over time and failed to maintain their popular
legitimacy. But this decay was not the sole determinant of their
termination. Instead, both the institutional response and the
non-institutional response were the result of independent social reform
movements, each reacting to the failures of the previous programs and each
constructively directed by a bold vision of innovation.
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Some writers equate the rise of the asylum program with structural
conditions alone, particularly the emergence of urbanization and
industrialization. Urbanization and industrialization are seen as forces
eroding the dominant position of the family as a locus of social welfare
and the institutions are seen as the substitute necessary to fill the void.
The problem with this analysis lies in the extent to which urbanization and
industrialization had advanced by the second and third decades of the
century.2 Boston was clearly an urban center filled with the various
problems of urban life by 1830 and it is supportive of this argument that
Boston was the site of the first institution for wayward youth in the state.3
Yet, it would not be correct to say that Massachusetts was well urbanized
until after 1850, when over half of the residents lived in communities of
over 2500 persons. While the first factories were constructed in the
1820's, the heavy impact of industrialization did not occur until after
mid-century when the major textile mills were opened in the Merrimack and
Connecticut River valleys. 4
1See Mechanic, 1969, p. 54, and Deutsch, 1937.
2By 1830, only 31 per cent of Massachusetts residents lived in communities
of over 2500 persons. It was not until 1850 that this figure reached
50 per cent. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Massachusetts 1970 (Washington,
D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), esp. Table 1: "Population
of the State: Earliest Census to 1970."
3By 1830 Boston had a population of 61,392 and was a densely packed city.
See Oscar Handlin, Boston's Immigrants (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1941), Table II, p. 239.
4Labor scarcity constrained much of the industrialization prior to the
1840's. See Handlin, 1941, p. 74. Stanley Lebergott's analysis of
nineteenth century occupational development finds that less than ten per
cent of the national labor force was occupied in manufacturing before 1840.
See his Manpower in Economic Growth: The United States Record Since 1800
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).
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Yet, the rise of the refuge and reform school movements did
coincide with the beginning of intensive economic growth in the new
republic.5 That this early growth did not result in significant
industrialization suggests that the growth of the 1820's and 1830's was
more in commerce than in manufacturing.6 But the growth of commercial
capitalism required a regular and dependable wage-based labor force as
surely as would the growth of industrial capitalism a half century later.
If the refuge and reform school were seen as functional in reproducing such
a labor force for the later industrial revolution they could have equally
well served this early nineteenth century commercial economy.
Thus the emergence of the institutional response to wayward youth
may well have resulted from the on-going social and economic transformations
in Massachusetts, but it was not a direct or automatic response. The
institutional prototype rapidly diffused into more rural states where
neither commercial nor industrial capitalism was yet to have impact in
the state economy. Further, while urbanization and industrialization were
to continue to expand significantly into the twentieth century, the
institutions soon degenerated and lost most of their popular and professional
legitimacy. Instead, the refuge and the reform schools were advocated as
part of a larger ideology in which they were as much a progressive innovation
51t has been conventional for historians to assume that the American economy
did not really "take off" in economic growth much before 1840. See, for
instance, W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1960). More recent analysis suggests that significant
growth may have begun as early as 1800. See P. A. David, "The Growth of
Real Product in the United States before 1840: New Evidence, Controlled
Conjectures," Journal of Economic History, 27:151-197 (June, 1967).
6Peter Temin refers to this as a "commercial revolution." See his Causal
Factors in American Economic Growth in the Nineteenth Century (London:
Macmillan, 1975), p. 16.
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directed at building a better society as they were a reactive impulse to
secular transformations.
In 1820 Josiah Quincy condemned the destructive effects of the
existing "outdoor" welfare approach to deviants and dependents, not only
because of the damage done to society, but, also, because of the demoralizing
effects it had on the individual.
Of all modes of providing for the poor, the most wasteful,
the most expensive, and most injurious to their morals
and destructive of their industrious habits is that of
supply in their own families. 7
Quincy envisioned the erection of a statewide network of shelters which
would separate and differentiate the poor, sick and wayward so as to protect
and reform them that they might yet emerge as respectable and productive
citizens. Foster, Lyman and Washburn followed Quincy in this two-fold
advocacy. The Foster Commission recommended the State Reform School noting,
"The leading object of this institution should be . . . the entire
reformation of wayward boys, thus saving the subjects of reform from ruin,
and rendering them permanent blessings to their race."8 In his dedication
address Emory Washburn went even further:
A moment's reflection would satisfy the mind of any of that in a
government like ours, the charge which these [delinquents] impose
upon the industry of the community must be heavy indeed. When ,
therefore, we remember that every one who shall here be reformed
is not only relieving the State from the expense of his support,
but is adding his industry to the aggregate wealth which is to
bear the burden, we shall see that, as a mere question of profit
and loss, the State has a deep stake in the establishment and
success of this institution. 9
7
"Quincy Report," 1821, p. 9.
8
"Report of the Foster Commission," 1849, p. 31.
9Washburn, 1849, p. 101.
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This analysis, further, helps explain the failure of the
supervised placement program to transform youth corrections during the
mid-nineteenth century. Under the conditions of early commercial and
industrial capitalism labor was scarce. Outdoor relief was seen as
threatening the mobility and productivity of the labor market.10
Supervising problematic children in their own families converted them
into dependents who sapped family resources and constrained the
availability of adult breadwinners. Permitting idle youth to wander freely
necessitated additional law enforcement personnel and encouraged the future
development of unskilled, undisciplined and, most likely, dependent adults.
Such idle and undisciplined youth were not only dangers to their own future
productiveness, they were seen as contagions among their peers serving as
bad apples to spoil the lot of potential workers and family supporters.
Supervising problematic children in rural farm families made sense to the
placement family. Farm family life was labor intensive and a state ward
could generally be made an economic asset. But agriculture in Massachusetts,
like the nautical business of whaling and shipping, was not a growth sector
of the economy, and youth in either setting could not be well prepared for
a productive future. The institutions that separated wayward children from
struggling families, removed them from the undisciplined life of the streets
10Mencher, 1967, p. 94.
11 "The moral condition of many children and youth in Boston is
truly deplorable. Great numbers are not attending school, are
without proper parental control . . . are in a daily practice
of small offences and appear to be ripening for a life of
poverty, idleness and crime. . . . If parents can not or will
not keep their children in school and from the daily violation
of wholesome regulations, the public had better support and
teach them and effect a permanent moral as well as pecuniary
savings."
See Boston House of Reformation, A.R., 1846, p. 11.
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and set them to the orderly acquisition of work skills, self-discipline
and respect for conventional values provided the most effective response
for both the children and the social order of the nineteenth century.
Why, then, did the movement for community-based services arise
in the late 1960's? What forces mandated the final abdication of the
institutional response? Again the motivation is revealed in the program
statements. In 1972 Jerome Miller complained,
. . . incarceration in training schools . . . is inhumane by
current standards, destructive and humiliating of inmates
even under the best of circumstances, educates youth in ways
of crime and anti-social behavior, is incredibly expensive
as either a correctional or rehabilitative method, and . . .
these infantalizing, corrupting and expensive characteristics
are inherent in institutions and not susceptable to reform.12
The institutions were inhumane, ineffective and above all expensive. The
significant increase in the number of commitments during the late 1960's
recreated the dilemma of congestion. The more youths incarcerated in the
congested institution, the more the institutions were seen as illegitimate.
The rising costs of maintaining the increasing number of youths in
institutional settings was the final challenge. The entire institutional
response had come to be questioned. Discontent was rampant. Yet
deinstitutionalization was not simply anti-institutional. Within the program
lay the same dual tension which had formed the underpinnings of the asylum
program a century and a half earlier. Miller and the reform activists saw
in community-based services a means of correcting that part of society which
defined and, in theory, created delinquency:
The value in the movement to community programs is not . . . in
their effectiveness in lowering recidivism--though hopefully
they will be effective. The value is in the fact that community
12"A Strategy for Youth in Trouble," 1972, p. 16.
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programs have a potential to re-educate the public as to who and
what "criminals" and "delinquents" are in a variety of roles
other than those of "inmates." These programs . . . provide the
underpinnings of a new ideological backdrop against which
diagnosis and classification can develop in new, less restrictive
directions.13
The movement to community programs was not unique to Massachusetts
youth corrections. The principles of deinstitutionalization and
community-based services were a part of a broader ideology that swept
several different social policy areas and many of the progressive states
during the late 1960's. This community care ideology was not without
structural roots. The emergence of community-based services coincides with
the emergence of a fiscal crisis in state budgets and an over-supply of
human service professionals. Reducing capital and maintenance outlays for
inefficient residential institutions and relying instead on ("outdoor")
welfare payments and purchase-of-service contracts with private agencies
offered an opportunity to relieve the pressure on the state budget.
Contracting welfare and correctional services would placate young
professional activists by expanding occupational opportunities for working
with the poor, the sick and the deviant. During the past two decades state
budget appropriations for human services mushroomed. A large percentage of
this increase occurred in the maintenance of social service institutions.
The widespread unionization of state employees and the advent of the
eight-hour day/forty-hour-week seriously raised the costs of institutional
services. By the 1960's the physical plants of the custodial institutions,
most built during the nineteenth century, were rapidly approach such decay
13Jerome G. Miller, "Corrections: Reform or Retrenchment," Massachusetts
Department of Youth Services, Boston, Mass., September, 1972, p. 6.
(Mimeographed.)
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and inefficiency as to require replacement. State budgets, strained by
the rising costs of services and constrained from raising taxes or debt
ceilings by political and economic factors, arrived at a fiscal impasse
close to crisis proportions.14 In this setting, Jerome Miller's revelation
that the state could send a boy to Harvard University for a year plus give
him a summer in Europe for what it cost annually to incarcerate him carried
significant impact. 15
Where the mid-nineteenth century had been a period of labor
scarcity, particularly among the low wage earners necessary for early
industrialization, the mid-twentieth century has witnessed the emergence
of an oversupply of labor, particularly among middle class professionals.
The expansion of the social services during the past two decades has in
part been a response to this labor surplus.16 The 1960's witnessed the
activism of a reform generation. Many of the educated young who reached
adulthood during this period were attracted to community work and the
helping service occupations. Initially less interested in achieving
economic advantage than in doing work that was considered socially and
morally right, they formed a large pool of inexpensive and dedicated labor.
These young professionals were eager to serve just those clients that the
14It is this tendency for government expenditures to outrun revenues that
has come to be labeled "the fiscal crisis of the state." See O'Connor,
1973, p. 2.
15See B. Vachon, "Hey Man, What Did You Learn in Reform School? The
Massachusetts Plan," Saturday Review, 55:69-76 (September 16, 1972).
16The development of this human service army has been considered elsewhere.
See Brigitte Berger, "'People Work'--the Youth Culture and the Labor
Market," The Public Interest, 35:55-66 (Spring, 1974, and Alan Gartner
and Frank Riessman, The Service Society and the Consumer Vanguard (New York;
Harper and Row, 1974). For its relevance to deinstitutionalization, see
Scull, 1977, p. 150.
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state was increasingly eager to economize on. The deinstitutionalization
in Massachusetts and the development of a complex web of community-based
services may have resulted as much from these two structural conditions as
it did from the institutional critique of the social reaction thesis and
the ideological rhetoric of Jerome Miller.
Like each of the social reforms covered in this study, the
movement to establish the institutional response and the movement to
establish the non-institutional response arose from a combination of
structural and ideological conditions. In each of the reforms of
Massachusetts youth corrections policy, the motivation for change and the
processes which effected change emerged from transformations in the larger
social order and the dreams and fears of coping with an uncertain future.
Each represented the adoption of an innovation and each arose on the
wings of a social reform movement that mingled in the larger flight of a
general social movement.
CONCLUSION
SOCIAL REFORM AND SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Social policy is the result of the continuous developmental
processes of social reform. At a given moment of history the content of
social policy is an artifact of the successes and failures of the social
reforms which have shaped its biography. Current social policy always
bears the scars of its own development.
Social reforms arise within the context of particular socio-economic
conditions, but the content of the programs that they advance is formed
within the constraints of the continuous unfolding of existing social
policy. Social reforms are therefore reactive as well as progressive.
They derive their energy from the forces associated with modernization,
but they derive their content from the legacies of tradition. The dynamic
of change which social reform offers social policy is specifically
developmental because changes of social policy are fundamentally
conservative. The long trends in the development of social policy expose
new programs as a struggle to confront the challenge of new times with
the values and visions of past history. From this perspective it is now
possible to delineate the model of social reform which has been posed in
this study.
Social reforms arose from a combination of six conditions. All
are necessary, but two are primary in determining the timing of reform.
A specific discontent, responding participants, a social network and
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generative concepts are necessary and frequently available. The more rare
conditions which set the basis for action are structural and ideological
conduciveness.
The first, structural conduciveness, sets the action climate,
from which the mobilization of participants, in the form of a social
movement, springs. Structural conditions become conducive to social reform
following major economic dislocations such as significant business
depressions or wars. But the emergence of a conducive action climate is
not enough. An action climate does not determine the ideational climate.
Ideational climates are derived from general socio-political ideologies.
Only within a conducive ideational climate can generative concepts achieve
the legitimacy necessary to direct social reform movements. Alternative
belief systems arise in emergent form when existing social service
programs are commonly discredited, ambivalence runs high and a clear new
generation of social reformers is latent. Particularly where older
reformers have institutionalized existing programs and rapid vocational
mobility for new practitioners is limited, conditions are conducive for
new ideational climates. When structural conditions have created
conducive action climates and ideological conditions have created
conducive ideational climates and these conditions overlap in time,
social reform is imminent.
Given the necessary conditions, social reform movements will
arise to advance new policy programs. The action climate is conducive
for the emergence of general social reform movements. Such general social
movements are indicated by the conversion of discontent into general unrest
through the mobilization of participants. The mobilization of participants
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occurs as emergent belief systems arise in the ideational climate. The
fusion of general social reform movements and emergent belief systems
around specific generative concepts transforms the general movement into
a specific reform movement and the emergent belief system into a formal
program statement.
Where a specific social reform movement and a specific program
statement achieve policy dominance, the social reform movement is
transformed and the new program is institutionalized. The movement is
converted into a social institution and the new program is established as
the dominant formation of the problem and response. Typically, the
ascendancy of a new program to policy dominance is immediately followed
by a period of consensus and enthusiasm. This optimism is eventually
replaced by ambivalence and skepticism as the performance of the new program
fails to achieve its expectations and a general discontent again settles in.
With this discontent, the full cycle of social reform has run its course.
Renewed social reform action must await the next period of structural and
ideological conducivenes.
The cycle of social reform is not only one of process; it is
also a cycle of ideas. New patterns are carried backwards in search of
old precedents. Innovation and tradition merge in the language of social
reform. Old concepts are drawn forward to combat the anxiety and
insecurity of the present. The sense of loss that in part, motivates
social reformers, can only be relieved through the affirmation of renewed
purpose. The forward thrust requires a conscious rebuilding of new
Peter Marris marks out other avenues for coping with loss, but sees them
as leading into debilitating postures, repression and repetition, or a
compulsion for deception and diversion. See Marris, 1975, chaps. 2 and 3.
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structures of social reality. It can be a creative act involving invention
and innovation.2  It requires an entrepreneurial spirit and a willingness
to risk. The willingness to risk must derive from the hope for a better
future. Thus, the social reform movement is forward motivated, but backward
looking. The generative concepts provide re-affirmations of an idealized
past. As compelling features, they offer generative avenues for
re-structuring social reality. The purpose of action arises from the
desire to build or implement, that is, generate, real phenomena designed
upon projected patterns. The social reform movement mobilizes a generation
of participants because in its emergent program lies a means of channeling
loss and hope into purposive action.
In a peculiar fashion, social reform breaks traditions and
allows for the advent of new innovations and the flow of diffusion in
order to re-establish and re-dedicate traditions. Reform generations have
much in common with each other even where scores of years separate them.
They transmit to the culture a vitality and vision which is at once
threatening, disturbing and, fundamentally, confirming. The social reformers
who navigated reform movements in Massachusetts youth corrections set out
to improve services to delinquent youth as well as the society which those
youth offended. They sought to create policies that would be models for
proper social living, that would stabilize the fundamental child
socializing institutions and that would confirm their own group status as
moral guardians of a vulnerable society. That no one program ever came
close to meeting all these expectations nor finding a full consensus among
youth corrections practitioners does not detract from the intentions and attempts.
2Marris, 1975, p. 111.
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The study has followed the effects of social reform on youth
corrections policy. Much has changed and, yet, fundamental changes have
been few. Throughout the history there has been a continuous tension
between differentiation and integration. Each effort to identify,
separate, segregate and decentralize within the program categories
has been countered by efforts to integrate programs of response and create
internal consistency among the program categories. Refinements and
reconstructions have been frequent, but replacive changes were more rare.
The emergence of the institutional response, the emergence of the
non-institutional placement response, and the deinstitutionalization all
represent significant transformations in policy. But even in these
cases, not all program categories were equally affected by change.
Programs of response are seldom well articulated or worked through. The
various modes of reform yield an unevenness in policy development. The
continuous development of authority and practice is not well matched by
the sometimes rancorous and conflictual changes in theory and structure.
The additive changes of practice provide a cumulative quality to the
development of practice, but the replacive character of reforms in
theory offers potential tensions between practice and theory in the
cumulative development of social policy. The heavy investment nature of
structural forms results in a conservativism toward change that is
potentially incompatible with the highly discontinuous nature of reforms
of theory. Only with the wrenching reform of the deinstitutionalization
were all four categories similarly affected. That was the genius of
success in the deinstitutionalization: the new program of response
required replacive reforms in all program categories. Most all concepts of
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conventional structure, practice, theory and authority were replaced.
Whether such a radical transformation of social policy can long survive
in pure form remains a question for future histories.
2. In conclusion, it is valuable to consider if the developmental
approach to changes in social policy has been useful. There have been
advantages. The approach has revealed the functioning of social reform
in policy change. Policy making is viewed as a social process involving
large numbers of people pressuring, advocating, thinking and doing.
Single decisions are comfortably embedded within a larger social process.
Single actors are given symbolic and charismatic importance as well as
instrumental significance.
Concepts are provided a biographical background. New ideas do
not simply spring forward out of a search among alternatives. They emerge
as a product of the times and help to create and shape those times.
Rather than identifying policy changes and asking the origin of new
concepts, the emergence of new concepts appears as one of the principle
factors in making policy change happen. New concepts shape the problems
they resolve.
Temporal patterns are given a place in social policy analysis.
Policy changing events are not seen as sporadic occurrances. Particular
structural and ideological conditions are seen as controlling the timing
of social policy changes and these conditions, themselves, are seen as
regulated by temporally constraining factors.
Policy formation and policy implementation are united into one
continuous process. The social action that formalizes and affects policy
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programs becomes a direct extension of the social action that shapes and
advances such programs into policy dominance.
The policy making process is not developed as a story told in
reverse. The activities, motivations and intentions leading up to a
decision need not be reconstructed as if they occurred only to explain
the decision. Instead, the developmental approach records a long history
in which many events lead on to many others, each shaping and constraining
the next. Events have meaning in themselves, and occur for reasons which
quite often render actual policy outcomes as inadvertant. While the
timing of social reform exhibits a lawful-like quality, its content is
typically seen as fortuitous.
Finally, the developmental frame of analysis provides a
comprehensive and holistic vision of policy development. Each program is
seen in the context of its history and its future. Policy is viewed as a
responsive, ever changing climate within which programs vie for dominance
and under which structural and ideological conditions float. The
ecological relationship of social reform and structural and ideological
conditions makes for an integrated and systematic vision of social
policy development.
The developmental approach has disadvantages as well. It
requires an enormous amount of research. The policy development story
is not complete until a large amount of historical evidence is unearthed.
There are no methodological criteria for delimiting the depth of evidence
that is relevant.
Because of its survey quality, the approach easily can become
superficial. Just as no criteria exist to indicate enough information has
416
been collected, no criteria exist to suggest too little has been
collected. It is easy to write bad history by simply glossing over and
ignoring dissonant evidence for the sake of simplistic and compelling
visions.
Further, the long chronological dimension to the developmental
approach inhibits the range of synchronic research. A narrow band is cut
through history and there is little to see of the character of the broad
phalanx of social action with which events actually move across time.
Viewing the changes of social policy thorugh the lenses of
development offers strengths at the price of weaknesses. Much can be
learned of social policy within this view. Muchhas been revealed of both
the long term and short term changes in Massachusetts youth corrections
history. What is lost in depth may be gained in context and perspective.
I have asked nothing more of this way of seeing. Social reform and social
policy have been linked and it is this linkage that has served as the
central point of this study.
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